{
  "id": 5392049,
  "name": "Home And Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard O. Scharli, Individually and as Admr. of the Estate of Lee K. Scharli et al., Defendants-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Home & Automobile Insurance v. Scharli",
  "decision_date": "1973-02-13",
  "docket_number": "No. 55759",
  "first_page": "133",
  "last_page": "136",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 133"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "149 N.E.2d 641",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "17 Ill.App.2d 230",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5184502
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/17/0230-01"
      ]
    }
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    "simhash": "1:980a7b571b81c770",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:00.166365+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Home And Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard O. Scharli, Individually and as Admr. of the Estate of Lee K. Scharli et al., Defendants-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Home and Automobile Insurance Company, sued for a declaratory judgment that the automobile insurance policy it issued to the defendant, Richard O. Scharli, was void ab initio and that the policy was, therefore, not in effect on October 14, 1965, when the defendant\u2019s car was involved in an accident. The plaintiff contends that defendant made a misrepresentation in his application that materially affected the acceptance of the risk it assumed in issuing the policy. The trial judge found that the wording of the application was ambiguous. As a result of his construction of the language of the application he found that the insurer had failed to prove a misrepresentation by the insured.\nThe application, Section 9, reads as follows:\n\u201c9. Statement of Convictions. Has the applicant * * * been convicted of any of the following motor vehicle violations during the preceding 36 months?\n(a) Driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.\n(b) Failure to stop and report when involved in an accident.\n(c) Homicide or assault arising out of die operation of a motor vehicle.\n(d) Driving during a period while license is suspended or revoked.\n(e) The accumulation of points under a state point system or a series of convictions as a result of which a filing of evidence of financial responsibility is required. (Emphasis added.)\n(f) Any other conviction of a moving traffic violation as a result of which a filing of evidence of financial responsibility is required.\n(g) Any other conviction of a moving traffic violation as a result of which the operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked.\u201d\nThe defendant answered all the questions in the negative.\nThe policy covering the family automobile was issued on October 7, 1965, and was to terminate on October 7, 1966. The accident occurred on October 14, 1965. Driving the family automobile was the defendant\u2019s son, Lee K. Scharli. Lee, John Kearney, who was a passenger in the defendant\u2019s car, and Richard J. Barnicke, the driver of the other car involved, all died as a result of the accident. The defendant\u2019s license had been suspended on March 3, 1963, for 30 days. The record does not disclose when the plaintiff discovered this. There is no stenographic report of proceedings before us but rather what has been entitled \u201cRecord of Proceedings,\u201d prepared by the plaintiff and approved by the trial judge. The Record of Proceedings, which is, in effect, a statement of facts, recites that the defendant testified that his license had been revoked during the 36-month period preceding the date of the application. However, the same Record contains the allegation that the trial judge found that the license suspension was a result of \u201cthree violations.\u201d The conflict in the record apparently has been resolved by the statements made in oral argument that the defendant\u2019s license had been suspended for 30 days for three traffic violations.\nThe defendant claims that sub-paragraph 9(g) of the application is ambiguous, that \u201cany other conviction\u201d means a single conviction of an offense like driving under the influence of alcohol or leaving the scene of an accident, rather than a series of convictions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 95%, sec. 6A-205, 206.) The plaintiff contends that \u201cany other conviction\u201d includes a \u201cseries of convictions\u201d or, at least, means the last conviction of the series that caused the suspension. There is no issue as to the materiality of the representation. Loving v. All State Insurance Co., 17 Ill.App.2d 230, 149 N.E.2d 641.\nInsofar as we can determine from the Record before us, the trial court held that the language of the application should be construed strictly against the insurer and accepted the interpretation that tire defendant gave the phrase.\nThe rule has been pronounced too often to require citation: Where it is possible that the language of an insurance policy is susceptible of two constructions, that construction will be adopted which is more favorable to the insured. Chapter 95Vz, section 6 \u2014 205, enumerates the offenses for which a license may be revoked. They include offenses which are not covered in the application, e.g., drag racing. Thus, one could argue that the phrase \u201cany other conviction\u201d referred to some other moving violation listed in the statute not already expressly referred to in the application.\nIn addition, the application has two separate questions concerning tire filing of evidence of financial responsibility. 9(e) inquires about a \u201cseries of convictions as a result of which a filing of evidence of financial responsibility is required.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 9(f) inquires about \u201cany other conviction of a moving traffic violation as a result of which a filing of evidence of financial responsibility is required.\u201d (Emphasis added.) If the insurers position is correct, then part of question 9(e) is redundant. Meaning and effect should be given, if possible, to every part of a contract including all its terms and provisions. No part of a contract should be rejected as meaningless or surplusage unless absolutely necessary. The reason for the rule is that it is presumed that all the provisions of a contract are inserted deliberately and for a purpose, and that the parties to a transaction did not intend to employ language idly. ILP Contracts, Section 215.\nWhy then did the insurer speak of both \u201cseries of convictions\u201d and \u201cany other conviction\u201d with respect to financial responsibility but only \u201cany other conviction\u201d with respect to revocation or suspension? We must assume that the author of the policy was aware of the distinction between the two phrases and selected them with care and that by including both phrases in his questions concerning financial responsibility and only one concerning revocation or suspension he intended to exclude \u201cseries of convictions\u201d from 9(g). We conclude, therefore, that the trial judge\u2019s construction of the language of the application and his finding that the applicant had made no misrepresentation were correct.\nThe judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nBURKE, P. J, and GOLDBERG, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EGAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ernest T. Koehler, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Gerald S. Murphy, of Chicago, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Home And Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard O. Scharli, Individually and as Admr. of the Estate of Lee K. Scharli et al., Defendants-Appellees.\n(No. 55759;\nFirst District (1st Division)\nFebruary 13, 1973.\nErnest T. Koehler, of Chicago, for appellant.\nGerald S. Murphy, of Chicago, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0133-02",
  "first_page_order": 157,
  "last_page_order": 160
}