{ "id": 5472216, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THERESA ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rogers", "decision_date": "1982-02-02", "docket_number": "No. 80-2700", "first_page": "326", "last_page": "331", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 326" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392199 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S. Ct. 1887", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 L. Ed. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 U.S. 1013", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2467, 2901, 2525, 2662 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/435/1013-02", "/us/435/1013-03", "/us/435/1013-01", "/us/435/1013-04" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455040 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 U.S. 410", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185347 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "2267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/447/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2929131 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/11/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630842 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2624869 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2521848 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S. Ct. 1658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L. Ed. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11767201, 11766531, 11766566, 11766759, 11767023, 11767089, 11766834, 11766972, 11767158, 11766684, 11766623 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0972-11", "/us/402/0972-01", "/us/402/0972-02", "/us/402/0972-05", "/us/402/0972-08", "/us/402/0972-09", "/us/402/0972-06", "/us/402/0972-07", "/us/402/0972-10", "/us/402/0972-04", "/us/402/0972-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962537 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5628121 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/58/0387-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 656, "char_count": 11865, "ocr_confidence": 0.898, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.49828264861247e-07, "percentile": 0.6651706335002543 }, "sha256": "2be2b6b4b0417788c33fc7b7e68215ade21c52468d9c502b8658f7dcf807ce83", "simhash": "1:857c70cd63c8c8d5", "word_count": 2039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:33.067215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THERESA ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was charged by information with aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 4(a)) and cruelty to children (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 23, par. 2368). After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of endangering the life or health of a child, a misdemeanor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 23, par. 2354), and sentenced to one year probation.\nThree grounds for reversal are presented by defendant: first, that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; second, that the finding of the trial court amounted to an improper inconsistent verdict; and third, that the statute under which she was convicted is unconstitutional in that it fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct it proscribes.\nDefendant Theresa Rogers is the mother of Marinda Rogers, the victim. Marinda was six months old on the date of the incident. Marinda\u2019s father is Byron Hampton, who is not married to defendant. At the time of the incident, defendant, Marinda, and Byron lived with Byron\u2019s parents, Mr. and Mrs. John Hampton, Sr.\nByron Hampton testified that he went to work on the day of the incident at 4 p.m., leaving defendant and the baby at home. He noticed no injuries on the baby. Defendant was mixing pina coladas when he left. Byron returned home on a break at 8:30 p.m. Defendant was drunk and smoking a cigarette. The baby had a cigarette burn on her left eyelid. Byron didn\u2019t recall defendant\u2019s answer to his question of how the burn was caused. He went back to work.\nReturning home around 11:30 p.m., Byron found defendant lying in his parents\u2019 bed, and Marinda in his bed. The baby had sustained multiple injuries. Her face was bruised, her arms had scratches, and her right leg appeared broken. When he saw the baby, Byron went into his parents\u2019 room and kicked defendant in the head, knocking her hearing aid out. He then hit her side. Byron had called his father and brother when he saw the baby, and they arrived home. Defendant fled the house and returned with the police, and they all went to the hospital with the baby. Byron admitted on cross-examination that he had a temper, and that he once put his fist through a wall in the house. He also stated that he has never seen defendant hit the baby.\nJohn Hampton testified that he was Byron\u2019s father. He was at work the evening of the incident, where he received a call from Byron at 11:45 p.m. He went home and saw the baby all bruised. Defendant was drunk and incoherent, and half a fifth of Crown Royal whiskey was missing from his liquor supply. The half empty bottle was on the kitchen table. When shown People\u2019s exhibits Nos. 1-5, photos of Marinda taken at the hospital, he stated that the full extent of her bruises was not visible in the pictures. On cross-examination, he conceded that two years ago, he called the police and charged defendant with breaking into his house.\nPolice officer Gregory Ramirez testified that he responded to a child-abuse complaint at Michael Reese Hospital. In his initial conversation with defendant, she stated that she didn\u2019t know how Marinda\u2019s injuries were caused. Later, she told a police investigator that she left the baby with a sitter and found her in that condition when she picked her up. On cross-examination, Ramirez stated that although defendant appeared intoxicated, she didn\u2019t smell of alcohol.\nJanice Yokley testified that she was a licensed day care provider, and that she cared for Marinda for four days, February 11-14. The baby had no marks the last time she saw her.\n. Carlos Alberto Flores testified that he was a third-year pediatric resident at Michael Reese Hospital, and that he examined Marinda. In sum, the baby had the following injuries: facial bruises, random scratches, fractured arm, fractured femur, fractured skull, and a cigarette burn on her eyelid. Marinda was placed in traction to treat the femur fracture. Dr. Flores stated that the femur was the hardest bone to break in an infant.\nDefendant testifed she was hard of hearing and had to read lips when not wearing her hearing aid; that Byron was very jealous and beat her up several times; that she called the police once and had him charged with battery; that on the day of the incident, she was out on a job interview in the morning and Byron was at home with Marinda; and that he was drinking Crown Royal.\nDefendant further testified that after Byron left for work, she gave the baby a warm bath. The doctor had instructed her to do so to bring the baby\u2019s fever down. The telephone rang while the baby was in the bath, so defendant picked up the baby and went through the kitchen to answer the phone. In the kitchen, the baby jumped from her arms, fell to the kitchen table, and then fell to the floor. Defendant put a cold rag on the baby\u2019s head, fed her, and then put her to sleep in Byron\u2019s bed. Defendant then had a can of Ch\u00e1mpale and lay down in the other bed. She awoke to Byron\u2019s kick on the head. Her hearing aid was knocked out and broken.\nDefendant explained her initial story to the police about the babysitter as a product of her fear of being thought a bad mother for dropping the child.\nIn rebuttal, the State introduced a stipulation to the testimony of Dr. Flores. His opinion was that it was unlikely that the skull and arm fractures occurred in the fall described by defendant, and that the leg fracture could not have occurred in that fall.\nI\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s claim that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is premised on the circumstantial nature of the State\u2019s case; no eyewitnesses to the beating of Marinda Rogers were produced. When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the facts proved must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. (People v. Gilbert (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 387, 392, 374 N.E.2d 739.) Defendant suggests that the evidence is consistent with the theory that Byron Hampton beat Marinda, and with the theory that the injuries were accidentally inflicted. We disagree.\nThe trial was a question of credibility. The evidence is clear that only defendant and Byron were involved with the baby. The trial court clearly believed Byron\u2019s testimony that he did not commit the crime and disbelieved defendant\u2019s testimony that she did not commit the crime. Defendant presents no basis for this court to doubt the trial court\u2019s determination of credibility. We do not believe that the hypothesis that Byron Hampton committed the crime is reasonable.\nThe testimony of Dr. Flores established that the injuries could not have occurred in the fall as described by defendant. Although defendant argues that this testimony does not preclude the injury occurring in another accident, there is no evidence in the record of any other accident. Where an accused elects to justify her connection with the crime, she \u201cmust tell a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities.\u201d (People v. Gilbert (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 387, 392.) We do not believe that the hypothesis that the injuries were accidentally inflicted is reasonable.\nIn our opinion, based upon the record, defendant was clearly proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nII\nNext we consider defendant\u2019s contention that the finding of the trial court was an impermissible inconsistent verdict. \u201cVerdicts of guilty of crime A but not guilty of crime B, where both crimes arise out of the same set of facts, are legally inconsistent when they necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist.\u201d People v. Murray (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 521, 531, 340 N.E.2d 186.\nDefendant relies on People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert, denied (1971), 402 U.S. 972, 29 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 1658, and People v. Pearson (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 543, 306 N.E.2d 539, in support of her argument that a legally inconsistent verdict is not permitted. She contends that her acquittal on the felony charges of aggravated battery and cruelty to children and her conviction on the misdemeanor charge of endangering the life of a child are inconsistent.\nThe fallacy in defendant\u2019s argument is that there was no acquittal of the felony charges. She was found guilty of endangering the life of a child by the trial court. No finding was entered on the two charges contained in the information, aggravated battery and cruelty to children. Specifically, the trial court stated:\n\u201cOf course, there is no doubt that this child sustained very painful injuries, required long hospitalization * * *;\nAccordingly, there will be a finding of guilty of the lesser included offense of endangering the life of a child 0 w\nWe believe that the finding of the trial court was not inconsistent because there was only one finding: guilty of endangering the life. There was no finding on the other two offenses. If there was only one finding, there is nothing with which it can be inconsistent. See, e.g., People v. Chisum (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548, 333 N.E.2d 546, appeal denied (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 598.\nWe recognize, of course, the cases which state that where a finding of guilty is entered on a lesser included charge and no finding is entered on the greater charge, there is an implied acquittal on the greater charge. (People v. Roberts (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 811, 818, 345 N.E.2d 132, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 561; see also People v. Thompson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758, 297 N.E.2d 592.) These cases, however, are in the context of double jeopardy. The usual situation is that a conviction on the lesser offense is reversed due to trial errors, and the reviewing court states that there cannot be a retrial on the greater offense. This is consistent with the double jeopardy principle that conviction of a lesser included offense bars prosecution on the greater offense. Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 420, 65 L. Ed. 2d 228, 238, 100 S. Ct. 2260, 2267; People v. Gray (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 44, 49-52, 370 N.E.2d 797, cert, denied (1978), 435 U.S. 1013, 56 L. Ed. 2d 395, 98 S. Ct. 1887.\nThe instant case does not arise in a double jeopardy context. The question here is whether the finding of the trial court was inconsistent. Inconsistency occurs when a verdict on one count is premised on the existence of an element of the offense and a verdict on another count is premised on the nonexistence of the same element. An inconsistent finding implies that the trial court was confused, and this requires the conclusion that the defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Murray, 34 Ill. App. 3d 521, 532.\nThe experienced and learned trial court was not confused in the instant case. The only inconsistency is that which is implied for purposes of double jeopardy. Since this is not a double jeopardy case, we will not imply an acquittal on the charges of aggravated battery and cruelty to children. We thus reject defendant\u2019s argument.\nIll\nDefendant contends that the statute under which she was convicted is unconstitutional in that it does not provide adequate notice of the conduct it proscribes. The identical argument was rejected by the supreme court in People v. Vandiver (1971), 51 Ill. 2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681. We, therefore, must also reject this contention.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J\u201e and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stanley L. Hill, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, J. Mark Lukanich, and Michael J. Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THERESA ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-2700\nOpinion filed February 2, 1982.\nStanley L. Hill, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, J. Mark Lukanich, and Michael J. Kelly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0326-01", "first_page_order": 348, "last_page_order": 353 }