{ "id": 5450240, "name": "In re PETITION FOR FEES IN: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID \"MICK\" JOHNSON, Defendant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN L. DORRIS, Defendant; R. C. LANTO, JR., et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johnson", "decision_date": "1982-11-04", "docket_number": "No. 4-82-0109", "first_page": "1135", "last_page": "1139", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 1135" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 A.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.J. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1904396 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/46/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2802161 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2805398 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/38/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031073 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3132336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0848-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 10848, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15968807447847347 }, "sha256": "e75a95aaa09f7e729318753362038875fca29fd545a70cfd0f04388b9422907c", "simhash": "1:4c85f00cb0478f5a", "word_count": 1803 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:00:34.731811+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re PETITION FOR FEES IN: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID \u201cMICK\u201d JOHNSON, Defendant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN L. DORRIS, Defendant; R. C. LANTO, JR., et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WEBBER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis matter is again before us on the petition of attorneys Reino Lanto and Paul Wilson, Jr., for fees in connection with their appointment to defend \u201cMick\u201d Johnson and John Dorris in the circuit court of Champaign County.\nOn a prior appeal concerning the same subject matter (People v. Johnson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 848, 417 N.E.2d 1062), this court reversed the holding of the trial court and remanded the case for reassessment of fees. The supreme court granted leave to appeal, affirmed this court in that reasonable fees were to be assessed, and remanded to the trial court for that purpose. People v. Johnson (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 98, 429 N.E.2d 497.\nUpon remand from the supreme court, the circuit court again considered the matter without holding any further evidentiary hearing. In a lengthy memorandum opinion the circuit court dealt with a variety of factors. It accepted the number of hours stated by petitioners as having been spent in their representation of Johnson and Dorris. It then concluded that the cases were not complex; this finding appears to be based largely on the size of the files and the court\u2019s comment that the bulk of the files was comprised of discovery materials. It also noted that Johnson\u2019s case was dismissed.\nThe court then turned to a consideration of local conditions and found that there were a large number of competent attorneys in Champaign County ready and willing to accept criminal appointments, and held the supreme court\u2019s concern about a small group inapplicable. In connection with local conditions the court also noted that the budget prepared by the Champaign County Board reduced the appropriation for appointed counsel fees by some 40%. The court found that examination of public defenders\u2019 salaries and the fees awarded to special prosecutors was of little assistance.\nThe court then turned its attention to specific figures. It was of the opinion that under the supreme court\u2019s decision it could either start upward from fixed overhead costs or downward from the going rate for private counsel. The court complained that it was \u201cleft adrift without an oar.\u201d Nonetheless, it elected to start with the overhead figure. It found Lanto\u2019s overhead was $18 per hour and Wilson\u2019s was $21. It then struck a rough average of $20. It next considered hourly rates and found Lanto\u2019s to be $55 to $60, and Wilson\u2019s $75. Other evidence persuaded the court that considering the community generally, the hourly rate should be fixed at $60. Lanto, at the original hearing, testified to a total of 162 hours of which seven were in court; Wilson testified to a total of 255 hours, 35 in court.\nThe court then awarded Lanto the sum of $4,050 and Wilson $7,740. Simple arithmetic demonstrates that Lanto then received $25 per hour and Wilson $30 per hour. Based on their overhead figures as recited above, their fees become $7 per hour for Lanto and $9 per hour for Wilson.\nWe do not believe that the trial court properly interpreted the opinion of the supreme court and overlooked the formula laid down in that opinion. We therefore vacate its award.\nThe parties have argued strenuously that the trial court erred in not convening a further evidentiary hearing upon remand. Specifically, the petitioners complain of the court\u2019s taking judicial notice of local conditions. We believe that the argument is beside the point. The real problem is the failure of the trial court to follow the mandate of the supreme court.\nWhile we believe that it would have been preferable for the trial court to allow argument from the parties on the matters of which it took judicial notice, particularly the local conditions, we cannot say that this notice can be elevated to the level of reversible error. All of the matters considered in addition to what had already been presented at prior hearings were items of public knowledge and particularly within the knowledge and experience of the trial judge. (Compare Welsh v. Welsh (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 35, 347 N.E.2d 512.) The situation is unlike that in which a trial judge makes a private investigation of operative evidentiary facts as in People v. Wallenberg (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 350, 181 N.E.2d 143.\nThe supreme court\u2019s mandate to the trial court was explicit:\n\u201cTHEREFORE, it is considered by the Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Champaign County, BE AFFIRMED IN ALL THINGS AND STAND IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT, notwithstanding the said matter and things therein assigned for error, and this cause be remanded to the Circuit Court of Champaign County for a redetermination of the attorney fee awards in accordance with views expressed in the opinion attached to this mandate.\u201d\nThus the duty of the trial court was to apply the formula stated in the supreme court\u2019s opinion to the facts generated in the trial court\u2019s record, together with the matters of which the trial court took judicial notice, and arrive at a redetermination. This was a pure mechanical exercise and was necessary only for the reason that no power exists in a reviewing court to order an additur. Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (87 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)) permits a remittitur, but we are aware of no authority permitting additur under the Rule, except in cases of obvious arithmetical error. In the instant case the supreme court apparently felt that local conditions were significant in its formula and these were absent in the record before it.\nIt is our opinion that the trial court erred in confining its redetermination to a single paragraph in the supreme court\u2019s opinion. That portion of the opinion states:\n\u201cAccordingly, we believe that reasonable compensation \u2018should reimburse assigned counsel for his overhead and yield something toward his own support.\u2019 (State v. Rush (1966), 46 N.J. 399, 413, 217 A.2d 441, 448.) In the instant case, this was not done. A fee award which is insufficient to cover reasonable office overhead and expenses of trial is clearly unreasonable.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d 98, 105, 429 N.E.2d 497.\nContrary to the trial court\u2019s finding that the supreme court\u2019s opinion permits either escalation from an overhead figure or de-escalation from an hourly rate figure, we believe that the foregoing quotation specifically rejects the overhead approach.\nThe key to the supreme court\u2019s opinion, its \u201cformula,\u201d is contained in the paragraph following:\n\u201cThe formula for reasonable compensation should be the hourly fee normally charged for comparable trial court services, less an amount adequate to satisfy the pro bono factor. In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the trial court must consider a number of factors, including, but not limited to, time spent and services rendered, the attorney\u2019s skill and experience, complexity of the case, overhead costs, and expenses of trial. Another consideration is local conditions, which refers to the number of attorneys, in a given location, who could be called upon to perform pro bono work. Where there are only a few criminal-trial lawyers in a particular locale, the court must necessarily appoint attorneys from the same select group to represent indigent defendants. This process imposes an unfair burden on that group of attorneys, a burden which is not being shared by all members of the bar. The trial court must also consider this inherent inequity in determining compensation.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d 98, 105-06, 429 N.E.2d 497, 500.\nThe court dealt with two concepts: \u201creasonable compensation\u201d and \u201ca reasonable fee.\u201d The former is an abstraction, while the latter is concrete; the former is what ought to be paid, while the latter is what is paid.\nAt its root \u201ccompensation\u201d carries the notion of balancing. In Webster\u2019s Second New International Dictionary 545 (1959), the primary meaning is defined as \u201c[t]hat which constitutes, or is regarded as, an equivalent or recompense.\u201d This is elaborated in Webster\u2019s Dictionary of Synonyms 610 (1st ed. 1951):\n\u201cCompensate is often preferred to pay when no legal obligation is implied or no payment for services is expected, because the term stresses a return, usually but not necessarily in money, that is regarded as an equivalent for a service given, for trouble taken, time spent, or the like; as, to compensate a waiter for his cheerful willing service; to compensate a friend for the time he spent in helping one; to compensate a neighbor for taking care of one\u2019s pets during the summer. But in this sense compensate often does not imply an obligation to another or the passing of money; it often suggests a counterbalancing, as of something unpleasant by something pleasant, or of something lost by something gained; ***.\u201d\nThe court mandated this balancing process: take the hourly rate and balance against it a pro bono factor to determine a \u201creasonable fee,\u201d the amount in fact to be paid. Under the formula the fee will be less than the compensation. How much less is determined by the factors outlined by the court.\nThe trial court therefore was in error in its method of computation. Additionally, even if it had used the proper method, we find a clear abuse of discretion. As applied to Lanto, the pro bono reduction amounts to 58.4%; as applied to Wilson, it is 60%. We find these reductions excessive. In our opiinion the reductions in the instant case, based upon all the factors in the record, should not exceed 40%. We make this statement only as dictum since the supreme court rejected the definitive approach used in Wisconsin (331/s% reduction) and in New Jersey (40% reduction).\nIt remains to be decided what disposition is to be made of this case. As has been indicated, this is its third appearance in the reviewing courts and judicial economy indicates that it should end here. However, as has likewise been indicated, we find ourselves powerless to order an additur, even though we believe that this court possesses the competency to determine fees, a competency which extends to all courts. Welsh.\nTherefore, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County that fees are due is affirmed, but its redetermination of them under the supreme court\u2019s mandate in Johnson is vacated and the cause is again remanded to that court for another determination under the supreme court\u2019s formula as explicated in this opinion.\nVacated and remanded.\nMILLS and TRAPP, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WEBBER" } ], "attorneys": [ "John Gadau, of Champaign, for appellants.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Trisha Crowley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re PETITION FOR FEES IN: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID \u201cMICK\u201d JOHNSON, Defendant; THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN L. DORRIS, Defendant; R. C. LANTO, JR., et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201482\u20140109\nOpinion filed November 4, 1982.\nJohn Gadau, of Champaign, for appellants.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Trisha Crowley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1135-01", "first_page_order": 1157, "last_page_order": 1161 }