{
  "id": 2999356,
  "name": "REAVY GRADY & CROUCH REALTORS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES W. HALL et al., Defendants-Appellees.-(Ray L. Unterbrink, Plaintiff.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Reavy Grady & Crouch Realtors v. Hall",
  "decision_date": "1982-11-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 17338",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "REAVY GRADY & CROUCH REALTORS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES W. HALL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\u2014(Ray L. Unterbrink, Plaintiff.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE TRAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThis action arises out of a real estate listing contract for an apartment building in Chatham, Illinois. Appellants, Reavy Grady and Crouch Realtors, and Willard Kennedy, a realtor, sued to recover $14,000, alleging earned as a real estate commission, plus costs of suit. Defendant, Joyce L. Hall, was dismissed at the close of the plaintiffs\u2019 case. The trial court found for the defendants on all counts of the complaint. All plaintiffs, except Ray Unterbrink, appeal the trial court\u2019s decision.\nWhen the defendant, James W. Hall, moved to Florida in 1976, he employed Howard McCormick to manage the Chatham property. In 1978, McCormick told the defendant that he had a prospective purchaser for the apartments. The defendant then sent McCormick a letter which authorized him to act as defendant\u2019s representative in the sale of the apartments. The letter further stated that McCormick was empowered to act in the defendant\u2019s best interest as agreed upon by the defendant and his attorney. The letter did not specifically refer to McCormick\u2019s prospective buyer. At trial, the defendant stated that this letter of authorization was for the sale to McCormick\u2019s prospecfive buyer and no one else.\nOn September 10, 1978, McCormick told the defendant that he had listed the property with plaintiff, Willard Kennedy, of Century 21 Realty. This multiple listing agreement was executed on September 2, 1978. The defendant said that he was terribly upset about the listing with Kennedy. According to the defendant, his prior understanding with McCormick was that, if McCormick\u2019s prospective buyer backed out, the defendant would find his own realtor. McCormick testified, however, that he and the defendant did discuss listing the property with a realtor, and that the defendant agreed to the listing with Kennedy. After he learned of the multiple listing contract, the defendant did not tell McCormick to cancel it, and also never personally attempted to cancel the agreement.\nOn September 27, 1978, McCormick informed the defendant that Kennedy had found a buyer, Ray Unterbrink, who was offering $200,000. Unterbrink\u2019s offer had to be accepted on or before noon September 28. At approximately 10:40 a.m. (EST), Kennedy and the defendant discussed Unterbrink\u2019s offer and Kennedy\u2019s commission. The defendant did not want to accept the offer. He then terminated the conversation because he wanted to discuss the matter with his attorney and accountant. Although the defendant could not reach his attorney, he did have a discussion with his accountant. After this, the defendant again talked to Kennedy. The time of this conversation and what occurred next are in dispute. According to the defendant, he told Kennedy that he still opposed the sale, but was uncertain of what action he should take. When Kennedy suggested sending a telegram of acceptance, the defendant replied that he would send such a telegram only on the condition that the sale was subject to the approval of both his attorney and accountant. Kennedy testified that the defendant accepted the offer. Kennedy supplied the defendant with the words to use in the telegram. According to Kennedy, he told the defendant that he would sign, as agent, the defendant\u2019s name on the contract of sale. Kennedy stated that the defendant put no stipulation on his acceptance, and did not inform Kennedy that the acceptance was contingent upon the approval of his accountant or attorney.\nThe mailgram which defendant sent to Kennedy read:\n\u201cI accept Ray Unterbrink\u2019s offer of $200,000 for 405 East Mulberry Chatham Illinois for these apartments.\u201d\nThe defendant stated that he considered adding the words \u201csubject to the approval of a lawyer\u201d to the mailgram. However, he did not do so because he had Kennedy\u2019s promise to send copies of the contract to defendant\u2019s lawyer and accountant, and because defendant did not wish to spend the money on the additional words. The defendant claimed that he never authorized Kennedy to sign the contract of sale.\nLater on the afternoon of September 28, 1978, the defendant decided against selling the apartment. The primary reason for rescinding the sale was that the price was too low. The defendant testified that he called Kennedy on October 2, 1978, to cancel the sale. The defendant told Kennedy that he had finally been able to talk with his lawyer and that his attorney advised defendant against the sale. Kennedy could not recall talking with defendant on this date. Kennedy testified that his first notification of defendant\u2019s cancellation was upon receipt of a letter from the defendant dated October 9, 1978. This letter read as follows:\n\u201cAfter further consideration I do not wish to accept the offer of Ray Unterbrink to buy the apartments from me at 405 E. Mulberry, Chatham, Illinois, for $200,000.\nI am hopeful that you will be successful in selling the apartments closer to the listed price of $280,000 during the balance of the three months in which the property is listed with you.\nDuring the next several weeks, I will do everything possible to bring the apartments into better condition for you to sell. My plans are to spend this weekend and most of next week personally working on the apartments.\nI would appreciate your suggestions how we can get a better price on the apartments.\u201d\nThe trial court found that no enforceable sales contract existed because Kennedy did not have the power of an agent. The plaintiffs now claim that an agency between Kennedy and defendant was established by ratification. For purposes of argument, the plaintiffs assume that McCormick\u2019s listing of the property with Kennedy was beyond the scope of the agency granted to him by the defendant. However, defendant\u2019s actions in continuing the seller-broker relationship with Kennedy constituted a ratification of McCormick\u2019s conduct. We agree.\nThe authority of an agent may come only from his principal. Where an agent has acted outside the scope of his authority, a principal may ratify the act and render it obligatory upon himself; and that subsequent assent and ratification is equivalent to an original authority and confirms that which originally was an unauthorized act. A principal needs to have a full knowledge of the facts and the choice of either accepting or rejecting the benefits of the transaction. Wing v. Lederer (1966), 77 Ill. App. 2d 413, 222 N.E.2d 535.\nWe find that the defendant ratified, through acquiesence, McCormick\u2019s participation in the multiple listing agreement. (See Magid v. Drexel National Bank (1947), 330 Ill. App. 486, 71 N.E.2d 898; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Com. (1929), 335 Ill. 322, 167 N.E. 80.) The defendant admitted that McCormick informed him of the listing agreement approximately three weeks before Kennedy presented Unterbrink\u2019s offer. The defendant did not tell McCormick to cancel the listing agreement, and did not attempt to cancel the agreement himself. Even after the defendant informed Kennedy, by letter, that he would not accept Unterbrink\u2019s offer, the defendant still wished to retain Kennedy\u2019s representation. Thus, the defendant ratified McCormick\u2019s signing of the multiple listing agreement.\nWhere a broker enters into a listing agreement with the property owner and procures a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase upon the terms proposed by the seller, the broker is entitled to his commission. (Haas v. Cohen (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 896, 295 N.E.2d 28.) The listing agreement in the instant case specifically provided for payment of the broker\u2019s commission in the event the broker found a ready, willing, and able purchaser. Unterbrink was such a purchaser.\nThe defendant points out that his wife, Joyce Hall, was dismissed from the case. Her dismissal does not have any effect on the plaintiffs\u2019 right to a commission. The fact that the seller may not be the sole owner of the property neither renders the sale agreement unenforceable, nor affects the seller\u2019s liability under the listing agreement where the broker has performed according to its term. Haas.\nThe plaintiffs also contend that the defendant, as the principal, has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions or qualifications existed on an otherwise general grant of authority.\nThe listing agreement clearly delegated a general power to sell defendant\u2019s property. The defendant said that his acceptance of Unterbrink\u2019s offer was conditional, and would become final only upon approval of both his attorney and his accountant. Plaintiffs argue that, by reciting these conditions, the defendant is attempting to modify the term of the listing agreement through parol evidence. Parol evidence is admissible to show a condition precedent to the existence of a contract. (Huegel v. Sassaman (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 414, 393 N.E.2d 1361.) We have reviewed the record closely and conclude that defendant\u2019s evidence does not support his contention that he placed qualifications upon an otherwise general grant of authority to Kennedy. According to the defendant, he informed Kennedy that he would accept Unterbrink\u2019s offer only with stipulated conditions. However, the defendant admits that his decision to cancel the sale was made unilaterally on the very day that he sent the mailgram. We find it difficult to believe that Kennedy, as an experienced broker, would consider defendant\u2019s conditions as an acceptance, rather than a counteroffer. Kennedy stated that the defendant placed no conditions upon his acceptance. This assertion is strongly reinforced by the mailgram which contained no trace of the purported conditions. RaJean Mudgett, a salesman for Reavy Grady and Crouch Realtors, showed the defendant\u2019s property to Unterbrink. She testified that Kennedy called her before noon on September 28, 1978, and announced that defendant had accepted the offer. The testimony of Mudgett and Kennedy, combined with certain portions of the defendant\u2019s own testimony, clearly shows that the defendant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he placed qualifications or conditions on his grant of authority to Kennedy.\nWe find that the defendant, through acquiesence, ratified his agent McCormick\u2019s participation in the multiple listing agreement. The defendant failed to prove that his acceptance of Unterbrink\u2019s offer was conditional. The plaintiffs procured a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase upon the terms proposed by the seller. Thus, the plaintiffs were entitled to their real estate commission.\nAccordingly, we reverse the trial court. This cause is remanded with directions that the trial court enter judgment for the plaintiffs Heavy Grady & Crouch Realtors and Willard Kennedy in the amount of $14,000 plus costs.\nReversed and remanded with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE TRAPP"
      },
      {
        "text": "MILLS, J.,\nconcurs.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "MILLS, J.,"
      },
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN,\ndissenting:\nWhile plaintiff argues that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the general grant of authority in the telegram was conditional or qualified, the issue in this respect at this stage of the proceedings is whether the trial court\u2019s finding that it was, is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288.\nThe trial court heard the testimony of Kennedy that defendant made no oral qualifications to the mailgram purporting acceptance of Unterbrink\u2019s offer. It also heard the testimony of defendant that he did make such oral qualifications. While the circumstantial evidence surrounding the transaction tends to support plaintiffs\u2019 version of what happened, the trial court heard the testimony of the two witnesses who were privy to this crucial telephone conversation and observed their demeanor and manner. I do not find that determination of the trial court to be palpably wrong, nor do I conclude that a different result was clearly evident. Owen v. Pret\u2019 A Porter Boutique, Inc. (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 438, 302 N.E.2d 672.\nAccordingly, I would affirm the circuit court.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Wayne R. Golomb and Thomas Y. Pearson, both of Springfield, for appellants.",
      "Edward G. Free, of Free and Free, of Springfield (Michael W. Hogan, of counsel), for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "REAVY GRADY & CROUCH REALTORS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMES W. HALL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\u2014(Ray L. Unterbrink, Plaintiff.)\nFourth District\nNo. 17338\nOpinion filed November 15, 1982.\nGREEN, P.J., dissenting.\nWayne R. Golomb and Thomas Y. Pearson, both of Springfield, for appellants.\nEdward G. Free, of Free and Free, of Springfield (Michael W. Hogan, of counsel), for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0325-01",
  "first_page_order": 347,
  "last_page_order": 352
}
