{ "id": 2997333, "name": "THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT I. AULER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "City of Champaign v. Auler", "decision_date": "1982-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201482\u20140215", "first_page": "243", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 243" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 1208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3346649 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3224450 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 N.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5605282 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2610992 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/63/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5236118 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/58/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2601864 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/21/0632-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 479, "char_count": 8723, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33303312278051733 }, "sha256": "82ae93ccbc02be36aa1918f079a2235689db6703d4d524560c677d093659b0d0", "simhash": "1:935bdc4f091b9704", "word_count": 1479 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:28:01.901115+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT I. AULER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MILLS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA Staffordshire terrier became entangled in a \u201cleash law.\u201d\nThe question: Is the element of knowledge or scienter required of the dog\u2019s owner to find him in violation of this ordinance?\nThe answer: Yes.\nWe reverse.\nDefendant Auler was found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance of the city of Champaign which prohibits dogs from running at large and was fined $10. He appeals from the judgment of the trial court.\nAuler was charged with violating sections 6 \u2014 6 and 6 \u2014 19 of the Municipal Code of Champaign (1975), as amended. Section 6 \u2014 6 provides:\n\u201cNo person owning any dog *** shall suffer or permit such dog to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood by barking *** or by running through or across public property or private property other than that of the owner.\u201d\nSection 6 \u2014 19 provides:\n\u201c(A) No owner of any dog shall permit such animal to run at large, or to be on any public place or private property other than that of the owner without being securely restrained by a leash or other means.\u201d\nEugene Jacobs testified on behalf of the city. On April 29, 1981, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Jacobs was walking his pair of greyhounds on the south side of Church Street just west of Prospect Avenue in Champaign. Suddenly, a Staffordshire terrier bounded across the street and attacked Jacobs\u2019 dogs. Jacobs identified the terrier as belonging to the defendant. The terrier was not on a leash or otherwise restrained.\nAuler took the stand and admitted that he owns a Staffordshire terrier. On the evening of April 29, 1981, he was in Indianapolis, Indiana, with his wife. The babysitter left in charge of the defendant\u2019s children was told by defendant that she should not permit the dog to leave defendant\u2019s residence. Auler stated that he had no personal knowledge of the injuries to Mr. Jacobs\u2019 dogs and that he had taken steps to prevent his dog from running free. In a 10-year period the dog had crossed the line between defendant\u2019s driveway and the sidewalk only once.\nIn rebuttal, Jacobs testified that he had seen defendant\u2019s dog left unattended in the defendant\u2019s yard on several occasions.\nThe trial court found the defendant\u2019s dog was running at large during the evening of April 29, 1981. The court construed the ordinances as malum prohibitum offenses and held that the city was not' required to prove defendant\u2019s mental state as an element of its casein-chief.\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred in construing sections 6 \u2014 6 and 6 \u2014 19 of the Municipal Code of Champaign (1975), as amended, as malum prohibitum offenses. He argues that the language found in the ordinance, especially the phrase \u201csuffer or permit,\u201d indicates that the drafters of the ordinance intended that a violation would exist only where the dog owner knew that his dog was running at large or was negligent in failing to take measures to keep his dog from running at large. The city contends that the trial court\u2019s construction of the ordinance was correct and that public policy supports the view that a defendant\u2019s mental state is irrelevant in a case of this nature.\nSimilar questions were presented to our supreme court in a series of Civil War era cases. In Case v. Hall (1859), 21 Ill. 632, the trial court dismissed the third plea of a complaint, which alleged that defendant\u2019s hogs were running at large in violation of an ordinance prohibiting such conduct. The supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the plea because the plea did not contain an allegation that the hogs were running at large at their owner\u2019s sufferance. The court went on to state:\n\u201cThis knowledge and sufferance is the gist [original emphasis] of the offense. The penalty is not to be enforced because the hogs were running at large, but became the owner suffered them to run at large.\" (Emphasis added.) 21 Ill. 632, 636.\nThe court was confronted with yet another ordinance prohibiting hogs from running at large in Town of Collinsville v. Scanland (1871), 58 Ill. 221. The ordinance in question read:\n\u201cThat any person being the owner of *** any hog or hogs, shoat, or pig, who shall suffer the same to run at large *** shall be subject to a penalty of not less than five dollars nor more than fifteen dollars.\u201d (58 Ill. 221, 222.)\nThe defendant was found not guilty and the supreme court affirmed the verdict. The court held that- the ordinance required that the owner of the hogs had known that the hogs were running at large or had been negligent in failing to keep the hogs from running at large. The court stated:\n\u201cBut to subject the owner to a penalty therefor, he must himself have participated in the act, by suffering it to be done, which requires that he should have knowingly permitted his hogs to run at large within the town, or have been guilty of such negligent conduct in enabling them to do so, as would have been equivalent thereto.\u201d (58 Ill. 221, 225.)\nSimilarly, in Kinder v. Gillespie (1872), 63 Ill. 88, the court held that a horse owner was guilty of violating a \u201crunning at large\u201d ordinance only if there was some guilty intention or wilful neglect on the part of the horse owner.\nThese early cases were relied on by the Second District in an opinion construing a liquor control ordinance containing similar language. In Hansmar, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Com. (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 690, 397 N.E.2d 241, defendant was found guilty of various liquor control ordinance violations and his liquor license was suspended. One of the allegations contained in the complaint alleged that the defendant did \u201csuffer or permit\u201d a minor to remain in licensed premises in violation of the ordinance.\nOn appeal, the Second District held that the phrase \u201csuffer or permit\u201d contained in the ordinance required that the plaintiff prove either authorization, knowledge or recklessness in failing to know on the part of the defendant liquor licensee. See also Fitzgerald v. Illinois Liquor Control Com. (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 403 N.E.2d 696.\nThe city contends that sections 6 \u2014 6 and 6 \u2014 19 are malum prohibitum, relying on Village of Northbrook v. Cannon (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 315, 377 N.E.2d 1208. In Cannon, an ordinance prohibited any animal owner from causing or permitting that animal to create a nuisance by running uncontrolled. Defendant was convicted of violating the ordinance and appealed his conviction, contending that plaintiff failed to prove he permitted his dogs to run uncontrolled because it failed to show that he had knowledge of the violation.\nThe court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction. The court compared the language of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. HV-k, par. 1001 et seq.) to the language of the ordinance and compared the purposes behind each measure. Seeing what it considered to be an obvious analogy, the First District relied on several cases involving violations of provisions of the Environmental Protection Act to hold that lack of knowledge or intent is not a defense to a charge of allowing or permitting a given result.\nWe do not find that Cannon controls the result in this case. Cannon does not cite or distinguish the authorities cited by defendant in the case at bar. Therefore, we do not choose to follow the holding in Cannon.\nThe Champaign ordinance declares that anyone who shall \u201csuffer or permit\u201d their dogs to run at large is in violation of the ordinance. The phrase \u201csuffer or permit\u201d has been construed by the highest court of this State as requiring proof of knowledge or negligent conduct on the part of the animal\u2019s owner. (Case; Town of Collinsville; Kinder.) The supreme court has not chosen to overrule or modify its holdings in these cases, and we find that Case and its progeny control the result in the case at bar.\nErgo, we hold that in a prosecution under sections 6 \u2014 6 and 6 \u2014 19 of the Municipal Code of Champaign (1975), as amended, the city must prove that the dog owner either intentionally permitted his dog to run at large or was negligent in failing to take steps to prevent such conduct.\nThe trial court erred in its construction of the ordinance. The city failed to show that defendant\u2019s conduct was either intentional or negligent. Consequently, defendant\u2019s conviction and fine for violating sections 6 \u2014 6 and 6 \u2014 19 is reversed.\nReversed.\nLONDRIGAN and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MILLS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert I. Auler, of Auler Law Offices, of Urbana, for appellant.", "Frederick Stavins, City Attorney, of Champaign (Kathryn L. Samuelson, Assistant City Attorney, and Terrence J. Anastas, law student, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT I. AULER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201482\u20140215\nOpinion filed November 17, 1982.\nRobert I. Auler, of Auler Law Offices, of Urbana, for appellant.\nFrederick Stavins, City Attorney, of Champaign (Kathryn L. Samuelson, Assistant City Attorney, and Terrence J. Anastas, law student, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0243-01", "first_page_order": 265, "last_page_order": 269 }