{ "id": 3009354, "name": "In re ADOPTION OF ALEX J. McFADYEN III.-(LEON R. SHURE et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ALEX J. McFADYEN et al., Respondents-Appellants.)", "name_abbreviation": "Shure v. McFadyen", "decision_date": "1982-08-03", "docket_number": "No. 81-1928", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 329" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "405 U.S. 645", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11723248 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3239068 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 928", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3198097 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0928-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 N.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2911528 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959807 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 P.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "623 R2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Wash. App. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1829446 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/28/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3368720 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506338 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3130770 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Wis. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8674224 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/105/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3086202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 A.2d 1075", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7993013 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/430/1075-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 917, "char_count": 20577, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.465663343562144e-07, "percentile": 0.6582098029653466 }, "sha256": "88f72cb019aa020cb72d1ed65b85b11388147266acdaa2764c914bda1de94d97", "simhash": "1:b3e3f9a65fc3c2c7", "word_count": 3446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:18.761710+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ADOPTION OF ALEX J. McFADYEN III.-(LEON R. SHURE et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ALEX J. McFADYEN et al., Respondents-Appellants.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the granting of a petition for adoption. Petitioners Leon and Marianne Shure filed a petition to adopt Alex J. McFadyen III (\u201cAlex III\u201d). The petition was contested by respondents Alex and Diane McFadyen. Two issues are presented on appeal: (1) whether the circuit court correctly construed the term \u201cparents\u201d in the Adoption Act to mean only biological and legally adoptive parents (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1510(a)); and (2) whether such a construction deprives Alex McFadyen of due process.\nAlex and Diane were married on March 7, 1979. Diane gave birth to a son, Alex III, on February 23, 1980, in Casper, Wyoming. Alex and Diane concede on appeal that Alex is not the biological father of Alex III.\nThe Shures filed a petition to adopt Alex III on August 13, 1980. Diane executed a \u201cfinal and irrevocable\u201d consent to the adoption of Alex III on August 14, 1980. Alex and Diane concede on appeal that this consent was valid. The biological father, Robert Giddick or an unknown person, was served by publication in the circuit court and a default judgment entered against him. The circuit court entered an order terminating the parental rights of Diane, appointing a guardian ad litem for Alex III, and granting temporary custody of Alex III to the Shures.\nThe Shures\u2019 petition, with amendments, alleged that Alex was the presumptive legal father of Alex III, and that Alex was an \u201cunfit person\u201d within the meaning of section 1(D) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)). The petition also alleged that Robert Giddick was the biological father of Alex III and that he was an unfit person.\nAlex filed a general appearance on February 25, 1981. Alex\u2019 section 45 motion to dismiss the petition for adoption was denied (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 45). After further proceedings not relevant to this appeal, the Shures filed a motion for judgment of adoption, which the circuit court treated as a motion for summary judgment. The motion alleged that Diane, the natural mother, consented to the adoption, that Alex had no standing since he was not the biological father, and that the biological father was in default. In support of the contention that Alex was not the biological father, excerpts from the deposition transcripts of Alex and Diane were submitted.\nAlex testified at his deposition that he had a vasectomy in 1972, and that he believed himself to be sterile. He further testified that he and Diane had an agreement that she could have intercourse with other men for the purpose of becoming pregnant. One of the men with whom she had intercourse was Robert Giddick. Diane\u2019s deposition testimony corroborated the existence of this \u201cagreement,\u201d and that she had intercourse with Giddick and several other men.\nIn denying the Shures\u2019 motion for summary judgment, the court stated that if Alex was not the biological father, neither his consent nor a finding of unfitness was needed. A trial on the issue of paternity followed.\nSix days before the trial began, Alex and Diane filed a joint verified answer to the petition for adoption. Alex had previously filed a verified answer to the petition. Alex and Diane denied that Alex was an unfit person. They claimed that it was possible for Alex to be the biological father, but that if he was not, that Alex III was conceived through \u201ctheir type of artificial insemination.\u201d In an affirmative defense, they defined this type of \u201cartificial insemination\u201d as consisting of \u201csomeone other than the husband was, by their choice, the sperm donor to help them conceive their child.\u201d It was more clearly explained in a further affirmative defense as \u201cartificial insemination by means of a surrogate donor\u2019s penis.\u201d The Shures did not file a responsive pleading to this answer.\nAlthough the trial court had ruled that the sole issue at trial was to be paternity, this ruling was not strictly followed. Much of the testimony of the 10 witnesses concerned the issue of paternity, but other evidence was introduced by both parties. A brief chronology of the events leading up to the surrender of Alex III for adoption follows.\nAlex and Diane were married on March 7, 1979, in Chicago. Several weeks later they moved to Covert, Michigan. Alex spent May and part of June in jail on a misdemeanor charge. It was during this time that Diane had intercourse with Giddick and several other men. Alex and Diane moved to Casper, Wyoming, at the end of July 1979. They lived in Casper until April or June of 1980. Alex III was born in Cas-per on February 23, 1980. From Alex Ill\u2019s birth until they left Wyoming, Diane took Alex III to visit relatives in Chicago on several occasions.\nDiane testified that in late April 1980, she hitchhiked to Chicago with Alex III, where they took up permanent residence with Laura Kroll, Diane\u2019s grandmother. Mrs. Kroll\u2019s testimony was consistent about this date. Alex moved to Mrs. Kroll\u2019s in late June. (Alex testified that the entire family moved together from Wyoming to Chicago in late June 1980.) Alex attended truck driving school in Wisconsin for three weeks from approximately June 30 to July 17, 1980. Diane and Alex III accompanied him to Wisconsin. Upon graduation, Alex traveled to at least 10 states in search of employment. Diane and Alex III returned to Mrs. Kroll\u2019s and did not travel with Alex. In late July 1980, Alex secured employment as a cross-country truck driver with a firm in Wichita, Kansas.\nWhile working as a truck driver, Alex did not see Diane or Alex III. When Alex returned to Wichita on August 27 after finishing a run, Diane was waiting for him. She told Alex that she had placed Alex III up for adoption.\nEvidence was introduced on issues other than paternity as follows. Alex was called as an adverse witness during the Shures\u2019 case in chief. Ruling on an objection to a line of questioning, the circuit court held that evidence of Alex\u2019 fitness as a parent was relevant and allowed questioning on the subject. Consequently, substantial evidence was introduced in an attempt to establish Alex\u2019 unfitness, including his prior criminal history and his prior marital and child-support history. During their case, Alex and Diane introduced evidence in an attempt to establish Alex\u2019 fitness. This evidence consisted of testimony that Alex played with, fed, and changed the diapers of Alex III.\nAlex and Diane introduced evidence in an attempt to establish the existence of their \u201csurrogate insemination\u201d agreement. On direct examination, Alex was asked the following questions:\n\u201cQ During your married life to the best of your knowledge, did Diane have intercourse with other men?\nA Yes.\nMR. COUGHLIN [counsel for the Shures]: Objection, Your Honor. No, I\u2019m sorry, I withdraw the objection.\nMR. ROSENBERG [counsel for the McFadyens]: Was this with your prior permission?\nA Yes, it was.\u201d\nAt the completion of the testimony, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion, later incorporated into the judgment of adoption. The court found that Alex was not the biological father of Alex III, and thus was a stranger to the proceedings. The court construed \u201cparents\u201d in section 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1510) to mean biological and legally adoptive parents. The court also rejected the claim that Alex III was the product of Alex\u2019 and Diane\u2019s unique form of extramarital artificial insemination. The court held that Alex and Diane did not factually establish the existence of such an agreement, and, as a matter of law, that such an arrangement was not legally equivalent to artificial insemination.\nAlex and Diane then stipulated that the Shures were fit persons within the meaning of the Adoption Act. The trial court accordingly entered a judgment of adoption in favor of the Shures, from which Alex and Diane appeal.\nI\nAlex first contends that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted the adoption statute. Section 8(a) of the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1510(a)) requires the consent, or a finding of unfitness, of \u201cthe parents\u201d for adoption of a child. \u201cParent\u201d is defined as \u201cthe father or mother of a legitimate or illegitimate child.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1501(E).) The circuit court held that the term \u201cparent\u201d is limited to biological and legally adoptive parents. Alex contends that, \u201c[i]f a man\u2019s wife gives birth to a child which was conceived during the marriage, the man accepts the child as his own, and no other man asserts his paternity, the husband should be deemed to be the legal \u2018father\u2019 of the child within the meaning of the adoption statute.\u201d Two different theories are used by Alex in support of this proposed statutory interpretation. One theory is based on the presumption that a child conceived by a married woman during the marriage is legitimate. A second theory attempts to draw an analogy to cases involving artificial insemination.\nA.\nIn support of the first theory, Alex relies on a recent decision of the Delaware Supreme Court. (Petitioner F. v. Respondent R. (Del. 1981), 430 A.2d 1075.) The Delaware court recognized the presumption that a child born to a married woman is legitimate, in effect holding that this presumption was irrebuttable. (430 A.2d 1075, 1077-78.) The court relied on a statement by Lord Mansfield in a case decided over two centuries ago. (Goodnight v. Moss (1777), 98 Eng. Rep. 1257.) Alex in effect argues that an irrebuttable presumption should exist that he is the biological father of Alex III.\nThe law in Illinois is not the same as the law in Delaware. In Illinois, there is a presumption that such a child is legitimate, but that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. (Happel v. Mecklenburger (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 107, 112, 427 N.E.2d 974.) The petitioner in Happel, a stranger to the marriage, was allowed to assert that he had parental rights. The court concluded that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of legitimacy by clear and convincing evidence.\nIn the present case, Alex is entitled to a presumption that Alex III is legitimate, and therefore that he is the biological father. In light of the evidence adduced at trial of Alex\u2019 vasectomy, Diane\u2019s relations with other men, and Diane\u2019s assertion that someone else was the biological father, the presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.\nB.\nAlex\u2019 second theory is based on an attempt to draw an analogy to artificial insemination cases. In re Adoption of Anonymous (1973), 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, involved a man whose wife gave birth to a child after she was artificially inseminated in a medical procedure with the semen of a third party donor, with her husband\u2019s consent. The court held that the husband was a \u201cparent\u201d whose consent was required for adoption of the child. Alex argues that the \u201cagreement\u201d he had with Diane that she could have intercourse with other men to become pregnant is tantamount to an agreement to have a child born through artificial insemination.\nInitially, Alex contends that the Shures judicially admitted the existence of this \u201csurrogate insemination\u201d agreement. Alex and Diane filed a joint verified answer to the petition to adopt six days before the trial started, replacing a verified answer filed earlier by Alex. The joint answer alleged the fact of the existence of an \u201cagreement,\u201d and the legal conclusion that the agreement makes Alex, for all practical purposes, the \u201clegal biological father.\u201d Because the Shures did not file a pleading denying the allegations in the answer, Alex claims that they have admitted these allegations.\nSection 2 \u2014 610(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: \u201cEvery allegation, except allegations of damages, not explicitly denied is admitted, unless the party states in his or her pleading that he or she has no knowledge thereof sufficient to form a belief, and attaches an affidavit of the truth of the statement of want of knowledge, or unless the party has had no opportunity to deny.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 610(b).) Section 2 \u2014 602 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, in part: \u201cif new matter by way of defense is pleaded in the answer, a reply shall be filed by the plaintiff ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2-602.\nCase law consistently holds that failure to deny factual allegations constitutes an admission of those allegations. (Mooney v. Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s, London (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 566, 570, 213 N.E.2d 283; First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 460, 467, 241 N.E.2d 615.) A party, however, can waive the benefit of the admission in two different ways. First, the benefit of the admission is waived by the introduction of evidence in support of the uncontradicted allegation. (Mooney v. Underwriters at Lloyd\u2019s, London (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 566, 570; First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 460, 467-68.) Second, a waiver is caused by failure to raise the admission in the trial court. Interstate Printing Co. v. Callahan (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 930, 932, 310 N.E.2d 786; First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 460, 468.\nAlex and Diane have waived the benefit of any admission that may have occurred. First, they introduced evidence regarding the \u201csurrogate insemination\u201d agreement at trial through Alex\u2019 testimony concerning its existence. Second, we can find no evidence in the record that the McFadyens called the admission to the attention of the trial court. We conclude that if an admission occurred, the benefit of it was waived. -\nNext, Alex argues that he was precluded from introducing evidence at trial concerning the \u201csurrogate insemination\u201d agreement by the pretrial ruling of the circuit court limiting the trial to the issue of paternity. At oral argument in this court, Alex urged a remand to enable him to introduce evidence on this subject. From our examination of the record, we note that the trial court did not enforce this ruling and admitted evidence- on other issues at trial. We find nothing in the record to suggest Alex was prevented from introducing more evidence regarding this \u201cagreement.\u201d Alex is thus not entitled to a remand for this reason.\nWe need not address the legal consequences of a \u201csurrogate insemination\u201d agreement (see In re Marriage of L.M.S. (Wis. App. 1981), 105 Wis. 2d 118, 312 N.W.2d 853) because the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that Alex and Diane did not establish the existence of such an agreement between themselves. The factual findings of the trial court will not be reversed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (In re Adoption of Garrison (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 670, 673, 417 N.E.2d 787; Stines v. Vaughn (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 511, 519, 319 N.E.2d 561, appeal denied (1975), 58 Ill. 2d 595.) We find no basis upon which to reverse this finding of fact.\nC.\nWe believe that the trial court correctly interpreted the term \u201cparents.\u201d The language of the statute defines parents as \u201cthe father or mother of a legitimate or illegitimate child.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1501(E).) By this plain language, we cannot say that the General Assembly intended to extend the definition of the term \u201cparent\u201d beyond biological or legally adoptive parents. See In re Adoption of Weller (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497-98, 362 N.E.2d 73.\nOur conclusion is buttressed by reference to the recent decision of In re Application of Santore (1981), 28 Wash. App. 319, 623 R2d 702. Karen Santore, married to Richard Santore, became pregnant by Michael Murphy, who died without knowing of the pregnancy. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were pending between Karen and Richard at the time of conception, although the dissolution apparently did not occur. Soon after the birth of the child, Karen signed a consent to adoption, along with an affidavit of paternity. She gave up custody of the child. One month later, Karen filed a revocation of consent and, along with Richard, a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to void the adoption.\nRichard argued that his consent was necessary for the adoption, and that it was not given. Washington law provides that consent is required from the \u201cparents.\u201d (Wash. Rev. Code Ann. sec. 26.32.030 (1961).) The court held that Richard was entitled only to notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to establish his paternity. Once the court determined that he was not the biological father, it concluded that his consent was not necessary. (In re Application of Santore (1981), 28 Wash. App. 319, 329-30, 623 P.2d 702, 709.) This case is very similar to the present case, and we agree with the reasoning of the Washington court.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the circuit court correctly interpreted the term \u201cparents\u201d to mean biological and legally adoptive parents. Accordingly, Alex is not a \u201cparent\u201d and has no right to contest the adoption of Alex III.\nII\nAlex contends that if he is not a \u201cparent\u201d under the adoption statute, that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. He claims that the statute violates his \u201cright of family privacy and association guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.\u201d Phrasing the issue somewhat differently, Alex states: \u201cThe question presented by this case is whether the relationship between a child and his psychological parent constitutes a \u2018family\u2019 relationship entitled to substantive and procedural protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d\nInitially, the Shures contend that Alex waived his constitutional claim by failing to raise it in the circuit court. Our examination of the record indicates that neither this constitutional claim nor any similar claim was presented to the circuit court. It is a well settled principle of judicial restraint that constitutional questions not presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Brunswick v. Mandel (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 502, 505, 322 N.E.2d 25; City of Chicago v. Birnbaum (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 250, 251, 274 N.E.2d 22; Smith v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 928, 931, 407 N.E.2d 708; Department of Transportation v. Collins (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273, 387 N.E.2d 6.\nAccordingly, it is our view that Alex waived this constitutional claim by failure to raise it in the circuit court.\nIn conclusion, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTAMOS, P. J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.\nThe record indicates the guardian ad litem was present at all court proceedings.\nIn the original petition filed August 13, 1980, it was alleged that the address of Alex was unknown, and that Alex had abandoned Alex III on or about May 1,1980.\nLikewise, we will not discuss the public policy question implicit in such an arrangement, although we note that adultery is against the public policy of the State. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 401(2).\nAlex argued the following theories in the circuit court, some of which he attempted to elevate to constitutional dimension:\n(a) Alex is the biological father.\n(b) The statute should be construed to include Alex as the father.\n(c) An irrebuttable presumption exists that the husband of a married woman is the father of her child. Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208, is cited by Alex here, but this case, a procedural due process case, is not relevant to the due process argument raised by Alex in this court.\n(d) Alex III was born through Alex\u2019 and Diane\u2019s own form of \u201cartificial insemination,\u201d which is in fact \u201csurrogate insemination.\u201d Alex attempts to put a constitutional gloss on this argument by stating: \u201cThe right of artificial insemination by penis is as much protected by the Constitution of the United States as the right of artificial insemination by glass test tube.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lake, Rosenberg & Associates and Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin, Barezky & Berkson, both of Chicago (Miles N. Beermann, Howard A. London, and Edward D. Rosenberg, of counsel), for appellants.", "Mandel, Lipton and Stevenson, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard L. Mandel, Nicholas Stevenson, and Richard A. Lifshitz, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ADOPTION OF ALEX J. McFADYEN III.-(LEON R. SHURE et al., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ALEX J. McFADYEN et al., Respondents-Appellants.)\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81 \u2014 1928\nOpinion filed August 3, 1982.\nLake, Rosenberg & Associates and Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin, Barezky & Berkson, both of Chicago (Miles N. Beermann, Howard A. London, and Edward D. Rosenberg, of counsel), for appellants.\nMandel, Lipton and Stevenson, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard L. Mandel, Nicholas Stevenson, and Richard A. Lifshitz, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 351, "last_page_order": 360 }