{ "id": 2645106, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James York, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. York", "decision_date": "1968-03-19", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 67-120", "first_page": "180", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. App. 2d 180" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "228 NE2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill App2d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2554282 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 NE2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill App2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2556585 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/83/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 NE2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2770963 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 NE2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill App2d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2542947 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/81/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 NE2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5363068 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 NE2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 NE2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "410 Ill 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311989 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 NE2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill App2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2547836 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/87/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 NE2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill App2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2554674 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0388-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 6692, "ocr_confidence": 0.636, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5046715916883656e-08, "percentile": 0.2819241585127164 }, "sha256": "d6631a5ef6c6d8085f846476b2b94c5e4f0885a44a133aa78719ac013ab8cc92", "simhash": "1:37d3346af3267934", "word_count": 1141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:43.606130+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James York, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of burglary after a jury trial and a sentence of not less than one year nor more than five years.\nThe defendant claims reversible error in the voir dire examination of one juror, urging that on the whole record he was thereby deprived of a fair trial.\nThe record discloses that, after the court had questioned the first panel, the State inquired of the first juror called: \u201cDo you know any attorneys that practice law as far as defense of criminals is concerned?\u201d The court overruled the defense objection to this question. Defendant argues that this resulted in his being labelled as a \u201ccriminal,\u201d and his counsel demeaned.\nImmediately prior to that particular question being asked, the State had inquired of the juror as to acquaintance with anyone in the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. Following the challenged question the State asked whether the juror could be fair to both sides and whether the juror would sign a verdict of not guilty if the State failed to meet its burden of proof \u2014 to which the juror responded affirmatively.\nThe court, preliminary to the voir dire examination, had carefully and thoroughly explained that the defendant had pleaded not guilty and thereby denied the charge against him; that the jurors were to determine whether defendant was guilty; that the indictment was a mere formal charge and not evidence; that the defendant was presumed to be innocent; and that the burden was on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In its examination of the particular juror, the court inquired whether the juror had any bias or prejudice simply because of the charge that the defendant had committed an offense. The juror answered \u201cNo.\u201d\nAt the close of the case the jury was fully instructed on the issue of the presumption of innocence and no error is claimed as to instructions.\nThe defendant accepted the juror.\nWhile the challenged question was inept and objection to it should have been sustained, no substantial error resulted in the context of the entire questioning on voir dire, the admonishment and instructions of the court.\nDefendant\u2019s argument based on People v. Trotter, 84 Ill App2d 388, 228 NE2d 467 (1967) is not persuasive. There the prosecutor\u2019s argument inferred that defendant was guilty of a crime not in evidence. Nor is the case of People v. Harges, 87 Ill App2d 376, 231 NE2d 650 (1967) helpful to the defendant. In that case the defendant was asked before the jury whether he had ever seen the police station before the day he was taken to it in connection with drunken driving charges. This was obviously prejudicially improper as an attempt to bring a prior arrest to the jury\u2019s attention, but has no real bearing on the instant case.\nThe voir dire question here cannot be raised to a similarly prejudicial status. People v. Jenko, 410 Ill 478, 485, 102 NE2d 783 (1952). It is also noted that the defendant did not avail himself of his peremptory challenges, which lends strength to the assumption that the jury was not affected by the remarks. People v. Sleezer, 9 Ill2d 57, 61, 136 NE2d 808 (1956).\nThe defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the voir dire examination because there was no overwhelming evidence that the defendant took or intended to take anything out of the premises in question; and that many persons had access to the premises.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel, as public defender, has flagrantly violated the rules requiring the submitting of a sufficient abstract. However, the court has considered the whole record and has concluded that it amply supports the verdict. The case is not close.\nThe owners of the premises in question testified that they did not give the defendant permission to enter the premises; one of the owners testified that prior to February 28, 1967, she was at her property and everything was in order, and she detailed the items missing after that date. Walter Kowalczyk testified that he had permission to use the premises. He identified a pair of shoes as the pair that were left by him in the property. Detective Odie Smith testified he took the shoes from defendant while he was in custody. Mrs. Kowalczyk testified that she had permission to use the premises and she never gave the defendant permission to enter them; that she was the last person to be in the property prior to February 28th, and she locked the doors securely; that when she went to the premises on February 28th she found a hot pot of coffee on the front room floor; the rear door had the glass broken out; and the premises were described as a \u201cmess.\u201d Three sets of fingerprints were found on the premises and identified as those of the defendant \u2014 one set on both sides of the glass that was removed from the rear door; one on a bottle and another on a can located in the premises.\nThe witness Kowalczyk volunteered that he had purchased the shoes at a certain Penney store, and there was direct testimony by the manager of that particular store that they did not carry these sizes in stock. However, on cross-examination, he stated that the size in question could be obtained by special order, and that he placed at least one special order each day. All of these facts went to the weight of the testimony only. The triers of the facts were peculiarly suited to determine questions of truthfulness. People v. Boney, 28 Ill2d 505, 510, 192 NE2d 920 (1963).\nThe purpose of review has often been stated. It is not to decide whether the record is perfect, but to determine whether the defendant has had a fair trial free from substantial and prejudicial errors, and whether his conviction is based upon evidence establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Sleezer, 9 Ill 2d 57, 62, 136 NE2d 808; People v. Conrad, 81 Ill App2d 34, 54, 225 NE2d 713 (1967). The fingerprint identification was evidence of the highest order. People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill2d 52, 150 NE2d 806 (1958). That evidence coupled with his possession of the shoes when arrested established the defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Napue, 83 Ill App2d 41, 227 NE2d 143 (1967); People v. Wilson, 84 Ill App2d 215, 228 NE2d 585 (1967).\nThe defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and had a fair trial. The conviction is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nDAVIS and MORAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "John Vogel, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.", "William V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney of DuPage County, of Wheaton, and Frank Wesolowski, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James York, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 67-120.\nSecond District.\nMarch 19, 1968.\nJohn Vogel, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.\nWilliam V. Hopf, State\u2019s Attorney of DuPage County, of Wheaton, and Frank Wesolowski, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0180-01", "first_page_order": 186, "last_page_order": 190 }