{ "id": 5476583, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE RUFUS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rufus", "decision_date": "1982-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 79-1927", "first_page": "467", "last_page": "478", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 467" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 S. Ct. 1538", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 L. Ed. 2d 790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 973", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6370976, 6370720, 6372036, 6370182, 6371142, 6370409, 6369580, 6371308, 6371822, 6371568, 6370547, 6369814 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0973-07", "/us/440/0973-06", "/us/440/0973-12", "/us/440/0973-03", "/us/440/0973-08", "/us/440/0973-04", "/us/440/0973-01", "/us/440/0973-09", "/us/440/0973-11", "/us/440/0973-10", "/us/440/0973-05", "/us/440/0973-02" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 3d 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3389842 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173155 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199-200" }, { "page": "411-12" }, { "page": "382-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 F.2d 1370", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 616256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/521/1370-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1177, "char_count": 26235, "ocr_confidence": 0.904, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.925422257223763e-07, "percentile": 0.733547592929163 }, "sha256": "c22509e8c3aaa6eaaa67888806bd7d689b7e105e62d3d04ba1646c68202b7225", "simhash": "1:edf1b910753d8645", "word_count": 4330 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:33.067215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE RUFUS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nEddie Rufus and four others were charged with the murder of Michael Simkins. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1.) Defendant Rufus was tried alone before a jury and found guilty. He was sentenced to a term of 40 years.\nMichael Simkins was shot to death on the sidewalk of North Mohawk Street in the city of Chicago, near the Cabrini-Green housing project. The shooting occurred on April 29, 1979, at approximately 5:15 p.m. Two eyewitnesses testified for the State. Owen Terry was sitting in a parked car when he heard a gunshot. He testified that he turned and saw two men standing over a man lying on the ground. One man had a gun which he pointed at the victim\u2019s head, from a distance of about Bi feet, and fired another shot. The two men then fled.\nGrover Evans, 18 years old, was acquainted with the victim. Two nights before the shooting, he, Simkins, and Makia Davis met with defendant Rufus and four of his companions. Defendant asked Evans for the money obtained from a cab driver holdup, and then stated that he had a contract out on the lives of Evans, Simkins, and Davis.\nThe day of the incident, Evans, Davis, and Simkins went to Farmer Brown, a chicken and ribs restaurant. There, they encountered defendant and two companions. Defendant told Michael Simkins that \u201che was going to be fried like hot links.\u201d Subsequently, Evans and Simkins were standing on Mohawk Street eating their chicken when three men with handguns, identified as defendant, \u201cBear,\u201d and Rick Stone, appeared and fired at Evans and Simkins, hitting Simkiris. He fell, and defendant approached, stood directly over Simkins, and fired a shot into his head from a distance of l/\u00e1 feet.\nTwo days after the shooting, defendant surrendered to the police. A lineup was conducted for Owen Terry and he identified defendant. At a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the out-of-court identification,\nOwen Terry and Investigator Lawrence Flood testified, after which the trial court denied the motion to suppress.\nThe other major trial witnesses for the State were Officer Masalski, who arrived on the scene soon after the incident, Bahaadar Mujaahid, a friend of defendant, and Investigator Flood, who testified to statements he had taken. The testimony of Mujaahid will be recounted in detail in the discussion of the issues.\nI\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s claim that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the out-of-court identification made by Owen Terry. We disagree. Terry, an eyewitness to the shooting, identified defendant in a lineup. Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the out-of-court identification was denied after a hearing, and Terry subsequently testified to that identification. Terry was unable to make an in-court identification of defendant.\nTwo days after the incident, defendant surrendered to the police. A lineup was then conducted for Terry. Terry previously described the suspect to the police as a black male wearing a grey cap, green jacket, and light blue pants. Defendant was wearing similar clothes when he surrendered and was placed in the lineup. Defendant\u2019s cap was placed, in turn, on all six men in the lineup.\nTerry stated that he never saw a front view of the suspect\u2019s face during the shooting, and during the lineup could not identify defendant by his face. The identification of defendant in the lineup was based primarily on defendant\u2019s clothes, according to Terry.\nDefendant claims that the lineup identification should have been suppressed as the fruit of a suggestive lineup. Defendant cites Israel v. Odom (7th Cir. 1975), 521 F.2d 1370, which we read to support the proposition that the instant lineup was not unconstitutionally suggestive. There, the description of the defendant included eyeglasses. At the lineup, defendant was the only one of five men wearing glasses. Further, Odom was S'SM\" tall, while three of the other four men in the lineup were over 6' tall. The court of appeals held there were sufficient indicia of reliability present to permit the admission of the lineup identification.\nA lineup identification will be admitted at trial even if the lineup procedure was suggestive, so long as there are sufficient indicia of reliability surrounding the identification. Several important factors to be considered are set out in Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 199-200, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 411-12, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382-83. Upon our consideration of these factors and the totality of the circumstances, we find sufficient indicia of reliability in the instant identification to permit its admission.\nAlternatively, defendant contends that any lineup identification based primarily on the clothing of the suspect is per se invalid and must be suppressed. Terry was vigorously cross-examined concerning the lineup, and the jury was fully aware of the circumstances surrounding it. That the identification was based primarily on clothing goes only to the weight to be given the identification by the jury, not its admissibility. The cases cited by defendant support this conclusion. (See People v. Versher (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 148, 150, 367 N.E.2d 311; People v. Reed (1968), 103 Ill. App. 2d 342, 346-49, 243 N.E.2d 628.) We find this contention without merit. The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.\nII\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s order clearing the courtroom of certain spectators during the testimony of Owen Terry deprived him of his right to a public trial. Prior to Owen Terry\u2019s testimony on the motion to suppress, the trial court held an in camera hearing, on the State\u2019s request, to close the courtroom during Terry\u2019s testimony. The defense objected. The trial court ordered the courtroom closed. Subsequently, during Terry\u2019s testimony in the trial, the courtroom was also closed based on the evidence adduced at the earlier in camera hearing.\nAt the in camera hearing, Owen Terry testified that he was afraid to testify, and that certain incidents occurred which he perceived as threats. He had sent two of his children out of town. He received a phone call in which a male voice said, \u201cDid you get the message?\u201d Shots were fired at his front porch and his automobile was vandalized. The trial court believed that Terry was afraid and thus issued the closure order. The order limited access to the courtroom during Terry\u2019s testimony to the parties, their attorneys, other defendants on the trial court\u2019s call and their attorneys, the press, and court personnel. Subsequently, a group of high school students on a field trip was allowed to remain in the courtroom during Terry\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant claims that his right to a public trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments was violated, citing the recent cases of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980), 448 U.S. 555, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S. Ct. 2814, and Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (1979), 443 U.S. 368, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608, 99 S. Ct. 2898. Those cases, however, deal with the right of the press and the public to attend a trial when all parties and the trial court agree to closure.\nWe consider the relevant case law to be that which deals with situations where the courtroom was closed over defendant\u2019s objection, as in the instant case. People v. Latimore (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 812, 342 N.E.2d 209, appeal denied (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 591, and United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff (7th Cir. 1977), 561 F.2d 691, cert, denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1076, 55 L. Ed. 2d 782, 98 S. Ct. 1266, deal with the same trial. In Latimore, the courtroom was closed during the testimony of the victim in a rape trial, but remained open during the testimony of the other eight witnesses. The press was allowed to remain, although it is unclear whether any reporters were present. Both the appellate court and the court of appeals approved of this procedure.\nThe court of appeals stated that the right of the defendant to have ordinary spectators present at trial was not absolute, but must be balanced against other interests which justify excluding them. We agree. In Latimore, the other interest was the concern for the rape victim. The court noted that society has an interest in lessening the ordeal of the victim, thereby encouraging her to report the crime. The court also noted that the closure order was drawn as narrowly as possible.\nWe find the instant case very analogous to Latimore. Here, the interest balanced against defendant\u2019s right to a fully open courtroom is the safety of the witness. Society has an interest in encouraging those who witness murder to testify. The closure order in the instant case only applied during the testimony of Owen Terry, and the press and various other persons were still permitted in the courtroom. We fail to see how the defendant was prejudiced. We hold that the closure order of the trial court was proper.\nIll\nA.\nDefendant argues that the trial court placed an improper limitation on defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Grover Evans, who testified as a prosecution eyewitness to the shooting of Michael Simkins. He positively identified defendant as one of the people who shot at Simkins initially, and as the person who fired the second shot directly at Simkins. Evans also supplied a motive for the shooting. In sum, Evans was a critical witness for the State.\nIn turn, Evans was subject to a great number of impeachment questions on cross-examination which took two principal forms. First, Evans was examined about a prior tape-recorded inconsistent statement that was given to defense counsel. Evans had earlier stated that he didn\u2019t see who fired the shots, as he was too drunk at the time. There was extensive cross-examination concerning this prior statement.\nSecond, Grover Evans was impeached by reference to various aspects of his criminal background. Reference was made to a prior conviction for criminal trespass to a vehicle and to his currently being on probation. Evans was, at the time of his testimony, charged by information with armed robbery, aggravated battery, and home invasion, and resided in Cook County jail. Defense counsel was permitted to bring before the jury that Evans had felony charges pending and that he had been recently moved to the witness quarters of the county jail. Counsel also asked a number of questions concerning whether any leniency had been promised in return for Evans\u2019 testimony.\nThe trial court, however, refused to allow disclosure to the jury of the specific nature of the pending charges (i.e., armed robbery). Defendant claims that this constitutes reversible error. He claims that he was entitled to show the bias of the witness by showing that the witness was currently charged with a crime by the same authority that was prosecuting the instant case. Defendant argues that, to fully assess the witness\u2019 bias, the jury should be presented with the exact nature of the charges.\nB.\nA full discussion of this issue involves two separate principles of law. First, the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution grants the accused the right \u201cto be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u201d (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) This provision is applied to the States through the fourteenth amendment. (Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 406, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 927, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1069.) Impeachment through showing bias comes within the ambit of the confrontation clause. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105.\nIn Davis, the court held that petitioner\u2019s rights under the confrontation clause were violated by the trial court\u2019s limitation of his cross-examination of a prosecution witness. The witness, the only eyewitness to any part of the crime, was currently on juvenile probation. Defense counsel wanted to present that fact to the jury in order to establish the bias of the witness, but was not permitted to do so. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, stating:\n\u201cWhile counsel was permitted to ask Green whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why Green might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. 0 * *. [Djefense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308. 318. 39 L. Ed. 2d 347. 355. 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1111.\nWe find no violation of defendant\u2019s right of confrontation in the instant case. Defense counsel was allowed substantial leeway in cross-examining Grover Evans, including cross-examination about the pending charges. Counsel was allowed to demonstrate that Evans had a pending felony information and that he currently was incarcerated in the county jail. Further, Evans admitted that after he agreed to testify against defendant, he was transferred from the general area of the jail to the witness quarters. The only area defense counsel was prohibited from developing was the specific nature of the charges pending against the witness. Under these circumstances, the constitutional mandate of confrontation was met. Compare People v. Wilkerson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 151, 156 (right of confrontation violated).\nC.\nSecondly, it has long been held that cross-examination is permitted to show bias of a witness. \u201c[T]he pendency of any indictment against the witness indicates indirectly a \u00b0 * \u00b0 possibility of his currying favor by testifying for the state.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 3A Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7967 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); see E. Cleary and M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7607.7 (3d ed. 1979).\nA leading case in this State is People v. Mason (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835. In Mason, the court held that the widest latitude should generally be allowed a defendant in cross-examination for the purpose of establishing bias. A criminal defendant should be allowed to show that a witness has been charged with a crime \u201cwhere it would reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias or a motive to testify falsely.\u201d 28 Ill. 2d 396, 401; see generally E. Cleary and M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7607.7 (3d ed. 1979).\nDefendant\u2019s rights secured by the confrontation clause and the common law right to cross-examine regarding bias must be considered independently. The discretionary authority of the trial court to restrict the scope of cross-examination comes into play only after there has been permitted, as a matter of right, sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation clause. (United States v. Vasilios (5th Cir. 1979), 598 F.2d 387, 389, cert, denied (1979), 444 U.S. 967, 62 L. Ed. 2d 380, 100 S. Ct. 456.) To determine whether a limitation of cross-examination violates defendant\u2019s right of confrontation, we look:\n\u201c* \u201d * not to what defendant has been prohibited from doing but to what he has been allowed to do. * * * [I]f it appears from the entire record that the jury has been made aware of adequate factors concerning relevant areas of impeachment of a witness, no constitutional question arises merely because, defendant has been prohibited on cross-examination from pursuing other areas of inquiry.\u201d (People v. Hines (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1048, 419 N.E.2d 420.)\nSee also People v. Baugh (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 946, 951, 422 N.E.2d 166.\nAlthough we find no constitutional violation, we do find that the trial court\u2019s limitation of defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Grover Evans was improper under the law of evidence. The trial court\u2019s refusal to allow the specific nature of the pending charges constituted an abuse of discretion in the instant case. We perceive no good reason to keep this information from the jury, and a good reason to bring it to their attention. The jury is entitled to know the nature of the pending charge in order that it will have before it complete information so as to be better able to resolve the bias question. The seriousness of the charge is a factor the jury is entitled to weigh when assessing the bias of the witness.\nWe next consider whether, under the record of this case, the record is so prejudicial so as to require reversal. A reviewing court will not find reversible error where cross-examination was unduly restricted unless \u201cthere was a clear abuse of * * * discretion, resulting in manifest prejudice.\u201d People v. Hubbard (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 142, 151, 302 N.E.2d 609; see also People v. Eddington (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 41, 47, 394 N.E.2d 609; People v. Mason (1963), 28 Ill. 2d 396, 403; People v. Patterson (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 168, 175, 410 N.E.2d 396.\nWhile the trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination, we cannot say that defendant was manifestly prejudiced by this error. In view of the substantial cross-examination of Grover Evans and argument to the jury by defense counsel, the credibility of the witness was clearly brought to the attention of the jury. We do not believe that the additional cross-examination would have affected the jury\u2019s determination of the witness\u2019 credibility. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error notwithstanding the limitation of cross-examination.\nIV\nWe next consider whether the examination of witness Bahaadar Mujaahid by the State was improper. The State called Mujaahid during its case in chief for one reason: to testify about a statement made by defendant in which he admitted the shooting. A police report quoted Mujaahid as making the following statement to police, relating a conversation he had with defendant:\n\u201cHe [defendant] and Bear were walking down a side street and noted the subjects continue to follow them. At this point, Rufus said that he, quote, iced, unquote one of the subjects, and Bahaador [sic] asked why he had shot the subject. Rufus stated that his weapon had been cocked and everything happened very quickly.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s statement to Mujaahid purportedly occurred on April 29, after the shooting.\nMujaahid, however, was not a cooperative witness at trial. Initially, Mujaahid could only remember that defendant had said to him on April 29 that defendant was afraid for his life and wanted to \u201ctalk to the police and surrender hisself [sic].\u201d The prosecution\u2019s request that Mujaahid be declared a court\u2019s witness was denied.\nSeveral more questions were asked of Mujaahid which implied that he was not testifying to everything he knew. A representative colloquy follows:\n\u201cMISS PROPES [prosecutor]: Mr. Mujaahid, did you ever tell Investigator Flood about a conversation you had with Eddie Rufus on the night of April 29, 1979?\nMR. MUJAAHID: I think I told you the man told me some people were trying to kill him. What I told\u2014\nQ. Did you ever tell Investigator Flood that Eddie Rufus told you anything else besides that someone was trying to kill him?\nA. Your Honor, may I address the Court, sir?\nTHE COURT: Do you understand the question?\nMR. MUJAAHID: No, sir.\u201d\nThe court thereupon denied another request by the prosecution to declare Mujaahid a court\u2019s witness.\nSubsequently, the court appointed attorney George Howard to represent the witness and to advise him of his obligation to testify truthfully and of the penalties for failure to do so. Upon resuming his direct testimony, Mujaahid\u2019s memory improved somewhat. He now recalled that defendant told him the following: Defendant was at Farmer Brown when three members of the El Rukn street gang appeared and threatened him. He left, went down Mohawk Street and was followed by the three. Then, \u201cthe guy got shot.\u201d According to Mujaahid, defendant never told him who shot the victim, or who defendant was with at Farmer Brown.\nThe jury was excused and at the request of the State, a voir dire was conducted of the witness. He denied making the statements attributed to him in the police report. When the jury returned, the prosecution asked the witness if defendant told him who shot the victim, and how many times the victim was shot. These questions were repeated several times due to objections raised by defense counsel. Mujaahid eventually answered both questions, \u201cno.\u201d Finally, the following colloquy ensued:\n\u201cMISS PROPES: Mr. Mujaahid, when you spoke with Mr. Rufus on the 29th of April and in the ensuing days before he turned himself in to the police, did you perceive yourself as being a confidante of his?\nMR. REYNOLDS [defense counsel]: I object to that.\nTHE COURT: The objection will be sustained.\nMISS PROPES: Did you perceive\u2014\nTHE COURT: The question as phrased.\nMISS PROPES: Did you act as a confidante to Eddie Rufus in those days?\nMR. REYNOLDS: I object to that.\nTHE COURT: The objection will be sustained to the question.\nMISS PROPES: In those days \u2014 well, strike that. Did you advise Eddie Rufus to turn himself in to the police?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. Did you perceive Eddie Rufus as a friend of yours?\nMR. REYNOLDS: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: The objection will be sustained.\nMISS PROPES: Now, Mr. Mujaahid, in the times since April 29, 1979, you and I have had several conversations, have we not?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. Have you expressed to me a reluctance to come to this court and testify?\nMR. REYNOLDS: I object now.\nTHE COURT: Objection sustained.\nMISS PROPES: Nothing further.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial was denied.\nDefendant contends that the State\u2019s examination of Mujaahid consisted of impeachment of the witness on a collateral matter. The impeachment purportedly consisted of Mujaahid\u2019s prior statement to the police, which as hearsay was substantively inadmissible. Defendant claims that there was no basis for impeachment since the witness never said anything that was damaging to the State\u2019s case, but merely refused to testify to matters beneficial to the State. In support of this contention, defendant cites People v. Grigsby (1934), 357 Ill. 141, 191 N.E. 264; People v. Bryant (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 17, 425 N.E.2d 1325; People v. Pastorino (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 921, 414 N.E.2d 54; and People v. Triplett (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 763, 409 N.E.2d 401.\nEach of the foregoing cases, although involving pertinent principles applicable to the instant issue, is distinguishable from the instant case. For example, the prior inconsistent statements were read to the jury in all four cases. In Bryant, we recently covered the applicable law. (See People v. Bryant (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 17, 22-26.) There is no need to repeat the same review of the law.\nIn the instant case, the prior statement was never presented to the jury. Defendant recognizes that no verbatim reading of the prior statement occurred, but argues that the State achieved its goal of convincing the jury that the prior statement existed without actually reading the statement. Our reading of the record convinces us that the questioning of Mujaahid by the prosecution straddled, but did not cross the boundary between the permissible and the objectionable. The out-of-court statement was not before the jury. Further, the questioning by the prosecution did not explicitly suggest the existence of a prior statement. The prosecutor\u2019s conduct was not beyond reproach, but it did not rise to the level of error. Compare People v. Giangrande (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 397, 403-04, 428 N.E.2d 503.\nV\nDefendant objects to three remarks by the prosecutor in closing argument which he claims deprived him of a fair trial. We have reviewed each of the remarks and based on the entire record, we find no error.\nVI\nDefendant argues that an erroneous jury instruction was given. The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.06 (1968), which stated:\n\u201cYou have before you evidence that the defendant made a [statement] relating to the crime charged in the indictment.\nIt is for you to determine whether the defendant made the [statement], and if so, what weight should be given to the [statement]. In determining the weight to be given to a [statement], you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.\u201d (People\u2019s Instruction No. 9.)\nIPI Criminal No. 3.06 is identical to this modified version except that \u201cadmission\u201d replaces \u201cstatement\u201d in the original version.\nThe statement referred to in the instruction is that given by defendant to Bahaadar Mujaahid. Defendant contends that the instruction is flawed in two respects: first, the statement given by defendant does not indicate when the incident occurred; and second, there is no proof that the statement was \u201crelating to the crime charged in the indictment.\u201d\nThere must be sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of a jury instruction. When an improper instruction is given, a reviewing court will not reverse unless the instruction affected the outcome of the verdict. People v. Kurzydlo (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 791, 796, 320 N.E.2d 80, appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill. 2d 594.\nWithout prolonged discussion, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of People\u2019s Instruction No. 9. Compare People v. Dixon (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 557, 561-62, 374 N.E.2d 900, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 610, cert, denied (1979), 440 U.S. 973, 59 L. Ed. 2d 790, 99 S. Ct. 1538.\nVII\nLastly, defendant contends he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and find overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. We hold that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J., and PERLIN, J., concur.\nThe prosecutor did not ask questions such as, \u201cDid defendant tell you that he shot someone?\u201d but asked only, \u201cDid defendant tell you who shot Simkins?\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy P. O\u2019Neill, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Ruth Stern Geis, and James B. Koch, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE RUFUS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 79-1927\nOpinion filed February 16, 1982.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy P. O\u2019Neill, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Ruth Stern Geis, and James B. Koch, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0467-01", "first_page_order": 489, "last_page_order": 500 }