{ "id": 3014018, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL S. QUEEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Queen", "decision_date": "1982-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 80-571", "first_page": "1088", "last_page": "1095", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 1088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "383 U.S. 375", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171240 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3349233 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3384805 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11643095 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443843 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0421-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 810, "char_count": 16341, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5212902373844962 }, "sha256": "dd0cce4196ef4739ae899507b6f16b3d5c1add178381521796b8e69123cc2054", "simhash": "1:babaf6c4cbd225d7", "word_count": 2818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:18.761710+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL S. QUEEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 4, 1979, Lida Belle King was found dead in her Du-Quoin, Illinois, apartment. The results of an autopsy indicated that she had been strangled. In March of that year, the defendant, Paul S. Queen, was charged by a Perry County indictment with the murder of Mrs. King. Following a bench trial in July of 1979, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals to this court, and argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order an examination into his fitness to stand trial, and that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the first of his contentions.\nThe defendant first appeared before Judge Robert Bastien on March 29, 1979, for purposes of his arraignment. As a preliminary matter, the court inquired about the defendant\u2019s educational background, to which he replied that he had gone to eighth grade, had some additional training in high school and then \u201ctook college and law school.\u201d When asked where he went to college, the defendant answered that he \u201ctook it in law school.\u201d Judge Bastien then asked him where he studied law, and the defendant responded, \u201cPerry County and with the Army.\u201d The defendant also told Judge Bastien that he had a bachelor\u2019s degree and that, in fact, he had \u201ctwo or three of them some place,\u201d but he didn\u2019t know where they were.\nIn order to determine the defendant\u2019s eligibility for the services of the public defender, the court asked if the defendant owned any real estate. The defendant said that he was \u201csupposed to,\u201d but \u201cthe real estate company has changed around\u201d on him. He further stated,\n\u201cI don\u2019t know what they did since they started changing the highways and the electric around because I called and they were getting me into public housing and all.\u201d\nDuring the course of the arraignment, the defendant informed the court that he \u201cjust came back from spending 2V2 years in Quincy, but I had the Advocate General up there.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s next appearance before Judge Hastien came on May 15, 1979, when the defendant sought to waive his right to a jury trial. In this hearing, the State\u2019s Attorney suggested to Judge Hastien that, upon his investigation, it appeared that there was a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. The State\u2019s Attorney read the appropriate statutory provision (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141) to require that, once the issue of the defendant\u2019s fitness has been raised, the court must hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness, and, if so, then a full fitness hearing would be needed. The court stated that once a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness is raised, the full fitness hearing must be held, without the necessity for any sort of preliminary hearing. Judge Hastien then terminated the jury waiver proceedings and ordered the State to file a motion raising the question of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial.\nOn May 16, the State\u2019s Attorney orally requested the court to reconsider the order directing him to file a motion concerning the defendant\u2019s fitness. This motion was denied, and, on May 17, the State filed a petition to hold a fitness hearing. This was accompanied, on the following day, by a motion to withdraw that petition.\nAttached to the State\u2019s petition were several written statements from law enforcement personnel which had given rise to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s doubts of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. DuQuoin Police Chief Walter Minton had gone to the defendant\u2019s residence to arrest him. According to Chief Minton, the defendant told him, \u201cYou can\u2019t arrest me.\u201d He further stated that \u201cthe court can\u2019t arrest me, the county can\u2019t arrest me and the State can\u2019t arrest me. The only guy that I take orders from and the only guy that can arrest me is General MacArthur.\u201d The defendant indicated to Minton that he was aware of what murder was, but that no one in this world could put him in jail.\nThe defendant professed to Minton to have once been a lawyer, doctor, and the owner of a large construction company. He said that he \u201cdidn\u2019t think the world was all together\u201d and warned that it \u201cwasn\u2019t safe to keep driving.\u201d The defendant told Minton that he thought the world was flat and that \u201cthere was a red light up there to stop you and keep you from driving off.\u201d\nIn his report, Chief Jerry Minton opined that the defendant could not \u201ckeep on the same track\u201d when he was questioned. He would answer him in \u201can unrelated way.\u201d Minton offered examples of the defendant\u2019s responses to his inquiries.\n\u201cQUESTION: Do you drink?\nANSWER: I didn\u2019t do anything.\nQUESTION: Have you ever spent time in prison?\nANSWER: I was in Quincy and I was a lawyer.\nQUESTION: Do you know what strangling is?\nANSWER: I was a doctor once too.\u201d\nIn his report, Sheriff Jerry Woolsey noted that he had observed and spoken to the defendant on several occasions in the Perry County Jail. He said that the defendant \u201crepeatedly demonstrated inappropriate responses to questions asked of him.\u201d Woolsey commented that the defendant\u2019s behavior was \u201cof concern\u201d to himself and the staff members as well as fellow prisoners. His behavior included what Woolsey termed \u201cbizarre and inappropriate responses to daily activity at the jail.\u201d\nWoolsey further related in his report:\n\u201cOn several occasions he has seemed disoriented as to time and place and has expressed great concern over the fact that he does not understand why he is being held in custody. He has repeatedly stated that he has no idea why he can\u2019t go home.\u201d\nIt was Woolsey\u2019s conclusion that the defendant was exhibiting the same type of behavior that he did when he was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health\u2019s Chester facility from 1966 to 1968. Woolsey was employed at that facility during that time.\nThe report of Sheriff Timothy Russell provided additional support for the observations of Woolsey and Minton. Russell also remarked on the defendant\u2019s tendencies to answer questions by \u201crambling about totally unrelated subjects.\u201d He stated that twice, during an interview on March 28, 1979, the defendant \u201cflared up and began raging for no apparent reason.\u201d The following day, the defendant was to be taken to the Perry County Courthouse for arraignment. Russell related that\n\u201cQueen seemed to be calm at the time. I asked Queen to turn around and put his hands behind his back so I could handcuff him. Queen did exactly as I asked but before I could put the handcuffs on, Queen turned and started raging. Queen doubled up his fists and shook them and was shouting. I started talking to Queen in a calm voice for several minutes asking Queen to calm down. After several minutes, Queen calmed down and then did exactly what I asked him to do.\u201d\nOfficer Carl Melton also prepared a report of the defendant\u2019s activities at the Perry County Jail. This report is handwritten and is not in final form as are the other three evaluations, and consequently is more difficult to interpret. However, it is obvious that the defendant kept telling Melton about \u201cthey,\u201d who were those people \u201cin the towers\u201d or \u201con radar.\u201d\nOn May 18, 1979, a hearing was. held on the State\u2019s motion to withdraw its petition for a fitness hearing. The State\u2019s Attorney argued that he was vested with the discretion to withdraw the petition, in much the same way that he could decide whether or not to proceed with any particular prosecution. Judge Bastien then remarked that defense counsel would have had a better opportunity to gauge the defendant\u2019s capacity to cooperate in the presentation of his own defense than would either the court or the State\u2019s Attorney. To this observation defense counsel replied that he did not want to make a statement at that time.\nThe court continued,\n\u201cAs I read the statute, the Code of Corrections, the court is not empowered to order expert examination of the defendant regarding his fitness to stand trial or to be sentenced. Is either side at this time requesting under the statute that a doctor or expert be appointed to make such an examination?\u201d\nBoth counsel replied in the negative. The court then granted the State\u2019s motion to withdraw its petition, and directed that the defendant be brought into court, to complete the jury waiver proceedings. The court admonished the defendant:\n\u201cIn case you do not have the complete information in your mind, I will explain to you one more time that you do have the. right to a trial by jury on this murder charge. And Mr. Sims [defense counsel] have you discussed with Mr. Queen his right to a trial by jury?\nMR. SIMS: Yes Sir.\nTHE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Queen?\nMR. QUEEN: If that is what they really want. I was willing to waive the other day.\nTHE COURT: As I said, those proceedings were ended through no fault of your own.\nMR. QUEEN: I can understand part of it, but so far I have no definite proof or anything like that as to time or place which I know would be brought out in court. But right now I have no idea of.\u201d\nThe court accepted the defendant\u2019s waiver of a jury trial.\nThe defendant\u2019s case proceeded to a bench trial in July 1979 before Judge William Starnes. The State introduced testimony which showed that the defendant had been seen speaking with Mrs. King several days before she was found dead in her apartment. Polygraph examiner Dennis Smith testified that, after he conducted a polygraph examination of the defendant on January 11, 1979, he asked the defendant about the death of Mrs. King. At first, he claimed not to remember the incident, then later he told Smith that he did not kill Mrs. King.\nMuch of the State\u2019s case was based upon scientific testimony presented by pathologist Steven Nuernberger and forensic odontologist Roger Adams. Dr. Nuernberger, who performed an autopsy on the body of Mrs. King, recalled that, during the autopsy, he discovered what appeared to be a bite mark on her right arm. Due to the reaction of the surrounding tissue to the trauma caused by the bite, Dr. Nuernberger was able to conclude that the bite must have been inflicted between two hours prior to Mrs. King\u2019s death and one hour after her death.\nA skin sample containing the bite mark was removed from Mrs. King\u2019s body by Dr. Nuernberger and was delivered to Dr. Adams in St. Louis, along with stone cast molds which had been made of the defendant\u2019s dentures. Dr. Adams made a comparison of the bite mark and the molds and concluded that it was quite likely that the mark had been made by the defendant\u2019s dentures. In formulating his opinion, Dr. Adams noted that the indentation left by a lateral incisor on Mrs. King\u2019s arm corresponded to a protruding incisor in the dentures. Dr. Adams stated that the uniqueness of this protrusion, combined with the lack of any feature in the dentures which would exclude them, assisted him in arriving at his conclusions.\nAt trial, the defendant did not testify, nor did he produce any witness in his own defense. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Starnes found the defendant guilty of murder. A hearing was held on defendant\u2019s post-trial motion on February 1, 1980, at which time Judge Starnes ordered sentencing to be continued until the defendant had been examined to ascertain his fitness to be sentenced. Reports were submitted to the court, and, on April 24, 1980, the defendant was adjudged unfit to be sentenced. On October 30, 1980, Judge Starnes found the defendant fit to be sentenced, and, after hearing argument on sentencing alternatives, sentenced the defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nAs section 5 \u2014 2\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections provided during the pretrial proceedings and during trial, \u201c[w]hen a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial or be sentenced is raised, the court shall order that a determination of that question be made before further proceedings.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141(c).) In other words, once facts are brought to the attention of the trial court, either from observation of the defendant or by suggestion of counsel which raise a bona fide doubt of defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial, the court has a duty to hold a fitness hearing. People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 430, 381 N.E.2d 677, 682.\nIn order to be considered fit to stand trial, a defendant must be able to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20141(a).) This issue \u201cis often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated\u201d (Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 180, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 118, 95 S. Ct. 896, 908), and thus whether there is a bona fide doubt of a defendant\u2019s fitness for trial depends upon the facts of that particular case. (People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 435, 381 N.E.2d 677, 684.) The trial court\u2019s decision on this question will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Skorusa (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 577, 304 N.E.2d 630.\nThe People argue that the trial court acted properly in not holding a fitness hearing. Although recognizing the contents of the reports attached to the petition for a fitness hearing, the People stress that the defendant seemed to know the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial when he relinquished his right to the latter and he also indicated to the court that the main issue at trial would be his whereabouts when Mrs. King was killed. They contend that neither the police reports nor the fact that the defendant had been hospitalized over 10 years earlier cast doubts on the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial (People v. White (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 155, 366 N.E.2d 491; People v. Richardson (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 718, 377 N.E.2d 1235), and they further urge that the post-trial psychiatric evaluations, which, of course, were not then before the court, contain nothing to alter that conclusion.\nWhile the People may be correct that the defendant was fit to stand trial, that is not the precise issue before this court. Whether or not the defendant would have been found fit, we must determine whether the trial court erred in concluding, by not holding a hearing, that there was no bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness. Under this standard, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in not inquiring into the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial.\nAt the time of the pretrial hearings, the court was presented with several reports which detailed the defendant\u2019s conduct. These observations came not from experts retained by the defense, nor from the defendant or his attorney, but from local law enforcement personnel entrusted with the care of the defendant. Each of these observers noted the defendant\u2019s inability to provide a responsive answer to questioning, and this trait also manifested itself at pretrial hearings. Wild and unsubstantiated claims made by the defendant as to his past employment and other matters, combined with Sheriff Woolsey\u2019s opinion that the defendant seemed \u201cdisoriented\u201d and did not know why he was in jail convince us that a bona fide doubt of the defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial was raised. The contents of the police reports and the defendant\u2019s demeanor at the pretrial hearings should have caused the trial court to direct that a fitness hearing be held. The court thus abused its discretion in failing to do so.\nBecause the trial of the defendant without a hearing on the issue of his fitness to stand trial resulted in the denial of a fair trial (Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 86 S. Ct. 836), we must reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction and remand this cause to the circuit court of Perry County for a fitness hearing and whatever further proceedings may be appropriate.\nReversed and remanded.\nJONES and KASSERMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy E. Blue and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Martin N. Ashley and Frank J. Bieszczat, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Mt. Vernon, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL S. QUEEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 80 \u2014 571\nOpinion filed July 13, 1982.\nRandy E. Blue and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nMartin N. Ashley and Frank J. Bieszczat, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of Mt. Vernon, for the People." }, "file_name": "1088-01", "first_page_order": 1110, "last_page_order": 1117 }