{ "id": 2538490, "name": "James S. Saleson and J. Palmer Realty, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants in Each of the Causes, v. Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois, an Administrative Agency, John C. Watson, Director of Said Department, and Oscar C. Brown, et al., Members of the Real Estate Examining Committee Thereof, Defendants-Appellees in Each of the Causes, Bertha Haug and Fred A. Haug, Appellees in Gen. No. 52,315, Samuel L. Evins, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,316, Margaret Sanchez, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,317", "name_abbreviation": "Saleson v. Department of Registration & Education", "decision_date": "1968-04-22", "docket_number": "Gen. Nos. 52,315-52,317", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "117", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "95 Ill. App. 2d 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "57 NE2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "388 Ill 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2501317 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/388/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 NE2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "412 Ill 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2666140 ], "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 NE 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5175315 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/323/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5282760 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/357/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 Ill 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2477034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/393/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2587477 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/364/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2561179 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 NE2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863398 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 US 415", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450732 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 US 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6164855 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 US 117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1285830 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/366/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 US 511", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340402 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0511-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 846, "char_count": 20447, "ocr_confidence": 0.649, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.837320459100099e-08, "percentile": 0.5337332408182871 }, "sha256": "ecd6933ef733c176966ea1ff13bcf8edbd2030ea065d76e20953a423c320e2f2", "simhash": "1:bbe5c89c4a5e1db8", "word_count": 3404 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:15:57.800656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James S. Saleson and J. Palmer Realty, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants in Each of the Causes, v. Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois, an Administrative Agency, John C. Watson, Director of Said Department, and Oscar C. Brown, et al., Members of the Real Estate Examining Committee Thereof, Defendants-Appellees in Each of the Causes, Bertha Haug and Fred A. Haug, Appellees in Gen. No. 52,315, Samuel L. Evins, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,316, Margaret Sanchez, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,317." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn three separate administrative decisions, the Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois revoked the real estate broker\u2019s certificate of plaintiff, James S. Saleson, who does business under the name of J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc. Plaintiff filed separate appeals from Circuit Court orders which affirmed each decision of revocation. The appeals (Nos. 52,315-16-17) are consolidated in one opinion for convenience and clarity. The facts in each appeal are set forth separately.\nNo. 52,315\nIn this action the report of the \u201cfindings and recommendation\u201d of the Real Estate Examining Committee included the following:\n\u201cHearing on the charges herein was held at the Chicago office of the Department on February 17, 1965. The Respondent was present in person and represented by Mr. Louis Jaffie and Mr. Abraham Rottenberg. The relator was present in person. Mr. Frank J. Gagen, Jr., was present on behalf of the Department.\n\u201cAfter due consideration of all of the evidence adduced at the said hearing the undersigned Real Estate Examining Committee, finds as follows:\n\u201c1. Respondent James Saleson is, and was at all times referred to herein, a duly licensed real estate broker in the State of Illinois.\n\u201c2. That Bertha L. Haug and Fred A. Haug listed their property at 3305 Eastwood, Chicago, Illinois for sale with J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc. at a net price of $15,500.00. J. Palmer Realty Associates Inc. sold said property to Richard Wrona and Rita J. Wrona, his wife, for the sum of $15,900.00; the Wronas deposited $1,000.00 earnest money with said J. Palmer Realty.\n\u201c3. That the deal was closed at Avondale Savings and Loan Association on October 29, 1964; a representative of said J. Palmer Realty delivered a receipt for $400.00 as commission and delivered check #1082, J. Palmer Realty Assoc., Inc. Special Account, drawn on the Bank of Niles, dated October 29, 1964, in the sum of $600.00 payable to Fred A. Haug and Bertha L. Haug; check was deposited by Haug with the Lakeview Trust and Savings Bank.\n\u201c4. That said check was returned marked \u2018N.S.F.\u2019 A call to the cashier of the Bank of Niles on November 7, 1964 disclosed that there were not sufficient funds in the aforesaid Special Account to pay said check. Mr. Palmer promised to redeem said check on November 9,1964 and on said date promised to redeem on or before November 12, 1964. Calls to Mr. Palmer after November 9, 1964 were not answered.\n\u201c5. That the complaint was filed in the Department of Registration and Education on November 14, 1964, and, thereafter, on a date in December, 1964 the amount due the Haugs was delivered to them; that neither this Committee nor any individual member thereof was party to any agreement to dismiss this action and no notice thereof was delivered or served on the Committee for its action or consideration thereon.\n\u201cOn the basis of the foregoing the undersigned Real Estate Examining Committee concludes that the Respondent is guilty of conduct within the purview of Section 8(d) 7, 11 and 14 of the Illinois Real Estate Brokers and Salesman Law, and it is respectfully recommended to the Director of the Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois that the Respondent\u2019s license as a real estate broker in the State of Illinois be Revoked.\u201d\nOn December 29, 1965, the Director of Registration and Education adopted the findings and recommendation of the Real Estate Examining Committee and revoked \u201cthe certificate of registration of James S. Saleson as a real estate broker.\u201d\nOn April 10, 1967, in a review action, the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order which revoked plaintiff\u2019s license as a real estate broker and affirmed the decision of the Department of Registration and Education. This is the order from which plaintiff appeals.\nAs to the foregoing findings of fact of the committee, plaintiff contends: \u201cThe evidence in the record shows only that there was, at most, a delay of six weeks in the delivery of $600.00. This does not justify the revocation of a license to practice a trade or profession and the deprivation of a livelihood to the licensee. The real reason for the revocation of the license in the case at bar is to punish the licensee for his refusal to testify before the Department of Registration and Education. The Department\u2019s conduct is prohibited by the Federal Constitution, as determined by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which cases are hereinafter discussed.\u201d\nNo. 52,316\nIn this action the hearing was also held on February 17, 1965. Respondent was present in person and represented by counsel.\nThe findings of the committee included the following:\n\u201c2. That on October 9, 1964, Samuel L. Evins presented a contract for the purchase of a four (4) apartment building located at 2642 West Summerdale in the City of Chicago to James Saleson together with a cashiers check in the amount of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, endorsed to the J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc., escrow account only, earnest money deposit.\n\u201c3. That under the terms of said contract, the earnest money was to be held in the escrow account until the offer was accepted or rejected, on or before October 19, 1964, and if the offer is rejected, within the ten (10) days, on or before October 19, 1964, the offer shall be null and void and all earnest money refunded immediately to Samuel Evins.\n\u201c4. That the contract and earnest money was to be held by J. Palmer Realty Assoc., Inc., escrow account for the mutual benefit of the parties and that James Saleson was the agent and operator of J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc.\n\u201c5. That on the 19th day of October, 1964, the offer was not accepted and on October 24, 1964, James Saleson and J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc., received a registered letter demanding return of the $3,000.00 escrow deposit which he and it failed to remit to Samuel L. Evins.\n\u201c6. That Samuel L. Evins filed his complaint with the Department of Registration on November 5, 1964, and same was served upon James Saleson on November 13, 1964 by registered mail; that on some date thereafter during the month of December, 1964 a sum of money in the amount of $3,000.00 was delivered to Samuel Evins by an agent of James Saleson.\u201d\nThe committee concluded respondent (plaintiff) was guilty of conduct \u201cwithin the purview of Section 8(d) 7 and 11 of the Illinois Real Estate Brokers and Salesman Law\u201d and recommended that his license as a real estate broker be revoked.\nThe subsequent license revocation review procedure and dates, including the trial court order of affirmance, are the same as set forth in appeal No. 52,315.\nAs to the findings of fact in this case, plaintiff contends: \u201cThe evidence in the record shows only that there was, at most, a delay of two months in the return of the $3,000.00 which Evins gave to Saleson. This does not justify the revocation of a license to practice a trade or profession and the deprivation of a livelihood to the licensee.\u201d Plaintiff also asserts, as in appeal No. 52,315, that \u201c [t] he real reason for the revocation of the license in the case at bar is to punish the licensee for his refusal to testify . . . .\u201d\nNo. 52,317\nIn this action the hearing on the charges was held on March 17, 1965. The respondent (plaintiff) was not present in person but was represented by his attorney, Mr. Louis Jaffie. The findings of the committee included the following:\n\u201c2. That on December 2, 1964, Marguaret Sanchez executed a real estate contract for the purchase of property at 4948 North Saint Louis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, and delivered same together with an earnest money deposit of $2,000.00 to James S. Saleson in the offices of the J. Palmer Realty Associates, Inc.\n\u201c3. That James S. Saleson failed and neglected to present the offer to purchase the property at 4948 Saint Louis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois to the owners thereof, and had not done so by December 28,1964.\n\u201c4. That beginning on December 28, 1964 and on numerous times thereafter, demand was made on the said James S. Saleson by Marguaret Sanchez and her agent for return of the earnest money deposit.\n\u201c5. That James S. Saleson has wilfully refused to return the said earnest money deposit or otherwise account to the said Marguaret Sanchez.\u201d\nThe committee concluded that respondent was guilty of conduct within the purview of Section 8(d) 7 and 11 of the Illinois Real Estate Brokers and Salesman Law, and recommended that his license as a real estate broker be revoked.\nThe subsequent license revocation review procedure and dates, including the trial court order of affirmance, are the same as set forth in appeal No. 52,315.\nAs to the findings of fact in this case, plaintiff contends : \u201cThe evidence in the record shows only that there was, at most, a delay in the return of the $2,000.00 which Mrs. Sanchez gave to Saleson. This does not justify the revocation of a license to practice a trade or profession and the deprivation of a livelihood to the licensee.\u201d Plaintiff also asserts, as in appeals Nos. 52,315 and 52,316, that \u2018[t]he real reason for the revocation of the license in the case at bar is to punish the licensee for his refusal to testify . . . .\u201d\nIn Illinois, the regulation of real estate brokers and real estate salesmen is provided for in Chapter 114%, Illinois Revised Statutes. Section 8 sets forth the grounds for the \u201cRefusal, suspension or revocation of certificate,\u201d and includes the following:\n\u201cThe Department may refuse to issue or to renew or may suspend or revoke any certificate of registration for any one or any combination of the following causes:\n\u00a3<\n\u201c (d) Where the registrant in performing or attempting to perform or pretending to perform any act as a real estate broker or salesman, or where such registrant, in handling his own property, whether held by deed, option, or otherwise, is deemed guilty of:\na\n\u201c7. Failure to account for or to remit for moneys or documents coming into his possession which belongs to others, or\n\u201c11. Having demonstrated unworthiness or incompetency to act as a real estate broker or salesman in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public,\nIn the three appeals, plaintiff asserts that the issue presented for review is \u201cwhether the Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois complied with Federal Constitutional law in the revocation of the real estate broker\u2019s license.\u201d Based upon the foregoing Federal Constitutional issue, plaintiff makes the following contentions:\n1. There is no evidence to justify the revocation of a real estate broker\u2019s license in the case at bar.\n2. A proceeding to revoke a license to practice a trade or profession causing the deprivation of an opportunity to earn a livelihood through such trade or profession is a \u201ccriminal case.\u201d\n3. Since the proceedings herein is a \u201ccriminal case,\u201d the State had the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which the State failed to do.\n4. The revocation of the license in the case at bar causing the deprivation of the opportunity to earn a livelihood constitutes \u201ccruel and unusual punishment,\u201d in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.\nThe determinative contention of plaintiff is that \u201ca proceeding to revoke a license to practice a trade or profession causing the deprivation of an opportunity to earn a livelihood through such trade or profession is a \u2018criminal case.\u2019 \u201d In support, plaintiff relies on Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511 (1967). In that case, plaintiff, a New York lawyer, refused to produce his records in a disciplinary proceeding. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available in the light of Cohen v. Hurley, 366 US 117 (1961). In reversing the New York disbarment order, the court said (p 514):\n\u201cWe conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor or disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. . . . We said in Malloy v. Hogan [378 US 1 (1964)]:\n\u201c \u2018The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarahtees against federal infringement \u2014 the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.\u2019 \u201d\nAnd on page 516:\n\u201cThe threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of compulsion as \u2018the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him We find no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to others. Lawyers are not excepted from the words \u2018No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself\u2019; and we can imply no exception.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues, \u201cIt is, therefore, clear that the holding of Spevack v. Klein is that a disciplinary proceeding is a criminal case.\u201d On the basis of this interpretation of the Spevack decision, plaintiff asserts that the Department of Registration had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the revocation of his broker\u2019s license constituted the infliction of \u201ccruel and unusual punishment.\u201d\nPlaintiff further argues that \u201cin order to circumvent the citizen\u2019s protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, many States have labeled as \u2018civil\u2019 proceedings which result in penalties and deprivation to the citizen. In 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States made it clear that \u2018a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels.\u2019 (N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429).\u201d\nThe defendants argue that the ruling in Spevack v. Klein, supra, is not applicable to these cases because the record in each case \u201cis completely absent of any suggestion that the license was revoked for failure to cooperate with the Department of Registration and Education. [In appeal No. 52,315] the license was revoked because Saleson gave a worthless check to Mrs. Haug; [in appeal No. 52,316] the license was revoked for withholding earnest money. There was no finding that the licensee failed to cooperate in any way with the Real Estate Examining Committee; [in appeal No. 52,317] the license was revoked for his failure to transmit an offer to purchase and for withholding earnest money. There was no finding that the licensee failed to cooperate in any way with the Real Estate Examining Committee. Thus, the reliance on the Spevack case is misplaced and of no benefit to the licensee.\u201d\nWe do not agree with plaintiff that \u201ca proceeding to revoke a license to practice a trade or profession causing the deprivation of an opportunity to earn a livelihood through such trade or profession is a \u2018criminal case.\u2019 \u201d\nRecently, in a disbarment proceeding, In re Damisch, 38 Ill2d 195, 230 NE2d 254 (1967), our Supreme Court said (p 206):\n\u201cRespondent also urges that Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511, 17 L Ed2d 574, 87 Sup Ct 625, has made it clear that disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature, entitling respondents therein to all the rights to which criminal defendants are entitled, and that its implications are fatal to complainant\u2019s case. Spevack extends the privilege against self-incrimination to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding. The reason given for this extension is that disbarment is a punishment and that there can be no punishment for refusal to speak. The fifth amendment provides that: \u2018No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\u2019 (Emphasis supplied.) Seizing on the italicized language of this quotation, respondent apparently argues that since the Supreme Court extended the privilege against self-incrimination to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding, such a proceeding must be a \u2018criminal case\u2019. In his reply brief he recognizes that the italicized language has been wholly ignored in defining the limits of the privilege against self-incrimination and by so doing he has acknowledged the defect in his argument. Nothing in Spevack has affected the continuing validity of the rule which has heretofore been adhered to in this State: a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal prosecution and is not subject to all the rules that govern such a case. E. g., In re Anderson, 370 Ill 515, 522; In re Needham, 364 Ill 65, 68.\n\u201cThe principal argument presented is that the evidence in support of the complaint is insufficient to establish solicitation, citing our decisions holding the complaint of misconduct similar to an indictment in that respondent is presumed innocent until proved guilty (In re Donaghy, 393 Ill 621) and that the evidence should be resolved upon a theory of innocence where reasonably possible to do so (People v. Bentley, 357 Ill 82). There is no doubt that such is and should be the rule, but neither the Commissioners nor this court are required to be naive or impractical in appraising an attorney\u2019s conduct.\u201d\nWe believe the pronouncements made in In re Damisch apply here, and the record in each case must be examined in the light of the guidelines established in this state for disciplinary proceedings.\nAdministrative as well as judicial proceedings are governed by the requirement of due process of law (Italia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Ill 427, 154 NE 198 (1926)), and plaintiff\u2019s right to enjoy the privilege of a real estate broker\u2019s license is entitled to be so protected and secured, and \u201cin a proceeding so serious, due process of law requires a definite charge, adequate notice and a full, fair and impartial hearing.\u201d (Smith v. Department of Registration and Education, 412 Ill 332, 106 NE2d 722 (1952).) The findings of an administrative committee \u201cmust be based on evidence presented in the case, with an opportunity to all parties to know of the evidence to be submitted or considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced as such.\u201d Fleming v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 388 Ill 138, 149, 57 NE2d 384 (1944).\nAn examination of the record in these three appeals shows that the findings of the Real Estate Examining Committee are substantiated by the evidence and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The conduct of the hearings was fair and impartial, and plaintiff was represented. The record does not reflect plaintiff\u2019s contention that \u201cthe real reason for the revocation of the license in the case at bar is to punish licensee for his refusal to testify.\u201d We fail to find, as is required in order to reverse any one of these three appeals, that an opposite conclusion to that of the Committee is clearly evident.\nWe conclude the judgments of the Circuit Court affirming the orders of the Department of Registration and Education were correct and are hereby affirmed.\nAppeals Nos. 52,315, 52,316, 52,317 \u2014 judgments of the Circuit Court of Cook County affirmed.\nBURMAN, P. J. and ADESKO, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marvin L. Goldberger and Louis Jaffie, of Chicago (Harry G. Fins, of counsel), for appellants.", "William G. Clark, Attorney General of State of Illinois, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole and Robert F. Nix, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James S. Saleson and J. Palmer Realty, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants in Each of the Causes, v. Department of Registration and Education of the State of Illinois, an Administrative Agency, John C. Watson, Director of Said Department, and Oscar C. Brown, et al., Members of the Real Estate Examining Committee Thereof, Defendants-Appellees in Each of the Causes, Bertha Haug and Fred A. Haug, Appellees in Gen. No. 52,315, Samuel L. Evins, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,316, Margaret Sanchez, Appellee in Gen. No. 52,317.\nGen. Nos. 52,315-52,317.\nFirst District, First Division.\nApril 22, 1968.\nRehearing denied June 12, 1968.\nMarvin L. Goldberger and Louis Jaffie, of Chicago (Harry G. Fins, of counsel), for appellants.\nWilliam G. Clark, Attorney General of State of Illinois, of Chicago (John J. O\u2019Toole and Robert F. Nix, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 110, "last_page_order": 123 }