{ "id": 2649044, "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James S. Newsum, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Newsum", "decision_date": "1968-09-16", "docket_number": "Gen. No. 51,695", "first_page": "219", "last_page": "228", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 Ill. App. 2d 219" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 Ill 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314018 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 NE2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill2d 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2770692 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 NE 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill App2d 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5322041 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/92/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 US 293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168284 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L Ed 210", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 US 581", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 365313 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/332/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 NE2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379799 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 NE 2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12127077 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0317-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 698, "char_count": 13919, "ocr_confidence": 0.615, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.34602287623718603 }, "sha256": "5142c5ffd0abfb583c690bcd1af462f8e9cae158ce35a23382157992f82f1ba5", "simhash": "1:a7527af0740ced0f", "word_count": 2348 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:27:49.397892+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James S. Newsum, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the offense of indecent liberties with a child. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of from two to eight years. On appeal, defendant contends he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe complaining witness was a twelve and one-half-year-old boy, who lived at 1800 North Richmond Street, Chicago. At the trial he testified that on December 16, 1965, at approximately 8:00 p. m., his mother gave him a dollar and sent him to a store one block from home to purchase a carton of Royal Crown. On the way he met defendant, whom he did not know, and who asked him to take a walk and told him there was money involved, a couple of dollars. After some conversation, he accompanied defendant to defendant\u2019s apartment, about a block and a half from the boy\u2019s home. While there, the defendant performed several acts of deviate sexual conduct on the boy. Defendant then gave the boy a dollar and drove him to the store in a \u201c1956 or 1957 green Plymouth.\u201d\nWhen the boy arrived at home, he gave the dollar bill to his mother but did not tell her what had occurred in defendant\u2019s apartment until the following night. The police were called and, after they interrogated the boy, he went with the police to the defendant\u2019s building, which contained 47 apartments. The boy pointed out defendant\u2019s apartment, and the police secured a key from the caretaker and with the boy they entered defendant\u2019s apartment. Defendant was not there at the time.\nOn cross-examination, the complaining witness testified that he had lived at 1800 North Richmond for approximately six years and was familiar with the neighborhood and the different streets in the area. Before the night in question, he had seen defendant\u2019s apartment building several times when he had gone to a swimming pool. There were large apartment buildings to the north and south of defendant\u2019s building.\nRoy Handler, a Chicago police officer, testified that on December 17,1965, at about 8:30 p. m., he and his partner interviewed the complaining witness and his parents about the incident. The boy furnished the officers with a description of the defendant and then took them to an apartment building at 1742 North Humboldt Boulevard. As they walked into the lobby of the building, the boy pointed to a door and stated that it was the apartment. There was no name on the door or on the doorbell. The caretaker of the building was requested to open the apartment, and they all entered, the police, the boy and the caretaker. They all remained in the apartment for a few minutes. Because of defendant\u2019s objection, Officer Handler was not permitted to describe what he saw in the apartment.\nAnother witness for the State, John A. Cooney, a Chicago police detective, testified that he and his partner arrested the defendant in his apartment at 11:35 p. m. on December 17, 1965. Defendant was taken to the Homicide and Sex Bureau at 2138 North California Avenue. Later, the boy and his parents came to the station, and the boy pointed at defendant.\nOfficer Cooney further testified that prior to defendant\u2019s arrest, they knocked on his apartment door, and defendant answered the door. The officer identified himself and told defendant the nature of the charge. The arrest was made inside the apartment. The court permitted the officer to describe the apartment.\nDefendant testified in his own defense and in substance denied the boy\u2019s testimony. He was employed and lived at 1742 North Humboldt Avenue. On December 16, 1965, he had worked until 4:30 p. m. He had dinner with his sister and her boyfriend at Walgreen\u2019s, where they stayed until approximately 6:30 p. m. He then purchased a bottle of beer and some potato chips and returned to his apartment, where he spent the evening alone. At that time he owned a 1956 green Ford. He had never seen the complaining witness before he saw him at the police station on the evening of December 17, 1965. Defendant testified that when the boy arrived at the police station, \u201cthe detective asked him, Ts this the man?\u2019 And the kid just shook his head. He said nothing, he just shook his head.\u201d On cross-examination, defendant stated that on his arrest he had said, \u201cI\u2019m not guilty because it\u2019s the boy\u2019s word against mine. I was pretty perturbed.\u201d\nHallie Rollins, the caretaker of the building at 1742 North Humboldt, testified for the defense. The building had 47 apartments. She stated that police officers came to her on the night in question and ordered her to open the door of defendant\u2019s apartment because a crime had been committed there. They had a young boy with them, and she did not recognize the complaining witness as the boy who came with the officers. After threats of arrest, she opened the door for police. Later that night two plainclothesmen came and, under protest, she gave them the key to defendant\u2019s apartment, and they opened it themselves.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that the police illegally entered his home, and any testimony which described his apartment was evidence which should have been suppressed. Defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress was held by the court for disposition during the trial. In support, defendant cites People v. Albea, 2 Ill2d 317, 118 NE 2d 277 (1954), where the court said (p 322):\n\u201cHowever, we cannot be unmindful of the principles established by long precedent which have sought to preserve the sanctity of the home and the right of privacy of the individual merely because the evidence has changed from inanimate to animate form. It has been held that an illegal search cannot later be justified by the discovery of contraband property. . . . We see no reason for a different rule in this case when the ends of justice sought to be maintained are the same.\n\u201cThis State had steadfastly adhered to the theory of inadmissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search\nIn People v. Albea, supra, it is also said (p 321):\n\u201c \u2018The principle seems clear that evidence obtained independently of the illegal search may be used against the defendants/ .... \u2018It is only necessary for us to determine whether it has been shown the testimony of the witnesses was received from independent sources.\u2019 \u201d\nThree witnesses for the State were questioned about the interior or layout of defendant\u2019s apartment: (1) The complaining witness, who gave a detailed description of the apartment on his direct examination; (2) Officer Handler, who entered the apartment in defendant\u2019s absence; and (3) Officer Cooney, one of the arresting officers, who entered the apartment to arrest defendant. The trial court admitted descriptive testimony of the apartment by the complaining witness and Officer Cooney and sustained objections to Officer Handler\u2019s description of the apartment.\nThe State contends that both entries of defendant\u2019s apartment by police officers were proper, because at both times the officers entered defendant\u2019s home to arrest him for a crime which they had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had committed. Cited in support is People v. Barbee, 35 Ill2d 407, 220 NE2d 401 (1966), where it is said (p 411):\n\u201cA police officer may arrest without warrant \u2018when a criminal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it.\u2019 (Ill Rev Stats 1961, chap 38, par 657; cf. Ill Rev Stats 1965, chap 38, par 107-2.) And when an officer is authorized to make an arrest, he is also authorized \u2018to break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance after he has announced his authority and purpose.\u2019 (Code of Crim Proc, Am Law Inst Official Draft (1930) sec 28; see Ill Rev Stats 1965, chap 38, par 107-5 (d), which became effective Jan 1, 1964.) It is of course true that in the present case the officers who entered Barbee\u2019s home made no arrest. But this circumstance can not be significant. Just as \u2018a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up,\u2019 (United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581, 595, 92 L Ed 210,) so the legality of the conduct of the officers in this case is to be determined upon an appraisal of the situation that confronted them, and not upon the success or lack of success of their efforts.\u201d\nAs to the first entry of defendant\u2019s apartment by police officers, the record does not indicate that the officers announced their authority and purpose before entering the apartment. Here the trial court correctly sustained the objection. As to the second entry by the officers, Officer Cooney testified that they did knock on the door and, when defendant opened the door, the officer identified himself and his purpose. Defendant testified that he heard the knock, and by the time he got to the door it was opened as far as the latch, and \u201cI had to unlatch the door and Officer Cooney entered and took me to the Shakespeare station.\u201d The testimony of the boy purported to be what he saw on his initial visit to the apartment on December 16, 1965, and the testimony of Cooney about the apartment was of what he saw after defendant was arrested in the apartment on December 17, 1965. We see no error here.\nDefendant also complains that the police station identification violated his constitutional right to due process because there was no lineup and his counsel was not present. (Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293.) We are not persuaded that the station identification procedure here was improper or impaired the testimony of the complaining witness. He had described the defendant to the police and led them to defendant\u2019s apartment, where defendant was found later. After defendant\u2019s arrest, we think it was proper procedure for the police to notify the complaining witness and his parents to come to the police station for identification purposes. The individual confrontation at the police station neither suggested nor induced defendant\u2019s identification by the complaining witness. See People v. Harris, 92 Ill App2d 412, 416, 236 NE 2d 281 (1968). The \u201cin-court\u201d identification of the defendant by the complaining witness was positive, clear and convincing, and it was not tainted by the earlier police station identification. We find no error here.\nConsidered next is defendant\u2019s contention that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant asserts that a charge of indecent liberties is an accusation easily made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused. Defendant cites People v. Hinton, 14 Ill2d 424, 152 NE2d 830 (1958). Defendant argues that his conviction rests entirely upon the testimony of the complaining witness, a child of tender years, and the evidence \u201cmust be so clear and convincing as to remove even a shadow of doubt. To be satisfactory this testimony must be consistent with the surrounding facts and circumstances. Where such evidence is not clear and convincing, this Honorable Court must reverse the causes.\u201d Defendant cites People v. Williams, 414 Ill 414, Ill NE2d 343 (1953), an indecent liberties case, where the court said (p 416):\n\u201cWe have always safeguarded the interests of an accused where the testimony is uncorroborated, by requiring that it should be clear and convincing. . . . \u2018When a conviction of taking indecent liberties with a child depends upon the testimony of the prosecuting witness, and the defendant denies the charge, there must be substantial corroboration of the prosecuting witness by some other evidence, fact or circumstance in the case. . . .\u2019\u201d\nDefendant questions at length the testimony of the complaining witness and asserts it was not natural for a child to wait until the next evening before he complained about what had happened. Also, in leading the police to the building with 47 apartments, he selected the first apartment he saw upon entering the building, and \u201cthe tenant was not in so a description of the apartment was observed. If the boy was in the apartment the previous night, he didn\u2019t holler, scream or fight off his alleged attacker, the answer is simple, he wasn\u2019t there. The only time he saw the apartment was when he and the police entered it on the next night for the first time.\u201d\nThe State argues that the record shows no motive on the part of the complaining witness to accuse the defendant falsely. He was twelve and one-half years old and in the 8th grade at school. He was the recipient of several awards for achievement in school, and he was able to clearly relate what happened. Also, all of the facts related by the complaining witness were unimpeached by defendant on cross-examination.\nWe conclude that the testimony of the prosecuting witness was clear and convincing. The description by the boy of the defendant\u2019s apartment as he saw it on the night of the incident was corroborated by Officer Cooney. Why the boy failed to promptly report the incident to his mother and why he did not resist the defendant were questions to be considered by the jury when it came time to consider the credibility of the witnesses and to reach a verdict.\nThe totality of the State\u2019s evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and met the requirements necessary to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction in a case of this nature.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBURMAN, P. J. and ADESKO, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Saul Brauner and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Sheldon Schapiro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James S. Newsum, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 51,695.\nFirst District, First Division.\nSeptember 16,1968.\nGerald W. Getty, Public Defender of Cook County, of Chicago (Saul Brauner and James J. Doherty, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and Sheldon Schapiro, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0219-01", "first_page_order": 225, "last_page_order": 234 }