{ "id": 5482934, "name": "PATRICK J. GANNON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Gannon v. Freeman", "decision_date": "1982-01-12", "docket_number": "No. 81-142", "first_page": "917", "last_page": "920", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 917" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3229065 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/252/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5007576, 5012004 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/339/0645-02", "/ill-app/339/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3291876 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2471066 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528159 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2939879 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0240-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 466, "char_count": 7255, "ocr_confidence": 0.855, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4039320875122234e-07, "percentile": 0.6452781610047535 }, "sha256": "be572aa64c4cd7e267774b0336d7a81909c19c7004e7e598f614a221bdba03a9", "simhash": "1:cc60e992aa210256", "word_count": 1177 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:39.830915+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATRICK J. GANNON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff and defendant were involved in an automobile accident. The parties settled the claims involving personal injury, and the matter went to trial on the issue of property damage, based on the total loss of plaintiff\u2019s automobile. The jury returned a verdict of $4000 and defendant appeals.\nDefendant has admitted liability, so the circumstances of the accident are not at issue. The principal issue is whether the $4000 verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. No court reporter was present at trial; the record on appeal contains a stipulated recitation of the evidence.\nIn May 1976, when plaintiff was 18 years old, he purchased a used 1969 Dodge Super Bee for $500. The \u201cSuper Bee\u201d was a limited production, high-performance version of the Dodge Coronet. Oyer the next 15 months, plaintiff drove the car infrequently, putting on only 200-300 miles. Plaintiff testified that he planned to rebuild the auto to \u201cshow\u201d car status. Plaintiff introduced receipts for various repairs and high-performance parts. The value of the receipts admitted into evidence totals $1546.50. Plaintiff also testified that he put at least 100 hours of his own time into rebuilding the car.\n\u2022 In the early morning of September 24, 1977, plaintiff\u2019s car collided with that of defendant. After the accident, plaintiff\u2019s car was towed to his home. Plaintiff took 18 color photographs of the wrecked car; these were admitted into evidence. The car was later towed to a police pound. Plaintiff never saw the car again. He testified that the car was damaged beyond repair and he was able to salvage only the stereo speakers before the car was towed the second time.\nPrior to the accident, plaintiff had completed substantially all of the restoration work on the car\u2019s engine. The photographs in evidence show that the body, though unrestored, was largely free from rust and was in good condition. Plaintiff offered no expert testimony concerning the car\u2019s value immediately prior to the accident, though plaintiff opined that the car, fully restored, would be \u201cworth a fortune.\u201d\nDefendant offered the testimony of Sam Papalardo, a used car salesman. Papalardo had three years\u2019 experience selling new and used cars \u2022at Ford and Lincoln-Mercury dealers. The trial court prevented Papalardo from giving an opinion on the value of a 1969 Dodge Super Bee. The trial court apparently based its ruling on the premise that Papalardo might competently testify to the value of an ordinary used car but showed no expertise with respect to the value of plaintiff\u2019s \u201csubstantially rebuilt\u201d automobile. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $4000.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in barring Papalardo\u2019s testimony regarding the market value of plaintiff\u2019s car. Whether a witness \u2022is qualified to testify as an expert is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Hardware State Bank v. Cotner (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 240, 250, 302 N.E.2d 257.) Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Papalardo unqualified. In this connection, defendant argues that the trial court implicitly found that plaintiff\u2019s car was a \u201cshow\u201d car, a fact issue that should have been left to the jury. We believe that defendant reads too much into the trial court\u2019s ruling. The court below needn\u2019t have found that the vehicle in question was a \u201cshow\u201d car; the court only had to conclude that the car was sufficiently out of the ordinary to preclude an \u201cordinary\u201d car salesman from testifying to its value. Viewed in this light, we find that the ruling was not an abuse of discretion.\nDefendant also contends that the jury\u2019s verdict of $4000 is unsupported by the evidence. When personal property is totally destroyed, the measure of damages is the reasonable value of the property immediately prior to its destruction. (Behrens v. W. S. Bills & Sons, Inc. (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 567, 576, 283 N.E.2d 1.) Defendant notes that plaintiff offered no expert testimony regarding the car\u2019s value. While such testimony would have been preferable, we believe that it is not absolutely necessary. Where damages are susceptible of precise proof, direct and tangible evidence must be offered. (Leon v. Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 911, 913, 272 N.E.2d 799.) Here, however, no conclusive proof was possible. An expert witness could only have given his opinion on the car\u2019s value. Such an estimate should not be considered indispensable when value can be proved in other ways. The law does not require the plaintiff to prove the exact amount of his loss; it is sufficient that the evidence provide a basis for assessing damages with a fair degree of probability. (Karlin v. Inland Steel Co. (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 183, 187, 395 N.E.2d 1038.) Here, plaintiff offered proof of value relating to the cost basis of the car: the $500 initial cost, the $1546.40 (admissible evidence) spent on parts for the car and the 100 hours of plaintiff\u2019s time spent on restoration of the car.\nNevertheless, these items of plaintiff\u2019s evidence do not total $4000, even when the value of plaintiff\u2019s time is considered. Lannon v. Alex (1950), 339 Ill. App. 645, 90 N.E.2d 800 (abstract), presents an analogous situation. There, the plaintiff sued for damage to his automobile and won a jury verdict of $143.09. The appellate court found no evidence to support this amount and noted that plaintiff had estimated the car\u2019s damage at about $25. The appellate court ordered a remittitur and affirmed a judgment of $25. (See also Welter v. Schell (1929), 252 Ill. App. 586, 590-91, where the appellate court affirmed upon remittitur in another vehicle damage case involving unproved damages.) In discovery in the case at bar, plaintiff received an interrogatory concerning the cost of repairing his car. He responded: \u201c1969 Dodge Auto which was damaged beyond repair and value. Purchased Car for $500.00 and thereafter totally rebuilt auto at a cost of approximately $1800.00. Total Loss $2300.00.\u201d That plaintiff herein estimated his loss well below the jury\u2019s verdict corresponds to the situation in Lannon.\nIn consideration of the shortage of proof of damages, we conclude that judgment for the plaintiff was proper but the full judgment amount ($4000) is not supported by the evidence. A lesser amount ($2546.40) has evidentiary support. This amount takes into consideration the cost of the car ($500), the amount spent on parts ($1546.40) and plaintiff\u2019s time ($500 for 100 hours of restoration work). This amount also corresponds roughly to plaintiff\u2019s own estimate given in response to defendant\u2019s interrogatory. If plaintiff will file his consent to a remittitur of $1453.60, the judgment will be affirmed. Otherwise, the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nAffirmed upon remittitur.\nDOWNING and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Office of Tim J. Harrington, of Chicago (Robert Guilfoyle and John R. Withall, of counsel), for appellant.", "Law Offices of Joseph F. Phelan, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICK J. GANNON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81-142\nOpinion filed January 12, 1982.\nLaw Office of Tim J. Harrington, of Chicago (Robert Guilfoyle and John R. Withall, of counsel), for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Joseph F. Phelan, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0917-01", "first_page_order": 939, "last_page_order": 942 }