{ "id": 5469062, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK M. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Schroeder", "decision_date": "1982-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 81-60", "first_page": "677", "last_page": "680", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 677" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 879", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3325542 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0879-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405143 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2910853 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177400 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "2254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173155 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5578062 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5411710 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5642285 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3128690 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0200-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 477, "char_count": 6596, "ocr_confidence": 0.903, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.81869903719237e-08, "percentile": 0.45785989839562075 }, "sha256": "dfd6903cdbaf53eb3ac5082fdf4cebd713bab03f50417a67953fa41e84e20288", "simhash": "1:fcc533e36fdcab55", "word_count": 1065 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:10:29.392087+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK M. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant-appellant, Patrick Schroeder, and co-defendant, Thomas Streck, were charged by information with four counts of deviate sexual assault, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of intimidation, one count of attempt (rape), and one count of robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 11 \u2014 3, 10 \u2014 2(a)(3), 12 \u2014 6(a)(1), 8 \u2014 4, 18 \u2014 1). Prior to their trials, both defendants moved to suppress identification evidence and to sever their trials. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion to suppress, but granted their motion to sever. In a separate trial, the co-defendant was acquitted. After a bench trial, defendant Schroeder was found guilty on four counts of deviate sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, intimidation and robbery, resulting in a sentence of 10 years in the Department of Corrections on the four deviate sexual assault convictions and five years on the intimidation conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant Schroeder brings this appeal.\nDefendant initially contends that the identification testimony was vague, doubtful and uncertain, and, therefore, he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any of the charges. We disagree. It is well settled that, where the identification of the accused is at issue, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict, even if the identification testimony is contradicted by the accused, provided that the witness is credible and the accused is viewed under circumstances which would permit a positive identification to be made. People v. Johnson (1980), 94 Ill. App. 3d 200, 206.\nThe record demonstrates that the victim had ample opportunity to view her assailants in an area adequately supplied with artificial light. The victim could describe certain facial features of the assailants despite their faces being covered most of the time with nylon stocking masks. The degree of attention of the witness was more than casual or passing, in that she was the victim of one of the most personally humiliating crimes. The witness\u2019 description of the person who had initially grabbed her matched the defendant except for the fact that the defendant was lighter than the victim\u2019s estimate and had a distinctive moustache. These discrepancies in the witness\u2019 testimony do not destroy the witness\u2019 credibility, for an identification is usually not made by distinguishing separate features but by the \u201ctotal impression\u201d made upon the witness. (People v. Moore (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 952, 957; People v. Winston (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 237, 239.) The record further demonstrates that within three weeks of the offense, the witness picked the defendant out of a lineup of eight individuals with little or no difficulty. Thus, the record does establish that the victim\u2019s identification was positive and precise, and that the failure to detect the presence or absence of a moustache is a minor discrepancy and does not destroy the credibility of the witness. People v. Agosto (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 851, 856.\nThe foregoing evidence also establishes that, considering the total circumstances of the matter, the identification was reliable and admissible even though some suggestive remarks were made during the confrontation procedure. In making this determination we have applied the factors which the United States Supreme Court indicated should be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification, to wit: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness\u2019 degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness\u2019 prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 199, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, 411, 93 S. Ct. 375, 382.\nWe have reviewed these factors and the evidence in light of any corrupting effect of the alleged suggestive procedures. (Manson v. Brath waite (1977), 432 U.S. 98,116, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140, 155, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2254.) Although each participant in the lineup wore a wristband with his name printed on it with one-half inch lettering, there was no evidence that any of the witnesses knew the names of the accused at the time. Additionally, although defendant\u2019s attorney heard someone state, \u201c[Ejveryone wants to see 2 and 5 [the two co-defendants] again, right? Everybody 2 and 5,\u201d there was no evidence that any of the witnesses heard this remark. There was testimony that neither of the two detectives who had testified at the hearing heard this statement; moreover, the witnesses were located in an adjacent room. Finally, although all the witnesses to the lineup were placed in the same room, both before and after viewing the lineup, there was no testimony which indicated that the witnesses discussed the accuseds\u2019 descriptions. (People v. Norfleet (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 758, 763-64.) We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that the defendant had failed to sustain his burden in establishing that the lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive. (People v. Watkins (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 273, 278; People v. Anton (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 344, 348; see People v. Jones (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 300, 308.) The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the identification testimony.\nDefendant, citing People v. Beasley (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 550, also contends that the acquittal of the codefendant, Streck, raised a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. For a reasonable doubt to be raised on such grounds, it must be shown that the evidence given against both defendants is identical in all respects. (People v. Stock (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 461,465.) This rule has been applied only where the codefendants were tried simultaneously upon the same evidence. (People v. Hill (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 879, 886.) The rule is not applicable in a case such as this, where the defendants have received separate trials which were held at different times.\nFor the reasons stated above the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSEIDENFELD, P. J., and UNVERZAGT, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Arthur H. Zimmerman, of Des Plaines, for appellant.", "J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PATRICK M. SCHROEDER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 81-60\nOpinion filed April 7, 1982.\nArthur H. Zimmerman, of Des Plaines, for appellant.\nJ. Michael Fitzsimmons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0677-01", "first_page_order": 699, "last_page_order": 702 }