{
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  "name": "VIRGINIA RANDALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUBIN NAUM, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Randall v. Naum",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "VIRGINIA RANDALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUBIN NAUM, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals from a jury verdict rendered for defendant in a suit seeking damages for plaintiff\u2019s injuries incurred when her automobile was struck by defendant\u2019s car. At the close of all the evidence on liability, the trial court held that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, but that the issue of contributory negligence was a question of fact for the jury. The issues raised on appeal are whether: (1) the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court properly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for a directed verdict; and (3) defense counsel\u2019s comment in closing argument denied plaintiff a fair trial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nAt trial, plaintiff, Virginia Randall, testified that at about 5:30 p.m. on October 18, 1974, she was driving in a southerly direction on the Stevenson Expressway with her two daughters as passengers. Her car occupied the left lane of three traffic lanes. She noticed that traffic was congested in all three lanes and that a traffic bottleneck had developed. She stopped her vehicle for approximately one minute. In her rearview mirror, she observed a car approaching from behind, the driver of which, defendant, was looking down. The front end of defendant\u2019s car collided with the rear end of hers, propelling it 20 to 30 feet forward. Her car did not touch the car in front of her, because traffic had begun to move again. She felt a sharp pain in her back, thumbs, neck and elbow and testified as to her injuries and medical treatment, which is not at issue in this appeal.\nDefendant Rubin Naum was called by plaintiff as an adverse witness under section 60 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 60). He testified that on the day and at the time of the accident, traffic was very heavy in all three southbound lanes and proceeded at a \u201cstop and go\u201d pace, with traffic moving \u201cbumper to bumper.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s car had been traveling in front of his at about 30 to 35 miles per hour when it suddenly came to \u201ca very fast stop,\u201d too quickly for him to avoid hitting it. It was difficult to determine how long Randall\u2019s car had been stopped before the accident; his estimate of this time interval ranged from a \u201cfraction of a second\u201d to a \u201cfew seconds.\u201d\nPlaintiff contends that she is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury\u2019s verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. We disagree. Naum testified that Randall\u2019s car had been traveling at about 30 to 35 miles per hour when it made an abrupt stop the instant before the accident. Although this testimony conflicts with Randall\u2019s, the responsibility of weighing the credibility of witnesses rests with the jury which directly observes their demeanor while testifying. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356, 226 N.E.2d 624.\nThe jury could have justifiably found Naum\u2019s version more credible than Randall\u2019s testimony that she had been stopped for approximately one minute just before the accident. Her testimony would have required the jury to believe that at the moment plaintiff stopped her car, defendant was almost one-half mile behind, assuming, as the jury could have based on the evidence, that defendant was traveling at about 30 to 35 miles per hour immediately before the accident. The jury could have considered it unlikely that cars would be approximately one-half mile apart during a congested rush hour on the Stevenson Expressway, with traffic proceeding at a stop and go pace, traveling bumper to bumper. Although Naum\u2019s estimate of how long Randall\u2019s car had been stopped before the collision varied from a \u201cfraction\u201d of a second to a \u201cfew\u201d seconds, such a discrepancy does not undermine his credibility as a matter of law; the jury could have reasonably believed his statement, consistent throughout the trial, that plaintiff\u2019s car came to an abrupt, sudden stop the moment before the accident and that the suddenness of the stop was unjustified in view of the surrounding traffic conditions. Morse v. Johnson (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555, 401 N.E.2d 654; Ryon v. Javior (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 946, 387 N.E.2d 936; Zerbenski v. Tagliarino (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 166, 384 N.E.2d 753.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of contributory negligence. For the reasons set forth above, the jury\u2019s verdict was sufficiently supported by the evidence; it follows that the denial of plaintiff\u2019s motion was entirely proper. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504.\nFinally, plaintiff contends that defendant\u2019s closing argument was inflammatory and unreasonable and that the resulting prejudice to plaintiff necessitates a new trial. Error is assigned to defense counsel\u2019s comment in closing argument: \u201cCertainly you\u2019ve heard nothing here today to indicate a case of $30,000. Now you know why we had to try it.\u201d Whereas defendant\u2019s comment was improper insofar as it was not based entirely on the evidence adduced at trial (Lasswell v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co. (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 568, 574-75, 354 N.E.2d 25), it was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. Further, the trial court sustained plaintiff\u2019s objection to the comment and promptly admonished the jury to disregard it. No other reference was made thereto. The jury later was instructed to ignore any statement or remark which had no basis in the evidence. Finally, the comment pertained primarily to the extent of plaintiff\u2019s damages, an issue which the jury did not reach. In view of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that defendant\u2019s remark deprived plaintiff of a fair trial. Hahn v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 904, 910, 375 N.E.2d 914; Lopez v. Galeener (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 815, 821, 341 N.E.2d 59.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDOWNING and PERLIN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Walter M. Ketchum, Ltd., of Chicago (John C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Victor J. Piekarski and Glen E. Amundsen, both of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VIRGINIA RANDALL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUBIN NAUM, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-2990\nOpinion filed December 22, 1981.\nWalter M. Ketchum, Ltd., of Chicago (John C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellants.\nVictor J. Piekarski and Glen E. Amundsen, both of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0758-01",
  "first_page_order": 780,
  "last_page_order": 783
}