{
  "id": 5313879,
  "name": "Mary Ethel Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The South Shore National Bank of Chicago, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. South Shore National Bank",
  "decision_date": "1971-08-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 54833",
  "first_page": "136",
  "last_page": "139",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 136"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 428,
    "char_count": 7744,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.726,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 7.910444093458357e-08,
      "percentile": 0.4612118312689273
    },
    "sha256": "ca92f1487273fa8b1275ea83ce5fa96da157391c7ef263cdd0b9506f14b619ec",
    "simhash": "1:4f16afb726046865",
    "word_count": 1311
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:55.359601+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Mary Ethel Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The South Shore National Bank of Chicago, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis action was brought by the payee of a check against the bank upon which it was drawn for damages alleged to have arisen from defendant bank\u2019s non-payment of the check. On the motion of defendant the court struck a portion of the complaint. Subsequently, after further proceedings, summary judgment was entered for defendant.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged the following: Plaintiff was the holder and owner of a check in the amount of $130 drawn to her order on defendant and signed \u201cJohn W. or Christine S. Porter by Peter S. Sarelas.\u201d Plaintiff endorsed the check and deposited it with her bank, The First National Bank of Chicago, which, in turn presented it to defendant for payment. Defendant paid the check on February 28,1967, but thereafter, on March 2 returned the check to plaintiff\u2019s bank, representing that the check was \u201cPaid in Error\u201d and stamping on the face of the check \u201cNot\u201d and \u201cPaid in Error.\u201d A statement attached to the check stated that the signature was not on file. Plaintiff\u2019s account in her bank, as a consequence of defendant\u2019s acts, was debited in the amount of the check. Defendant had in its possession since February 10, 1966 a general power of attorney executed by John W. Porter naming Peter S. Sarelas as his attorney. The complaint goes on to allege that the statements of defendant were dehberate, false, fraudulent, libelous and defamatory and published for the purpose of defaming and libehng her valid title and ownership of the check and her name, credit and professional reputation and the statements were made with intent to suggest that plaintiff was issuing a forged check. As a consequence of these acts the plaintiff was wrongfuHy deprived of the proceeds of the check and interest thereon, required to expend money in the prosecution of her claim, injured in her good name and credit, and suffered from loss of sleep and anguish. Refief in the form of compensatory and exemplary damages was demanded in the amount of $50,000.\nDefendant filed a motion asking the court to strike the complaint. That motion asserted several grounds for dismissal including the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court entered an order striking portions of the complaint and concluding that plaintiff had stated a good cause of action for $130 plus interest at 5% thereon from March 2, 1967.\nSubsequently, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. A supporting affidavit executed by defendant\u2019s vice-president and cashier stated, inter alia, that the check presented to defendant was not accepted in accord with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 409 (l), that the check on its face stated that it was not accepted and that notice of dishonor was given to the First National Bank of Chicago, the collecting bank, which in turn gave notice to plaintiff.\nPlaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment with a verified pleading entitled \u201cObjections, Reply and Counter-affidavits of Plaintiff to Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Complaint at Law.\u201d This document states the following: The check was paid on Februaiy 28, 1967, and this fact is shown on the face of the check. The records of tire bank also indicate that the check was paid, posted and charged to the account of John Porter on that date. Defendant\u2019s statement of account dated March 1, 1967, shows that after payment of plaintiff\u2019s check there was a balance of $4,501.42 remaining in the account. The defendant had in its possession, in addition to the power of attorney executed by John W. Porter, a power of attorney executed by Christine S. Porter, joint tenant of the account, designating Peter S. Sarelas as her attorney-in-fact. The defendant paid earher checks issued to plaintiff since April 9, 1966 with the exception of the check dated February 2, 1967.\nOn October 16, 1969, an order granting summary judgment for defendant was entered, \u201cthe court being of the opinion that the plaintiff being a mere payee of a check not accepted\u2019 by the defendant bank, has no rights against it and that no factual issue exists.\u201d\nOn appeal plaintiff argues that summary judgment deprived her of her constitutional right to a jury trial of fact questions. Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should not have been entered for the reason that substantial factual questions were raised by the pleadings. We do not agree.\nIt is clear that in the absence of the certification or acceptance of a check a payee bank has no obligations to a holder to pay a check drawn on it. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 409(1). It is plaintiff\u2019s theory, however, that under the provisions of Chapter 26, Section 4\u2014 213(1) the actions of the bank constituted an acceptance of the check. That section states:\n\u201c(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the following, whichever happens first:\n(a) paid the item in cash; or\n(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agreement; or\n(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith; or\n(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house rule or agreement.\u201d\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint incorrectly asserts that the check was finally paid and posted by defendant. She contends the stamping of the check \u201cNot\u201d and \u201cPaid in Error\u201d and an entry on the statement of account of John W. Porter support her position. Section 4\u2014213(c), supra, states that a check is finally paid when the bank has completed the process of posting.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 26, par. 4\u2014109 defines \u201cprocess of posting\u201d as follows:\n\u201cThe process of posting\u2019 means the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the payment including one or more of the following or other steps as determined by the bank:\n(a) verification of any signature;\n(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;\n(c) affixing a \u201cpaid\u201d or other stamp;\n(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer\u2019s account;\n(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to the item.\u2019\u2019 (Emphasis added.)\nIt is clear that the process of posting involves several steps some of which are those specified by plaintiff. The mere fact that some of those steps were taken does not mean that the process was completed. The affixation of the stamps and the entry on the customer\u2019s account are but part of the process. Also included is the judgmental step of signature verification and, if necessary, correction or reversal of erroneous action. The act of the defendant in returning the check to plaintiff\u2019s bank demonstrated that the posting process was not completed, regardless of the entry on the \u201cstatement of account\u201d and the stamps, placed on the check. Because the posting process had not been completed acceptance had not occurred. Thus defendant was not obligated to pay.\nJudgment affirmed.\nENGLISH, P. J. and DRUCKER, J., concur.\nIll. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 26, par. 3 \u2014 409(1):\nPar. 3 \u2014 409. DRAFT NOT AN ASSIGNMENT.\n(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE LORENZ"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Peter S. Sarelas, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Mitchell J. Overgaard and Theodore E. Zahler, both of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mary Ethel Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The South Shore National Bank of Chicago, Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 54833;\nFirst District\nAugust 20, 1971.\nPeter S. Sarelas, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMitchell J. Overgaard and Theodore E. Zahler, both of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0136-01",
  "first_page_order": 156,
  "last_page_order": 159
}