{ "id": 5482296, "name": "BETTY JANE PLOCAR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUNKIN' DONUTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Plocar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc.", "decision_date": "1981-12-29", "docket_number": "No. 80-2788", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "750", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "169 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2737615 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 1171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3274523 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 979", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3332007 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1592990 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/111/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3353596 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 Ill. App. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4998307 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/340/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2478880 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/94/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "929" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386128 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3406696 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3265636 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2791226 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463121 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0085-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 896, "char_count": 22396, "ocr_confidence": 0.828, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.741321405521449e-07, "percentile": 0.9297710020931722 }, "sha256": "4b52decd74fc90642d5ce14a84378447606ac13d199ce1a9f0fc8540dd894bc1", "simhash": "1:7d93b4f0e74a9c54", "word_count": 3587 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:39.830915+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BETTY JANE PLOCAR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUNKIN\u2019 DONUTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County which dismissed with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action, the complaint of the plaintiffs, Betty Jane Plocar (Betty Jane) and Joseph Plocar, Sr. (Joseph, Sr.), upon motions of the defendants, Dunkin\u2019 Donuts of America, Inc. (Dunkin\u2019 Donuts) and Elizabeth Bennett, a district manager for Dunkin\u2019 Donuts. The trial court\u2019s dismissal of the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium and violation of a franchise contract was based solely on the pleadings.\nThe following issues are presented for review: (1) whether Betty Jane sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Elizabeth Bennett for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) whether Betty Jane sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts on the basis of the alleged actions of Elizabeth Bennett; (3) whether Joseph, Sr., sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Elizabeth Bennett and Dunkin\u2019 Donuts for loss of consortium or intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) whether plaintiffs properly alleged a cause of action against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts for violation of a franchise contract; and (5) whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint.\nFor the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nPlaintiffs filed three complaints in this action, all of which alleged that Betty Jane was a franchisee of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts, and that Elizabeth Bennett was a district manager for that company.\nBetty Jane\u2019s first complaint was filed on December 28, 1979, in the circuit court of Will County, Illinois. Subsequently the parties agreed by stipulation to transfer the cause to the circuit court of Cook County. Dunkin\u2019 Donuts and Elizabeth Bennett then filed motions to dismiss the complaint based on Betty Jane\u2019s failure to state a cause of action for injury to her business and intentional infliction of emotional distress and her failure to set forth, as required by section 36 of the Civil Practice Act, an alleged written agreement between her and Dunkin\u2019 Donuts.\nOn May 28,1980, after a full hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss the complaint. The court also granted plaintiff 28 days in which to file an amended complaint.\nOn July 11, 1980, Betty Jane moved the court for leave to file an amended complaint and to add Joseph Plocar, Sr., as a party plaintiff. Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. After reviewing plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint and hearing argument from all parties, the trial court ordered that plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint be stricken. The court granted plaintiff seven days to file a second amended complaint and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion to add the additional party plaintiff.\nOn July 16, 1980, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. That complaint is the subject of this appeal.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint was comprised of four counts. Count I alleged that defendant Elizabeth Bennett had \u201cunlawfully, wilfully and contemptuously insulted, disturbed, disquieted and threatened the plaintiff (Betty Jane) by the use of indecent language and proposals when she knew or should have known that such conduct was likely to cause the plaintiff the injuries herein described.\u201d It was averred that Bennett, a district manager and agent of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts, became romantically involved with Betty Jane\u2019s son, who was also her store manager. Due to Mrs. Plocar\u2019s disapproval of the relationship between Bennett and her son, Bennett \u201cthreatened\u201d Mrs. Plocar that if she did not stay out of her store, Bennett would cause her to lose the store by making false reports to the franchisor.\nIt was also asserted that Bennett, as district manager for Dunkin\u2019 Donuts, possessed \u201cgreat power over the operation and success of the franchises within her district and the plaintiff was at all times in great emotional fear of losing her store if she did not comply with the defendant\u2019s requests.\u201d Bennett allegedly offered to Mrs. Plocar\u2019s son another franchise operation for a price below the reasonable market value. Bennett also allegedly caused Mrs. Plocar\u2019s son to absent himself from the store for hours, disrupting Mrs. Plocar\u2019s business.\nPlaintiffs also claimed that Bennett\u2019s wrongful acts, words and proposals caused Mrs. Plocar to become \u201cill, excited and nervous; her moral sensibilities and ideals of decency and propriety were shocked and she suffered a nervous breakdown, and great pain, anguish and humiliation.\u201d Moreover, Bennett\u2019s acts allegedly caused Mrs. Plocar to be \u201cnervous, irritable, and unable to perform her necessary duties\u201d and that Mrs. Plocar was institutionalized as a result. Mrs. Plocar\u2019s health was allegedly \u201cpermanently injured\u201d and she was \u201cforced to expend large sums for doctor bills and medicine.\u201d\nIt was further charged that Bennett \u201cexhibited letters and made statements to the plaintiff referring to the plaintiff\u2019s son which included explicit and sexual connotations, all of which were calculated to severely traumatize and emotionally distress the plaintiff.\u201d Plaintiffs sought judgment against Elizabeth Bennett for $200,000, punitive damages in the amount of $200,000 and costs of the suit.\nCount II of plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint alleged that Elizabeth Bennett had acted with the implied and apparent authority of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts and that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts had thus negligently caused Mrs. Plocar to suffer \u201cmental and emotional distress and anxiety\u201d despite its being aware of the problem between Bennett and Mrs. Plocar. A judgment was sought against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts in the amount of $300,000 plus costs of the suit.\nCount III of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint alleged an action on behalf of Joseph Plocar, Sr., the husband of Betty Jane Plocar, for loss of his wife\u2019s consortium. It was alleged further that \u201cby being forced to witness the suffering endured by his wife, whereby his own nerves and health have been seriously and permanently shocked, weakened and impaired * * Mr. Plocar was deprived of the care and companionship of his wife. This count sought judgment against defendants in the amount of $75,000.\nCount IV of the second amended complaint alleged that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts, at the time it sold a franchise to Mrs. Plocar, both orally and in writing agreed to repair faulty equipment existing on the franchise premises. It was asserted further that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts \u201crefused and still refuses to\u201d repair such equipment, and that as a \u201cdirect and proximate cause, plaintiff has been damaged in the amount of\u201d $3,057. Plaintiffs sought judgment against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts in the same amount, plus costs of the suit.\nBoth defendants, Dunkin\u2019 Donuts and Elizabeth Bennett, filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint on the grounds that: (1) counts I and II failed to properly set forth facts that would support a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress because no bodily injury or physical impact was alleged and because the alleged facts did not show any extreme or outrageous conduct; (2) count III failed to properly set forth facts which would support the allegation that defendants were liable for the injuries allegedly sustained by Mrs. Plocar and thus Mr. Plocar would have no cause of action against defendants for loss of his wife\u2019s consortium; (3) count IV failed to state a cause of action against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts because plaintiffs did not set out in their complaint, as required by section 36 of the Civil Practice Act, the agreement allegedly breached by Dunkin\u2019 Donuts.\nOn September 25,1980, a hearing was held on the respective motions of Elizabeth Bennett and Dunkin\u2019 Donuts to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss and dismissed \u201cwith prejudice as to all defendants\u201d plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint.\nOn October 24, 1980, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of the trial court.\nI\nThe first1 issue presented is whether Betty Jane, in count I of her second amended complaint, sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Elizabeth Bennett for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue that this count of Mrs. Plocar\u2019s complaint is unsupported by allegations of specific facts that would give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and thus the trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss count I was proper.\nTo state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must allege facts to establish: (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by plaintiff was severe; and (3) in cases such as the instant one where plaintiff alleges that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201creckless,\u201d that defendant\u2019s conduct was such that defendant knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result. See Public Finance v. Davis (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765.\nWith respect to the first element, the nature of defendant\u2019s conduct, \u201c[liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency \u00b0 \u00b0 (Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a746, comment d (1965).) Extreme and outrageous conduct may arise from an abuse of position or a relation with another which gives the actor actual or apparent authority over the other or power to affect his interests.\nWith respect to the second element, the severity of the distress suffered by the plaintiff, \u201c[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a746, comment j (1965); see also Prosser, Law of Torts \u00a712, at 54 (4th ed. 1971).\nFinally, as to the recklessness of defendant\u2019s conduct, liability extends to situations in which there is a high degree of probability that severe emotional distress will follow and the actor goes ahead in conscious disregard of it. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a746, comment i (1965); Prosser, Torts \u00a712, at 60 (4th ed. 1971).\nAll of the above elements were delineated in Public Finance wherein the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a cause of action for either intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress was not adequately set forth. The court stated:\n\u201cThe liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities.\u201d (66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90.)\nThe court cited Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157, the case in which intentional infliction of emotional distress was recognized as a separate tort in Illinois. In Knierim the court cautioned:\n\u201cIt has not been suggested that every emotional upset should constitute the basis of an action [(for intentional infliction of emotional distress)]. Indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental anguish would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial hurts * * \u201c.\n<* fc fc\nThere is no inclination to include all instances of mere vulgarities, obviously intended as meaningless abusive expressions.\u201d 22 Ill. 2d 73, 85-86.\nIn the instant case we do not consider that the alleged conduct of defendant Bennett amounted to more than mere insults, indignities, threats or annoyances. Specifically it was alleged that Bennett \u201cinsulted, disturbed, disquieted and threatened the plaintiff (Betty Jane Plocar) by the use of indecent language and proposals\u201d; that she told plaintiff to \u201cstay out of the store\u201d and threatened to make false reports regarding plaintiff to Dunkin\u2019 Donuts. Bennett also allegedly exhibited to plaintiff letters and statements with explicit sexual connotations in reference to plaintiff\u2019s son.\nAlthough Bennett\u2019s actions, as described by her counsel, may have been \u201chasty and unfortunate,\u201d the complaint alleges no facts that would raise these actions to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Even if it is true that Bennett threatened to file false reports about Mrs. Plocar to Dunkin\u2019 Donuts, Mrs. Plocar never alleged that these threats were carried out or that she was reasonably in fear of losing her store. Although Bennett\u2019s relationship to Mrs. Plocar gave her actual or apparent authority to adversely affect Mrs. Plocar\u2019s franchise interest, such relationship, standing alone, does not relieve Plocar of the burden of alleging the extreme and outrageous nature of Bennett\u2019s conduct. \u201cConduct which otherwise amounts to no more than insults or indignities will not be deemed to be extreme and outrageous simply by virtue of some special relationship which exists between the parties.\u201d Farnor v. Irmco Corp. (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 851, 856, 392 N.E.2d 591, 596.\nWe conclude that the trial court properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action count I of plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint.\nII\nThe second issue presented is whether Betty Jane Plocar sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts on the basis of the alleged actions of Elizabeth Bennett. Plaintiffs argue that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts is liable for its \u201cwillfull or intentional or reckless failure to restrain its agent defendant Bennett.\u201d\nPlocar argues that Illinois law imposes liability on a corporation \u201cfor negligently entrusting improper people with the ability to adversely effect [sic] others.\u201d Plocar cites as an \u201canalogous\u201d case Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co. (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 370 N.E.2d 1235.\nIn Rosenberg the court stated:\n\u201c[Defendant Packerland wilfully, wantonly, or intentionally entrusted its truck to a driver it knew or should have known was emotionally and mentally unstable and unsuitable, had a disposition for intentional conduct which would cause or strike fear into other persons using roadways reserved for the general public, and was probably insane.\u201d (55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 964.)\nWe find no analogy between the actions of an employer in allowing an emotionally and mentally unstable person to drive a truck with which he could injure or kill others, and the actions of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts in allowing Bennett to continue in her job as a district manager for the company after she had allegedly insulted and threatened Mrs. Plocar. Moreover, there is no allegation in Mrs. Plocar\u2019s complaint that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts knew or should have known that Bennett was \u201cemotionally and mentally unstable.\u201d\nPlaintiffs\u2019 second theory of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts liability is predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior. The rule in Illinois with respect to respondeat superior is:\n\u201c \u00b0 \u00b0 [T]he 000 employer is liable for the negligent, wilful, malicious, or criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed during the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer; but when the act is committed solely for the benefit of the employee, the employer is not liable to the injured third party.\u2019 \u201d Hoover v. University of Chicago Hospitals (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 263, 266-67, 366 N.E.2d 925, 929.\nThe theory of respondeat superior clearly does not apply to the instant case since nowhere in count II of plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint is it alleged that the actions of Bennett were taken in furtherance of Dunkin\u2019 Donuts\u2019 business nor that such actions were within the scope of Bennett\u2019s employment. If the allegations of the complaint are taken as true, the most that can be said is that Bennett\u2019s acts were committed solely for her own benefit, i.e., to put an end to Mrs. Plocar\u2019s interference in Bennett\u2019s relationship with Plocar\u2019s son. Under the rule enunciated in Hoover, Dunkin\u2019 Donuts would not be liable for Bennett\u2019s alleged acts. We hold therefore that the trial court properly dismissed, for failure to state a cause of action, count II of plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint.\nIll\nThe third issue presented is whether Joseph Plocar, Sr., sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Elizabeth Bennett and Dunkin\u2019 Donuts for loss of consortium or intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nDefendants argue that if it is determined that Mrs. Plocar failed to state a cause of action against defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and cannot recover damages from defendants for her injuries, then her husband cannot recover from defendants for his loss of consortium or intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nIt is generally held that a right of action against a third party for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to a spouse is dependent upon the establishment of the third party\u2019s liability for the spouse\u2019s injuries. See Tjaden v. Moses (1968), 94 Ill. App. 2d 361, 237 N.E.2d 562; Clark v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. (1950), 340 Ill. App. 260, 91 N.E.2d 452.\nSince we find that Betty Jane Plocar has failed to establish that defendants are liable to her for intentional infliction of emotional distress, then it follows that Joseph Plocar, Sr., has no right of action against defendants for loss of consortium. Moreover, since Mrs. Plocar has failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Mr. Plocar cannot base his own action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on injuries which his wife has failed to establish. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed count III of plaintiff\u2019s second amended complaint.\nIV\nThe fourth issue presented is whether plaintiffs properly alleged a cause of action against Dunkin\u2019 Donuts for violation of a franchise contract. In count IV Mrs. Plocar alleged that Dunkin\u2019 Donuts did agree \u201cin writing\u201d to repair existing damage on the store premises. The damages were set forth by Mrs. Plocar in Exhibit B attached to her complaint. She did not, however, attach to her complaint a copy of the written \u201crepair\u201d agreement.\nSection 36 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 36) requires that if a claim is founded upon a written instrument, a copy thereof must be attached to the pleadings as an exhibit or recited therein. Since plaintiffs did not comply with this requirement, the trial court properly dismissed count IV of their second amended complaint.\nV\nThe final issue presented is whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint.\nSection 45(4) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 45(4)) provides in part:\n\u201c(4) After rulings on motions, the court may enter appropriate orders either to permit or require pleading over or amending or to terminate the litigation in whole or in part.\u201d\nA trial court has discretion to allow the amendment of pleadings or to finally terminate litigation, and the refusal of the trial court to allow amendment is reversible error only if there is an abuse of discretion. (See City of Des Plaines v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 995, 377 N.E.2d 114.) The test to be applied in determining whether discretion was properly exercised in denying an amendment to the pleadings is whether it furthers the ends of justice. In this regard the court may determine the ultimate efficacy of a claim in passing on a motion to amend and whether plaintiff had previous opportunities to assert his claim. Ennis v. Illinois State Bank (1969), 111 Ill. App. 2d 71, 76, 248 N.E.2d 534.\nIn the instant case the trial court afforded the plaintiffs three opportunities to state a cause of action: once in their complaint, a second time in an amended complaint, and a third time in a second amended complaint. Section 45 and the cases which have construed it clearly hold that a party does not have a right to unlimited amendments. The trial court may bring the litigation to an end when it believes that further amendments to pleadings will not further the interests of justice. Beresky v. Teschner (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979.\nPlaintiffs had a fair opportunity to attempt to state a cause of action against the defendants, but in the course of twice amending their complaint they were apparently unable to allege specific facts to support an actionable wrong. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the litigation by dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint.\nFor the reasons stated, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nHARTMAN, P. J., and DOWNING, J., concur.\nPlaintiff also alleges that Bennett\u2019s conduct was reckless in that Bennett knew such conduct would result in severe emotional distress to plaintiff. This allegation is unsupported by specific facts and appears to be merely a conclusion. See Tobolt v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 62-63, 393 N.E.2d 1171, 1175.\nIn reviewing count I and defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, we note that although such motion admits all facts well pleaded together with all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from those facts, it does not admit conclusions of law or conclusions of fact unsupported by specific facts upon which such conclusions rests. Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747.\nSection 36 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 36) provides:\n\u201cIf a claim or defense is founded upon a written instrument, a copy thereof, or of so much of the same as is relevant, must be attached to the pleading as an exhibit or recited therein, unless the pleader attaches to his pleading an affidavit stating facts showing that the instrument is not accessible to him. \u00b0 \u00b0 (Emphasis added.)\nPlaintiffs did not attach such an affidavit.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Phillip L. Kotula, of Roselle, for appellants.", "Jenner & Block, of Chicago (Howard R. Barron and Ruben Castillo, of counsel), for appellee Elizabeth Bennett.", "Rothbart, Stein & Moran, of Chicago (Thomas E. Moran, of counsel), for appellee Dunkin\u2019 Donuts of America, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BETTY JANE PLOCAR et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUNKIN\u2019 DONUTS OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-2788\nOpinion filed December 29, 1981.\nPhillip L. Kotula, of Roselle, for appellants.\nJenner & Block, of Chicago (Howard R. Barron and Ruben Castillo, of counsel), for appellee Elizabeth Bennett.\nRothbart, Stein & Moran, of Chicago (Thomas E. Moran, of counsel), for appellee Dunkin\u2019 Donuts of America, Inc." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 772 }