{ "id": 5475545, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE MALLOY, a/k/a John Plate, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Malloy", "decision_date": "1982-03-02", "docket_number": "No. 80-276", "first_page": "605", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 605" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "402 A. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Md. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2302216 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/42/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Colo. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 2369388 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/197/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.W.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9932716 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/558/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.W.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10138135 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/530/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619244 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "755-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 200", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531819 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217-18" }, { "page": "839-40" }, { "page": "2259" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "2260-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598-99, 604" }, { "page": "424, 427" }, { "page": "2259, 2262" }, { "page": "603-04" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "2261-62" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "2261" }, { "page": "603-04" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "2261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487-88" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073786 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95-96" }, { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777746 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 7767, "ocr_confidence": 0.893, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.984055557975116e-08, "percentile": 0.4224705764699023 }, "sha256": "621a315a8b977da84a8b85a205ef51da99306f2b9b411013f66e9b56ceaf234c", "simhash": "1:0919a23de99cc282", "word_count": 1280 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:33.067215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE MALLOY, a/k/a John Plate, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn a jury trial defendant, Eugene Malloy, was convicted of burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1) and was sentenced to serve six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal defendant contends that the incriminating statements used to convict him were derived from an illegal arrest. For the reasons which follow, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction.\nDefendant was charged and convicted of the burglary of a grocery store owned by Joseph Ibrahim and Zofia Lipkowski. The identification of defendant as the burglar rested entirely upon incriminating statements he gave to the police following his arrest on an unrelated charge of auto theft. Prior to trial defendant filed motions to suppress his statements on the grounds that they were obtained as a result of an illegal arrest, that they were involuntary and that they were secured in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. These motions were denied. Defendant has not appealed the trial court\u2019s determination that his statements were voluntary and were taken after proper Miranda warnings were given. The only issue before us, therefore, is whether defendant\u2019s statements were derived from an illegal arrest.\nDefendant contends that he was illegally arrested because the police lacked probable cause and because he was arrested in his dwelling without a warrant in violation of Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371. In the view we take of this case it is unnecessary to decide whether defendant\u2019s arrest for auto theft was unlawful because we find that there was no causal connection between that arrest and the statements defendant subsequently volunteered to the police incriminating himself in the burglary.\nIn People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 398 N.E.2d 574, our supreme court summarized the principles which determine whether a statement given after an illegal arrest should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree:\n\u201cIt is important to note that the Supreme Court has rejected a simple \u2018but for\u2019 test under which any statement by a defendant following his unlawful arrest must be suppressed on the ground that the statement would not have been made had he not been taken into custody. The evidence in the cases considered by the court showed a causal connection between the illegal arrest and the statement such that the statement could be said to have been obtained by exploitation of the illegality. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417; Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 598-99, 604, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259, 2262; Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 217-18, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 839-40, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259.) The opinions mention as significant factors in ascertaining whether such causality exists the \u2018temporal proximity\u2019 of the arrest and the confession, the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62.\u201d 78 Ill. 2d 88, 95-96.\nApplying these principles to the facts in the case at bar, we find that defendant\u2019s statements incriminating himself in the burglary were properly admitted.\nThe first factor mentioned in Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 603,45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261, is \u201cthe temporal proximity\u201d of the arrest and the statement. Here, as in Brown, defendant gave his initial statement to the police regarding the burglary approximately two hours after his arrest. Temporal proximity, however, has been described as the \u201cleast determinative factor involved\u201d in determining whether there is a causal connection between an arrest and a subsequent statement. (Comment, 13 Houston L. Rev. 753, 764 (1976); see also Justice Stevens\u2019 concurring opinion in Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 220, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 841, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2260-61.) More significant is the presence or absence of intervening circumstances \u201cand, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct * * Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 603-04,45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62.\nThe record discloses that defendant was arrested for auto theft at 3:30 p.m. on March 31, 1979. At that time the arresting officers had no knowledge of the burglary to which defendant later confessed. Officer Anthony Audeno and Sergeant Fred Bonke testified that after defendant admitted that he had committed the auto theft and showed them where he had stolen the vehicle, he said that \u201che had a few other places to take\u201d the officers. \u201c[H]e wanted to get everything off his chest.\u201d According to the officers, defendant stated that \u201che had this urge to steal things,\u201d that \u201c[h]e would steal at will,\u201d that \u201che didn\u2019t understand why,\u201d and \u201cthought that he needed some help.\u201d Defendant initiated this conversation. Defendant admitted that he had burglarized a food store on Lawrence Avenue. At Audeno\u2019s request, defendant directed the officers to the scene of the crime and explained how he had committed the offense. En route defendant provided the officers with details of many other thefts and burglaries he claimed to have committed. When they arrived at the grocery store at 1507 West Lawrence Avenue, defendant told the officers that on the preceding night (March 30,1979), he had burglarized the store. Sergeant Bonke exited the vehicle, inspected the premises and was able to confirm for himself defendant\u2019s account of the burglary. Defendant repeated his confession to other officers after he was taken back to the district station.\nSeveral courts have considered a volunteered statement, not made in response to police interrogation, as a significant intervening circumstance which renders the statement admissible under Brown. (See Sanders v. State (1976), 259 Ark. 329, 336, 532 S.W.2d 752, 755-56; State v. Johnson (Mo. 1975), 530 S.W.2d 690, 693-94; State v. Jones (Mo. App. 1977), 558 S.W.2d 233, 239.) And other courts have held that where a defendant volunteers an incriminating statement about a crime for which he was not under arrest and of which the police had no knowledge before the defendant spoke up, that statement cannot be said to have been obtained through any purposeful or flagrant police misconduct. (See People v. Hillyard (1979), 197 Colo. 83, 589 P.2d 939; Davis v. State (1979), 42 Md. App. 546, 402 A. 2d 77.) On the basis of the record before us we find that there was no causal connection between defendant\u2019s arrest for auto theft (assuming that arrest was unlawful) and his subsequent volunteered admissions to an unrelated offense of which the police had no knowledge. Here, as in People v. Gabbard (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 88, 98-99, 398 N.E.2d 574, \u201cthe purpose of the exclusionary rule, i.e., to deter improper police conduct [citation] would be served minimally, if at all, by exclusion of the defendant\u2019s statements.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\n\u2022 Affirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J, and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frances Sowa, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Kevin Sweeney, and Jannice A. Kendall, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUGENE MALLOY, a/k/a John Plate, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 80-276\nOpinion filed March 2, 1982.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Frances Sowa, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Kevin Sweeney, and Jannice A. Kendall, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0605-01", "first_page_order": 627, "last_page_order": 630 }