{ "id": 3082016, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HOPSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hopson", "decision_date": "1981-11-12", "docket_number": "No. 81-82", "first_page": "564", "last_page": "576", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 564" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3129590 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070111 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422397 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358649 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473573 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7-8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476149 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3316452 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3222953 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599-600" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473887 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" }, { "page": "331-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 U.S. 637", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181278 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/426/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427338 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12162083, 12162052, 12162150, 12162122, 12162026, 12162061, 12162031, 12162095, 12162038, 12162167, 12162136, 12162072, 12162108, 12162045 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0970-08", "/us/430/0970-05", "/us/430/0970-13", "/us/430/0970-11", "/us/430/0970-01", "/us/430/0970-06", "/us/430/0970-02", "/us/430/0970-09", "/us/430/0970-03", "/us/430/0970-14", "/us/430/0970-12", "/us/430/0970-07", "/us/430/0970-10", "/us/430/0970-04" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429030 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5540457 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3191822 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 1099", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383338 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 N.E.2d 1079", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3280293 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0221-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 987, "char_count": 28751, "ocr_confidence": 0.907, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2815644798684466e-07, "percentile": 0.6176560872853977 }, "sha256": "bd57ebe8033b6d61134a84a37210a9fe714864fbcb5e5fc9b363ac7d92a03b2d", "simhash": "1:b139f56cf1858871", "word_count": 4844 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:21:39.102418+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HOPSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE REINHARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, William Hopson, entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State\u2019s Attorney. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his plea. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant now appeals and alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on that motion.\nOn June 14, 1979, defendant was charged in a five-count indictment with the offense of murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1.) On December 6,1979, at a conference held pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 402) and prior to the court\u2019s acceptance of defendant\u2019s guilty plea, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney related that the defendant\u2019s guilty plea was to be entered pursuant to a plea agreement whereby defendant agreed to testify in the prosecution of two co-defendants in cases which arose from the same incident. In return for the defendant\u2019s testimony, the State agreed to recommend that defendant receive 20 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The court then concurred in the plea agreement. Immediately thereafter, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder as alleged in count I. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1).\nThe court then informed the defendant of the charges against him as follows:\n\u201cNow, the nature of the charge is that on or about May 21,1979, in DuPage County, you committed the offense of murder in that, without lawful justification and with intent to kill Scott Brunoehler, you strangled Scott Brunoehler, thereby causing the death of Scott Brunoehler * \u201d\nIn response to the question of whether he understood the charges, the defendant said, \u201cYes. I do.\u201d The court then admonished the defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402, and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney _articulated the factual basis for the guilty plea as follows.\nOn May 21, 1979, the body of Scott R. Brunoehler, an inmate at the Du Page County jail, was discovered hanging from a light fixture in the jail. The defendant was also incarcerated in the jail at the time of Brunoehler\u2019s death. Investigation by the Du Page County sheriff\u2019s office revealed that Brunoehler\u2019s death was caused by defendant and two other inmates, James Devin and Robert Gan gestead.\nThe defendant\u2019s participation in the crime involved holding down the victim\u2019s feet while one of the other individuals held down his arms and the third individual strangled the victim with a rope. The defendant and Robert Gangestead then held up the victim\u2019s body while James Devin tied the rope around a padlock, apparently suspended from the ceiling, \u201cin such a manner as to make it appear as if the offense had been a suicide\nOn May 24, 1979, defendant gave a full confession to Detectives Tanke and Glinski of the Du Page County Sheriff\u2019s Office. In the confession, Hopson indicated that James Devin told him that there was going to be a \u201cblanket party.\u201d Defendant observed James Devin take out a rope which had been braided from bed sheets and make the statement \u201c[sjnitches don\u2019t live.\u201d The defendant made similar confessions to Detective Allen McKechnie, assistant State\u2019s Attorneys Charles Emery and Robert Anderson on May 25, 1979, and to Deputy Robert Quinn of the sheriff\u2019s office on May 30,1979.\nAfter the assistant State\u2019s Attorney articulated the factual basis for the plea the following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cMR. ANDERSON: I believe that the defendant has indicated that he is pleading guilty because he did so participate.\nIs that correct, Mr. Hopson?\nDEFENDANT HOPSON : I\u2019m sorry, Yes.\nTHE COURT: Are those the facts that the State\u2019s evidence would show, Mr. Hopson?\nDEFENDANT HOPSON: Yes.\u201d\nThe court then accepted defendant\u2019s plea of guilty and set the date for the sentencing hearing.\nAt the sentencing hearing on May 1, 1980, the State nolle pressed counts II through V in the indictment and recommended a sentence of 20 years in the Department of Corrections. In response to a question from the court, the defendant stated:\n\u201cI just \u2014 from what I \u2014 I\u2019ve already talked to the State\u2019s Attorney, and they\u2019ve explained pretty much what is happening and all the questions have been answered so far.\nI just was wondering if the Court could reduce the charge, but I\u2019ve been informed that you could not. That\u2019s the only question I had.\u201d\nThe court then sentenced defendant to 20 years in the Department of Corrections.\nThereafter, defendant filed a motion to vacate the plea of guilty on May 30, 1980, and new counsel was appointed to represent him. In an amended motion to vacate the plea the defendant alleged:\n\u201c6. That there was not substantial compliance with said Supreme Court Rule 402, Chapter 110A, Illinois Revised Statutes. In that, the court did not properly inform him of the nature of the charges pending against him as the Defendant was not advised that intent was an element of the crime that he was pleading guilty to.\n7. That the record of the plea of guilty does not state a proper factual basis upon which to base a plea of guilty to the crime of murder.\n8. That your Petitioner maintained and continues to maintain that he never intended to murder the victim herein.\u201d\nAt the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, defendant Hopson testified that on December 6,1979, the day the plea was entered, he was given the drugs adapin and tranxene by Deputy Quinn prior to being brought to court. Hopson stated that he had met with attorney William (sic) Zimmerman three or four times prior to the entry of the guilty plea and that at no time did Zimmerman explain the elements of the offense of murder or explain the element of intent. Hopson could not remember the events of the day the guilty plea was entered because his attention was diverted elsewhere. He testified that as the State\u2019s Attorney was relating the factual basis for the guilty plea, his lawyer was informing him that his wife had left for Florida with his son. Finally, when asked if he understood from his conversations with Zimmerman, the State\u2019s Attorney, and the Judge, that the offense of murder involved the element of intent, Hopson replied, \u201cI, I presumed it, but he never explained it to me.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Hopson stated that his lawyer gave him the impression that if he didn\u2019t plead guilty, he would receive the death penalty. The defendant also indicated that he could not recall other portions of the proceedings concerning the guilty plea because \u201cwhen he told me I was going to get 20 years, I was in a state of shock.\u201d Hopson further testified that the drugs adapin and tranxene were administered to him to calm him down. The drugs were supposed to be administered at different times, but, defendant stated, on December 6, both drugs were administered at the same time by Deputy Quinn.\nOn redirect examination, defendant testified that he responded, \u201cI\u2019m sorry, [y]es\u201d to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s question at the December 6, 1979, hearing regarding defendant\u2019s participation in the crime because he did not hear what was said. He also stated that, in his opinion, the drugs he had taken on December 6 impaired his ability to think. Lastly, Hopson testified that had he known that the State would have to prove that he intended to kill the victim, he would not have pleaded guilty.\nThe State then called David Disharoon, who is employed as a senior medical officer for the Du Page County sheriff\u2019s department. Disharoon is responsible for the administration of medication to the residents of the Du Page County jail. A record of defendant Hopson\u2019s physical examination indicated that he was receiving one tablet of 22.5 milligrams of tranxene and one tablet of 30 milligrams of dalmene daily. Disharoon classified these drugs as mild tranquilizers. Disharoon stated that, in his opinion, people taking these types of medication do not have any particular difficulty understanding what is happening around them, and they are able to understand questions asked them. On cross-examination, Disharoon testified that although the two drugs are never administered together, if they were, \u201cyou would not be totally confused, but you would be very sleepy and you would probably sleep.\u201d\nArthur H. Zimmerman, defendant\u2019s lawyer who represented him during the entry of the guilty plea, testified that he had spoken with Hopson seven or eight times prior to the entry of the guilty plea and that they discussed the matter of the guilty plea and the possibility of defenses on those occasions. On December 6, 1979, prior to the time the plea was entered, the two discussed the plea one final time and whether it would be more prudent for Hopson to defend the matter. Zimmerman and Hopson discussed using the defense of compulsion and whether the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office would accept a plea of manslaughter. On that day, Zimmerman could not notice any marked difference in Hopson\u2019s manner. Hopson was competent and understood what was said to him. During Hopson\u2019s contacts with Zimmerman, Hopson never related that he wanted to withdraw his plea of guilty.\nOn cross-examination, Zimmerman stated that Hopson during a part of the time was not paying full attention to the proceeding during the entry of the guilty plea because he was asking Zimmerman about his marital situation and child custody. Zimmerman indicated that he did not discuss in specificity the element of intent with Hopson but that Hopson had frequently told him that he did not intend to kill anyone.\nRobert Anderson, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney who had been assigned to prosecute Hopson, was then called by the State. Anderson had conversed with Hopson on December 6,1979, just prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Anderson testified that Hopson seemed fully aware of what was occurring and was competent to enter the guilty plea.\nDefendant was granted leave to amend the motion to vacate to conform to the evidence that he had ingested some drugs prior to coming to court on December 6,1979. After hearing arguments from both sides, the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to vacate his guilty plea.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate his plea of guilty because the factual basis for the plea contained in the record was inadequate to support the charge of murder.\nSupreme Court Rule 402(c) requires that the trial court first determine the factual basis of a guilty plea before it enters final judgment on the plea. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 402(c).) A factual basis for a plea of guilty may be established in a number of ways. The prosecuting attorney may summarize the testimony he would present; the facts in the case may be stated by witnesses; or, the facts of the case may be determined from an examination of the presentence report. (People v. Lumley (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 221, 223, 394 N.E.2d 1079.) In the present case, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney recited a factual basis for the plea as set forth above and related the substance of a confession by the defendant given on several occasions. At the conclusion of this recitation, defendant\u2019s attorney stipulated to and defendant acknowledged the truth of the facts asserted.\nHowever, defendant asserts that the facts read into the record do not conform to the charge contained in count I of the indictment. Count I alleges that William Hopson \u201cwithout lawful justification and with the intent to kill Scott Brunoehler strangled Scott Brunoehler thereby causing the death of Scott Brunoehler at a time when Scott Brunoehler was an inmate in the DuPage County Jail.\u201d The factual basis as read into the record by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney demonstrated that defendant\u2019s involvement in the crime consisted of holding the victim\u2019s feet down while James Devin strangled the victim. The fact that defendant was not the one who actually strangled the victim is not significant. The factual basis clearly exhibits that defendant would be guilty of the offense of murder pursuant to a theory of accountability. Section 5 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that a person is accountable for the conduct of another when \u201c[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) The defendant was properly charged in count I of the indictment since it is well established that a person who commits an offense under accountability principles can be charged and tried under an indictment for the substantive offense. People v. Buffington (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 899, 902, 366 N.E.2d 1099.\nDefendant further contends, however, that the facts fall short of establishing his guilt on a theory of accountability since, to be accountable for the acts of another, the defendant must have the concurrent specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. (People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 59, 68, 405 N.E.2d 1121.) Defendant asserts that, although the factual basis indicates that he held the victim\u2019s feet down, the record does not establish that he was aware that he was facilitating the murder of the victim, and thus, he lacked the necessary, specific intent. This assertion is not borne out by the record. The record indicates that just prior to the victim\u2019s murder, James Devin told defendant that there was going to be a \u201cblanket party\u201d and that \u201csnitches don\u2019t live.\u201d Also, the record indicates that, once it became apparent to defendant that a murder was taking place, defendant did not attempt to prevent the commission of the offense or retract his actions in any way. In fact, after the murder, defendant helped the other inmates in hanging the body from the ceiling of the jail in an attempt to make it appear as if the death was caused by suicide. Although mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make a person accountable for the criminal acts of another, proof of a common design can be drawn from the circumstances surrounding commission of the act. (People v. Kelly (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 400, 404, 411 N.E.2d 1012.) We need not decide whether this evidence would have been sufficient to prove that defendant had the requisite intent if the case had gone to trial. It is clear that the quantum of proof necessary to determine if there is a factual basis for the plea is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction after a full trial. (People v. Nyberg (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 210, 215, 356 N.E.2d 80, cert. denied (1977), 430 U.S. 970, 52 L. Ed. 2d 362, 97 S. Ct. 1654.) Accordingly, we find that the factual basis for defendant\u2019s plea of guilty was clearly sufficient.\nDefendant next asserts that his motion to withdraw his plea should have been allowed since it was not made voluntarily. Defendant contends that he did not understand the nature of the charge with regard to the requirement of the element of intent for the offense of murder. He further argues that his attorney never explained the indictment to him; that the attorney never explained the elements of the crime to him, particularly that of intent; and that he continually maintained to his attorney that he did not intend to kill anyone. At the time the plea of guilty was entered by the defendant, the court informed the defendant of the nature of the charge against him by stating that defendant was charged with committing the offense of murder \u201cwithout lawful justification and with intent to kill \u00b0 * When asked if he understood the nature of the charge against him, defendant responded, \u201cYes. I do.\u201d Supreme Court Rule 402(a) has been interpreted to require the trial judge to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge and ascertain whether the defendant understands it prior to accepting a plea of guilty. (People v. Robinson (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 141, 145, 345 N.E.2d 465.) From our review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial judge complied with the requirements of Rule 402.\nDefendant, however, cites Henderson v. Morgan (1976), 426 U.S. 637, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253, in support of his contention that his misapprehension of law rendered his plea involuntary. In Henderson, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. He later pleaded guilty to the charge of second-degree murder in the State trial court without having been informed by the court of the necessary element of intent to kill. After exhausting his State remedies, defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in a Federal district court alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was unaware that intent to kill was a necessary element of second-degree murder. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the court held that defendant\u2019s conviction was entered without due process since he did not receive adequate notice of the offense, and hence, his plea was involuntary.\nHowever, we view the recent Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Barker (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 319, 415 N.E.2d 404, as being more relevant. In Barker, defendant pleaded guilty in the trial court to two counts of attempted murder. The defendant\u2019s plea was entered pursuant to an agreement with the State whereby the State agreed to nolle pros the other counts in the indictment along with several other unrelated offenses. It was also agreed that defendant would not receive a sentence of more than 20 years. At the hearing, the defendant was not informed that intent to kill was a necessary element of the offense. The defendant then agreed in substance with the factual basis of the plea as stated by the State\u2019s Attorney. Later, at the sentencing hearing, defendant stated, \u201cI never had no intentions of taking no one\u2019s life.\u201d The court then imposed a sentence of 20 years. The defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the trial court denied it. The defendant alleged in the supreme court, among other-things, that his pleas were not voluntary since the trial judge failed to admonish him that intent to kill was an essential element of attempted murder.\nThe supreme court rejected this argument and held that the trial judge\u2019s admonishments to the defendant were sufficient and that defendant had failed to establish a basis for withdrawal of his guilty plea. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the indictments adequately alleged the element of intent, the indictments were read to the defendant before his guilty pleas were accepted, the defendant had received copies of the indictments prior to the hearing, and the defendant indicated at the hearing that he had no question about \u201cwhat the charge is or what it means.\u201d The court stated that the record satisfactorily showed that the defendant was informed of the nature of the charges, including the requirement of the specific intent to commit murder, and that he understood the nature of the charges. (83 Ill. 2d 319, 330, 415 N.E.2d 404.) The court then distinguished Henderson v. Morgan in the following manner:\n\u201cA significant difference between our case and Henderson is found in the fact that no formal charge of second-degree murder was ever made against the defendant in Henderson. He had originally been charged with first-degree murder, a crime which requires a different mental state than second-degree murder.\nIn our case, unlike in Henderson, the indictment informed the defendant that he was charged with performing certain acts with the intent to commit murder. Since he was charged with having the requisite mental state, as the court stated in Henderson, this element of the offense could be proved by the objective evidence that the defendant fired the shotgun in the direction of the officers. From the evidence summarized in the statement of the factual basis, a jury could find the defendant guilty of attempted murder regardless of his protestations that he did not intend to kill anyone when he fired the gun. We therefore do not agree with the defendant\u2019s contention that his statement made at the sentencing hearing negated the requisite mental state or that it put the court on notice of his misapprehension of the law so as to render his pleas involuntary.\u201d 83 Ill. 2d 319, 331-32, 415 N.E.2d 404, 409-10.\nHenderson v. Morgan is inapplicable to the present case for the same reasons. The indictment charged the defendant with committing the act with the intent to kill. Unlike Henderson, the defendant did not plead guilty to a crime with which he was never charged. Also, much the same procedure that was followed in Barker was followed in the present case. Defendant acknowledged that he had received a copy of the indictment prior to the hearing, and the indictment alleged that defendant acted with \u201cintent to kill Scott Brunoehler.\u201d The trial judge informed defendant of the charge against him, including the fact that defendant had acted with the intent to kill, and defendant acknowledged that he understood.\nSupreme Court Rule 402 does not require the court to explain to the defendant separately each of the elements of the offense. It requires that he be informed of \u201cthe nature of the charge.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 402(a)(1).) There is sufficient compliance with the Rule if an ordinary person in the circumstances of the defendant would understand what the charges are. (People v. Bennett (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599-600, 403 N.E.2d 50.) A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by the failure to inform the defendant expressly that the charged offense requires proof of specific intent. People v. Cosey (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 670, 672-75, 384 N.E.2d 95.\nNext, defendant contends that his plea was involuntary because his mental state was altered due to the ingestion of certain drugs. Deputy David Disharoon testified that the drugs that defendant had been receiving would not cause a person to have any particular difficulty in understanding what is happening around him. Defendant\u2019s suggestion that his incoherence was caused by ingesting two different drugs at the same time was contradicted by Disharoon\u2019s testimony that tranxene and dalmene were never administered together at the jail, and, if they were, they would not cause the person to become confused but merely sleepy. Also, both Arthur Zimmerman and assistant State\u2019s Attorney Robert Anderson testified that defendant was competent and understood the proceedings on December 6, 1979. Allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea is, under Rule 604(d), a matter for the trial court\u2019s discretion. (People v. Hale (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 172, 175-76, 411 N.E.2d 867.) We do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s rejection of this contention. '\nDefendant\u2019s next arguments on appeal, i.e., that his plea should be vacated because of his lawyer\u2019s statement that if defendant didn\u2019t plead guilty he would receive the death penalty and because he was not paying full attention to the proceedings on December 6 because of his preoccupation with his marital difficulties, are not properly before this court. These issues were not raised in the defendant\u2019s motions to withdraw and could be deemed as waived. (People v. Adkisson (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 1, 7-8, 413 N.E.2d 1238.) Supreme Court Rule 604(d) provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cUpon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 604(d); see also People v. Bennett (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599, 403 N.E.2d 50.)\nEven if these issues were not waived by defendant\u2019s failure to include them in the motion to withdraw, the record indicates that defendant\u2019s counsel denied telling him that if he didn\u2019t plead guilty he would get the death penalty. Also, the evidence was disputed as to defendant\u2019s attentiveness at the time the plea of guilty was entered. Both of these contentions appear to have been considered and rejected by the trial judge. From our review of the record, we cannot say that this conclusion was an abuse of discretion.\nDefendant next contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the proceedings on his motion to vacate his guilty plea. Defendant first cites his counsel\u2019s failure to file a certificate in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 604(d).) Rule 604(d) provides in relevant part:\n\u201cThe defendant\u2019s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by mail or in person to ascertain his contentions of error in the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 604(d).)\nAlthough we do not approve of counsel\u2019s failure to file the certificate, Illinois.courts have held that strict compliance with the filing provision of 604(d) is not necessary where the record reveals that counsel has performed all the functions required by the Rule. (People v. Lange (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 603, 605, 375 N.E.2d 919; People v. Thompson (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 100, 101, 372 N.E.2d 1105.) In such a case, the failure to file the certificate will be viewed as harmless error. (Lange, at 605; Thompson, at 101.) We believe that this is the case here. The record shows that a transcript of the December 6,1979, plea of guilty was filed on May 2,1980. A motion to vacate the plea of guilty was filed on May 30, 1980, and an amended motion to vacate the plea of guilty was filed on August 14,1980, which alleged that defendant lacked the requisite intent and that he was unaware that intent was an element of the crime. The amended motion also alleged an inadequate factual basis. At the hearing on this motion, defendant\u2019s counsel ably questioned witnesses with regard to the defendant\u2019s intent, his ingestion of drugs, and his state of mind at the time of the entry of the guilty plea. Defendant\u2019s counsel was then granted leave to amend the motion to reflect the fact that defendant had ingested drugs on December 6, 1979, prior to the time of the entry of the guilty plea. Further, it appears from our examination of the record of this hearing that defendant\u2019s counsel had examined the court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty. We find it evident from the record that defendant\u2019s attorney consulted with the defendant personally to ascertain his contentions of error in the entry of the plea of guilty, that the attorney examined the court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and that he made amendments necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings. Also, as in People v. Lange, the defendant was advised by the court in strict compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402. (People v. Lange (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 603, 605, 375 N.E.2d 919.) Under these facts counsel\u2019s failure to file the certificate as required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) was harmless error.\nThe defendant also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty by his counsel\u2019s failure to present allegations at that hearing on the inadequate representation of defendant by the counsel representing him at the time he entered his plea of guilty.\nOur independent review of the record discloses no evidence of actual incompetence of either of defendant\u2019s previous counsel which produced substantial prejudice to defendant and without which the result of the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to vacate would have been different. (People v. Greer (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 103, 120-21, 402 N.E.2d 203; People v. Scott (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 159, 418 N.E.2d 805.) We therefore hold that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel on his motion to vacate his guilty plea.\nFrom a careful review of the record, we find nothing to show that the trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or that the ends of justice would be better served by submitting the case to trial.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNASH and LINDBERG, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE REINHARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charmaine Tellefsen, of Tellefsen and Learn, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM HOPSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 81-82\nOpinion filed November 12, 1981.\nCharmaine Tellefsen, of Tellefsen and Learn, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Barbara A. Preiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0564-01", "first_page_order": 586, "last_page_order": 598 }