{
  "id": 5399969,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford Samuel Smith, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford Samuel Smith, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant Clifford Samuel Smith was charged with the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated battery. On Oct. 18, 1971 a competency hearing was held and the defendant was found competent to stand trial. A jury trial began Nov. 1, 1971 and defendant was found guilty of both charges in the Circuit Court of Peoria County. He was sentenced to a term in the Penitentiary of not less than nine nor more than twenty years.\nAt the arraignment proceedings, the defendant being indigent, the court offered to appoint the Public Defender. The defendant refused the offer and requested counsel appointed from the Bar Association. This was done. Later, this attorney filed a written motion requesting an examination be made of defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. In support of the motion, the attorney alleged the defendant to be unco-operative, refuses to take advice, and maintains he is the victim of a conspiracy.\nThe defendant requested this attorney withdraw and on July 19 informed the court that he had retained private counsel. The original attorney then was allowed to withdraw.\nOn Oct. 18, 1971 the competency hearing was about to commence when defendant demanded a jury trial, in fact he at least three times personally asked for a jury trial. He also wished to discharge his retained counsel who he claimed to be incompetent.\nThe court asked the State\u2019s Attorney for advice and was told that \u201cif proper demand is made through his attorney s * * I believe they have that right.\u201d Defendant\u2019s attorney said nothing. Defendant stated, \u201cI am entitled to a jury trial.\u201d\nThe court thereupon proceeded without a jury. Only two witnesses testified. Dr. Ian Wickram, a practicing psychologist and a member of the faculty of the Medical School, University of Illinois, had examined defendant on three occasions and had conducted extensive tests. His opinion was that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. He stated that \u201cdefendant understood the nature of the proceedings but will have problems in assisting with his defense\u201d and that \u201cthe nature of his disturbance is such that he \u2014 it would be militant against meaningful collaboration with his defense.\u201d He was disturbed to a significant extent having delusions of a paranoia nature. \u201cHe is in need of mental treatment * *\nThe accused also testified. He stated that he had been misrepresented by his former attorney who was in collusion with the State\u2019s Attorney. He felt that he was competent and he knew right from wrong.\nArticle 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch, 38, sec. 104), deals with incapacity to stand trial. Section 104 \u2014 1 defines an incompetent as follows:\n\u201cFor the purposes of this Article, \u2018incompetent\u2019 means a person charged with an offense who is unable because of a mental condition:\n(a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceeding against him; or\n(b) To assist in his defense; or [Emphasis supplied]\n(c) * *\nIn People v. McKinstray, 30 Ill.2d 611, the opinion of the expert witness was that defendant although understanding the nature of the crime of which he was charged was unable to co-operate with counsel. The only other witness there was defendant who opined that he was able to co-operate with his counsel in his defense. The court said, \u201cTo accept defendant\u2019s opinion * * *, when the purpose of the hearing is to determine that very fact, would make a sham out of the hearing.\u201d The court reversed the subsequent conviction and remanded for further proceedings.\nSection 104 \u2014 2 of the Article sets out the proceedings to determine competency. Paragraph (a) provides: If before a trial, * * * the court has reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent the court shall suspend the proceedings and shall impanel a jury to determine the defendant\u2019s competency. If a jury is waived by the defendant, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant\u2019s competency.\nThe Committee Comments state: \u201cThis section prescribes the procedure set forth in the former law # * * a jury was mandatory unless waived * * *. This procedure is continued.\u201d\nIt is clear that a defendant is entitled to a jury unless he waives that right. He is not first required to make a demand as in an ordinary civil proceeding. Defendant in demanding a jury before the hearing began cannot be said to have stood idly by without objection, thus waiving his right to jury. His attorney made neither express w\u00e1iver nor express demand, in fact the record shows that he remained silent. While an accused ordinarily speaks and acts through his attorney (People v. Sailor, 43 Ill.2d 256), it has long been the rule in Illinois that an attorney cannot waive a jury against the express demand of his client. In Lyman v. Kaul, 275 Ill. 11, 20 the court said, \u201cWhile counsel employed to represent a party to a suit have large powers and authority to enter into agreements and stipulations, they have no authority to waive legal rights guaranteed their clients by law, contrary to the express wishes, orders and directions of their clients. While, as a general rule, it is probably true the client accepts his counsel's advice as to agreements and stipulations in the trial, he is not bound to do so, especially where the agreement is the waiver of a right conferred by law, such as the right of trial by jury.\u201d\nThe people argue that a jury trial is not essential to due process and cite, out of context, a general statement made by the court in People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 561. In almost the next sentence the court stated, \u201cYet under the statutes, as enacted by our legislature, a jury trial has been decreed \u00b0\nThe right of trial by juiy, where it is granted by constitutional or statutory provision, cannot be taken away or impaired by the courts. If there is a statutory method of procedure and compliance in connection with jury law, the trial court may not permit infringement. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 3 L.Ed.2d 988.\nThe People also cite People v. Scott, 106 Ill.App.2d 98; People v. Stoudt, 90 Ill.App.2d 140; and People v. Wilson, 29 Ill.2d 82, for the proposition that a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s sanity must be raised before any investigation need be made by the comt. While we agree that the duty to cause \u00e1 competency hearing to be held arises only when the evidence or circumstances give rise to a bona fide doubt as to the accused\u2019s competency to stand trial (I.L.P. Criminal Law, Sec. 485), the question may be raised, as here, by suggestion of counsel, and, if made in good faith, it becomes the duty of the court to conduct \u00e1 hearing on the issue. (People v. Lego, 32 Ill.2d 76; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360.) The trial court in the instant case did, in fact, decide that the motion filed by counsel raised such a bona fide doubt as to the accused\u2019s incompetency so as to require a hearing, and did in fact conduct a hearing,\nThe matter was tried in 1971. The jury trial which should have been held would have determined his competency as of that date. \u201cSufficient time has elapsed since then to make it doubtful that the evidence bearing on his competence could be reconstructed if we were to remand for a hearing as to competence only. Consequently, we must reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the cause for a new trial in order that the defendant may have an opportunity to raise the question of his present competence. (See, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 15 L.Ed.2d 815, 86 S.Ct. 836; People v. McLain, 37 Ill.2d 173; People v. Thompson, 36 Ill.2d 332.)\u201d People v. Thomas, 43 Ill.2d 328. This resolution makes it unnecessary to consider the other points raised in defendant\u2019s brief.\nThe judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE DIXON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John L. Barton, of Marseilles, for appellant.",
      "Michael Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria, (Thomas M. Pennell, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford Samuel Smith, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 72-97;\nThird District\nMarch 1, 1973.\nJohn L. Barton, of Marseilles, for appellant.\nMichael Mihm, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria, (Thomas M. Pennell, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0061-01",
  "first_page_order": 85,
  "last_page_order": 89
}
