{
  "id": 2538828,
  "name": "The City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lowell J. Myers, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Myers",
  "decision_date": "1968-05-14",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 51,257",
  "first_page": "443",
  "last_page": "446",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "95 Ill. App. 2d 443"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "227 NE2d 760",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "37 Ill2d 470",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2864932
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "473"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/37/0470-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:e7facf98b0658166",
    "word_count": 635
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:15:57.800656+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lowell J. Myers, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe record shows that on January 9, 1966, a complaint was filed charging that on January 7, 1966 one \u201cMyers\u201d did park a Chrysler automobile bearing state license No. 743-980 on a public highway in a \u201cNo Parking At Anytime\u201d zone. On February 1, 1966, Mr. Lowell J. Myers, who is a Chicago lawyer, entered his appearance as the defendant. He entered a plea of \u201cnot guilty\u201d and waived a jury trial. No evidence was introduced. The defendant said \u201cI am willing to stipulate that the police officer will testify that he found an automobile with state license No. 743-980 on Friday, January 7,1966, at 10:00 p. m., parked in front of 1038 North Shore Avenue. . . .\u201d The stipulation was accepted. The defendant stated to the court that the City \u201chas not proven the necessary elements of its case.\u201d The court said that the stipulation established the violation and entered a judgment assessing a fine of $5 against the defendant. He appealed.\nSubsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the City succeeded in having an order entered in the trial court vacating the judgment and dismissing the charge against the defendant for want of prosecution. Thereafter this court granted a motion of the City to dismiss the appeal on the ground that there was no controversy between the parties. On appeal by Mr. Myers, the Supreme Court said (37 Ill2d 470, 473, 227 NE2d 760), \u201cHere, it is not disputed that the defendant properly filed a notice of appeal on February 10, 1966. The trial court was without jurisdiction when on February 24, 1966, it sought to vacate its order of February 1, 1966. The appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal. The judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District is reversed and the cause is remanded to such court for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.\u201d\nThe City asks us to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this is a \u201cfictitious case.\u201d Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Myer\u2019s \u201ctactics of volunteering himself as a defendant and in falsely claiming the privilege against self-incrimination render the case at bar a fictitious suit, a suit which is not based upon a controversy between the City and Myers.\u201d The Supreme Court decided that the appeal should not be dismissed. The record shows that Lowell J. Myers was a defendant in the parking violation charge, that he entered his appearance therein, and that on a trial based on a stipulation the court found him guilty and fined him. On this record we cannot say that it is a fictitious case. The trial court, the City and the defendant recognized that Mr. Myers was on trial charged with a violation of the parking ordinance. The contention of the City that the appeal should be dismissed because the case is a fictitious one is without merit.\nThere was no evidence. The stipulation which the court accepted as the basis for the judgment stated that if the officer were present he would testify that he found an automobile, state license 743-980 on Friday, January 7, 1966, at 10:00 p. m., parked in front of 1038 North Shore Avenue. This stipulation of the testimony does not prove the charge that the defendant parked or owned the automobile with the specified license number. The City failed to prove the charge in the complaint. Therefore the judgment is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nMcNAMARA and LYONS, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lowell J. Myers, pro se, of Chicago, appellant.",
      "Raymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Marvin E. Aspen, Sydney R. Drebin, and Marsile J. Hughes, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The City of Chicago, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lowell J. Myers, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 51,257.\nFirst District, Second Division.\nMay 14, 1968.\nLowell J. Myers, pro se, of Chicago, appellant.\nRaymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Marvin E. Aspen, Sydney R. Drebin, and Marsile J. Hughes, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0443-02",
  "first_page_order": 449,
  "last_page_order": 452
}