{ "id": 5398447, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Dixon, a/k/a Ruffin Dixon, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dixon", "decision_date": "1973-03-27", "docket_number": "No. 56090", "first_page": "1038", "last_page": "1043", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 1038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 N.E. 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5202232 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/329/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.E. 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5131849 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/314/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2859505 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305624 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.E. 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5630040 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/229/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2513012 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/391/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill.App.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2544815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/89/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897662 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill.App.3d 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2920979 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 76", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2841109 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0441-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 477, "char_count": 9789, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7783513952361367e-07, "percentile": 0.7131050883661557 }, "sha256": "4d0f6e1e2a3459c158a8510defe02ffff38e28b7a408c5ae1a7d7f73d5c3ad44", "simhash": "1:6514003f6b56acd7", "word_count": 1629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:49:00.166365+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Dixon, a/k/a Ruffin Dixon, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Henry Dixon, was charged with murder. At trial it was uncontradicted that he shot and killed decedent; defendant asserted self-defense as a justification for the shooting. A jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 20-50 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. Defendant appeals his conviction and presents these issues for our review:\n1. Whether the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence prejudicial hearsay testimony;\n2. Whether the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to impeach a defense witness as to a collateral matter by use of extrinsic evidence; and\n3. Whether the trial court improperly refused to allow defendant to testify as to his state of mind at the time of the shooting.\nThe evidence adduced at trial indicates that on November 23, 1969, at approximately 10:45 P.M., defendant shot and killed decedent in a West Side tavern. Decedent\u2019s girl friend testified that defendant and decedent argued over defendant\u2019s girl friend, and decedent left the tavern. A few minutes later defendant left. Soon after, decedent returned, and was standing with the witness and other friends at tire rear of the tavern. Defendant re-entered, and, from midway in the tavern, pulled a gun and fired 3 shots. Defendant\u2019s girl friend also testified that there had been an argument, but that she did not see defendant re-enter and shoot. She, too, was standing next to decedent in the rear of the tavern. She did, however, see defendant move toward the door after the shots were fired. A third witness testified that she did not see the argument, but she did see defendant shoot toward decedent from midway in the tavern. None of these witnesses saw a knife in decedent\u2019s hand, although one witness did testify that decedent\u2019s right hand was in his coat pocket. The owner of the tavern testified that when the police took decedent\u2019s right hand out of his coat pocket, decedent was holding a knife. There was no testimony that the body had been moved.\nWitnesses for defendant testified that decedent\u2019s reputation in the community for peacefulness was bad, and that defendant shot decedent when he approached defendant with a knife. One witness testified that decedent approached defendant, and when they were at arm\u2019s length apart, decedent pulled a knife and defendant then shot him. Another witness said that decedent put a knife in his pocket and put his hand in his pocket, but that he did not see him take his hand from his pocket. A third witness testified that decedent approached defendant with his right arm extended and with a knife in his right hand. One of t\u00edrese witnesses testified that defendant and decedent were standing near the front of the tavern when the shooting occurred, while two witnesses testified that the shooting occurred at the rear of the tavern.\nDefendant testified that decedent threatened to cut his head off earlier in the evening, then he shot decedent when decedent came at him with a knife\". He testified that the shooting occurred near the front of the tavern, and, when he first saw the knife, he shot over decedent\u2019s head.\nOPINION\nThe issues which defendant presents on appeal were not raised in his written motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial related only to questions of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the foundation for the introduction of certain physical evidence. Since the issues in this appeal were not properly preserved, they are deemed waived. (People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441, 207 N.E.2d 76; People v. Jackson, 4 Ill.App.3d 698, 281 N.E.2d 373.) However, even upon consideration of these alleged errors, defendant has presented no adequate grounds for reversal, and the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence prejudicial hearsay. A police officer who arrived on the scene 20 minutes after the shooting testified that the first officers at the tavern told him that decedent\u2019s body had not been moved since their arrival on the scene. Defendant argues that this testimony destroyed his contentions that the body ffiad been moved from the middle of the tavern to the rear. However, at no other time in the trial did defense counsel present the theory that the body may have been moved or manipulated after the shooting. Defendant merely relied on the testimony of the witnesses as to where decedent was standing at the time of the shooting. In addition, the hearsay testimony went only to the question of whether the body was moved after the first officers arrived at the scene, and was not directed to the issue of whether the body was moved before the police arrived. The prosecution\u2019s witnesses testified that decedent was standing in the rear of the tavern when he was shot, and a photograph of decedent\u2019s body lying in the rear of the tavern was also introduced into evidence. Defendant and his witnesses contradicted each other as to where decedent was standing when he fell. Therefore, in view of all the evidence regarding decedent\u2019s position, the hearsay testimony of the officer was not unduly prejudicial. People v. Moorehead, 45 Ill.2d 326, 259 N.E.2d 8; People v. Ford, 89 Ill.App.2d 69, 233 N.E.2d 51.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention, that the prosecution improperly impeached a witness as to a collateral issue, does not require reversal of this conviction. The witness testified on direct examination that decedent\u2019s reputation in the community for peacefulness was bad. He went on to testify that decedent \u201calways carried knives and cut peoples [sic] * * *. He once cut me on the neck.\u201d On cross-examination the prosecutor asked the witness if he had told a third party that he had \u201cganged\u201d decedent and that was the reason decedent had cut him. The witness answered no, and in rebuttal the prosecutor called a woman who testified that she heard the witness tell her husband that he had \u201cganged\u201d decedent. There was no objection to this rebuttal testimony.\nIn Illinois, testimony as to collateral matters is not subject to impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements. (See People v. Smith, 391 Ill. 172, 62 N.E.2d 669.) Where a defendant\u2019s contention is self-defense, he can introduce evidence of decedent\u2019s reputation for peacefulness (Kelly v. People, 229 Ill. 81, 82 N.E. 198), but he cannot introduce evidence of specific acts of the victim. (People v. Gibson, 385 Ill. 371, 52 N.E.2d 1008.) Decedent\u2019s reputation was put in issue in the case at bar, but the witness then went on to relate a specific instance. The testimony concerning that specific instance was improper, but was not objected to by the prosecution, and when the prosecution attempted to impeach the witness as to that specific incident by calling a rebuttal witness, defense counsel did not object. Since no objections were made, any error concerning the rebuttal testimony is deemed waived. (People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441, 207 N.E.2d 76.) Furthermore, the jury heard contradictory testimony concerning decedent\u2019s reputation and the shooting itself. The judgment of the jury will not be set aside unless it is so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Peto, 38 Ill.2d 45, 230 N.E.2d 236.) The jury in this case weighed the testimony, judged the credibility of the witnesses and determined the facts from the contradictory evidence. The evidence adduced by the prosecution was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant\u2019s final contention is that the trial court improperly disallowed defendant\u2019s testimony concerning his intent at the time of the shooting. The colloquy at trial was as follows:\n\u201cDefense Counsel: What, if anything, did he do?\nDefendant: He reached at me and slashed at me, and I jumped back and shot over his head.\nDefense Counsel: Now, when you shot at him, Mr. Dixon, do you recall how many times you shot in total?\nDefendant: Two times.\nDefense Counsel: Do you know whether or not you hit him with those shots that you fired?\nDefendant: The first time I shot over his head.\nDefense Counsel: When you shot the first time did you intend to kill him?\nProsecutor: Objection.\nDefendant: No, I did not.\nThe Court: Sustain that objection.\nDefense Counsel: When you shot at him the first time did you aim at him?\nDefendant: No, I did not.\nDefense Counsel: When you shot at him the second time, did you aim at him?\nDefendant: Yes, I did.\nDefense Counsel: What was your state of mind when you shot at him with the gun when he advanced on you with a knife, Mr. Dixon?\nProsecutor: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nDefense Counsel: What was your state of mind?\nDefendant: I was in fear of my life. I was scared.\nDefense Counsel: And this is when you shot the gun? Defendant: When I shot the gun.\u201d\nIt is proper for a defendant to testify as to his intention when his defense is self-defense. (People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 145 N.E. 706.) The objection by the prosecutor in the case at bar was improperly sustained; however, it is clear that the subsequent testimony of defendant cured this error by plainly setting forth defendant\u2019s intent and state of mind at the time of the shooting. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced. People v. Storer, 329 Ill. 536, 161 N.E. 76.\nFor the above reasons the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLEIGHTON and HAYES, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Dixon, a/k/a Ruffin Dixon, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 56090;\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nMarch 27, 1973.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "1038-01", "first_page_order": 1062, "last_page_order": 1067 }