{
  "id": 5395863,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William, Holtzman, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holtzman",
  "decision_date": "1973-04-02",
  "docket_number": "No. 11636",
  "first_page": "528",
  "last_page": "533",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 528"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "270 N.E.2d 550",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "132 Ill.App.2d 417",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2535944,
        2532980
      ],
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        "/ill-app-2d/132/0417-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:00.166365+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William, Holtzman, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWilliam C. Holtzman was convicted after a bench trial of criminal trespass to State supported land in violation of activity proscribed by section 21 \u2014 5, chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1969. Upon conviction, a fine was imposed. By this appeal from that conviction, the defendant urges that the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, further, that the statute defining the offense as here applied is violative of the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of petition.\nWe agree with the contention that the evidence does not establish a violation of the statute, and therefore we do not reach the constitutional issue.\nSection 21 \u2014 5 of chapter 38, so far as is here relevant, defines the offense as:\n\u201cWhoever enters upon land supported in whole or in part with State funds, * * * or any building on such land, * * * or remains upon such land or in such building after receiving notice from the State or its representative to depart, and who thereby interferes with another person\u2019s lawful use or enjoyment of such building or land, shall be fined not to exceed $1,000 or imprisoned in an institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year.\u201d\nThe People urge that the word \u201cinterferes\u201d as used in the statute means that kind of conduct which by its nature tends to hinder, disrupt or obstruct the orderly function of the official enterprise being carried on in the building or on the land. We accept that definition as generally applicable to the proscribed activity. As thus defined, the statute clearly prohibits activity that interferes with another persons use or enjoyment of such land or building after receiving notice to depart. Thus, entering upon land supported in whole or in part by State funds, or remaining thereon after receiving notice to depart and interfering are each essential elements of the offense.\nThe facts and evidence in this case establish that the defendant, a student at the University of Illinois at Champaign, was soliciting signatures to a petition demanding that the University stop purchasing iceberg lettuce. The defendant was in sympathy with the United Farm-workers Union and his activity was in furtherance of the so-called \u201clettuce boycott\u201d. He sought signatures in the Union Building, in the area of the snack bar, its lobby, and near the condiment trucks or trays in that area.\nThe evidence is that the defendant, as a student of the University and as one who had paid an activity fee, was entitled to use the facilities of the Union Building, including the snack bar area. Without a detailed recitation of the evidence, it is fair to say that his solicitation of signatures at the head of the cafeteria line caused some congestion and \u201cinterfered\u201d with the orderly and apparently the fast movement of that line. The defendant was asked by an employee of tire Union to stop his activity. The defendant did stop his solicitation in that location.\nThe defendant then moved to the public lobby area outside th\u00e9 snack bar, outside the food serving or cashier area. In this new position, he again solicited signatures to his petition. A university police officer saw his activity and instructed him to discontinue. The officer handed the defendant a copy of the university regulation that sought to regulate picketing and to prohibit picketing inside university buildings. The defendant did not cease his efforts. John Cocker, assistant director of the Union, told the defendant he could not engage in his picketing in the new location. The defendant did not cease. Cocker left, returned with another police officer, and the defendant was thereafter arrested. There is no evidence that the defendant\u2019s conduct in the second or lobby location interfered with the use or enjoyment of the premises by any other person; thus, interference after the requisite notice is not established. Hie offense as defined by the statute is not established. (See People v. Bufford, 132 Ill.App.2d 417, 270 N.E.2d 550.) The conviction is therefore reversed.\nReversed.\nSIMKINS, J., concurs.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE CRAVEN"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SMITH\ndissenting:\nI dissent because my view of the evidence is that there was interference as a matter of law, that is, a trier of the facts could so find. The majority opinion simply says that there was no evidence that his conduct interfered with the use or enjoyment of the premises by any other person. As I have said, I do not read the evidence to be this way at all. Accordingly a recital is in order.\nDefendant was a student at the University of Illinois, Urbana, and for reasons of his own \u2014 certainly not in evidence \u2014 he was opposed to the serving and presumably the eating of non-union picked lettuce \u2014 he characterized such as \u201cscab lettuce\u201d. His jeremiad took the form of soliciting signatures in the Illinois Union Building, a recreational center for students, to a petition \u2014 \u201cPetition to End University Financial Support of Scab Lettuce Growers\u201d. Following this heading, the petition read that the \u201cundersigned demand\u201d the University to end its \u201cunwarranted obstruction of self-determination for farm workers\u201d, that the University was using \u201cits enormous purchasing power to support a small, self-interested clique of growers by buying their lettuce\u201d, and spoke to the theme that in so doing the University was helping to break the strike of lettuce pickers \u201cwho are trying to climb out of poverty\u201d, it demanded cessation of \u201cmeddling\u201d in this labor dispute by the University using \u201cits purchasing orders to support the growers\u201d, and demanded a stop to purchase \u201ciceberg lettuce altogether\u201d, and explained, somewhat disingenuously the converse of the above, that by not buying lettuce the University \u201cwould not be cooperating with either\u201d side, this was followed by a culinary observation that the University \u201cshould find other types of lettuce for use in salads\u201d (not specified), and demanded \u201cimmediate initiation\u201d of this policy \u2014 no scab iceberg lettuce \u2014 and that by doing so the University will then \u201cconform to both the spirit and the letter of its own policies and of state law.\u201d \u2014 how this state of affairs would come about was not gone into, but left to imagination. In search of signatures, defendant first went to the basement area of the Union where the food services were located and stationed himself at the head of the cafeteria line speaking to those who passed to support the lettuce boycott and how this could be done \u2014 by signing his petition. He was asked to stop\u2014 and did, at least there. Since his petition related to food \u2014 and reasoning, we assume that the hungry would be the most apt to sign \u2014 he retreated to the snack bar \u2014 again to solicit signatures. This was during the noon hour. He was not in the food serving area as such, as he had been in the cafeteria, but instead he chose to make his stand near the pickle, ketchup and mustard stations. A police officer instructed him to discontinue what he was doing and handed him a form which read in part that, \u201cStudents who picket on University premises must do so in a peaceful and orderly fashion. Picketing should not involve invasion of the rights of others, interference with the operations of the University, or jeopardy to public order and safety. Specifically * * * Picketing inside University buildings is prohibited.\u201d He declined to desist and continued his efforts. His modus operandi was simply to stop persons and ask them to sign his petition. Next, the Assistant Director of the building told him that he could not engage in his petitioning activity in the area which he had chosen, but nothing daunted, he continued his quest. Enter: The Chief of the University Police. He, likewise, advised defendant that he should discontinue what he was doing or leave the building. Defendant again declined and this time he was arrested for Criminal Trespass To State Supported Land. Though he merely spoke to prospective petitioners\u2014 urging them to support the boycott by signing his petition, the evidence certainly supports the conclusion that he stopped everyone within reach and not only urged them to sign his petition but urged them also to eat elsewhere. He had positioned himself in an area and at a time when there was a heavy flow of traffic. Ingress and egress to the snack bar was not easy, the entryways being sufficient to accommodate only two people. His conduct, or so it was testified to, did cause people to congregate about him, blocking such entryways and making it difficult for patrons of the snack bar to get in and out \u2014 they had to walk around him. There was some conflict in the evidence on some of these aspects \u2014 suffice it to say, there was evidence enough to support this recital.\nThe central issue, as I see it, as to the question of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is whether by remaining in the building after receiving notice to depart, he did, as a matter of law, interfere \u201cwith another persons lawful use or enjoyment\u201d of the Ulini Union Building \u2014in other words was there interference within the meaning of this section. Well, there was certainly not interference in the football sense, but indubitably there was a \u201cbutting in\u201d though without actually obstructing anyone, certainly a meddling, though physical intervention was absent. The verb \u201cinterfere\u201d equates with insinuate, impose, to butt, horn, cut, push, or press in \u2014 to worm in, to thrust oneself upon or impose upon \u2014kibitzing, even, can be interference, not unlike interference on the television. To situate oneself as defendant did between the condiment trays, adjacent to a snack bar, during the noon hour when the traffic was heavy \u2014 the evidence supported this \u2014 to stop persons as they were coming or going through the snack bar line, and asking them to sign his petition, creating the congestion and inconvenience described above, is, in my opinion, to interfere with such persons\u2019 lawful use or enjoyment of the Union Building, particularly, their enjoyment 'of the snack bar. Indeed, as an aside, who could savor prepandial or post their lunch knowing that there was \u201cscab\u201d lettuce about. In short, I consider defendant\u2019s activities to be interference in law, and thus, since the evidence was certainly ample, a trier of the facts was justified in finding him guilty of the offense with which he was charged. I would therefore affirm.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SMITH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Prentice H. Marshall, of Champaign, and Edward Parsons, of American Civil Liberties Union, of Chicago, both for appellant.",
      "Lawrence E. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana, (Thomas L. Knight, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Robert Wennerholm, Senior Law Student, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William, Holtzman, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 11636;\nFourth District\nApril 2, 1973.\nSMITH, J., dissenting.\nPrentice H. Marshall, of Champaign, and Edward Parsons, of American Civil Liberties Union, of Chicago, both for appellant.\nLawrence E. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana, (Thomas L. Knight, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Robert Wennerholm, Senior Law Student, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0528-01",
  "first_page_order": 552,
  "last_page_order": 557
}