{ "id": 5449556, "name": "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF ROSEMONT, COOK COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICHARD L. MATHIAS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Trustees v. Mathias", "decision_date": "1982-10-15", "docket_number": "No. 81-2276", "first_page": "894", "last_page": "900", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 894" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1963 Ill. Laws 2442", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 A.L.R. 2d 1118", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.E. 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3393086 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/248/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 N.E. 974", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3401206 ], "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/246/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 Ill. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2465609 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/396/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 N.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970018 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965261 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991646 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" }, { "page": "243-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926305 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0161-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 709, "char_count": 16294, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5471885022396942e-07, "percentile": 0.6740149715292282 }, "sha256": "4097a4623d070bb0389eb47042f156c9544d62a764a8a676c0c4877ab4dd2a78", "simhash": "1:a52477153683de4d", "word_count": 2659 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:34.731811+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF ROSEMONT, COOK COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICHARD L. MATHIAS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe board of trustees of the village of Rosemont filed a declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, a declaration that the Director of the Department of Insurance erred in ordering the board to establish a firemen\u2019s pension fund under article 4 of the Illinois Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 101 et seq.).\nA bench trial was held, and the court (a) entered judgment in favor of the Director, and (b) ordered the Rosemont board to establish an article 4 firemen\u2019s pension fund. We reverse and remand for the reasons set forth below. But first, a brief statement of the material facts will aid in understanding the legal issues presented by the Board\u2019s appeal.\nOn April 1, 1975, the village of Rosemont \u2014 a home rule unit of government under article 7, section 6(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution-held a referendum in which the municipal electorate exercised its statutorily granted authority to adopt articles 3 and 4 of the Pension Code. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, pars. 3 \u2014 145, 4 \u2014 141.) By virtue of section 4 \u2014 101 of article 4, a \u201cmunicipality as defined in Section 4 \u2014 103\u201d is required to establish a pension fund for the benefit of \u201cfiremen as defined in Section 4 \u2014 106.\u201d Article 3, in contrast, pertains to police pension funds. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3\u2014 101.\nOn April 5, 1975 \u2014 four days after the village voters adopted article 4 \u2014 the Rosemont board of trustees enacted an ordinance which stated that it was abolishing the Rosemont fire department and transferring the employees of the abolished department to the Fire Section of a newly created Rosemont Public Safety Service. (Rosemont Ordinance 75 \u2014 4\u20145A.) This was followed by an ordinance enacted on September 17, 1975, in which the. board of trustees created a unified Public Safety Department consisting of all the Rosemont police officers, the employees of the abolished fire department, and the village\u2019s other public safety employees. (Rosemont Ordinance 75 \u2014 9\u201417.) The new department includes detective, patrol, fire suppression, and paramedic sections, and all the department\u2019s employees are designated as public safety officers. (Rosemont Ordinance 75 \u2014 9\u201417.) The September 17 ordinance expressly contemplates that each of the public safety officers will \u201cserve several public safety functions.\u201d So, for example, the ordinance gives the new department the power to transfer public safety officers from one section to another, and all the department employees are given the job duties of enforcing the law (including making arrests) and extinguishing fires.\nUnder an amendment to article 4, effective October 1, 1975, the General Assembly (a) precluded home rule units of government from altering or amending the provisions of article 4 of the Pension Code, and (b) provided that a home rule unit which constitutes a \u201cmunicipality, as defined in Section 4 \u2014 103\u201d of the Pension Code, is prohibited from providing a pension program for \u201cfiremen\u201d other than through a fund which complies with the provisions of article 4. \u201cAn Act to add Sections 3 \u2014 150 and 4 \u2014 142 to the \u2018Illinois Pension Code\u2019 ***,\u201d Pub. Act 79 \u2014 988 (codified, in pertinent part, at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 142).\nThe Rosemont board of trustees eventually established a police pension fund under article 3 of the Pension Code. This fund covers all the employees of the Public Safety Department, a,nd the board has not established a separate firemen\u2019s pension fund under article 4.\nThe Director of the Department of Insurance appointed a hearing officer to determine whether Rosemont violated the provisions of the Pension Code. The hearing officer concluded that the Rosemont board of trustees was obligated to establish both a police officer\u2019s pension fund and a firemen\u2019s pension fund because, by referendum, Rosemont had adopted both articles 3 and 4 of the Pension Code. The Director of the Department of Insurance followed the hearing officer\u2019s recommendation and ordered the board of trustees to establish an article 4 pension fund in addition to the already established article 3 fund. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 22 \u2014 509.\nIn response, the board of trustees filed a declaratory judgment action which challenged the Director\u2019s order on the grounds that the board\u2019s home rule powers under the 1970 Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 7, sec. 6(a)) empowered it to supersede the pension law which had been adopted by referendum. The board also argued that the Director did not have authority to appoint a hearing officer to conduct a hearing on whether it had violated the provisions of the Pension Code.\nThe trial court viewed the controlling issue as being whether the board of trustees unlawfully thwarted the results of the April 1, 1975, municipal referendum. And, despite the fact that Rosemont is a home rule unit of local government, the trial court concluded that the board of trustees unlawfully defeated the will of its electorate by attempting to avoid application of a law which was adopted by municipal referendum.\nOpinion\nBefore the enactment of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the powers of units of local government were limited to what was specifically authorized by the General Assembly or the 1870 Constitution. (Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. 7, sec. 6, Constitutional Commentary, at 22 (Smith-Hurd 1971).) The 1970 Illinois Constitution \u201cdrastically altered] the relationship which previously existed between local and State government\u201d (Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243) by providing that \u201c[ejxcept as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs ***.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. 7, sec. 6(a).\nIn matters concerning their government and affairs, \u201cHome rule units *** have the same powers as the sovereign except where such powers are limited by the General Assembly\u201d (City of Urbana v. Houser (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 268, 273, 367 N.E.2d 692, 694) or by section 6 itself (e.g., Ill. Const. 1970, art. 7, secs. 6(d), (e)). Accordingly, an ordinance enacted by a home rule unit supersedes a conflicting statute which was enacted before the effective date of the 1970 Constitution. (County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 494, 513, 389 N.E.2d 553, 559; Paglini v. Police Board (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 233, 235, 335 N.E.2d 480, 482.) Furthermore, a statute enacted after the effective date of the 1970 Constitution does not restrict the home rule power unless it falls within one of the article 7, section 6 preemption provisions. See, e.g., Ill. Const. 1970, art. 7, secs. 6(g), (h), and (i); see also Stryker v. Village of Oak Park (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 523, 528, 343 N.E.2d 919, 923 (\u201cA statute intended to limit or deny home rule powers must contain an express statement to that effect\u201d).\nIn the present case, the board of trustees argues that the municipal referendum which adopted article 4 of the Pension Code was superseded by the inconsistent home rule ordinances which it enacted after the April 1975 referendum, but before October 1, 1975, when Public Act 79 \u2014 988 (codified, in pertinent part, at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 142) became effective.\nThe Rosemont board does not dispute that this amendatory law prospectively preempted its home rule powers. The initial question, therefore, is whether \u2014 before October 1, 1975 \u2014 the board of trustees could use its home rule powers to supersede the referendum which adopted article 4 of the Pension Code. We note, preliminarily, that the Director of the Department of Insurance does not contend that the General Assembly preempted the board\u2019s home rule powers before October 1, 1975. And the Director does not assert that the legislature intended that section 4 \u2014 142 should be retroactively applied. Furthermore, the Director does not dispute that municipal pensions concern the government and affairs of home rule units.\nInstead, despite the fact that a majority of the Illinois citizens voting on the question ratified the 1970 Constitution \u2014 including the home rule provision \u2014 the Director claims that it would \u201cabrogate] the very core of democracy \u2014 the electoral process\u201d if the Rosemont board of trustees could \u201ctotally ignore and avoid the effect of a referendum\u201d by subsequently passing an inconsistent ordinance. However, the only case cited by the Director in support of this argument, Routt v. Barrett (1947), 396 Ill. 322, 71 N.E.2d 660, is irrelevant because (1) it preceded the enactment of the home rule provision in the 1970 Constitution, and (2) it concerns a provision in the 1870 Constitution which expressly provided that certain laws (concerning public debts) had to be enacted by referendum, and could not be repealed by the legislature. (Ill. Const. 1870, art. 4, sec. 18.) We further find that the Director misperceives the relationship between home rule ordinances and provisions which are adopted by local referendum.\nWhen the legislature has authority to directly enact a particular law, but it nevertheless provides that the law may be adopted by referendum, then \u2014 in the absence of a conflicting constitutional provision \u2014 the law thereby adopted \u201cis still the act of the legislature, and is subject to repeal or amendment by that body in the same way as any other statute.\u201d (Waugh v. Glos (1910), 246 Ill. 604, 607, 92 N.E. 974, 976; see also Culver v. Waters (1910), 248 Ill. 163, 168, 93 N.E. 747, 749 (\u201cThe fact that the original act was adopted by a vote of the people does not require that every amendment made by the legislature must also be submitted to the people for their approval\u201d).) Illinois, therefore, follows the general rule that:\n\u201cIn jurisdictions where the initiative and referendum procedures exist, measures adopted by those procedures have the same status as ordinary acts of the legislature except where the constitution accords them a special position in the legal hierarchy by exempting them from amendment or repeal except by means of special procedures. Therefore, the rules applicable to repeals pertain to laws conceived by the initiative process or formally executed by the referendum process and both kinds of laws can repeal other prior statutes, or be repealed by subsequent legislation.\u201d 1A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 23.23, at 263 (4th ed. 1972); accord, Annot., Power of Legislative Body to Amend, Repeal, or Abrogate Initiative or Referendum Measure ***, 33 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1121 (1954).\nThe referendum which is the subject of the present controversy was authorized by section 4 \u2014 141 of the Illinois Pension Code, a law which was approved, and became effective, in 1963. (1963 Ill. Laws 2442.) Questions concerning legislative preemption of home rule powers \u201cwere totally foreign in the contemplation of legislation adopted prior to the 1970 constitution\u201d (Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166-67, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243-44), and the legislature could not have intended \u2014 in 1963 \u2014 to preclude home rule Units from exercising powers which did not exist until years later when the citizens of Illinois ratified the 1970 Constitution.\nIn light of Rosemont\u2019s home rule power to supersede inconsistent statutes which were not enacted under one of the preemption provisions of article 7, section 6, of the 1970 Constitution, it is clear that the municipal referendum authorized by section 4 \u2014 141 of the Pension Code resulted in a law which was (before October 1, 1975) on the same footing as any nonpreemptive statute enacted by the legislature. Therefore, prior to October 1, 1975, the effective date of Public Act 79 \u2014 988 (codified, in pertinent part, at Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 142), the Rosemont board of trustees could validly supersede the law which was previously adopted through the municipal referendum authorized by section 4 \u2014 141.\nThe Director correctly points out, however, that in addition to prospectively preempting the power of home rule units to alter or amend the provisions of article 4 of the Pension Code, section 4 \u2014 142 also provides that no \u201chome rule unit which is a municipality, as defined in Section 4 \u2014 103\u201d shall provide pension benefits to firemen in any manner other than a fund which complies with the provisions of article 4. Thus, the Director contends that \u2014 as of its October 1, 1975, effective date \u2014 the second clause of section 4 \u2014 142 required Rosemont to establish an article 4 firemen\u2019s pension fund.\nThe factual predicate for this conclusion, however, is the Director\u2019s assumption that when section 4 \u2014 142 became effective on October 1, 1975, (1) Rosemont was \u201ca municipality, as defined in Section 4 \u2014 103\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 142), and (2) that Rosemont continued to employ \u201cfiremen\u201d as that term is defined in section 4 \u2014 106.\nThe significance of these provisions in determining whether Rosemont must establish an article 4 pension fund becomes apparent upon careful examination of article 4.\nSection 4 \u2014 101 requires \u201ceach municipality as defined in Section 4 \u2014 103\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 101) to establish an article 4 firemen's pension fund. But the relevant clause of section 4\u2014 103 defines \u201cmunicipality\u201d as \u201c[a]ny *** city, village, incorporated town or township of less than 5,000 inhabitants [i.e., Rosemont] having a full-time paid fire department which adopts the provisions of this article pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 \u2014 141.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 103.) Thus, for example, if Rosemont did not have a \u201cfire department\u201d on October 1, 1975, then neither sections 4 \u2014 103 nor 4 \u2014 142 would apply to the village or require it to establish an article 4 fund.\nFurthermore, sections 4 \u2014 142 and 4 \u2014 101 deal with pensions for \u201cfiremen,\u201d and Rosemont asserts that by September 1975 it did not employ any \u201cfiremen\u201d as that term is used in section 4 \u2014 106. Relevant portions of section 4 \u2014 106 define \u201cfireman\u201d as someone who is classified as a fireman by the municipal civil service commission (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 106(b)) or anyone who has been \u201cappointed to any full-time position in the fire department or service of such municipality.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 4 \u2014 106(c).) So, if Rosemont\u2019s public safety officers are not \u201cfiremen\u201d within the statutory definition, then sections 4 \u2014 142 and 4 \u2014 101 would not require Rosemont to establish a firemen\u2019s pension fund.\nThe trial court in the present case did not reach these factual issues because it based its ruling on its conclusion concerning Rosemont\u2019s power to supersede laws adopted by referendum. We therefore must remand to the trial court so that it can address the questions raised by Rosemont\u2019s allegations that it did not have \u2014 within the meaning of the statutory definitions \u2014 a fire department or any firemen when the preemption statute became effective.\nFinally, we note that the legislative debate on the bill which became section 4 \u2014 142 shows that the purpose of preempting this area from the jurisdiction of home rule units was to insure that Illinois firemen would receive uniform pension benefits. It may well be that the provisions of article 4 do not apply to Rosemont\u2019s Public Safety Department and its alleged hybrid classification of police officer/firefighter. If that is the case, then only the legislature can act to insure uniformity in the pension benefits provided to such employees throughout the State.\nFor the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMEJDA and WILSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald M. Glink and Peter M. Rosenthal, both of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P. C., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield (Edward M. Kay, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF ROSEMONT, COOK COUNTY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RICHARD L. MATHIAS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 81\u20142276\nOpinion filed October 15, 1982.\nRonald M. Glink and Peter M. Rosenthal, both of Ancel, Glink, Diamond, Murphy & Cope, P. C., of Chicago, for appellants.\nTyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General, of Springfield (Edward M. Kay, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0894-01", "first_page_order": 916, "last_page_order": 922 }