{ "id": 5480909, "name": "CONSULTANTS & ADMINISTRATORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Consultants & Administrators, Inc. v. Department of Insurance", "decision_date": "1982-01-12", "docket_number": "No. 81-283", "first_page": "920", "last_page": "926", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 920" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3308321 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 906", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179113 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0906-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71144", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 S. Ct. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 L. Ed. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 831", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11355488, 11356034, 11356198, 11355366, 11355304, 11355945, 11355756, 11355661, 11355859, 11356281, 11355579 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0831-03", "/us/439/0831-09", "/us/439/0831-10", "/us/439/0831-02", "/us/439/0831-01", "/us/439/0831-08", "/us/439/0831-06", "/us/439/0831-05", "/us/439/0831-07", "/us/439/0831-11", "/us/439/0831-04" ] }, { "cite": "571 F.2d 502", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 922509 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/571/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 F. Supp. 1294", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7869378 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/425/1294-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 F.2d 1287", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1240053 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/650/1287-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 905", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5479390 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71002", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.Y.S.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.Y.2d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2312139 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/34/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 N. Y.S.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 800, "char_count": 13445, "ocr_confidence": 0.81, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.540165812740519e-07, "percentile": 0.8133418203146207 }, "sha256": "ec3d59c75ed77b9e54d12bbfa6b7b3308de3cd535b0d9d46b128a2290f731b50", "simhash": "1:eb2550d07be99284", "word_count": 2224 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:39.830915+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CONSULTANTS & ADMINISTRATORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Consultants & Administrators, Inc. (C&A), appeals from the decision of the circuit court of Cook County which upheld an administrative order entered by defendant Illinois Department of Insurance (DI). DI had directed C&A to comply with the provisions of the Voluntary Health Services Plans Act (the Health Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 595 et seq.) or show that it was exempt therefrom.\nC&A argues that (1) DI lacks jurisdiction over it, having been preempted by the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA); (2) the Health Act is not mandatory, but rather is permissive in nature; (3) the Health Act violates \u201cthe constitutional and civil rights\u201d of C&A; (4) the circuit court violated C&A\u2019s procedural due process rights; and (5) DI is \u201cperpetuating an unconstitutional monopoly\u201d in violation of Federal antitrust law.\nIn 1966, the Chicago Newspaper Publishers Association and a division of the Teamsters Union agreed to create a trust entity (the Trust) for the benefit of the employees of Chicago\u2019s major daily newspapers. The trust agreement was amended in March 1976 to conform to the provisions of ERISA (29 U.S.C. \u00a71001 et seq. (1976)). On March 15, 1976, the Trust entered into a contract with C&A. Under that contract, C&A was to provide facilities for a dental care program and an optometric/vision care program for beneficiaries of the Trust, and was to contract with professional and technical personnel to conduct the programs. The Trust was obligated to pay C&A $16.25 per month for each participant-beneficiary enrolled in the programs.\nOn February 1, 1979, defendant Illinois Vision Services Plan (IVSP), a business entity incorporated under the Illinois Vision Service Plan Act (the Vision Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 651 et seq.), complained to DI that it had encountered competition from C&A, which firm, IVSP believed, had not been incorporated under that statute. IVSP requested that DI conduct an investigation of C&A\u2019s activities to determine its compliance with Illinois law. DI proceeded with the requested investigation and eventually informed C&A that it believed the latter was operating in violation of both the Vision Act and the Illinois Dental Service Plan Act (the Dental Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 690.1 et seq.). DI suggested that C&A file an application for certification under the Health Act. C&A responded that it would seek a declaratory judgment in court on the matter (which action C&A apparently never pursued). In the face of C&A\u2019s intractability, DI initiated formal administrative proceedings to determine whether C&A was indeed operating in violation of the Health Act by providing dental and optical services without procuring a charter under that statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 602.\nOn December 14, 1979, a hearing was held before an appointed hearing officer. At that hearing, a single witness appeared, having been called by DI. Essentially, the witness, Ronald Chew, assistant deputy director in the health delivery section of DI, stated that he believed C&A was operating a voluntary health services plan in violation of the provisions of the Health Act. C&A did not attempt to rebut this conclusion, instead asserting among other things that the Health Act was preempted by ERISA, was unconstitutional, and was not intended to cover the operation of a private corporation.\nThe hearing officer recommended that DI terminate the proceeding without prejudice. The director of DI declined to accept this recommendation. Instead, he issued a lengthy administrative decision finding C&A to be operating a voluntary health services plan without incorporating under the Health Act, in violation of that statute. The director ordered C&A to comply therewith. C&A responded by seeking judicial review of this administrative determination. After hearing the parties\u2019 arguments and examining their briefs, the circuit court affirmed the administrative decision in its entirety.\nI\nC&A argues that ERISA preempts the Health Act and that DI thus lacked jurisdiction to proceed against it, relying on the following provisions of ERISA:\n\u201c(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan # \u00bb e e # *\n(b)(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in [ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance 90 *.\n(B) Neither an employee benefit plan * * \u00b0 nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer * * \u00b0 or to be engaged in the business of insurance 0 * * for the purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies * * 29 U.S.C. \u00a71144 (1976).\nInitially, we note that C&A has not adequately contested on this appeal the factual finding of DI, which was affirmed by the circuit court, that C&A is operating a \u201cvoluntary health services plan\u201d as defined in the Health Act, and that C&A has not incorporated under the provisions of the Health Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 597). Our resolution of this appeal thus proceeds from the premise that these factual determinations are correct. Consequently, we note that under these circumstances, C&A is subject to the provisions of the Health Act unless it is able to succeed on the merits of the ERISA-preemption argument or on its other claims.\nTurning to the merits of C&A\u2019s argument, we are faced with an insurmountable obstacle to our resolution thereof. C&A has asked us to establish new Illinois precedent on a question of weighty significance, but has cited to us only two tangentially related Federal decisions and a segment of a California statute which we find of no relevance. C&A\u2019s brief presents no argument demonstrating the relationship of the cases and the California statute to the present circumstances; its presentation at oral argument failed to clarify the matter. We note that the briefs of the Attorney General (representing DI) and IVSP attempted to address the substance of the issue in a coherent manner despite C&A\u2019s failings. Nonetheless, we do not feel that the law on the question nor the theorizations of either side thereupon have been adequately presented so as to enable this court to establish enlightened precedent in this complex field. This court will not research and argue a case for an appellant. (See Thanopoulos v. Pickens (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 906, 909, 409 N.E.2d 477; Fogel v. Hodes (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 594, 600, 386 N.E.2d 389; 47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp. (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 231-33, 371 N.E.2d 294, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 598.) This rule is especially applicable where, as here, the court\u2019s decision has such potentially significant ramifications. In light of the inadequacies of C&A\u2019s presentation of the ERISA preemption issue, we decline to reach its merits. The remainder of this opinion therefore proceeds from the presumption that, despite ERISA, the Health Act is indeed applicable to C&A (barring its inapplicability based upon C&A\u2019s other arguments).\nII\nC&A claims that the Health Act is \u201cvoluntary and not mandatory\u201d and thus does not cover the type of arrangement involved in this case.\nC&A presents us with no relevant, authoritative support for its contention. This court has previously noted the underlying concerns of a statute similar to the Health Act: the Vision Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 651 et seq.). We noted that the Vision Act involves two major concerns: that corporations providing vision services have sufficient monetary reserves to insure the performance of their contractual obligations, and that beneficiaries of such plans have the opportunity to choose from a significant plurality of available practitioners in using the vision services provided. (National Consolidated Industries, Ltd. v. Department of Insurance (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 816, 820-21, 392 N.E.2d 295.) We believe these concerns are equally applicable to health services rendered by a health services plan corporation. Clearly, achievement of these considerations would be severely undermined were the Health Act read as a permissive, rather than mandatory, statute. Consequently, we are unconvinced by C&A\u2019s unsupported claim to that effect. The Health Act envisions mandatory compliance by all voluntary health services plans, including C&A.\nIll\nC&A raises constitutional issues in regard to the outcome below.\nA.\nC&A claims that the Health Act is unconstitutional. In support of this argument, C&A reprints a large segment of the supreme court\u2019s opinion in Scully v. Hallihan (1936), 365 Ill. 185, 6 N.E.2d 176, and adds a one-sentence \u201cparaphrasing\u201d of the rule of that case applied to the facts of this case. General allegations of constitutional violations which do not specify the manner in which the asserted constitutional rights are infringed do not adequately raise constitutional claims. (Redmond v. Novak (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 374, 378, 427 N.E.2d 53.) We therefore will not address this part of C&A\u2019s constitutional claim.\nB.\nC&A argues that it was denied procedural due process in the circuit court proceeding, citing Drezner v. Civil Service Com. (1947), 398 Ill. 219, 231, 75 N.E.2d 303. We have reviewed the record of proceedings from the circuit court and find no basis therein for holding that the circuit court\u2019s action violated either the rule of the Drezner case or any constitutional matters connected therewith.\nIV\nFinally, C&A contends that DI \u201cand other persons, corporations, and associations * * * have combined to restrain competition in the field of health service in violation of the Anti-Trust laws of the United States,\u201d citing the United States Code.\nJudicial proceedings under Federal antitrust statutes (15 U.S.C. \u00a71 et seq. (1976)) may only be brought in Federal court; State courts lack jurisdiction to accept such causes of action. (See Blumenstock Brothers Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1920), 252 U.S. 436, 440, 64 L. Ed. 649, 40 S. Ct. 385; Van Dusen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc. v. Rochester Telephone Corp. (1972), 72 Misc. 2d 34,_, 338 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34-35, modified on other grounds (1973), 42 App. Div. 2d 400, 348 N. Y.S.2d 404, aff'd (1974), 34 N.Y.2d 904,359 N.Y.S.2d 286, 316 N.E.2d 719; see generally 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices \u00a7265 (1971).) Thus, C&A\u2019s claim cannot be addressed by this court.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J\u201e and HARTMAN, J\u201e concur.\nThe Attorney General, representing DI, informs us that the Trust itself is an \u201cemployee welfare benefit plan\u201d under ERISA. That statute defines such a plan as:\n\u201c[A]ny plan, fund, or program which 1 1 \"is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical \" \u00b0 \u00b0 benefits * \u00b0 (29 U.S.C. \u00a71002(1) (1976).)\nWe accept this representation as being correct. See, e.g., Russo v. Boland, 103 Ill. App. 3d 905, 908.\nIVSP was allowed to intervene in this and subsequent proceedings.\nThe Health Act defines such a plan as \u201ca plan or system under which medical, hospital, dental, nursing and relating health services may be rendered to a subscriber or beneficiary, at the expense of a health services plan corporation.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 596(b).\nWe do not find any of the listed exceptions to the applicability of the Health Act, found in section 3, to be relevant to this case. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 597.\nC&A cites this court to Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky (2d Cir. 1981), 650 F.2d 1287; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes (N.D. Cal. 1977), 425 F. Supp. 1294, aff'd (9th Cir. 1978), 571 F.2d 502, cert. denied (1978), 439 U.S. 831, 58 L. Ed. 2d 125, 99 S. Ct. 108; and CAL. GOV\u2019T CODE \u00a712530 (Deering 1981 Supp.), repealed July 1, 1976, Stats. 1975, ch. 941, \u00a71. We note again that C&A provided this court with no discussion of how these cited authorities are related to the circumstances of this case.\nAs the remainder of our opinion makes clear, C&A\u2019s briefs in this case failed to even minimally comply with the terms of Supreme Court Rule 341 regarding the content of briefs. (73 Ill. 2d R. 341.) We suggest that appellate counsel make use of the directive provisions of that rule.\nIn order to bring a valid antitrust claim in Illinois courts, C&A should'have relied upon the Illinois Antitrust Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 60\u20141 et seq.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "George J. Haddad, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees Department of Insurance and Phillip R. O\u2019Connor.", "Martin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, of Chicago (Thomas B. Cassidy, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Vision Services Plan." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CONSULTANTS & ADMINISTRATORS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81-283\nOpinion filed January 12, 1982.\nGeorge J. Haddad, of Chicago, for appellant.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joseph D. Keenan, III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees Department of Insurance and Phillip R. O\u2019Connor.\nMartin, Craig, Chester & Sonnenschein, of Chicago (Thomas B. Cassidy, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Vision Services Plan." }, "file_name": "0920-01", "first_page_order": 942, "last_page_order": 948 }