{ "id": 5500777, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEATRICE L. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Robinson", "decision_date": "1981-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 80-1328", "first_page": "660", "last_page": "663", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 660" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912651 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 1311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994055 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413612 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2642683 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1038" }, { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/42/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2849950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 750", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 L. Ed. 2d 771", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6506361, 6506462 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1023-01", "/us/434/1023-02" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813107 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2733016 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436473 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0206-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 502, "char_count": 8159, "ocr_confidence": 0.896, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.512986447411313e-08, "percentile": 0.5241046871844652 }, "sha256": "2af6c34f0f77dfcc6c52ac712314d0a5478d697e14cb5d37343b4cc3d450f7b0", "simhash": "1:2908d1267a57abde", "word_count": 1312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:06.230892+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEATRICE L. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nBeatrice L. Robinson (defendant) was adjudged guilty of contempt of court. A fine of $100 was assessed against defendant. Defendant, pro se, appeals.\nDefendant originally filed suit against a corporation and two individuals. Defendant claimed damages for an alleged assault and battery upon her person. On January 9, 1980, upon defendant\u2019s verified petition, the trial judge allowed defendant a change of venue. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 501(2).) The cause was reassigned to another judge.\nOn May 2, 1980, defendant filed in open court another verified petition for change of venue from the newly assigned judge. This was patently contrary to the pertinent statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 508.\nProper consideration of this appeal requires us to restate verbatim portions of the charges made against the trial judge in the second petition for change of venue. The verified petition charged that the trial judge, stating his name, without legal justification entered into \u201ca criminal conspiracy against the person, property and Civil Rights of the Plaintiff\u2019s [defendant\u2019s] by reason of outside influences being the Chicago Police Department, and other criminal inhabitants of Cook County, Illinois, to obstruct and deny justice to the Plaintiff herein in this case\u201d because \u201cof the Plaintiff\u2019s race, color, religion, religious devotion, malicious, heterosexual nature, sex organ structure and practice and not in prostitution nor sodomy, * *\nThe verified petition also alleged that the trial judge, stating his name, on April 26, 1980, \u201cwillfully, and compromisingly engaged in criminal sex with a known criminal, lesbian-prostitute for Chicago Police Officer WALSH, a/k/a MARVIN MANDELL, a known Pimp, who falsely imprisoned the plaintiff herein on a past occasion.\u201d\nThe verified petition alleged that the trial judge, stating his name, \u201cwilfully, and compromisingly engaged in criminal lesbian-sex on Saturday, April 26,1980\u201d with a \u201cLesbian-Prostitute who wilfully, maliciously, conspiratorily and criminally destroyed the Plaintiff\u2019s [defendant\u2019s] legal documents and records 0 e\nThe verified petition further alleged that the \u201ccriminal misconduct with that Lesbian-prostitute in question\u201d by the trial judge, stating his name, \u201cseriously violated Ch. 110A, pars. 4 and 23, Supreme Court Rule 61, Illinois Revised Statutes, as amended; and further in serious violation of Ch. 38, Section 11 \u2014 18, Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated, as amended, being the Criminal Code of Illinois * *\nOn May 2, 1980, upon presentation of defendant\u2019s petition, the trial judge entered an order which recited that he had been \u201cfully advised in the premises.\u201d The trial court accordingly found that the petition for change of venue filed in open court by defendant \u201ccontains scurrilous, libelous and defamatory statements directed at this court.\u201d The trial court found these statements were \u201cwithout any foundation\u201d and \u201care insulting and repugnant to the dignity of the court.\u201d The court found these statements \u201cobstruct justice and normal and necessary administration of justice by this court.\u201d It was accordingly ordered that defendant be held in direct contempt and fined $100 to be paid within 30 days. The motion for change of venue was denied.\nThe power of a court to punish for contempt is of ancient origin. It might well be stated that this power exists not so much to maintain the dignity of a court or of any individual judge but to make certain that the power of administration of justice vested in the court should be freely exercised and not impeded. It has been authoritatively held that contempt proceedings are not quite civil and not quite criminal. The accepted description of the power to punish for contempt is that it is sui generis and therefore has both civil and criminal characteristics. Marcisz v. Marcisz (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 206, 208-09, 357 N.E.2d 477, quoting from People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 407, 409-10, 173 N.E.2d 417.\nReviewing courts have also had occasion to define the phrase \u201ccontempt of court.\u201d The generally accepted definition has been stated in People ex rel. Kunce v. Hogan (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 55, 59-60, 364 N.E.2d 50, cert, denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1023, 54 L. Ed. 2d 771, 98 S. Ct. 750, quoting from In re Estate of Melody (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 451, 452, 248 N.E.2d 104:\n\u2018Contempt of court has been generally defined as conduct calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or to derogate from its authority or dignity, or bring the administration of law into disrepute.\u2019 \u201d\nThe definition of \u201ccontempt\u201d has been expanded by delimiting the meaning of the phrases \u201cdirect contempt\u201d and \u201cindirect contempt.\u201d In People v. McNeil (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1038, 356 N.E.2d 1073, this court stated:\n\u201cDirect contempt takes place in the presence of the court and all elements of the offense are matters within the court\u2019s personal observation and knowledge [citation], while an indirect contempt is one which in whole or an essential part occurred out of the presence of the court and is dependent for its proof upon extrinsic evidence of some kind.\u201d\nAnother distinction has been traditionally made between \u201ccivil\u201d and \u201ccriminal\u201d contempt. This court illuminated that distinction in 47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 233, 371 N.E.2d 294:\n\u201cProceedings in the nature of \u2018civil\u2019 contempts are defined as those prosecuted to enforce the rights of private parties and to compel obedience to orders or decrees for the benefit of opposing parties. [Citation.] Proceedings in the nature of criminal contempt are defined as those directed to the preservation of the dignity and authority of the court [citation], or a judge acting judicially [citation].\u201d\nFinally, it should be noted, as stated in 47th b State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 233, that the power to punish for contempt of court \u201cis inherent in all courts as essential to proper and effective functioning of the courts and to the administration of justice\u201d and, \u201cis an essential auxiliary to the administration of the law.\u201d\nIn the case before us the second petition for change of venue, submitted and filed in open court by defendant, is classified without difficulty. The very filing of the petition constituted contempt of the court. Filing of this document in open court is in itself sufficient to support a finding of direct contempt in the presence of the court so as to authorize summary punishment of the offender. (See People v. Graves (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 279, 284, 384 N.E.2d 1311.) Also, the contempt is direct rather than indirect. (People v. McNeil (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 1036,1038.) Therefore, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary. The contempt was criminal in its nature, so that these proceedings are directed to the preservation of the authority of the court. See 47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 233.\nIt follows that the order appealed from was properly entered. Perhaps the closest case to the situation here at bar is People v. Baxter (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 286, 278 N.E.2d 777. There, the contemnor filed a petition for substitution of judges in a criminal case. The charges and language used in that document are comparable to the case before us. The supreme court affirmed a summary finding of contempt and a punishment of incarceration for one year. In the instant case, the able trial judge was apparently of a forgiving nature. The punishment of a fine of $100 is inconsequential.\nThe order appealed from is accordingly affirmed.\nOrder affirmed.\nMcGLOON and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Beatrice L. Robinson, of Chicago, for appellant, pro se.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Jane Clark Casey and Penny Nathan Kahan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEATRICE L. ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 80-1328\nOpinion filed September 28,1981.\nBeatrice L. Robinson, of Chicago, for appellant, pro se.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Jane Clark Casey and Penny Nathan Kahan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0660-01", "first_page_order": 682, "last_page_order": 685 }