{ "id": 5314159, "name": "Sylvia Madrazo, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin R. Michaels, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Madrazo v. Michaels", "decision_date": "1971-09-10", "docket_number": "No. 54405", "first_page": "583", "last_page": "589", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 583" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "271 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill.App.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5801678 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/53/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill.App.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1583468 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/120/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill.App.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578931 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/124/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill.App.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5271879 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/48/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5321120 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 N.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill.App.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2570794, 2572661 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/77/0274-02", "/ill-app-2d/77/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill.App. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3273051 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/293/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill.App.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5140223 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/6/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 N.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill.App.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1593025 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/111/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2711855 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Nev. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 8556443 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/74/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 So.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9874067 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/172/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 A.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.J. Super. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 521324 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/109/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.E. 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4936693 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill.App.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5270342 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/47/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill.App.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2562307 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/80/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill.App.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5178392 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/16/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill.App.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5221295 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/29/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill.App.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1599832 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/103/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 So.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9730017, 9730237 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/248/0504-01", "/so2d/248/0504-02" ] }, { "cite": "95 A.L.R.2d 992", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 A.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.H. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4460521 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/105/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5634359 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/231/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 Ill. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2643765 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/408/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 A.L.R.2d 90", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill.App.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5249240, 5248290 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/42/0036-02", "/ill-app-2d/42/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill.App.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1581452 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/122/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.E. 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5641453 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/234/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 773, "char_count": 13244, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5630426705345557e-07, "percentile": 0.8155180089650015 }, "sha256": "31ad06ea653aedd7026a0d7da025524130d6c4e4e71eec594e69699e9fd17677", "simhash": "1:c34124972f85d4e8", "word_count": 2201 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:27:55.359601+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Sylvia Madrazo, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin R. Michaels, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE LEIGHTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis was a suit to recover damages for personal injuries which plaintiff sustained when she fell on a stairway in defendants\u2019 home. The parties agree concerning the facts which give rise to the issue in this appeal.\nDefendants Benjamin and Paula Michaels are husband and wife, and at the time in question were parents of two children, three and six years old. Plaintiff is Paula\u2019s aunt. Early in 1962, she was a seamstress and lived in New Jersey. In March 1962, defendants planned to move from one house to another in Skokie, Illinois. In January or February, Paula wrote plaintiff, told her that Benjamin Michaels was going to be in New York on the day of the move and asked her to come and help with the moving and with care of the children. Plaintiff, without any promise by defendants or expectation that she would be paid or reimbursed her expenses, left her job and came to defendants\u2019 home. The move, into a house that had three levels, was accomplished on March 1, 1962.\nThe next day, plaintiff and Paula unpacked cartons of household items. At about 11:00 A.M., plaintiff walked up the stairway to the third level. Paula, without telling plaintiff, took a box and placed it on the stairway. A short time later, plaintiff \u201c[w]as coming down, loaded up with clothes, as usual, and I couldn\u2019t see too much down * * * I was leaning against the railing * \u00bb * j found myself slipping and my foot got into something * * *. I noticed that my foot was inside of a box.\u201d Paula Michaels, called by plaintiff as an adverse witness, told the jury of her letter inviting plaintiff to her home and of the incident on March 2, 1962 when she placed the box on the stairway just before plaintiff\u2019s fall. In addition, by stipulation, a deposition of the doctor who examined plaintiff in March 1969 was read to the jury. At the close of plaintiff\u2019s case, defendants moved for a directed verdict on two grounds. They argued that (1) plaintiff\u2019s evidence proved she was their social guest, a licensee in their home to whom they owed only the duty to refrain from willful and wanton conduct which could cause injury; and (2) the evidence proved plaintiff, as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory negligence because she walked down the stairway with her arms so full of clothes that she could not see where she was going. After hearing argument, the trial judge concluded that plaintiff was a social guest and that even if she were an invitee in defendants\u2019 home, she was guilty of contributory negligence. Therefore, he ruled that defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. The issue is whether this ruling was correct.\nWe begin with the principle that the trial judge ought to have directed the verdict only if all the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to plaintiff, so overwhelmingly favored defendants that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. (Pedrick v. Peoria and Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504; Bachman v. Illinois Central R. Co., (Ill.App.2d), 268 N.E.2d 42.) Correctness of the ruhng depends on plaintiff\u2019s status in defendants\u2019 home when she was injured, that is, whether she was a social guest or an invitee.\nPlaintiff contends that her status was a question of fact for the jury. She argues that there was evidence which would have sustained a verdict that she was defendant\u2019s invitee. Plaintiff insists that defendants\u2019 motion should have been denied and the jury allowed to decide whether she was guilty of contributory neghgence and whether she was injured by defendants\u2019 negligence.\nDefendants, on the other hand, contend that plaintiff was their social guest, a licensee on their property, to whom they owed no other duty than to refrain from willful and wanton conduct that could cause her injury. They argue that on plaintiff\u2019s evidence, no verdict, contrary to the one directed, could ever stand. It is necessary, therefore, that from the evidence in the record we determine whether, as defendants contend, plaintiff was defendants\u2019 social guest who, as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory negligence when she was injured, or, as plaintiff insists, she was an invitee on defendants\u2019 property who, in the exercise of due care for her safety, was injured by defendants\u2019 negligence. In making this determination we must resort to the authoritative sources of our law and language.\nWebster, in the context that concerns us, defines \u201csocial\u201d as that which is \u201c[s]pent, taken, enjoyed * * * in the company of one\u2019s friends or equals; marked by or pertaining to companionship * <* * for the salce of diversion * * A guest, he teUs us, is \u201c[a] person entertained in one\u2019s house or at one\u2019s table; * * * hence, a person to whom the hospitafity of a home is extended.\u201d (Webster\u2019s New International Dictionary, 2d ed. 1949.) Therefore, a \u201csocial guest\u201d is a person who goes on the property of another for companionship, diversion, enjoyment of hospitafity. He is a licensee who enters the premises of the owner by permission, but for his own purposes. (See Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N.E. 933; compare Dobrin v. Stebbins, 122 Ill.App.2d 387, 259 N.E.2d 405.) To his social guest the owner is liable only for injuries occasioned by willful and wanton misconduct. Cunag v. McCarthy, 42 Ill.App.2d 36, 191 N.E.2d 404; I.L.P. Negligence \u00a7 56; Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 90 (161).\nAn invitee, as that term has evolved in Anglo-American law, is a person who goes on the property of another by express or implied invitation to transact business in which he and the owner have a mutual interest. (Ellguth v. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 Ill. 343, 347, 97 N.E.2d 290.) He is invited on the premises of the owner to promote some real or fancied material, financial, or economic interest of the owner. To his invitee the owner is hable for injuries caused by the failure to exercise due care to make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee\u2019s use. (Pauckner v. Wakem, 231 Ill. 276, 83 N.E.202.) In this country and in England, the test of invitee status in this definition has been economic activity or benefit. See Dowd v. Portsmouth Hospital (1963), 105 N.H. 53, 193 A.2d 788, and Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 992 (1964).\nHowever, the trend in modern English and American law is away from economic activity or benefit as the exclusive test of invitee status on the land of another. (Lunney v. Post, (Ct.App.Fla. 1971), 248 So.2d 504; Occupier\u2019s Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2c. 31 (1957); Prosser, Torts, (3d ed.) 394-401 (1964), 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, \u00a727.12 (1956).) Examples of this trend in Illinois are Augsburger v. Singer, 103 Ill.App.2d 12, 242 N.E.2d 436, decided by the second district appellate court in 1968; Drews v. Mason, 29 Ill.App.2d 269, 172 N.E.2d 383, decided by the third district in 1961; Bogovich v. Schermer, 16 Ill.App.2d 197, 147 N.E.2d 711 and Hamilton v. Faulkner, 80 Ill.App.2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 304, decided by the fourth district in 1958 and 1967, respectively. Kapka v. Urbaszewski, 47 Ill.App.2d 321, 198 N.E.2d 569, decided by this district in 1964, and relied on by defendants, is a case which on its facts is consistent with the trend in the modern law of invitee-owner relations. A survey of this trend is to be found in an annotation in which the author concludes that \u201c[i]n a number of the more recent cases the courts have expressly rejected economic benefit as the exclusive test of invitee status.\u201d Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 992, 1006 (1964).\nIllinois decisional law supports the rule that a person is an invitee on the land of another if (1) he enters by invitation, express or implied, (2) his entry is connected with the owner\u2019s business or with an activity the owner conducts or permits to be conducted on his land and (3) there is a mutuality of benefit or a benefit to the owner. (See Drews v. Mason, supra, and compare Milauskis v. Terminal RR. Ass\u2019n., 286 Ill. 547, 122 N.E. 78.) The status of an invitee does not depend on whether the invited person is to gain an advantage or benefit from his entry; it is sufficient that the go on the land in furtherance of the owner\u2019s business or an activity he conducts or permits on the premises. Augsburger v. Singer, supra.\nWhen these definitions and principles are applied to the evidence in this case, Paula Michaels\u2019 letter inviting plaintiff to come to defendants' home and help them move from one house to another acquires significance. The help which defendants requested involved labor, not companionship. Common sense teUs us all that one who goes to the home of another to help him move and care for his children is not partaking of diversion or hospitality. We assume that familial conviviality was one of the inducements that led plaintiff to accept defendants\u2019 invitation. However, plaintiff\u2019s purpose in leaving her seamstress\u2019 job in New Jersey and traveling to defendants\u2019 home in Skokie, Illinois, without expectation of compensation or reimbursement of expenses, was in furtherancet of an activity which, for their benefit, defendants were conducting on their property: the moving of their home from one house to another. Therefore, plaintiff was not defendants\u2019 social guest; she was their invitee. Benedict v. Podwats (1970), 109 N.J. Super. 402, 263 A.2d 486; Brant v. Matlin (Ct.App.Fla. 1965), 172 So.2d 902; Murdock v. Petersen (1958), 74 Nev. 363, 332 P.2d 649.\nThis status of plaintiff on their property imposed on defendants the duty to exercise reasonable care for her safety. (Blue v. St. Clair Country Club, 7 Ill.2d 359, 131 N.E.2d 31; 65 C.J.S. Negligence \u00a7 63 (45).) Whether defendants breached this duty when Paula Michaels, without plaintiff\u2019s knowledge, placed the box on the stairway was a question of fact for the jury to determine, considering all the circumstances of the case with proper instructions from the court. (Shatkus v. Checker Taxi Co., Inc., 111 Ill.App.2d 1, 249 N.E.2d 704; 57 Am. Jur.2d, Negligence \u00a7 7.) It was also a question for the jury whether defendants\u2019 negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. (Holsman v. Darling State Street Corp., 6 Ill.App.2d 517, 128 N.E.2d 581; and see Ryan v. Harry\u2019s New York Cabaret, 293 Ill.App. 534, 12 N.E.2d 905.) The trial judge ruled, however, and defendants argue here, that as a matter of law plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which barred her from recovery, even if she were defendants\u2019 invitee.\nContributory negligence is ordinarily a question for the jury, guided by proper instructions from the court. (Olson v. Weingard, 77 Ill.App.2d 274, 222 N.E.2d 24; Swenson v. City of Rockford, 9 Ill.2d 122, 136 N.E.2d 777; 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence, \u00a7\u00a7 7, 295.) Each case must be determined on its own facts. (Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill.App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) To have proved that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, defendant had to show that all the evidence, viewed most favorably to her, so overwhelmingly established plaintiff\u2019s negligence that no verdict in her favor could ever stand. (Maddox v. Grisham, 124 Ill.App.2d 421, 260 N.E.2d 336; Bebb v. Yellow Cab Co., 120 Ill.App.2d 454, 257 N.E.2d 164.) Contributory negligence becomes one of law only when evidence is such that no reasonable inference can be drawn from it to support a plaintiff\u2019s conduct. Hedge v. Midwest Contractors Equipment Co., Inc., 53 Ill.App.2d 365, 202 N.E.2d 869.\nAt the close of plaintiff\u2019s case, the evidence showed she had waHced up and down the stairway in defendants\u2019 home four or five times without accident; and then, she walked down the same stairway, guiding herself by leaning against the railing, although with clothes in her arms that impeded her vision. Obviously, conflicting inferences can be drawn from this evidence. Therefore, whether the conduct described constituted contributory negligence that caused plaintiff\u2019s injuries was a question best suited for the jury. (Compare Bozarth v. McGrath Sand and Gravel Company, (Ill.App.2d), 271 N.E.2d 374.) In our judgment, the evidence at the close of plaintiff\u2019s case did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law.\nWe conclude that the jury did not have before it, at the close of plaintiff\u2019s case, evidence which so overwhelmingly favored defendants that no contrary verdict could ever stand. If the jury, properly instructed, had returned a verdict that plaintiff was defendants\u2019 invitee, that she was free of negligence and that defendants\u2019 negligence caused her injuries, such a verdict could stand. Therefore, the standard of Pedrick was not met when the trial judge sustained defendants\u2019 motion, took the case from the jury and directed the verdict against plaintiff. This was error.\nFor these reasons, the judgment is reversed and thet cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nSCHWARTZ, and STAMOS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE LEIGHTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kavathas, Castanes & Chakos and Benjamin Daidone, of Chicago, (John C. Castanes, of counsel,) for appellant.", "Pretzel, Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, of Chicago, (Joseph B. Lederleitner, of counsel,) for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Sylvia Madrazo, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin R. Michaels, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\n(No. 54405;\nFirst District\nSeptember 10, 1971.\nKavathas, Castanes & Chakos and Benjamin Daidone, of Chicago, (John C. Castanes, of counsel,) for appellant.\nPretzel, Stouffer, Nolan & Rooney, of Chicago, (Joseph B. Lederleitner, of counsel,) for appellees." }, "file_name": "0583-01", "first_page_order": 603, "last_page_order": 609 }