{
  "id": 5322515,
  "name": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fredeberto A. Melero, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Melero",
  "decision_date": "1968-09-16",
  "docket_number": "Gen. No. 52,517",
  "first_page": "208",
  "last_page": "212",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 208"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "224 NE2d 577",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1967,
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2565038,
        2564206
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      "cite": "174 NE2d 213",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1961,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "30 Ill App2d 264",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5788091
      ],
      "year": 1961,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "268"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:23.218839+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fredeberto A. Melero, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nDefendant appeals from a nonjury conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of section 47 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic (Ill Rev Stats 1959, c 951/2, 144). He was fined $100 and costs. On appeal, defendant contends that he was not given a fair trial, and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOn April 10,1967, at about 2:45 a. m., defendant, while driving an automobile in Chicago, was stopped for speeding. After some questioning and observance of defendant by the arresting police officer, the drunken driving charge followed.\nAt the trial, the police officer testified that he saw defendant pass up three cars, and he clocked defendant\u2019s speed at 40 miles per hour. After he stopped defendant, he noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant. On questioning, defendant stated he was going \u201cnowhere\u201d and admitted that he had had several beers. The officer observed that defendant\u2019s eyes were bloodshot, his face flushed, his clothes disorderly, he was combative, he was crying, and later on he was sorry. Defendant was staggering on walking, he was faltering, and on the street and in the station he was in a falling condition. He walked limplike and mumbled.\nThe officer further testified that during his 21 years of service, he made thousands of arrests of people under the influence of alcohol, and in his opinion, defendant was under the influence of alcohol and unfit to drive an automobile.\nOn cross-examination, the officer stated that his opinion that defendant was unfit to drive was based upon the fact that he drove to the left of the center of 18th Street, where sewers were being installed. The officer did not understand Spanish, and defendant\u2019s English was not too good. He followed defendant a sufficient distance to observe that defendant was \u201cdriving badly\u201d and over the speed limit.\nDefendant testified that he lived with his father and mother and was working. He had a couple of beers at 19th and Ashland. He answered some questions in English and some in Spanish. In response to a question by his attorney, \u201cDid you drive fast? Speak in English,\u201d he answered, \u201cthirty miles an hour,\u201d and when asked, \u201cDo you think you were drunk?\u201d, he responded, \u201cNo.\u201d\nConsidered first is defendant\u2019s contention that he did not have a fair trial because he \u201cdid not understandingly and knowingly waive his right to a jury trial,\u201d and because \u201cthe trial proceeded when it should have been obvious to the Court that the defendant could not proceed without an interpreter.\u201d\nThe record shows that defendant was represented at all stages of the trial by an attorney, Joseph B. Gilbert. In response to the question by the clerk, \u201cAre you ready for trial?\u201d, Mr. Gilbert said, \u201cWe might have a little difficulty. My client does not speak English too well.\u201d The Court: \u201cHe\u2019ll have to do the best he can. Does he want time to bring an interpreter in here? Could he go to trial without an interpreter?\u201d Mr. Gilbert: \u201cHe will try to do it. He speaks Spanish.\u201d The Court: \u201cDo you want me to hear the case or do you want a jury trial?\u201d Mr. Gilbert: \u201cWaive the jury, Your Honor.\u201d The Court: \u201cState ready?\u201d Mr. Hackett: \u201cThe State is ready,\u201d and the trial proceeded.\nFrom the foregoing, defendant argues that no question of any kind was directed to him as to his understanding of his right to a jury trial, and that this was probably because the trial court felt that the defendant, because of his inability to speak English, would not understand. Defendant further argues that it was error to proceed without an interpreter because the court was made aware of the language handicap, even though no formal request was made by the defendant.\nWe think the record demonstrates that defendant was sufficiently conversant with the English language to understand and make responses in English, so as not to require an interpreter in this case. Defendant used English understandingly a number of times in testifying, both on direct and cross-examination, and in his initial conversation with the police officer at the time of his arrest.\nAs to the jury waiver, we agree that the trial court has the duty to see that an accused person\u2019s election to waive a jury trial is not only expressly but also understandingly made, and the performance of that duty cannot be perfunctorily discharged. If the jury waiver here was not understandingly made, this record does not show it. We are not persuaded that defendant did not understand what was happening. By permitting his attorney, in his presence and without objection on his part, to waive his right to a jury trial, defendant must be held to have knowingly acquiesced in that action. Also, the trial court was entitled to rely on the professional responsibility of defendant\u2019s attorney that when he informed the court that his client waived a jury, it was knowingly and understandingly consented to by his client. Defendant is not permitted to complain of an alleged error which was invited by his behavior and that of his attorney. People v. King, 30 Ill App2d 264, 268, 174 NE2d 213 (1961).\nConsidered next is defendant\u2019s contention that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding defendant guilty of \u201cdriving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt,\u201d the court remarked, \u201cThe odor of alcohol is strong \u2014 the balance is wobbling and the walking is staggering, turning is falling, and I won\u2019t even talk about the speech at this time. ... If there was any doubt in my mind at all \u2014 I\u2019d find him not guilty, but to me there is no doubt and that is why I found him guilty.\u201d\nWe conclude that defendant received a fair trial. Defendant\u2019s alleged inability to understand and speak English does not support his contention that the conviction should be reversed. Where the guilt or innocence of a defendant depends upon the credibility of conflicting testimony, the finding of the trial court will not be disturbed. (People v. Greenberg, 79 Ill App2d 288, 293, 224 NE2d 577 (1967).) The State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to establish defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBURMAN, P. J. and ADESKO, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MR. JUSTICE MURPHY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joseph B. Gilbert, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "John J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James R Truschke, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fredeberto A. Melero, Defendant-Appellant.\nGen. No. 52,517.\nFirst District, First Division.\nSeptember 16, 1968.\nJoseph B. Gilbert, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn J. Stamos, State\u2019s Attorney of Cook County, of Chicago (Elmer C. Kissane and James R Truschke, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0208-01",
  "first_page_order": 216,
  "last_page_order": 220
}