{ "id": 3075028, "name": "DAVID ZEUNERT, Indiv. and d/b/a David Zeunert and Associates, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUAIL RIDGE PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Zeunert v. Quail Ridge Partnership", "decision_date": "1981-12-14", "docket_number": "No. 80-2789", "first_page": "603", "last_page": "609", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 603" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128654 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 932", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336556 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3407645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3407577 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290695 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3182963 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 875", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3160461 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785531 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S. Ct. 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 11307042 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L. Ed. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 1060", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11439712, 11439558, 11439622, 11439596, 11439642, 11439677 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/1060-06", "/us/444/1060-01", "/us/444/1060-03", "/us/444/1060-02", "/us/444/1060-04", "/us/444/1060-05" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991699 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0393-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 676, "char_count": 13381, "ocr_confidence": 0.899, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4487057806291817e-07, "percentile": 0.654624265739045 }, "sha256": "57c9e96ea827e1089e42f1629f522108135033a1076ca437973e781a0ad67006", "simhash": "1:7b7bde171ec3d720", "word_count": 2145 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:07:42.734695+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAVID ZEUNERT, Indiv. and d/b/a David Zeunert and Associates, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUAIL RIDGE PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal involves one aspect of litigation brought by David Zeunert, individually, and doing business as David Zeunert and Associates (plaintiff), against Quail Ridge Partnership, a partnership, Curtis Brink, Paul E. Magnuson, Thomas J. Ellefson and Raymond Dryer, doing business as Quail Ridge Partnership (defendants). Plaintiff seeks reversal of an order quashing personal service of summons in the State of Wisconsin upon the defendants Thomas J. Ellefson and Paul E. Magnuson. No brief has been filed in this court by defendant Magnuson.\nPlaintiff is an architect doing business in Illinois. In count I of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, against all of the defendants, plaintiff alleged the four named individuals were partners doing business as Quail Ridge Partnership. It is alleged plaintiff met with three of the defendants in Wisconsin about March 20, 1979. Defendants represented that the partnership had purchased Wisconsin land for development of a Federally funded housing project. The defendants informed plaintiff they desired to employ him as architect for the entire project. Defendants agreed to follow Federal guidelines for plaintiff\u2019s fees.\nPlaintiff also alleged that about May 21, 1979, plaintiff met with defendant Curtis Brink in plaintiff\u2019s office in Chicago. Plaintiff was \u201cinformed by Brink to proceed with\u201d the project. About May 30, 1979, plaintiff \u201ccontacted\u201d defendant Magnuson. Plaintiff was told the project was not proceeding and plaintiff should bill defendants for his services to date. The complaint prayed damages of $44,736 for architectural services.\nThe pertinent facts appear from the motions and the affidavits filed by defendants Ellefson and Magnuson in support of their motions to quash service of summons and responses thereto together with affidavits filed by plaintiff.\nEllefson stated under oath that he has been a resident of Wisconsin for 31 years. He met with plaintiff in Wisconsin on March 20,1979. He had no other or further contact with plaintiff. The meeting concerned a housing project in Wisconsin. Ellefson entered into no agreement with plaintiff and never agreed to pay plaintiff for services. Ellefson had no prior or subsequent contact with plaintiff. Ellefson had no contact or correspondence with plaintiff in Illinois. Ellefson also stated he was never a partner and was never involved in Quail Ridge Partnership.\nDefendant Magnuson stated under oath he was in his office in Wisconsin in late February or early March 1979. Plaintiff called him there and asked about a proposed housing project in Wisconsin. Magnuson met with plaintiff in Wisconsin on March 20,1979, and again on April 30,1979. Magnuson received one telephone call in Wisconsin from plaintiff after April 30, 1979. He entered into no written or verbal agreement with plaintiff and never agreed to pay plaintiff for services. Magnuson never sent or received correspondence from plaintiff other than proposed copies of minutes of the meeting held in Wisconsin on March 20, 1979. Magnuson is not a resident of Illinois, never made agreements in Illinois and never conducted business in Illinois. He never was a partner in Quail Ridge Partnership and no partnership was ever established regarding the proposed housing project in Wisconsin.\nPlaintiff filed an affidavit in which he stated he met with Brink, Magnuson and Ellefson on March 20,1979, in Wisconsin. He told them he was a licensed architect and exhibited some of his work. The three defendants told him they were partners who owned land in Wisconsin. They wished to employ plaintiff\u2019s services as an architect for a housing project. The name of their partnership was Quail Ridge Partnership. Another meeting in Wisconsin was held on April 23,1979, with defendants Brink and Magnuson. Both \u201cindicated\u201d to plaintiff that they were accepting the work plaintiff had done. Plaintiff also met at his offices in Illinois with defendant Brink. Brink did not deny existence of the partnership. Brink \u201cindicated\u201d that \u201che was accepting the work\u201d plaintiff had performed \u201cfor the partnership.\u201d Brink told plaintiff the fees would be paid.\nPlaintiff also stated about May 30,1979, he called Magnuson who told him the partnership had given up the option on the land and he should bill the partnership for work to date. All work by plaintiff, such as on drawings or plans, was performed in plaintiffs office in Chicago.\nAn additional affidavit was filed by defendant Ellefson. This affidavit included a copy of proposed minutes of the Wisconsin meeting held March 20, 1979, prepared by plaintiff, unsigned by any of the parties. It appeared from these proposed minutes that plaintiff stated a retainer would necessarily be negotiated regarding payment for his services. The affidavit states no retainer was ever agreed upon and no other agreement was reached. Defendant Ellefson never entered into any partnership agreement with any of the other defendants.\nThis appeal involves only the order entered by the trial judge on May 28, 1980, quashing service and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction as regards defendants Ellefson and Magnus on and a subsequent order denying the motion of plaintiff to vacate and reconsider this order.\nDiscussion of the legal problems created by these facts must commence from examination of the pertinent statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 17):\n\u201c(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:\n(a) The transaction of any business within this State;\n(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State; * *\nIt is undisputed that plaintiff was at all times doing business in the State of Illinois. Defendants Ellefson and Magnuson were residents of the State of Wisconsin. Thus, the issue, generally speaking, is whether these defendants have transacted business within the State of Illinois so as to bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the State in accordance with the statute. Many cases have considered the application of this statute. In Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 393, 402, 389 N.E.2d 155, cert. denied (1980), 444 U.S. 1060, 62 L. Ed. 2d 738, 100 S. Ct. 992, the court cited with approval the following statement from Nelson v. Miller (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673:\n\u201c \u2018Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due-process clause.\u2019 \u201d\nThe next problem is a delineation as to what extent the due process provision authorizes jurisdiction by the courts of this State over a nonresident.\nIn Chandler Leasing Co. v. Trus Joist Corp. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 875, 880, 414 N.E.2d 15, this court with a citation of the pertinent cases, made this definitive statement:\n\u201cThe essence of the due process requirement under either a minimum contacts or substantial business test is that the activities within the State are such that it is reasonable to require a foreign corporation to defend a particular suit because they have sought the benefits and protection of the law of the forum and that requiring it to defend does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u201d\nIn addition, it is the duty of the trial court to pass upon the pertinent factual issues by consideration of the affidavits \u201cand any evidence adduced upon disputed issues of fact.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 20(2).) In this type of proceeding where \u201cjurisdiction is denied by the defendant, the burden of proving its presence rests on the party asserting it.\u201d Stephens v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965, 409 N.E.2d 423.\nSince no testimony was offered by the parties, it is the duty of this court to determine from all of the affidavits before it, and from the pertinent allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, whether the contacts of defendants Ellefson and Magnuson with the State of Illinois were of such a type or nature as to subject them to the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois under the statute first above cited.\nIt seems to us that plaintiff has in effect attempted primarily to assert the merits of his claim. For example, plaintiff depends strongly upon the statutory concept of partnership by estoppel. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 106/2, par. 16.) However, that is not the issue before us. The record here shows that a judgment has been entered in favor of plaintiff against the defendants \u201cQuail Ridge Partnership and Curtis Brink individually and as a partner in the Quail Ridge Partnership.\u201d However, the notice of appeal has established our jurisdiction only to determine the narrow issue of whether the courts of Illinois can properly exercise jurisdiction over the individual defendants Ellefson and Magnuson.\nAs regards the defendant Ellefson, it appears that he had no contact with the State of Illinois. He attended one meeting with plaintiff in Wisconsin. His affidavit denies that he ever retained the services of plaintiff or made any agreement to pay plaintiff anything. We conclude that he did not have sufficient contacts with Illinois so as to vest personal jurisdiction in the courts of this State over him. It is also important to note that defendant Ellefson did not at any time \u201cvoluntarily seek the benefits and protections of the laws of this State\u201d so that he became \u201csubject to the jurisdiction of our courts.\u201d Woodfield Ford, Inc. v. Akins Ford Corp. (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 343, 348, 395 N.E.2d 1131, citing Chicago Film Enterprises v. Jablanow (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 739, 371 N.E.2d 161.\nIt is also significant here that none of the activities of defendant Ellefson took place within Illinois. The few contacts Ellefson had with plaintiff were exclusively within the State of Wisconsin. The only solicitation of a contract here came from plaintiff and this was carried out, as regards defendant Ellefson, strictly and entirely within Wisconsin. Compare Morton v. Environmental Land Systems, Limited (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372, 370 N.E.2d 1106.\nPlaintiff also claims the courts of Illinois have jurisdiction because defendants Ellefson and Magnuson committed \u201ca tortious act within\u201d Illinois. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 17(1)(b).) Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged defendants committed fraud by knowingly representing that they \u201cowned\u201d the property in Wisconsin, when in fact they owned only an option to buy the property which they subsequently declined to exercise. Plaintiff contends a tort was committed in Illinois because his injury, i.e., his performance of services without being compensated, occurred in Illinois. We find plaintiff\u2019s contention without merit.\nWhen a defendant challenges jurisdiction, a court will make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the complaint states a legitimate cause of action \u201cto insure that acts or omissions which form the basis of a cause of action that is patently without merit will not serve to confer jurisdiction.\u201d (Wiedemann v. Cunard Line Limited (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 380 N.E.2d 932.) In the case at bar, it is abundantly clear that the basis of plaintiff\u2019s claim against these defendants is purely contractual and stems from the alleged breach of an alleged contract. The requisite elements of actionable fraud are not alleged in the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. (See Oltmer v. Zamora (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 651, 653, 418 N.E.2d 506.) Also, even if fraud were present, the representations concerning the interest of defendants in the land were made in Wisconsin. We believe plaintiff\u2019s count sounding in tort is legally insufficient and therefore cannot in itself serve as a basis for jurisdiction.\nDefendant Magnuson did not file a brief in the instant controversy. Nevertheless, a reviewing court should adjudicate an issue if \u201cthe record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief, e (First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493.) In the case at bar, the factual and legal issues in adjudicating jurisdiction over Magnuson are virtually identical to those addressed in adjudicating jurisdiction over defendant Ellefson. Furthermore, even accepting the factual statements in plaintiff\u2019s affidavits, we are impelled to conclude the trial court was correct in quashing service on defendant Magnuson. Therefore, we can readily dispose of the appeal regarding Magnuson without the benefit of another brief.\nFor these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P. J., and McGLOON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDBERG" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Robert E. Zeitner and Andrew W. Pipitone, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Baker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Edward J. Zulkey, and Donald B. Bruns, of counsel), for appellee Thomas J. Ellefson." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID ZEUNERT, Indiv. and d/b/a David Zeunert and Associates, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUAIL RIDGE PARTNERSHIP et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 80-2789\nOpinion filed December 14, 1981.\nLaw Offices of Robert E. Zeitner and Andrew W. Pipitone, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBaker & McKenzie, of Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Edward J. Zulkey, and Donald B. Bruns, of counsel), for appellee Thomas J. Ellefson." }, "file_name": "0603-01", "first_page_order": 625, "last_page_order": 631 }