{ "id": 5442108, "name": "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELMHURST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "County of Kane v. Elmhurst National Bank", "decision_date": "1982-12-28", "docket_number": "Nos. 82-532, 82-651 cons.", "first_page": "292", "last_page": "300", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 292" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "42 Wis. 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 11285163 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/42/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Wis. 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 11285143 ], "year": 1877, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/42/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.W.2d 950", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10185394 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/276/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Or. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2290504 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/9/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio Dec. Reprint", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.Y.S.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Misc. 2d 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1271320 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/76/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 N.J.L. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.L.", "case_ids": [ 386159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/njl/35/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 N.H. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 475437 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/54/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Mo. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8854233 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/26/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 Mo. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8854806 ], "year": 1858, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/25/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Miss. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 8829925 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/miss/245/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 A.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Md. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2205174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/205/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Md. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1013370 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/7/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Me. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 8846688 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/me/34/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.W.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ky. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 8514734 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ky/249/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ga. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 43146 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/69/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 P. 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Colo. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 2570365 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/9/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 U.S. 95", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175189 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 F.2d 768", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1828186 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/49/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 F.2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1773408 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/37/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 F.2d 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1765924 ], "year": 1929, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/35/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 F. Cas. 821", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Cas.", "case_ids": [ 6130169 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-cas/3/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851180 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ala. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 8488575 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" }, { "page": "902-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/198/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 A.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "502, 505-06" }, { "page": "505-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Md. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1899569 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "413, 419-22" }, { "page": "419-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/265/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Mass. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 881894 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/336/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 P. 986", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "991" }, { "page": "989-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Cal. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal.", "case_ids": [ 2143325 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal/192/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 N.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Mass. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 3863157 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/353/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 N.E. 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 N.Y. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2327195 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/186/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547669 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 A.L.R.3d 1104", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Cal. Rptr. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.E.2d 1254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "1260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ind. App. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind. App.", "case_ids": [ 1491806 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind-app/173/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3025355 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 N.W.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Iowa 1082", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 4400226 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/259/1082-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3082842 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2541036 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "296-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/376/0292-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 974, "char_count": 18346, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2452676011037336e-07, "percentile": 0.6088594354342667 }, "sha256": "af869da1d065338dce13a6f5f2b0aa316238209e6730a77eec2f437c2704a461", "simhash": "1:2a3a8a4f96b7e658", "word_count": 3007 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.990742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELMHURST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe County of Kane (County) filed complaints in the nature of equitable bills for discovery against the defendant landowners and thereafter filed a motion for \u201cpre-pleading discovery.\u201d It sought permission to enter the land of the defendants, Elmhurst National Bank, as trustee under Trust No. 3000, Frederick E. Haskins and Mary L. Haskins (the Owners) to conduct surveys, appraisals and subsoil tests preliminary to condemning the lands for highway construction purposes. The defendants filed motions to dismiss alleging that neither the provisions of the Illinois Highway Code relied upon by the County (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 121, par. 4\u2014503) nor Supreme Court Rule 214 (73 Ill. 2d R. 214) authorize the relief sought in the absence of the owners\u2019 consent; and alleging alternatively that if so construed a violation of defendants\u2019 constitutional rights would ensue. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint. The motion of the County for prepleading discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 214 was granted and the court entered the following order:\n\u201cIt is hereby ordered that the County of Kane or its agents are allowed to reasonably enter the premises and allowed to take and perform necessary and reasonable and necessary [sic] procedures in securing a survey, appraisal and subsoil and geologic samples outlined in the following manner:\nJerry Hines to come upon the property to survey (with transit) and Stake the Center line of the proposed highway by placing stakes every 100\u2019 (small stakes), that soil and material services shall enter the premises with a small jeep like vehicle with an auger on the back and every three hundred feet take a soil boring and at special insistence of Plaintiff\u2019s attorney and after soil boring made and geologic study completed shall fill said hole. Finally Robert Lightner shall enter the premises and appraise both the vacant parcel and appraise said home on parcel. That this entire process shall be over 8 working days and any damages done shall be paid for. That at least 4 days advance notice is needed to have and coordinate all parties so that a minimum of inconvenience shall be done to Defendants\u201d\nfrom which the Owners appeal.\nA preliminary question arises from the County\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal which we have taken with the case. The County argues that the order, being a grant of a discovery motion, is not appealable under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (73 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)), since, while injunctive relief was prayed for in the complaint, it was not granted in the order. Generally, preliminary orders in a pending suit are not appealable because they are reviewable on appeal from the final order in the suit. (Durkin v. Hey (1941), 376 Ill. 292, 297.) Here, although the order was formally a grant of a discovery motion, no condemnation proceedings have been initiated by the County. The complaint sought permission to enter upon defendants\u2019 land pursuant to section 4 \u2014 503 of the Hlinois Highway Code \u201cfor the purpose of conducting engineering studies and appraisals of the property to be acquired.\u201d The trial court\u2019s order allowing the County to enter the land and to perform reasonable and necessary procedures to secure a \u201csurvey, appraisal and soil and geologic samples,\u201d specifying methods of surveying and soil borings to be used, in substance granted plaintiff the relief sought under the complaint and it is therefore appealable. (Durkin v. Hey (1941), 376 Ill. 292, 296-97.) To hold otherwise would enable the County to obtain the requested relief while denying the property owners the right to a review of the granting of the petition.\nThe Owners argue that section 4 \u2014 503 does not allow plaintiff to enter upon the lands of others to make surveys or appraisals or to take subsurface soil surveys without either the landowners\u2019 permission or prior condemnation proceedings. But the County asserts that although the complaint was brought under section 4 \u2014 503 of the Illinois Highway Code, because the highway is a county highway the case is controlled by section 5 \u2014 803 of the Code. Section 5 \u2014 803 provides:\n\u201cFor the purpose of making surveys and the determination of the amount of property necessary to be taken or damaged in connection with any highway project, the county through its officers, agents or employees, after notice to the owner, may enter upon the lands or waters of any person or corporation, but subject to responsibility for all damages that may be occasioned thereby.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 121, par. 5\u2014803.\nWe agree that section 5 \u2014 803, and not section 4 \u2014 503, governs whether the County has the right to make the surveys requested by the complaint. Article V of the Illinois Highway Code deals with county administration of highways, whereas article IV deals with State administration of highways. The power of entry and survey granted by section 5 \u2014 803 is in aid of the county\u2019s power under section 5 \u2014 801 to acquire property, by condemnation if necessary, for highway construction purposes.\nNonetheless we disagree with the County\u2019s assertion that section 5 \u2014 803 allows it to conduct the requested subsurface and geologic studies without the owners\u2019 consent. The County argues that because section 5 \u2014 803 does not (in contrast to section 4 \u2014 503) explicitly require the owners\u2019 consent for soil surveys, these surveys are permissible. However, statutes delegating the power of eminent domain are to be strictly construed to protect the property rights of landowners. (Village of Arlington Heights v. Gatzke (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 885, 887; Iowa State Highway Com. v. Hipp (1966), 259 Iowa 1082, 1088, 147 N.W.2d 195, 198.) In contrast to section 4 \u2014 503, section 5 \u2014 803 does not explicitly grant the county power to undertake subsurface soil surveys at all; to read the grant of power to \u201cmak[e] surveys\u201d as enabling the county to make unconsented subsurface soil surveys would give the county a power of entry for construction of county highways that neither it nor the Department of Transportation has under a sister statute in connection with state highway construction. Also, section 4 \u2014 503 was amended by Public Act 81 \u2014 1248, effective January 1, 1981; previously it did not mention subsurface soil surveys, granting only the right to make \u201cpreliminary surveys.\u201d The legislature evidently did not believe that the power to make \u201cpreliminary surveys\u201d embraced the power to make subsurface soil studies, which necessarily involve substantial and not merely incidental disruption and damage to the landowners\u2019 property. Therefore we will not construe section 5 \u2014 803\u2019s grant of power to \u201cmake[e] surveys\u201d to authorize subsurface soil and geological studies, at least in a case such as this where the landowner has not consented.\nFurthermore, to construe the statute as the County urges would, as we note below in discussing the permissible scope of the order in this case, require us to declare section 5 \u2014 803 unconstitutional as applied to a precondemnation proceeding. We therefore construe section 5 \u2014 803 so as to save it from doubts as to its constitutionality. Board of Commissioners v. County of Du Page (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 409, 412-13.\nAlthough the motion for prepleading discovery was made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 214, we agree with the Owners that this provision is not applicable to circumvent any statutory limitation placed on the authority granted under the Illinois Highway Code. Supreme Court Rule 214 is a general discovery provision which enables a litigant to obtain \u201caccess to real estate for the purpose of making surface or subsurface inspections or surveys ***.\u201d Section 5 \u2014 803 of the Illinois Highway Code deals specifically with the power of a prospective condemnor to enter and survey land before the institution of condemnation proceedings. If, as we conclude from our analysis of the statute, the legislature did not wish to permit precondemnation subsurface soil surveys, it could not have intended that prospective condemnors be allowed to undertake such surveys by using the discovery procedures of Rule 214 as a subterfuge. Also, to interpret Rule 214 as authorizing precondemnation subsurface soil surveys would raise the same constitutional problems as would arise with a similar interpretation of the statute.\nWe reject, however, the Owners\u2019 challenge to the validity of the order other than to the part dealing with the subsurface boring and sampling. They argue that not even preliminary surveys or appraisals may be undertaken without the landlord\u2019s consent unless a condemnation proceeding has first been instituted. We cannot agree.\nWhile there appears to be no particular precedent in Illinois, section 5 \u2014 803 of the Illinois Highway Code appears typical of statutory provisions allowing bodies with the power of eminent domain to enter the land of others, before the institution of condemnation proceedings, in order to make preliminary surveys or explorations of the land. The basic purpose of such statute is to enable the prospective condemnor to determine whether and how much of the land is suitable for eventual condemnation and thus to facilitate an intelligent, economical condemnation decision. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Stevenson (1977), 173 Ind. App. 329, 334, 363 N.E.2d 1254, 1259; County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co. (Cal. App. 1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76-77. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1104 (1970).\nThere is no language in section 5 \u2014 803 which can be reasonably read to require the prospective condemnor to institute condemnation proceedings before entering the land of others for preliminary surveys or appraisals. The section itself states that its purpose is in part to facilitate the \u201cdetermination of the amount of property necessary to be taken or damaged.\u201d Given the purpose of the statute to facilitate a decision on whether to condemn it would not be logical to require that the plaintiff institute condemnation proceedings before making a preliminary minimally intrusive entry.\nMoreover, although the question does not appear to have been addressed in Illinois, courts in a vast majority of jurisdictions have held that a prior condemnation suit is not a prerequisite to an entry on the lands of another for preliminary exploration and survey purposes. These courts have recognized a basic conceptual difference between a preliminary entry and a constitutionally compensable taking or damaging of property and have held that because the former is not a variety of the latter, it does not require adherence to condemnation procedures or constitutional provisions for just compensation. See Orange Water & Sewer Authority v. Estate of Armstrong (1977), 34 N.C. App. 162, 163, 237 S.E.2d 486, 487; County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co. (Cal. App. 1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 73; Litchfield v. Bond (1906), 186 N.Y. 66, 76-77, 78 N.E. 719, 723; Town of Carlisle v. Department of Public Utilities (1968), 353 Mass. 722, 234 N.E.2d 752.\nConstitutional restrictions on taking and damaging without just compensation (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 15); however, limit the permissible scope of an order authorizing entry for preliminary survey and appraisal purposes. A taking may not be allowed under the guise of a preliminary survey; the right of entry does not include the right to make permanent appropriation or cause more than minimal or incidental damage to property; and the entering party is free of liability \u201conly to the extent that the entry or occupation is temporary, or the infliction of damage is incidental and incipient or preliminary.\u201d (Litchfield v. Bond (1906), 186 N.Y. 66, 78, 78 N.E. 719, 723.) Permissible entry \u201ccannot amount to other than such innocuous entry and superficial examination as would suffice for the making of surveys or maps and as would not in the nature of things seriously impinge upon or impair the rights of the owner to the use and enjoyment of his property.\u201d (Jacobsen v. Superior Court (1923), 192 Cal. 319, 329, 219 P. 986, 991.) Thus the County may enter the property, appraise the premises, and place stakes on the property as specified. (See Onorato Brothers, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (1957), 336 Mass. 54, 142 N.E.2d 389; Mackie v. Mayor of Town of Elkton (1972), 265 Md. 410, 419, 290 A.2d 500, 505; Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Stevenson (1977), 173 Ind. App. 329, 363 N.E.2d 1254.) The order ought not be read, however, as authorizing any cutting of trees or damage to crops, except insofar as these are unavoidable incidents (for which the county must pay damages) of permissible preliminary surveying. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Stevenson (1977), 173 Ind. App. 329, 335, 363 N.E.2d 1254, 1260; Dancy v. Alabama Power Co. (1916), 198 Ala. 504, 507, 73 So. 901, 902-03; Litchfield v. Bond (1906), 186 N.Y. 66, 79, 78 N.E. 719, 723-24.\nSimilarly the part of the order authorizing soil borings and a geologic study without the landowners\u2019 consent or a prior condemnation proceeding would be invalid even if statutorily authorized. Such drilling and excavation, even where subsequent backfilling has been required, has been properly recognized as a substantial interference with the landowners\u2019 property rights rather than a minimally intrusive preliminary survey causing only incidental damage. (Jacobsen v. Superior Court (1923), 192 Cal. 319, 325, 219 P. 986, 989-91; County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co. (Cal. App. 1971), 94 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76; Mackie v. Mayor of Town of Elkton (1972), 265 Md. 410, 413, 419-22, 290 A.2d 500, 502, 505-06.) Rather than hold that such drilling and surveying is authorized under a statute which we would then have to invalidate, we decline to read the power to make the contemplated soil and geologic survey into section 5 \u2014 803\u2019s grant of power to \u201cmak[e] surveys.\u201d See Mackie v. Mayor of Town of Elkton (1972), 265 Md. 410, 419-22, 290 A.2d 500, 505-06.\nThe Owners have also raised a bare reference in their amended motion to dismiss the complaint and in their brief and argument to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, asserting without any argument or authority that the preliminary entry sought by the County is prohibited by these provisions unless the County first files a condemnation suit. We are unable to determine whether these questions are different from those we have discussed relative to the prohibition of the taking without just compensation. A bare contention in a brief unsupported by any further argument or citation of authority fails to raise or preserve an issue for appellate review. (Village of Roxana v. Costanzo (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 423, 426; 73 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).) We conclude that these issues have been waived.\nThat part of the trial court\u2019s order which allows subsoil surveys without the Owners\u2019 consent is vacated. The balance of the order is affirmed insofar as it authorizes preliminary entry onto the Owners\u2019 land for minimally intrusive surveys and appraisals consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.\nVacated in part and affirmed in part.\nLINDBERG and HOPE, JJ., concur.\n\u201cEntry on lands to make surveys\nFor the purpose of making subsurface soil surveys, preliminary surveys and determinations of the amount and extent of such land, rights or other property required, the Department, or any county, by its officers, agents or employees, after notice to the owner, and in the case of subsurface soil surveys, written consent by the owner, may enter upon the lands or waters of any person, but subject to responsibility for all damages which shall be occasioned thereby.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 121, par. 4\u2014503.\nMost other jurisdictions have also held that a preliminary entry for survey purposes is not an exercise of the power of eminent domain, but rather a mere temporary intrusion not substantially interfering with the owner\u2019s property rights or beneficial enjoyment of the land, and that a party statutorily authorized to make such an entry need not file preliminary condemnation proceedings. Such has been held or approved in dictum by Federal courts. (Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co. (D.N.J. 1830), 3 F. Cas. 821 (No. 1,617); Kincaid v. United States (W.D. La. 1929), 35 F.2d 235, later trial (W.D. La. 1929), 37 F.2d 602, aff'd (5th Cir. 1931), 49 F.2d 768, rev\u2019d on other grounds sub nom. Hurley v. Kincaid (1932), 285 U.S. 95, 76 L. Ed. 637, 52 S. Ct. 267) and courts in Alabama (Dancy v. Alabama Power Co. (1916), 198 Ala. 504, 73 So. 901); Colorado (McClain v. People (1886), 9 Colo. 190, 194, 11 P. 85, 87); Georgia (Chambers v. Cincinnati & Georgia R.R. (1882), 69 Ga. 320); Indiana (Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. Stevenson (1977), 173 Ind. App. 329, 363 N.E.2d 1254); Kentucky (Thomas v. City of Horse Cave (1933), 249 Ky. 713, 61 S.W.2d 601); Maine (Cushman v. Smith (1852), 34 Me. 247); Maryland (Steuart v. Mayor of Baltimore (1855), 7 Md. 500; LaFontaine\u2019s Heirs at Law v. LaFontaine\u2019s Heirs at Law (1953), 205 Md. 311, 107 A.2d 653); Mississippi (Wood v. Mississippi Power Co. (1962), 245 Miss. 103, 146 So. 2d 546); Missouri (Walther v. Warner (1857), 25 Mo. 277, aff'd (1858), 26 Mo. 143); New Hampshire (Orr v. Quimby (1874), 54 N.H. 590); New Jersey (State v. Seymour (1871), 35 N.J.L. 47); New York (Litchfield v. Bond (1906), 186 N.Y. 66, 78 N.E. 719; King v. Power Authority (1973), 76 Misc. 2d 725, 351 N.Y.S.2d 493); Ohio (Ward v. Toledo, Norwalk & Cleveland R.R. Co. (1853), 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 553); Oregon (Oregonian Ry. Co. v. Hill (1881), 9 Or. 377); Texas (Lewis v. Texas Power & Light Co. (Tex. Cir. App. 1955), 276 S.W.2d 950); and Wisconsin (Lyon v. Green Bay & Minnesota Ry. Co. (1877), 42 Wis. 538, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1877), 42 Wis. 548.) See also Annot., 29 A.L.R.Sd 1104 (1970); 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain sec. 6.11 (3d ed. 1982).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward T. Graham, of Glen Ellyn, for appellants.", "Robert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Edgar K. Collison, III, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE COUNTY OF KANE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELMHURST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNos. 82\u2014532, 82\u2014651 cons.\nOpinion filed December 28, 1982.\nEdward T. Graham, of Glen Ellyn, for appellants.\nRobert J. Morrow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (Edgar K. Collison, III, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0292-01", "first_page_order": 314, "last_page_order": 322 }