{ "id": 5471291, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE W. SMITH, a/k/a C. W. Smith, a/k/a John Davidson, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "1982-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 17345", "first_page": "639", "last_page": "643", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 639" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108806 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5480783 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045347 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0415-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 574, "char_count": 9835, "ocr_confidence": 0.906, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.348157698156601e-08, "percentile": 0.3895433672001727 }, "sha256": "5dec5c3ab4b96a3fd01f8f2d38326777362c16c18fec8c0011671601732b5733", "simhash": "1:9220b9a3725b2c31", "word_count": 1628 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:29.392087+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE W. SMITH, a/k/a C. W. Smith, a/k/a John Davidson, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TRAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial in the circuit court of Champaign County, the defendant, Clarence W. Smith, was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence. We affirm.\nAt trial, Sherry Walker testified that, in an attempt to sell two diamonds, she placed a classified advertisement in a newspaper. A man calling himself John Davidson responded to her ad and indicated his interest in one of the diamonds. They arranged an evening meeting at Ms. Walker\u2019s home.\nAfter entering Ms. Walker\u2019s house, Davidson flourished a sawed-off shotgun and demanded that Ms. Walker give him the diamond and her purse. She complied. Davidson forbade Ms. Walker to look at him. After pulling the telephone out of the wall, Davidson departed.\nDenise Sayre testified that she was an acquaintance of the defendant. The defendant asked her to sell a diamond for him, because it would \u201clook better for a white girl to sell it than a black guy.\u201d Ms. Sayre\u2019s attempts to sell the diamond at several jewelry stores were unsuccessful.\nOn appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred in giving, over his objection, the following instruction:\n\u201cIf you find that the defendant had exclusive possession of recently stolen property and there is no reasonable explanation of his possession, you may infer that the defendant obtained possession of the property by armed robbery.\nYou are never required to draw this inference. It is for the jury to determine whether the inference should be drawn from all the facts of the case before it.\u201d\nDefendant argues that, under People v. Housby (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 415, 420 N.E.2d 151, his possession of recently stolen property was insufficient by itself to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery. In Housby, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled upon an instruction given at a burglary trial. This instruction permitted the jury to infer that the defendant had obtained possession of recently stolen property by burglary if they found that the defendant had exclusive possession of recently stolen property and there was no reasonable explanation for his possession. The Housby court said that the inference used in the jury instruction did not infringe upon Housby\u2019s due process rights if: (1) there was a rational connection between his recent ^ ssessic: of property stolen in the burglary and his participation in the burglary; (2; b.'s guilt of burglary flowed more likely than not from his recent, unexplained, and exclusive possession of burglary proceeds; and (3) ther was evidence v rrokorating the defendant\u2019s guilt.\nOur reading of the record in the instant case leads us to conclude that the instruction met Housby\u2019s requirements. The defendant claims that there was no corroborating evidence of his guilt. We disagree. The defendant fit Walker\u2019s general description of the man who robbed her. Walker testified that the robber was a black male, with a medium brown complexion, who stood approximately 6 feet tall and weighed 175 to 180 pounds. The defendant is 6 feet tall and weighs 180 pounds. He had a complexion and skin color similar to that described by Walker. Walker was unable to positively identify the defendant. However, after viewing a lineup, Walker asked to see the defendant a second time.\nAccording to the defendant, a reasonable possibility existed that he had bought the diamond. Under this hypothesis an inference that the defendant obtained the jewel by armed robbery cannot be sustained by his mere possession of the stone. At trial, the defendant\u2019s story that he bought the diamond from a man in a pool hall was shown to contain several inconsistencies and was impeached in significant areas. The defendant first disclaimed any knowledge of the diamond to the police. He later denied giving this statement. On a different date, the defendant testified that he bought the diamond for $28 from a man in a pool hall, but the defendant could not describe this man. According to the defendant, he had the diamond appraised by a middle-aged man at Frank\u2019s Jewelers. This man allegedly gave the defendant an estimate free of charge. This employee supposedly stated that the diamond was worth $500-$1400, but did not provide the defendant with an appraisal slip. At trial, an employee of Frank\u2019s Jewelers testified that they did not have a middle-aged man working for them at the time that defendant allegedly received the appraisal. Also, Frank\u2019s Jewelers does appraisals only for jewelry they sell themselves. They do not appraise loose stones brought in by people off of the street. Appraisals from Frank\u2019s give a specific dollar amount as to the value of the jewelry and not a range of values. Frank\u2019s generally charges a fee for their appraisal and provides an appraisal certificate. The defendant also testified that he had the diamond appraised by Mr. Reed at Reed\u2019s Jewelers. The defendant said that he was not charged a fee or given an appraisal slip at this establishment. Sherry Walker had previously taken the stone to Reed\u2019s. Reed gave Walker an appraisal slip setting the value of the diamond at $575. Reed testified that Walker\u2019s diamond was somewhat unusual because it had nicks and abrasions around its edges and because it had certain internal flaws. When, at the prosecution\u2019s request, Reed examined the diamond possessed by the defendant, he stated that it was the same stone he had appraised for Walker. It would therefore seem likely that, if Reed had examined the diamond for the defendant, he would have recognized its similarities to Walker\u2019s stone at that time. Also, in accordance with Reed\u2019s business practices, Reed would have probably given the defendant a fixed value and an appraisal slip instead of a range of values and no appraisal slip.\nWe find that the requirements of Housby have been satisfied. There was a rational connection between the defendant\u2019s recent possession of Walker\u2019s diamond and his participation in the armed robbery. The defendant\u2019s guilt of armed robbery flowed more likely than not from his recent, unexplained, and exclusive possession of the diamond. There was sufficient evidence, as set out above, to corroborate the defendant\u2019s guilt. Therefore, the giving of the instruction in question here was proper and violated none of the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. See also People v. Killings (1982), 103 Ill. App. 3d 1074.\nThe defendant next claims that he was improperly sentenced and asks that this cause be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)) lists the differing factors in aggravation that may be considered by the trial court in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment or as a reason to impose a more severe sentence. The trial judge indicated that he relied upon the following factor when determining the defendant\u2019s sentence: \u201c[T]he defendant\u2019s conduct caused or threatened serious harm.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(1).) The trial court stated:\n\u201cThe crime of armed robbery is a crime which threatens the most serious kind of physical harm to another as it did in this case. The threat to the victim, Sherry Walker, in this case was that she complied with the demands of the defendant concerning the diamond and other demands made during the process of his obtaining the diamond for the implicit threat by the presence of the gun was pointed at her was that she would be shot and either killed or seriously injured as a result of such shooting as her assailant might see fit, that is, wherever he would choose to shoot her upon her failure to comply.\u201d\nIn support of his argument, the defendant relies upon our decision in People v. Allen (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 38, 422 N.E.2d 254, where we narrowly construed the use of the aggravating factor of risk of harm. We find Allen to be distinguishable upon its facts from the situation here. Allen\u2019s conduct could have conceivably harmed him. We said that almost all burglaries inherently impose a threat of serious harm to the burglar and also to the police as they attempt to capture the burglar. Thus, the risk of harm in Allen was no greater than that inherent in almost all burglaries. We took pains to point out that the situation in Allen was not like one in which the burglar engages in combat with the police, enters an occupied dwelling or other building, or has a confrontation with persons while in the building.\nThe use of this aggravating factor in sentencing must be examined in light of the particular circumstances of each case. In the array of available weapons, a sawed-off shotgun is among the most dangerous and threatening. The defendant here concealed this vicious weapon and, through duplicity, brought the weapon into Ms. Walker\u2019s home. He used the weapon to terrorize her. This combination of weapon and setting makes the instant crime one where the defendant\u2019s conduct clearly threatened serious harm greater than the harm inherent in all armed robberies. Thus, the trial court properly took this threat into account when determining the defendant\u2019s sentence.\nAccordingly, the judgment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMILLS and LONDRIGAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TRAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE W. SMITH, a/k/a C. W. Smith, a/k/a John Davidson, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 17345\nOpinion filed April 15, 1982.\nRehearing denied April 27, 1982.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Jeffrey D. Foust, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Robert J. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0639-01", "first_page_order": 661, "last_page_order": 665 }