{ "id": 2929751, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Jordan, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jordan", "decision_date": "1973-04-23", "docket_number": "No. 56712", "first_page": "482", "last_page": "487", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "11 Ill. App. 3d 482" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "408 F.2d 912", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2203508 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/408/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2862080 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899055 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 N.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2865683 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2860006 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2860743 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N.E.2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880350 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2884925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828667 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2745795 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744599 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5335222 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5319787 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635307 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0490-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 11370, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08578801312354505 }, "sha256": "918ac4446a7513b6e1e37779283cee4ce35d3b4684acc0efc71f2a386900eadf", "simhash": "1:824010e937f7a8a2", "word_count": 1954 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:35.785791+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Jordan, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJames Jordan was charged with possession of a depressant drug in violation of section 802(c) of the Drug Abuse Control Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 111\u00bd, par. 802(c).) After a bench trial he was found guilty and sentenced to 60 days in the House of Correction. The only error assigned is the failure to suppress the evidence found on his person.\nOfficer Ernest Harris testified that, after the defendant was stopped for making an illegal left hand turn, he could not produce a driver\u2019s license, but only a prior driving citation. The defendant was then placed under arrest and informed that he would have to accompany the officer to the station to post the proper bond. The defendant was given a pat-down search prior to being placed in the squad car which was to transport him to the police station. At that time, the officer discovered a small vial of pills which were analyzed as a depressant drug, barbituric acid. The record does not disclose where the officer found the vial. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant sought to prove that he drove his own car to the police station. The court said: \u201cI don\u2019t care how he got there. He is in this man\u2019s custody. I don\u2019t care if he drove in his own car.\u201d\nThe rule governing admissibility of evidence seized after traffic arrests has an erratic history. Beginning with People v. Edge (1950), 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359, the Supreme Court held that an arrest for a traffic violation (obstructing an alley and failure to have a safety-inspection sticker) justified a search of the defendant. That rule was followed in People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (illegal parking), and People v. Berry, 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (failure to have State license plates and city vehicle sticker).\nIn People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 18-19, 166 N.E.2d 433, the Supreme Corut held that not every traffic violation justifies a search, overruling Clark and Berry. The court said: \u201cA search incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover fruits of a crime. * * * Some traffic violations would justify a search.\u201d A parting violation alone, the court held, would not have justified the search, but because the officers were members of the gambling detail who had previously arrested the defendant and because he ran back into a building after he saw them, they had the right \u201cto assume that they were dealing with a situation more serious than a routine parking violation.\u201d See also People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440.\nIn People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill.2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612, the defendant was arrested for driving with obstructed vision. The time was 4:30 A.M., and the temperature was fifteen degrees below zero. He was seen coming from a private parking lot. The officers noted that the defendant matched the description of a man wanted for other violations in the area. In People v. Thomas, 31 Ill.2d 212, 201 N.E.2d 413, the defendant was arrested at 5:00 A.M. driving without proper lights. The officers learned that he did not have a driver\u2019s license and had just been released from jail. In People v. Davis, 33 Ill.2d 134, 210 N.E.2d 530, the defendant was arrested at 1:20 A.M. for mating an improper turn and driving with no light on the rear license plate. After stopping him, the police saw a tin foil package on the floor at the driver\u2019s side and opened the package, which contained white powder. They searched the car and found another tin foil package which contained narcotics in the crack of the front seat. The search in these three cases was upheld because the evidence showed that the police officers could reasonably conclude that they were dealing with a criminal rather than an ordinary traffic violator.\nIn People v. Lewis, 34 Ill.2d 211, 215 N.E.2d 283, the defendant was driving a 1959 Cadillac sedan at 8:30 P.M. when he was stopped for going through a red light. The officers noticed that the defendant and a similar 1959 Cadillac bearing the defendant\u2019s license number were listed in the Daily Police Department Bulletin as wanted in connection with a burglary. While the defendant was kept in a squad car, one officer searched the trunk of the Cadillac. The Supreme Court interpreted Watkins to mean that a search is permissible only when it is reasonably necessary to protect the officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover fruits of a crime. The court pointed out that at the time of the search there was no danger of attack nor the likelihood of escape. In reversing the conviction, the court construed \u201cfruits of a crime\u201d to be restricted to the fruits of the crime for which he was arrested, i.e., the traffic violation. It should be pointed out that this case does not hinge on the propriety of the search but, rather, what was seized.\nOver a year later, the court decided on the same day People v. Brown, 38 Ill.2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577, and People v. Jones, 38 Ill.2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580. In Brown, the officers had stopped the car because it had no State license plates. They learned then that the car had no city sticker and that the driver had no driver\u2019s license. He showed the officers a title which was not dated or signed and did not contain his name. The officers noticed a set of golf clubs and some clothing for which the driver could give no explanation. The search of the trunk was upheld. In Jones, the arrest was not based on a traffic violation, but the Supreme Court expanded the right to seize property to include \u201cmere evidence\u201d and not just weapons or fruits of the crime for which the defendant was initially arrested. (See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, sec. 108\u20141(d).) Both cases overruled People v. Lewis, Jones expressly and Brown by implication.\nIn People v. Reed, 37 Ill.2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69, the defendant was stopped around noon because his rear license plate was missing; he produced his driver\u2019s license and proof that he had purchased both license plates; the defendant behaved in a nervous fashion, moving his hands around and looking from side to side and \u201ctoward his car.\u201d The officers searched him and found no weapon. They decided to take him to the police station \u201cto check him out.\u201d A search of the car disclosed a bag containing heroin under the front seat. The court reversed a denial of the suppression of the evidence on the ground that the defendant\u2019s \u201cnervous\u201d behavior at the time he was stopped did not warrant the search of his automobile.\nIn People v. Holloman, 46 Ill.2d 311,263 N.E.2d 7, the defendant made an improper turn; he was unable to produce a driver\u2019s license or motor vehicle registration certificate; he started backing away from the officers, was placed under arrest and searched \u201cfor weapons for [the officer\u2019s] protection.\u201d In making a cursory pat-down for weapons, the officer felt, hidden inside the defendant\u2019s belt at the small of his back, a hard object which was a large manila envelope containing heroin. The court upheld the search, noting that the police had justification to believe from the defendant\u2019s furtive behavior that criminal activities were involved and the evidence seized was not discovered in an apparently innocuous place.\nReading these cases together, we conclude that the standard imposed by Watkins, Mayo and Davis, followed in People v. Tate, 38 Ill.2d 184, 188, 230 N.E.2d 697, requires that \u201ccircumstances reasonably indicate that the police may be dealing not with the ordinary traffic violator, but with a criminal.\u201d We further conclude that the police may properly seize pursuant to a reasonable search more than weapons or the fruits of the crime for which he has been arrested.\nThe defendant here was driving under a traffic citation, which was an accepted procedure after he had surrendered his driver\u2019s license on a previous violation. No other circumstance appears to have justified the search. Significantly, the defendant sought to prove that the police permitted him to drive his own car to the station. The trial judge ruled that such proof was immaterial, that the only relevant fact was that the man was in custody. If that position is correct, in every case where a motorist does not wish to surrender his driver\u2019s license after a traffic violation but wishes to post a bond at the station, or whenever a motorist does not have his driver\u2019s license, the police are justified in searching him. Such a holding flies in the face of the clear meaning of Watkins. If the police did not intend to convey the defendant in a police vehicle, what would be the basis of their right to search? A failure to have a driver\u2019s license or a preference to posting a bond rather than surrendering the license are not such facts, standing alone, that reasonably indicate to an officer that he may be in danger of an attack.\nA more troublesome question is presented by the State\u2019s argument in support of the search here that, whenever circumstances require the transportation of a defendant in a police vehicle, the officer is always justified in making a search. However, the determination of the right to search at all does not end the problem. The scope of any search, of course, is always subject to the standard of reasonableness, regardless of the underlying justification. For example, under some circumstances a search requiring removal of all of the defendant\u2019s clothing might be justified. But who would say that such a search would be justified under the facts of this case? Assuming the validity of the State\u2019s argument, which is based on understandable concern for the safety of the officer, the question then becomes to what extent may the officer search. A more\n. .......... ........ . ---------- thorough search of a man seized in a commission of a felony would be permitted than of a man who failed to have a driver\u2019s license. The final question then is whether the search of the defendant here was of unreasonable scope. We conclude that it was.\nThe officer \u201cconducted a pat-down\u201d search \u201cfor his own safety,\u201d and found a small vial \u201cthat [was] like a pharmacist puts pills in.\u201d At that time he did not know the chemical make-up of the pills in the vial. The motion for a new trial discloses that the vial was found in the defendant\u2019s pocket, which, unlike the facts in Holloman, is an \u201capparently innocuous place.\u201d In Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912, 916, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based upon a search where the officer in \u201cthe normal course of his \u2018frisk\u2019 felt only a small object, which was not, in his mind, a potential weapon.\u201d\nWhile we make no determination whether the police had the right to make any search in this case, we conclude that, even if they did, the search was unreasonable, and the motion to suppress should have been sustained. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nBURKE, P. J., and GOLDBERG, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EGAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald P. Alwin, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Elmer C. Kissane, Patricia C. Bobb, and Peter Costa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Jordan, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 56712;\nFirst District (1st Division)\nApril 23, 1973.\nRonald P. Alwin, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Elmer C. Kissane, Patricia C. Bobb, and Peter Costa, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0482-02", "first_page_order": 504, "last_page_order": 509 }