{ "id": 3032954, "name": "ROBERT LOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOVERNORS STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Lott v. Governors State University", "decision_date": "1982-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 81-1677", "first_page": "851", "last_page": "856", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 851" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475519 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104, 107" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5096362 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/348/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448595 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 L. Ed. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11305924 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "1154" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "1157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030894 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0028-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 599, "char_count": 12373, "ocr_confidence": 0.88, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1420636334148014e-07, "percentile": 0.7673312227855755 }, "sha256": "592fa2becf1870c66b771a778904d3b906e06b4432424bf374713531d5f13ab8", "simhash": "1:ad62c2f6af0b1652", "word_count": 2032 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:02:18.366242+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT LOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOVERNORS STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Robert Lott filed suit in the circuit court of Cook County, charging defendants with employment discrimination. Defendants in the suit are the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (BOG), Governors State University (GSU), and William Engbretson, former president of GSU. Plaintiff\u2019s action, brought under section 89 \u2014 102(B) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), seeks reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action on jurisdictional grounds, finding that plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit demands monetary relief from the State and is therefore cognizable only in the Illinois Court of Claims. Plaintiff appeals.\nAt the time the instant appeal was filed, the principal issue was this: is a suit against the State under section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA subject to the general rule that monetary claims against the State must be filed in the Court of Claims? We now find that this issue has become moot, in light of a recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court. In Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc. (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 28, 428 N.E.2d 489, the court found section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA to be unconstitutional special legislation. Plaintiff\u2019s action is founded solely on section 9 \u2014 102(B). The Wilson decision would appear to sound the death knell of plaintiff\u2019s cause of action, but a more recent decision by the United States Supreme Court makes it clear that plaintiff\u2019s remedy may not be so casually dispatched. That decision is Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982),_U.S._, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 102 S. Ct. 1148. Before addressing the impact of Wilson and Logan, we will recount the facts.\nIn 1974, plaintiff was hired by GSU as the university\u2019s Director of Student Services. Plaintiff, who is black, later became active in the Minority Caucus, an organization of GSU employees concerned with minority rights. Plaintiff was not offered a contract for the position of Director of Student Services for the 1976-77 school year. Instead, he was offered a \u201cterminal\u201d contract for that year at a lower salary. Plaintiff charges in his complaint that his demotion and ultimate termination were in retaliation for his activities in the Minority Caucus.\nFollowing his termination at the end of the 1976-77 school year, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (the Commission). By the terms of the Fair Employment Practices Act then in force, the Commission was required to issue a complaint or, alternatively, an order that no complaint issue, within 180 days of plaintiff\u2019s charge. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 858.01(a); see also Springfield-Sangamon County Regional Plan Com. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 61,68,373 N.E.2d 1307 (holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the Commission must act within 180 days).) The Commission did not act on plaintiff\u2019s complaint within 180 days.\nIn 1978, the legislature added section 8.01a to the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 858.01a). That section provided a remedy for certain individuals whose discrimination charges were not acted upon by the Commission within the 180-day time limit. Section 8.01a states in part:\n\u201cIn the case of any charge of an unfair employment practice which has been properly filed with the Commission prior to March 30, 1978, which has not been settled or adjusted by conference and conciliation under Section 8, and which within 180 days thereafter has not been the subject of a complaint issued by the Commission or an order that no complaint be issued, the person filing the charge may seek appropriate injunctive or other relief by filing an action in the circuit court of the county where the alleged unfair employment practice occurred.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 858.01a.)\nIn 1979, the legislature passed the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.), which replaced the Fair Employment Practices Act. Section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA is essentially a re-enactment of section 8.01a of the FEPA, providing a remedy for individuals whose FEPA charges were not disposed of within the statutory period.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint, filed on September 26,1980, purports to state a cause of action under section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA. On November 13, 1981, our supreme court filed its opinion in Wilson v. All-Steel, Inc., finding section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA unconstitutional special legislation. 87 Ill. 2d 28, 33.\nDefendants did not argue the constitutionality of section 9 \u2014 102(B) in the trial court. There is no doubt, however, that the Wilson case is applicable. We further find that no waiver occurred in defendants\u2019 failure to so argue. The case of Quitman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1952), 348 Ill. App. 481, 109 N.E.2d 373, is on point. There, the defendant won a dismissal of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint by relying on a statutory defense. While the plaintiff\u2019s appeal was pending in this court, the Illinois Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, found the statute unconstitutional. The defendant in Quitman argued that the plaintiff, who had not questioned the constitutionality of the statute in the trial court, was precluded from raising that claim on appeal. The appellate court held:\n\u201cOnce a statute is declared unconstitutional it is void ab initio. No rights can be predicated upon it, nor can it afford any protection. It is as if it had never been written. It is our duty to recognize and follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.\u201d (348 Ill. App. 481, 483.)\nFollowing the supreme court\u2019s decision in Wilson, we recognize that section 9 \u2014 102(B) is void and that no rights can be predicated upon it.\nThis finding, however, does not dispose of plaintiff\u2019s claim. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982),_U.S__, 71L. Ed. 2d 265,102 S. Ct. 1148, the plaintiff (Logan) filed an employment discrimination charge with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission. Section 8(b) of the FEPA required the Commission to convene a fact-finding conference within 120 days of Logan\u2019s charge. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 858(b).) The Commission did not convene the fact-finding conference within the specified period. The Illinois Supreme Court, acting on Logan\u2019s employer\u2019s petition for a writ of prohibition, held that the 120-day period was mandatory and that the Commission therefore lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Logan\u2019s complaint. (See Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 99, 104, 107, 411 N.E.2d 277.) In so holding, the court perfunctorily dismissed Logan\u2019s contention that his rights to due process and equal protection were violated. See Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 99,104.\nThe United States Supreme Court reversed. The majority found that Logan\u2019s access to the FEPA\u2019s adjudicatory procedures was a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982),_U.S. __,_, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1154.) Logan was deprived of this property without due process when an administrative delay (for which Logan was not responsible) led to the dismissal of his complaint.\nThe case at bar presents the same situation. Plaintiff timely filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Commission. The Commission did not act on his charge within the 180 days required by statute (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 858.01(a)), and plaintiff\u2019s claim was thereby defeated. Section 9 \u2014 102(B) of the IHRA would have preserved plaintiff\u2019s property interest (his right to an adjudication of his claim), but that section has been declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. In the present posture of this case, we find that plaintiff has a protected property interest in his employment discrimination claim and he can not constitutionally be deprived of that interest by the inaction of the Commission.\nWe next consider what process is due plaintiff. Section 9 \u2014 102(B) provided plaintiff with a private cause of action as a means of adjudicating his claim. Section 9 \u2014 102(B) is no longer operative. We are unwilling to create, by judicial fiat, a new cause of action to replace the one that perished with section 9 \u2014 102(B), and we do not believe the due process clause requires such a result. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., the court found that \u201cLogan is entitled to have the Commission [FEPC] consider the merits of his charge, based on the substantiality of the available evidence, before deciding whether to terminate his claim.\u201d (-U.S--, _, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265, 277, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1157.) The same minimum process is due the plaintiff here. Lott is entitled to have the Department of Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission (the successors to the FEPC) consider the merits of his discrimination charge in accordance with the procedures set out in articles 7 and 8 of the IHRA. The IHRA provides that the Department of Human Rights must accept and investigate charges of civil rights violations. The Department may, upon determining that there is no substantial evidence of a violation, dismiss the complaint. When a complaint is supported by sufficient evidence and there has been no settlement or adjustment through conciliation, the Department must file a written complaint with the Human Rights Commission, which is empowered to adjudicate the dispute and enforce its findings. See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, pars. 7 \u2014 102, 8 \u2014 102.\nIt follows that the Department of Human Rights and the Human Rights Commission are necessary parties in this action. Upon remand to the trial court, plaintiff should be permitted to amend his complaint and add these entities as parties defendant. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 26 (new parties may be added, by order of court, at any stage of the cause, as justice may require).) The trial court should then order the Department to accept and process plaintiffs charge as set out in the IHRA. We foresee no limitations problem here, as plaintiff\u2019s original charge was timely brought before the FEPC.\nAs noted above, the issue upon which the trial court based its disposition of this cause is no longer relevant. We find that the State and its agencies are \u201cemployers\u201d as defined in section 2 \u2014 101(B)(1)(c) of the IHRA (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 101(B)(1)(c)), and that the State as an employer is capable of committing a civil rights violation, thereby subjecting itself to the procedures set out in the IHRA. The Court of Claims is not the proper forum for plaintiff\u2019s employment discrimination charge. See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 111(D) (no court has jurisdiction over alleged civil rights violations except as provided by law).\nThe decision of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nDOWNING and PERLIN, JJ\u201e concur.\nWe note that plaintiffs original complaint wrongly laid venue in Cook County. Section 9 \u2014 102(B) requires that an action under that section be brought \u201cin the circuit court of the county where the alleged unfair employment practice occurred.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 68, par. 9 \u2014 102(B).) GSU is in Will County. Although defendants raised this defect in venue below, the trial court did not reach the issue. On remand, the venue provision of section 9 \u2014 102(B) will not control, since the cause of action on remand will not be based on that voided statute. Defendants, nevertheless, should be afforded the opportunity to argue venue or other matters not disposed of in this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wayne B. Giampietro, Kathrin A. Koenig, and George Bellas, all of Dejong, Poltrock & Giampietro, and Sidney C. Kleinman, Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jenner & Block, of Chicago, and Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel, Kombrink & Hundman, of Bloomington (Chester T. Kamin, Linda L. Listrom, and Kenneth G. Kombrink, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT LOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOVERNORS STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81-1677\nOpinion filed April 27,1982.\nRehearing denied June 15,1982.\nWayne B. Giampietro, Kathrin A. Koenig, and George Bellas, all of Dejong, Poltrock & Giampietro, and Sidney C. Kleinman, Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJenner & Block, of Chicago, and Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel, Kombrink & Hundman, of Bloomington (Chester T. Kamin, Linda L. Listrom, and Kenneth G. Kombrink, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0851-01", "first_page_order": 873, "last_page_order": 878 }