{
  "id": 3084405,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CHAMPION, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Champion",
  "decision_date": "1981-11-13",
  "docket_number": "No. 17233",
  "first_page": "670",
  "last_page": "672",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 670"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 737",
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      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:21:39.102418+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CHAMPION, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCan a trial judge issue a \u201cCertificate of Importance\u201d in a criminal case?\nCan he sua sponte order an appeal following a negotiated plea of guilty?\nNegative \u2014 on both.\nNo authority.\nOn March 24, 1980, Champion was charged by information with aggravated battery in which it was alleged that on March 23 he had intentionally caused great bodily harm to Donald Estes by striking Estes in the face several times.\nSome 14 months later \u2014 on May 22, 1981, Champion filed a motion for discharge based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. A hearing was held on this motion on June 2, 1981, and the motion was denied on June 4.\nAfter a recess following the denial of the speedy trial motion, the court was informed that the defendant had decided to enter a negotiated plea. The court then carefully advised Champion of the nature of the charge, the possible penalties, his right to a jury or bench trial, the terms of the plea agreement, and the agreed sentence of 2 years. After finding a factual basis, the court then accepted Champion\u2019s plea and sentenced him to a term of 2 years.\nThe trial judge then advised Champion that before he could appeal he would have to file a motion asking that the plea of guilty be set aside and that if that motion was allowed, and he went to trial, the misdemean- or case that had been dismissed by the State could be reinstated. The judge stated that any errors not set forth in the motion would be waived for purposes of appeal.\nThen \u2014 Judge White made these comments:\n\u201cGentlemen, I feel that this petition for discharge was of such importance, and that the law is sort of in a hazy condition, on my own motion I\u2019m going to appoint the Appellate Defender to represent him on the ruling on the motion for discharge, and I\u2019m going to let him appeal that on my own motion, whether he wants to or not. * * *.\nSo, on my own motion, e \u201d e I\u2019m going to issue a Certificate of Importance out of the trial court to the Appellate Court of the Fourth District, and let those folks determine whether or not I was right in my ruling under the circumstances of this case.\nNot going to hurt anything. If I\u2019m right, then he\u2019s got his negotiated plea; if I\u2019m wrong, then he shouldn\u2019t be penalized. If I\u2019m reversed on that finding, then this whole thing will be set aside and that will be it.\u201d\nThis concluded the proceedings. The same day, a notice of appeal was filed.\nWell, these \u201cfolks\u201d remand.\nAfter correctly admonishing defendant as to the procedure necessary to effect an appeal from his plea, the trial court decided that, on its own motion, a \u201cCertificate of Importance\u201d (!) would be issued to this court so that the denial of the speedy trial motion for discharge could be reviewed. This perhaps well-intentioned \u2014 but equally misguided \u2014 action by the trial judge in fact deprived defendant of his right to appeal following a guilty plea. Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 604(d)) clearly mandates that no appeal may be taken following a plea of guilty unless the defendant, within 30 days of sentencing, files a motion to withdraw his plea in the trial court.\nThe trial judge attempted to fashion a novel method of review. But it won\u2019t wash. Rule 604(d) is a model of lucidity and clarity: no appeal without first a motion to withdraw. Judge White meticulously advised defendant of this proper procedure, but then turned around and completely countermanded it \u2014 emasculated the admonishment \u2014 by sua sponte declaring a \u201cCertificate of Importance\u201d (for which we are aware of no authority) and ordering an appeal himself. He, quite effectively, destroyed the validity of the correct procedure by immediately fashioning an incorrect one. The second cancelled the first and defendant was left in limbo \u2014 as though he had not been properly advised at all as to his appeal rights.\nAlthough a limited exception to Rule 604(d) exists where both the State and defendant agree that the record on appeal permits an evaluation of the merits of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (People v. Petrovich (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 737, 396 N.E.2d 629), such is not the case here. Not only does this defendant argue that further proceedings in the circuit court are required herein, but the issue of a speedy trial has been neither briefed nor argued.\nDefendant\u2019s failure to file a motion to vacate is certainly understandable, given the action of the trial court. The only way to rectify the situation and to protect his appellate rights is to remand with instructions that he be allowed to file a motion to vacate if he so desires. The current state of the record raises at least a particle of a question as to whether Champion understood that his plea of guilty would waive any claim that he had been denied a speedy trial, and he did not receive any specific admonishments on this point.\nRemanded with directions.\nTRAPP, P. J., and GREEN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE MILLS"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Charles M. Schiedel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Lee J. Plummer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jerseyville (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CECIL CHAMPION, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 17233\nOpinion filed November 13, 1981.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Charles M. Schiedel, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLee J. Plummer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Jerseyville (Robert J. Biderman, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0670-01",
  "first_page_order": 692,
  "last_page_order": 694
}