{ "id": 5322041, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James Lee Harris, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harris", "decision_date": "1968-02-29", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 51,293", "first_page": "412", "last_page": "418", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 Ill. App. 2d 412" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "226 NE2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill App2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2556111 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 US 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 NE2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill2d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378616 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 NE2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill App2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2585546, 2586122 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/72/0419-02", "/ill-app-2d/72/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 US 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168284 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0293-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 10736, "ocr_confidence": 0.587, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0482681451391715e-07, "percentile": 0.5532129479363469 }, "sha256": "b9867f7b0161c5c4265d8764250149f89f7f72c795124888b623ccc90191b4f4", "simhash": "1:11b1beeee53a6268", "word_count": 1917 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:19:51.659076+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James Lee Harris, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE DEMPSEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nJames Harris was found guilty of armed robbery in a non jury trial and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of not less than 15 years and not more than 35 years.\nAbout 1:30 p. m. on a Saturday afternoon in October 1964, Charles Irwin wanted to cash a check. The banks were closed so he took a bus to a tavern where he knew the proprietor. He bought a six-can carton of beer and cashed the check. The money he received was in excess of $130 and was in tens, fives and singles. He put the roll of bills in his pocket next to his wallet and returned home. As he went up the front steps of his home he felt something shoved in his back. He turned and saw a man in a black leather jacket pointing a gun at him. Irwin, who was 78 years old, resisted and suffered a bump on his head and three cuts on his arm. The robber\u2019s hat came off during the struggle. He tore open the pocket where Irwin had placed his money, seized the money and Irwin\u2019s wallet and ran. Irwin chased him down an alley but was outdistanced.\nIn the meantime a neighbor had called the police. Irwin hurried home but a police officer was there ahead of him. He got in the police car and they drove down the alley. As they emerged from the alley Irwin saw the defendant Harris about 100 feet away and pointed him out as the robber. The officer turned his car in Harris\u2019 direction and, as he did so, Harris ran into another alley. The officer chased him by car and on foot. Irwin stayed in the car.\nThe chase led up and down side streets, through alleys and parking lots. Another squad car came along and joined in the chase. Finally Harris ran into a dead-end alley and was caught. After a struggle he was handcuffed and searched. A gun was found in one pocket and in another $140 in cash and a wallet which contained $4 and Irwin\u2019s identification papers. Harris said he did not know how he happened to have the wallet in his pocket. He was taken to a police station.\nThe officer returned to his car and told Irwin: \u201cWe got him. We got the money and we got the pocketbook.\u201d He showed Irwin his wallet and the money and drove him to the police station. At the station Irwin confronted the handcuffed man and identified him as the robber. Harris denied the robbery. He also denied that he owned the hat which had been recovered from Irwin\u2019s steps. It was placed on his head and it fit him.\nAt bis trial Harris testified that he ran from the police because one of them fired a shot at him and he was afraid of being killed. He denied robbing Irwin or striking him with a gun. He admitted that the gun was his but denied having Irwin\u2019s wallet in his possession. He said the money belonged to him and his sister; that his sister, with whom he lived, had given him $67.50, her half of their $135 monthly rent and that the balance was his own. He testified that he did not own a hat and that the one tried on at the station did not fit him.\nThe defendant\u2019s first contentions are that he was denied due process of law because of the manner in which he was identified and that he was prejudiced because the hat was not produced at his trial.\nAt times in his testimony Irwin referred to the robber as wearing a black leather jacket and at one time said he knew Harris was the robber because of the jacket. These references, plus the police officer\u2019s post-arrest remark: \u201cWe got the man,\u201d and the confrontation at the police station with the lone, handcuffed defendant, form the basis for the denial of due process contention. Harris argues that Irwin did not know the facial features of the robber; that the officer\u2019s remark convinced Irwin that the man who robbed him was captured; that he went to the police station prepared to identify any man shown to him by the police, and Harris happened to be that man.\nIrwin\u2019s identification was not limited to the jacket. He was robbed in the middle of the day. He turned, faced the robber and scuffled with him. He saw Harris\u2019 face and he testified that he knew it when he pointed Harris out to the officer from the police car. The accuracy of this identification was confirmed by the developments which followed.\nIrwin initiated the identification \u2014 not the police. They pursued Harris because of what Irwin told them \u2014 not because of their independent information or suspicion. Irwin did not go to the station to view a suspect arrested by the police. He went there to process the case against the man he had identified beforehand and perhaps to obtain his money and the papers from his wallet. The question asked him upon his arrival, \u201cIs that him? \u201d was superfluous and his answer merely confirmed what he had previously told the police.\nFurthermore, proof of Harris\u2019 guilt did not depend upon Irwin\u2019s identification. He ran away when the police car turned in his direction. He was apprehended a few minutes after the robbery. The proceeds of the robbery were found on him. The gun used in the robbery was in his possession. His flight, his exclusive and unexplained possession of Irwin\u2019s wallet and his possession of the weapon are circumstances so incriminating that they would sustain his conviction without Irwin\u2019s positive identification.\nUnder the total circumstances of this case, there was no violation of the defendant\u2019s right of due process. The individual confrontation at the police station neither suggested nor induced Irwin\u2019s identification and it did not taint his subsequent in-court identification. Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293, 87 S Ct 1967, 18 L Ed2d 1199 (1967) and People v. Kincy, 72 Ill App2d 419, 219 NE2d 662 (1966) cases relied upon by the defendant do not support his position.\nHarris claims that he was prejudiced because the State suppressed evidence which was material to his defense. The hat found at the scene of the crime was not in court. Harris implies that if the hat had been produced in court it would not have fit him and this would have proved that someone else committed the crime. He argues that the failure of the State to have the hat in court raises an inference negative to the State\u2019s testimony that the hat fit him, and that the suppression of this evidence was also a deprivation of due process. The record does not disclose that at the time of trial the hat was in the possession of either the police or the State. The arresting officer testified that he did not know where the hat was and said that it had not been inventoried. There was no evidence impugning the truth of the officer\u2019s assertion that the hat was not retained by the police, and no demand had been made before trial for its production. For all that the record shows, the hat may have been given to the defendant and may have been more available to him than to the State. What was said by the court in People v. Taylor, 35 Ill2d 341, 220 NE2d 164 (1966), is apropos here: \u201cThis is not a case such as Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 10 L Ed2d 215 [relied upon by Harris] . . . where it was clear that the prosecution concealed information in its possession favorable to the defendant.\u201d People v. Faulkner, 83 Ill App2d 54, 226 NE2d 467 (1967) also relied upon by Harris is not in point. In Faulkner, narcotics were found in clothing supposedly belonging to the accused. Faulkner, who was indicted for possession of narcotics, denied that the clothing was his. Proof that he owned the clothing was essential to the State\u2019s case; without this proof Faulkner\u2019s exclusive control of the narcotics could not be established. The clothing had not been tried on the defendant and it was not produced in court. The Appellate Court held that the State\u2019s proof was deficient. In the present case ownership of the hat was not an essential element in the proof of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\nThe last two contentions are that the trial judge questioned him at length and in doing so became a prosecutor rather than an impartial trier of the facts, and that the sentence imposed upon him was too severe.\nThe trial judge questioned the defendant after his attorney and the assistant State\u2019s attorney had finished their examinations. In response to the court\u2019s questions, Harris said that the gun was not found on him but in the alley where it had fallen out of his pocket; that the only wallet taken from him was his own and this was returned to him by the police. The judge asked him about his sister. He replied that he had expected her to be in court to tell about the rent money she had given him the day he was arrested. The judge offered to continue the case to the following morning so that his sister could be brought in. The defendant requested that this be done and the trial was postponed. The sister was in court the next day and substantially corroborated Harris\u2019 testimony concerning the money. However, she said she gave him $135 not $67.50, and on cross-examination she said she could not remember the date she gave him the $135.\nIt is now urged that the trial judge\u2019s insistence forced the defendant to bring in a witness whose testimony contradicted his, that this unwarranted meddling by the judge interfered with his trial strategy and that the searching and biased cross-examination by the judge prejudiced him. All of these accusations are unfounded. The judge\u2019s questions were fair and his examination impartial. His questions made it possible for Harris to amplify and clarify his previous testimony. His offer, to postpone the trial so that Harris\u2019 sister could testify was more than fair. Gratitude for extending this consideration to the defendant may not be expected but criticism for it is both undeserved and unkind. The case was not tried before a jury and there was nothing in the conduct of the trial prejudicial to the defendant.\nIn sentencing the defendant to a term of 15 to 35 years in the penitentiary the court observed that he would be eligible for parole at the end of 10 years, and that his robbing a 78-year-old man while armed with a gun and his prior record made a lesser sentence inappropriate. Harris had served two short sentences for petty larceny and a 3- to 10-year sentence for armed robbery. There is no sound reason for reducing the period of imprisonment imposed by the trial court.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCHWARTZ and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE DEMPSEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Marshall J. Hartman and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James B. Zagel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James Lee Harris, Appellant.\nGen. No. 51,293.\nFirst District, Third Division.\nFebruary 29, 1968.\nGerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Marshall J. Hartman and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James B. Zagel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0412-01", "first_page_order": 418, "last_page_order": 424 }