{
  "id": 5313460,
  "name": "Kenneth G. Hardway et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Board of Education of Lawrenceville Township High School, District No. 71, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hardway v. Board of Education of Lawrenceville Township High School, District No. 71",
  "decision_date": "1971-09-16",
  "docket_number": "No. 70-68",
  "first_page": "298",
  "last_page": "302",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 298"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "171 N.E.2d 37",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "21 Ill.2d 104",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2733763
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/21/0104-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "218 N.E.2d 227",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "72 Ill.App.2d 480",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2585345
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/72/0480-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "234 N.E.2d 66",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "91 Ill.App.2d 290",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2819968
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/91/0290-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 427,
    "char_count": 8597,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.694,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.6412201089428717e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8231497280343372
    },
    "sha256": "36193242ab48c6eeb57f52c6118bb46f56144a120c5fcc34226886adbe4c5257",
    "simhash": "1:b5b7ab6331d3b00c",
    "word_count": 1389
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:55.359601+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Kenneth G. Hardway et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Board of Education of Lawrenceville Township High School, District No. 71, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Board of Education of Lawrenceville, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lawrence County wherein judgment was entered in behalf of the eight plaintiffs in amounts ranging from $98.00 to $724.00 per plaintiff.\nOn March 22, 1967 the Board of Education of Lawrenceville Township High School District No. 71, Lawrenceville, Illinois, approved a salary schedule for the 1967-1968 school year. On April 17, 1967, a notice was sent to each teacher which indicated the maimer in which that individual\u2019s salary was determined. This was computed by listing the teacher\u2019s degree, plus semester hours beyond that degree, and the years experience in teaching. These notices included a provision that the contracts were subject to the School Laws of the State of Illinois. The eight plaintiffs were all teachers within the District and each received a notice specifying his salary and the method of computation.\nOn May 19, 1967, the Illinois Legislature amended Section 24-8, Chapter 122, Illinois Revised Statutes to provide for certain increases in the minimum salary which school boards may pay teachers. The pertinent provisions of the section state:\n\u201cEffective July 1, 1967, and based upon experience in a school district, teachers who serve on a full-time basis shall have their salaries increased to at least the following amounts above the starting salary for a teacher in such district in the same classification; * *\nOn May 26, 1967, the Office of the Superintendent of Public Education issued a memorandum written by its legal advisor which read in part:\n\u201cTo all County Superintendents and School Administrators:\nThe Governor approved House Bill No. 797 on May 19, 1967, and we enclose herewith a copy thereof. Numerous questions have already aiisen concerning the proper interpretation of some of the provisions of the Bill. It has therefore been determined that a general memorandum on this subject is advisable.\nThere can be no doubt that the first paragraph of Section 24-8 fixes the absolute m\u00ednimums which must be paid beginning July 1, 1967, to full-time teachers.\nThe second paragraph of the Bill provides for salary increases effective July 1, 1967, based upon experience in a school district, with a provision for increases in the amounts therein set forth \u2018above the starting salary for a teacher in such district in the same classification.\u2019 It is the opinion of this office that the reference to such district applies to a school district in which the teacher is presently employed on a full-time basis. In order to make up the requirement of 5 years experience, 8 years experience, or 13 years experience as provided in the bill, such experience may only be counted for the district in which the teacher is employed and which will be required to grant the increases. In other words, a teacher who has taught in other districts may not have the experience in those districts counted as qualifying such teacher for an increase in salary # *\nThereafter the Board of Education adopted a motion which provided that experience outside the district would not be included in the calculation. A revised salary schedule was prepared to conform with the decision. Under the revised schedule none of the plaintiffs received a lesser salary than that contained in the original notice of April 17, 1967.\nThe plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the revised salary schedule did not give them full credit for the years experience set forth in the notice of April 17. For example, the notice of April 17, 1967, sent to the plaintiff, Kenneth G. Hardway, stated:\n\u201cYour salary for the 1967-68 school year is determined from the salary schedule as follows:\nM.S. Degree plus 0 semester hours and 18 years experience (including the 1967-68 school year) x9/9........$8004.00\u201d\nIf given credit for the same years experience, namely, 18 years, Hard-way, under the revised salary schedule of August 21, 1967, would have received $8,728. The plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to such increases based upon their years of service and the school board should give credit for the years of experience in teaching in other school districts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.\nIn its opinion the trial court found that although plaintiffs received the amount specified in the original notice of April 17, 1967, and although they were paid amounts in excess of the minimum salary provided in Section 22-8 of the School Code, the action of the board in refusing to grant credit for years of experience in teaching in school districts other than the Lawrenceville District was arbitrary and discriminatory. The court noted that the language of the amendment \u201cbased upon experience in a school district\u201d is capable of being interpreted to mean that credit should be given for years of teaching in any Illinois school district or interpreted to mean that credit should be given only for years of teaching in the school district in which teachers are presently employed.\nOn August 17, 1968, the Legislature again amended Section 24-8 of the School Code. The statute was amended by deleting the words \u201cbased upon experience in a school district\u201d and replacing them with \u201cbased upon previous public school experience.\u201d The trial court\u2019s opinion stated that it viewed this amendment as a clarification of the legislature\u2019s original intention.\nThe appellant contends that the plain, simple language of the 1967 enactment leaves no room for any interpretation as to the legislature\u2019s meaning. Rather, the Board of Education contends that the replacing of the words \u201cexperience in a school district\u201d by \u201cprevious public school experience\u201d indicates a major change in the Act. In its brief the board quotes the opinion rendered by the Office of the Superintendent of Public Education.\nWe concur in the decision of the trial court. It is the cardinal rule in construction of statutes that a statute must be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the general assembly as expressed in the statute. (Gregory v. County of La Salle, 91 Ill.App.2d 290, 234 N.E.2d 66.) The Illinois courts have held that although construction of statutes by the executive or administrative branch of government are not binding, such construction should be and is persuasive. (Strat-O-Seal Manufacturing v. Scott, 72 Ill.App.2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 227.) However, subsequent to the interpretation of the statute by the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the legislature amended the statute in May of 1968. The Board of Education contends that this change was not a clarification but was a major change in policy. However, it is noted that the legislature in its amendment of August 1968 did not change the effective date of the provisions, July 1, 1967, although the amendment was enacted more than one year after the effective date. If the legislature did intend a major change in policy, then it would seem that the effective date for such a change would be at the present or some future date. The only change in the amendment was replacing the phrase \u201cexperience in a school district\u201d with the phrase \u201cprevious public school experience.\u201d We believe the trial court properly construed the later amendment as a clarification of the legislature\u2019s original intention.\nThe Board of Education also contends that there was no evidence of arbitrary or discriminatory action on its part and therefore the trial court must be reversed. A school board has discretionary control over the salaries of its teachers subject only to any limits expressly fixed by the School Code and to constitutional prohibitions against actions that are arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable. (Richards v. Board of Education, 21 Ill.2d 104, 171 N.E.2d 37.) In view of our finding that the board did not comply with the provisions of the School Code by refusing to allow credit for teaching experience acquired outside of its district, it is unnecessary to consider the issue of whether its action was arbitrary or discriminatory.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nEBERSPACHER, P. J., and CREES, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gosnell, Benecki & Quindry, of Lawrenceville, (Maurice E. Gosnell, of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "Drach, Terrell & Deffenbaugh, of Springfield, (Valjean R. Smith, of counsel,) for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Kenneth G. Hardway et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Board of Education of Lawrenceville Township High School, District No. 71, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 70-68;\nFifth District\nSeptember 16, 1971.\nGosnell, Benecki & Quindry, of Lawrenceville, (Maurice E. Gosnell, of counsel,) for appellant.\nDrach, Terrell & Deffenbaugh, of Springfield, (Valjean R. Smith, of counsel,) for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0298-01",
  "first_page_order": 318,
  "last_page_order": 322
}