{ "id": 5472851, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BODEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Bodeman", "decision_date": "1982-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 80-1716", "first_page": "39", "last_page": "46", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 39" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2459972 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 29", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6405124, 6405222, 6405325, 6406317, 6405935, 6405421, 6405041, 6405555, 6404951, 6405786, 6405661, 6406111 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0894-03", "/us/434/0894-04", "/us/434/0894-05", "/us/434/0894-12", "/us/434/0894-10", "/us/434/0894-06", "/us/434/0894-02", "/us/434/0894-07", "/us/434/0894-01", "/us/434/0894-09", "/us/434/0894-08", "/us/434/0894-11" ] }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2925142 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 1113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3109130 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/1113-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 983", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501016 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5470220 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "407 Ill. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2640134 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/407/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3222656 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857846 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3355831 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848334 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337746 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 N.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391194 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927490 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 N.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395691 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334974 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826151 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2755540, 2746255 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0324-02", "/ill-app-3d/2/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2708823 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827646 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912984 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991135 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3338283 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0092-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 16138, "ocr_confidence": 0.909, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3266970269677908e-07, "percentile": 0.628075613674774 }, "sha256": "a40aa2a7f6ad33e5a7a664202c52a8f5efc7c1ff8f3014c5045b17ab973659d1", "simhash": "1:3b6ecc16f2f74c49", "word_count": 2600 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:29.392087+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BODEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found defendant, Henry Bodeman, guilty of armed violence and of two counts of aggravated battery. The court sentenced him to terms of six years for armed violence and three years for each count of aggravated battery, all the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal defendant contends that prejudicial hearsay statements were improperly admitted into evidence; that the trial court permitted the State to impeach defense witnesses with prior inconsistent statements and then failed to advise the jury that these statements could not be considered substantively; that the trial court improperly limited defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of the complaining witness; that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument; that there is no valid count upon which the conviction for armed violence can stand; that defendant could not be convicted for both armed violence and aggravated battery since both offenses were based upon the same act; that the armed violence statute is unconstitutional; and that the evidence adduced was insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated battery.\nBernd Harrer, Louis Pocasangre, Sergio Cortez, and Alfred McCalla, all friends, testified for the State that they arrived at a tavern at about 1:30 a.m. on December 16, 1978. Shortly after 4 a.m., Mr. Hall, employed by the tavern as a bouncer, announced that the tavern was closing. As they were leaving, the four men exchanged insults with defendant, also a patron, and then entered Pocasangre\u2019s automobile which was parked outside. Harrer and Cortez sat in the back of the vehicle, while McCalla sat in front next to Pocasangre. Cortez returned to the tavern to use the washroom and was accompanied by McCalla who was refused service at the bar. Defendant and Hall followed McCalla to the vehicle. Hall stood at the driver\u2019s side while defendant knocked on the passenger\u2019s side window with a gun. Both men were yelling threats. When Pocasangre lowered the power-operated window, defendant tried to hit McCalla in the face with a gun. The gun fired, striking Pocasangre in the hand.\nDana White and Erol Sengellu, the tavern bartenders, testified for defendant that a gun found in a tavern drawer had been given to White by defendant after he arrived and that at closing defendant left without the gun and did not return. Both witnesses stated it was not the gun used in the shooting.\nWe first consider defendant\u2019s contention that several hearsay statements were improperly admitted into evidence. During cross-examination, White and Sengellu denied telling police officers that the gun in the tavern drawer was the one used in the shooting. A police officer testified that White advised him that the gun in the drawer was the one used in the shooting. Since defendant offered no objection to any of the foregoing questions or answers, he has waived his right to claim error on review. People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92, 136 N.E.2d 817.\nThe testimony of the police officers that White had advised them that defendant left the bar for a short time and then returned with the gun and asked the bartenders to hide it was not inadmissible hearsay. The statement was inconsistent with White\u2019s prior testimony and was admissible for impeachment purposes. It was error to allow a police officer to testify that White told him it was normal procedure, when police officers were coming, for patrons to give their weapons to the bartenders. This was hearsay, but its admission was not prejudicial to defendant. Defendant also argues that in his closing argument the prosecutor relied on these statements by the police officers for substantive rather than impeachment purposes. We have read the closing argument carefully, and it appears that the prosecutor\u2019s comments were properly made for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the bartenders. The prosecutor\u2019s reference to the tavern\u2019s custom of having patrons turn in weapons was error, but was not prejudicial to defendant.\nDefendant further maintains that the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury specifically that these prior inconsistent statements could not be considered as substantive evidence. He correctly asserts that Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.11 (1968), given for that purpose, was insufficient. (People v. Riley (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 176, 379 N.E.2d 746.) Defendant, however, failed to either object to the instruction or to tender a more appropriate one. The general rule is that failure to object at trial to an error in jury instructions waives the issue on appeal. People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331.\nAn exception to the general rule is provided where there were \u201csubstantial defects\u201d in the instructions \u201cif the interests of justice require.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 451(c).) This exception has been narrowly construed to apply only to the correction of grave errors (People v. Jenkins (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 61, 370 N.E.2d 532), or where the case was so close factually that fundamental fairness required the jury to be instructed properly. (People v. Joyner (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756.) Thus reversal has been required for failure to instruct the jury where a prior inconsistent statement was extraordinarily long and repetitious and where the conviction was based upon such statement (People v. Paradise (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 381,196 N.E.2d 689; People v. Fields (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 458, 334 N.E.2d 752; People v. Bacon (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 324, 276 N.E.2d 782), and in the particularly damaging situation where an incriminating statement was made by a co-defendant. (People v. Tate (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 400, 197 N.E.2d 26; People v. Tunstall (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 160, 161 N.E.2d 300.) In the present case there is no reason to depart from the general rule. The statements were not long and repetitious, and this is not a close case factually.\nDefendant also maintains that he was denied a fair trial when the police officer was permitted to testify that Hall had identified defendant as the person who did the shooting. We reject the State\u2019s position that the statement was offered merely to show why the police officers conducted their investigation as they did. When Hall\u2019s testimony is considered as a whole it is apparent that his identification of defendant as the person who did the shooting was offered for its truth, and its admission was error. Nevertheless, since three other eyewitnesses positively identified defendant, the hearsay testimony was merely cumulative and its admission does not require reversal. People v. Canale (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 107, 285 N.E.2d 133.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied him the right to confront a State\u2019s witness with a prior inconsistent statement. After Pocasangre testified that he did not recall telling anyone that the man who shot him was bald, defense counsel sought to impeach him by asking if he recalled talking to defense counsel\u2019s investigator. The basis of the State\u2019s objection and the court\u2019s reason for sustaining the objection was that a negative answer would require the calling of the investigator as a witness. In exchange for the investigator\u2019s exemption from a witness exclusion order, defense counsel had assured the court that the investigator would not testify.\nExclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is a time honored practice. Nevertheless, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit a witness to testify even though he has violated an order excluding witnesses. (People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600.) The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on review unless it can be shown that the party offering the witness was deprived of material testimony without his fault. People v. Bridgeforth (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 52, 281 N.E.2d 617.\nWhile defendant made no offer of proof as to what the investigator\u2019s testimony would have been, even if we were to assume that he would have testified that Pocasangre described his assailant as bald, defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of that testimony. Pocasangre did not describe or identify defendant at trial, and the prior statement would not have impeached Pocasangre. Nor could the statement serve to impeach the testimony of the three eyewitnesses who identified defendant as the assailant.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that various comments of the prosecutor during closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Defendant argues that the prosecutor made improper references to his failure to testify, and that the prosecutor improperly accused defense counsel of conducting an odious cross-examination and of presenting a sham defense.\nA prosecutor has wide latitude during closing argument and the trial court\u2019s determination as to the propriety of the argument will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Weatherspoon (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 315, 379 N.E.2d 847.) Even where prosecutorial comments are improper the defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the questionable language, in light of all the evidence, was a material factor in his conviction. (People v. Nicholls (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 91, 245 N.E.2d 771; People v. Shorter (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 468, 375 N.E.2d 513.) The appropriate test for determining whether a prosecutorial remark violated defendant\u2019s right to remain silent is whether the reference was intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 4, 237 N.E.2d 697.\nIn the present case, defendant complains that the prosecutor, in stating that the three eyewitnesses testified and were cross-examined, was commenting on defendant\u2019s failure to testify. The prosecutor actually was responding to defense counsel\u2019s remark that the three witnesses had something to hide because they refused to speak to him or his investigator prior to the trial. Defendant complains of another similar remark by the prosecutor that McCalla took the stand to be questioned and cross-examined. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor asked, \u201cWhere is Mr. Hall?\u201d Apparently he was drawing the jury\u2019s attention to defendant\u2019s failure to call a key witness. Defendant was not the only one to whom the comment could have referred. (People v. Mills.) Defendant also complains of the prosecutor\u2019s frequent use of the terms \u201cuncontradicted\u201d and \u201cundisputed,\u201d with regard to certain factual evidence. A mere reference to the uncontradicted nature of the State\u2019s case is permissible, however, even where the only person who could have contradicted the State\u2019s case was defendant (People v. Mills), so long as it was not intended or calculated to direct the jury\u2019s attention to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. (People v. Connors (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 312, 402 N.E.2d 773.) We do not believe that these comments were so intended.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s characterization of trial counsel\u2019s manner of cross-examination was merely a response to the defense statements that the State\u2019s witnesses had refused to talk to defense counsel. The characterization was not so inflammatory as to prejudice the jury. Similarly, the prosecutor\u2019s comment about defense counsel\u2019s trial tactics, unlike the lengthy attack made by the prosecutor in People v. Polenik (1950), 407 Ill. 337, 95 N.E.2d 414, was not so derogatory as to antagonize the jury against defendant and his attorney. In sum, the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s attacks on his conviction for armed violence. Relying on the trial court decision in People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 422 N.E.2d 627, he maintains that the armed violence statute is unconstitutional as overreaching and punishing too severely acts not justifying such punishment. Although the supreme court in Har\u00f3n found it unnecessary to reach this issue on review, this court recently has upheld the constitutionality of the penalty provisions of the armed violence statute. (People v. Pace (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 213, 426 N.E.2d 983; People v. Lynom (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 423 N.E.2d 1281.) We find no reason to depart from that conclusion.\nDefendant also argues that the armed violence conviction is invalid because the complaint failed to allege the essential elements of the crime. Armed violence is defined as the commission of any felony while armed with a dangerous weapon. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A \u2014 2.) Count 5 charges that defendant, while armed with a dangerous weapon, committed a battery on Pocasangre and intentionally caused him great bodily harm. The commission of a simple battery while armed with a dangerous weapon would not constitute armed violence because battery is a misdemeanor, but the additional charge that defendant thereby caused great bodily harm serves to charge defendant with aggravated battery which is a felony. Count 5 adequately advised defendant of the nature of the charge so that he could prepare a defense and was sufficiently specific to serve as a bar to future prosecution for the same conduct. People v. Harvey (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 585, 294 N.E.2d 269.\nWe next address defendant\u2019s contention that he was improperly sentenced for both aggravated battery and armed violence since both convictions arose from the same act. He correctly asserts that where a defendant is charged with multiple offenses arising from a single act he can be convicted and sentenced only on the more serious offense. (People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273.) In the present case the single act of shooting Pocasangre in the hand was the basis of both the armed violence and the aggravated battery convictions. (People v. Johnson (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 428 N.E.2d 1133.) Thus both convictions cannot stand, and we vacate the convictions for aggravated battery. In so holding, we recognize that this court has held that multiple convictions are proper for armed violence and the underlying offense when the latter may be committed without possession of a dangerous weapon. (E.g., People v. Best (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 424 N.E.2d 29.) We adhere, however, to our holding in People v. Johnson.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for either count of aggravated battery because the State failed to prove that he intentionally fired the shot which struck Pocasangre. Although we have vacated the aggravated battery convictions, this issue must be resolved since the armed violence conviction was based on the commission of aggravated battery. While intent is an essential element in a conviction for aggravated battery, intent may be inferred from the acts and circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s conduct. (People v. Barrington (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 445, 304 N.E.2d 525.) In the present case witnesses for the State testified to words and actions by defendant from which the jury could have concluded that defendant had the requisite mental state.\nWe need not address defendant\u2019s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the count of aggravated battery which was based on permanent disfigurement. We have vacated the convictions for aggravated battery and the trial court\u2019s finding of great bodily harm was sufficient to support a conviction for armed violence.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County as to armed violence is affirmed. The judgments as to aggravated battery are vacated.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part.\nWHITE, P. J., and RIZZI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat and Casimir J. Bartnik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY BODEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 80-1716\nOpinion filed March 24, 1982.\nFrederick F. Cohn, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat and Casimir J. Bartnik, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0039-01", "first_page_order": 61, "last_page_order": 68 }