{ "id": 5441822, "name": "EMIL PETRIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONARCH PRINTING CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.", "decision_date": "1982-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 81-2732", "first_page": "502", "last_page": "509", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 502" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "427 A.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Conn. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 1950161 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/179/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3174539 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/88/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 1053", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3013981 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3191023 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404-06" }, { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3197427 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994390 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463584 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5442540 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "132" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 18230, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.989983500020087e-07, "percentile": 0.9053736337523925 }, "sha256": "82c956d216c87688da22c1cff052d62b1430271a1b97ea00aeca016611fc09a3", "simhash": "1:95d9d5faf7f5f874", "word_count": 2867 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.990742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EMIL PETRIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONARCH PRINTING CORPORA-TION, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Emil Petrik, filed a three-count complaint against defendant, Monarch Printing Corporation (Monarch), his former employer, alleging inter alia that he had been discharged from his position as vice-president in retaliation for his reporting suspicions of embezzlement of corporate funds to Monarch\u2019s president and chief operating officer, Herbert C. Hansen. The trial court dismissed Petrik\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim, which was set forth in counts II and III, for failure to state a cause of action. Count I, which sought damages for defendant\u2019s alleged breach of an oral contract, is still pending in the trial court and is not involved in this appeal. The sole issue presented for our review is whether Petrik\u2019s complaint set forth sufficient facts to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that it does, reverse the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nPetrik alleged in his complaint that he was hired by Monarch in 1975 and that from 1975 until 1978 he was employed as the controller of the corporation. In 1978 Petrik was promoted to vice-president-finance in which position he earned a salary of $28,188 per year and was responsible for certain accounting and financing duties for Monarch \u201csuch as cost accounting, forecasting, pricing, budgeting, inventory control and preparation and review of financial statements.\u201d\nIn September 1978 Petrik, in the course of his duties as vice-president-finance, discovered a $130,000 \u201cdiscrepancy\u201d in Monarch\u2019s financial books and records. Petrik immediately informed Herbert C. Hansen, Monarch\u2019s president and chief operating officer, of the discrepancy and Hansen \u201corally requested\u201d Petrik to investigate the source of the missing funds and hired an assistant to aid Petrik in this assignment. In pursuing his investigation, Petrik, in October 1978, discovered what he characterized as \u201cmisconduct\u201d by Hansen and \u201ccertain unknown persons\u201d in their purchase of Monarch\u2019s capital stock from John Selig, Monarch\u2019s chairman of the board. The specific allegations of misconduct set forth in Petrik\u2019s complaint are as follows:\n\u201c(a) That the present management of defendant had agreed to purchase 51% of the capital stock of defendant from John Selig, Chairman of the Board of defendant, for a purchase price of about $640,000;\n(b) That 25% of the purchase price was to be paid by a loan obtained by the present management of defendant from LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois, with the remaining purchase price to be paid in 20 bi-monthly installments at an interest rate of 6% per year;\n(c) That the purchase price was to be totally paid out of personal, not corporate funds;\n(d) That some of the loan payments to LaSalle National Bank and some of the payments to John Selig had in fact been made from corporate funds of defendant, in direct violation of the purchase agreement; and\n(e) That the findings of plaintiff suggested embezzlement of corporate funds of defendant.\u201d\nPetrik asserts in his complaint that he immediately notified Hansen of his findings and warned him that \u201cofficers and/or employees\u201d of Monarch \u201cmight be involved in violation of the criminal laws of Illinois.\u201d Hansen replied that the contract for the purchase of Monarch\u2019s capital stock had been \u201cchanged\u201d in June 1978 and he told Petrik \u201cnot to worry about anything.\u201d Between November 1978 and April 1979 Petrik repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a copy of the purported revised contract.\nAccording to his complaint, on April 6, 1979, Petrik was discharged by Richard Volpe, Monarch\u2019s vice-president and treasurer, in direct retaliation for his efforts to bring to Monarch\u2019s attention the evidence he had uncovered of possible embezzlement of corporate funds and to require Monarch to operate in compliance with the criminal laws of Illinois. In count II of his complaint, Petrik sought compensatory damages for his discharge; in count III, he asked for punitive damages, alleging that Monarch\u2019s conduct was malicious.\nOn July 13, 1981, Monarch moved to dismiss Petrik\u2019s complaint, which motion was granted with leave to amend on September 30, 1981. The trial court reasoned that there are two elements to a claim for retaliatory discharge: an employment-at-will status and acts that would clearly violate public policy. The trial court ruled that since Petrik did not allege that he had disclosed his suspicions of wrongdoing to the public authorities, his complaint merely alleged an internal corporate dispute which did not involve violations of public policy. The complaint was dismissed and Petrik was given leave to amend so that, if possible, he could add an allegation that he had reported his suspicions to the public authorities. Subsequently, the parties stipulated that Petrik did not report his discovery of alleged wrongdoing to the police or to any other law enforcement officials; that no criminal or quasi-criminal investigation was ever conducted as a result of any of the alleged wrongdoings; and that, to the best of his knowledge, Petrik was never a party to a criminal or quasi-criminal investigation of the matters alleged. Following the stipulation, Petrik\u2019s complaint was dismissed with prejudice.\nOn appeal, the ultimate issue to be decided is whether Petrik has alleged facts sufficient to set forth a claim for retaliatory discharge. As the trial court correctly noted, there are two elements to a claim for retaliatory discharge: at-will employment status and acts that violate public policy. (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876.) There is no dispute that Petrik was an at-will employee. Thus the issue to be resolved is whether Petrik alleged facts which set forth acts by Monarch which were in violation of public policy.\nBecause the judgment below was entered upon allowance of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, all facts properly pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. (Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 179, 187, 380 N.E.2d 790.) Further, it is well established that a cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle plaintiff to recover. Fechtner v. Lake County Savings & Loan Association (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 361 N.E.2d 575.\nUntil 1978 Illinois courts steadfastly adhered to the rule that an employment contract of unspecified duration is terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee. According to this rule, an employee could quit or be fired at any time, with or without cause, and no liability would arise for the termination. In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, however, Illinois joined a growing number of States which have recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge as an exception to the rule that at-will employment is terminable at any time for any or no cause. In Kelsay, our supreme court held that an at-will employee could not be dismissed for bringing a worker\u2019s compensation claim against her employer. The court ruled that such a retaliatory discharge offended the public policy embodied in the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and, therefore, gave rise to a cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages.\nFollowing Kelsay, several appellate court decisions in other districts appeared to severely limit the scope of the Kelsay doctrine. In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595, aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part and remanded with directions (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876, the Appellate Court for the Third District, in a divided opinion, upheld the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint in which he alleged that he was fired both for supplying information to local law enforcement authorities that a fellow employee might be in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code and for agreeing to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the employee, if requested. The appellate court refused to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to include plaintiff\u2019s termination noting that the only Illinois cases applying the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule concerned workers\u2019 compensation claims. 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 52.\nShortly thereafter, the same court, again in a divided opinion, narrowed Kelsay\u2019s holding by denying tort relief to a union employee who allegedly had been fired for filing a worker\u2019s compensation claim against his employer. (Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95.) The court reasoned that the employee was not terminable at will because he had recourse against his employer under a collective bargaining agreement which permitted discharge only for just cause and allowed for arbitration to guarantee the parties\u2019 rights. Since filing a worker\u2019s compensation claim would not constitute just cause for dismissal, the employee was protected by the contract which, according to the court, provided his sole remedy. (Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 404-06; contra, Wyatt v. Jewel Companies, Inc. (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053.) The court held that before bringing an action on the contract, the employee had to exhaust his remedies under the contract by challenging his dismissal in a grievance procedure. His failure to do so precluded a contract action for retaliatory discharge. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 406-07.\nIn his dissent in Cook, Justice Barry distinguished between an allegation that Cook\u2019s discharge was unlawful because it violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and an allegation that his discharge was unlawful because it was in retaliation for pursuing his worker\u2019s compensation claim. Because the complaint involved the latter allegation and not the former, the dissent concluded that the cause of action sounded not in contract but in tort and could therefore be maintained under Kelsay independent of the employee\u2019s rights under the collective bargaining agreement. (85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407.) Justice Barry stated, \u201c[t]he result reached in this case and in Palmateer v. International Harvester (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, [406] N.E.2d [595], reflects a conservatism in matters of employer-employee relations which I find disturbing, and assures to employers that the tort of retaliatory discharge, although recognized by our supreme court, is virtually nonexistent in the Third District.\u201d 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 409.\nIn Rozier v. St. Mary\u2019s Hospital (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50, the Appellate Court for the Fifth District, also in a divided opinion and relying upon the third district\u2019s decision in Palmateer, held that discharging a nurse for informing a local newspaper of the allegedly immoral and improper acts of other hospital employees was not actionable. In analyzing Kelsay, the majority stated that \u201cKelsay was a decision of narrow applicability intended only to promote the public policy furthered by the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act,\u201d and that \u201cthe cause of action recognized in Kelsay is and should be limited to discharge in retaliation for the employee\u2019s exercise of his rights under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act.\u201d 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 998.\nOn April 17, 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed that part of the third1 district\u2019s decision in Palmateer which had affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claim for retaliatory discharge. (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876.) In so ruling, the supreme court cast considerable doubt on the narrow interpretation the foregoing appellate decisions placed on Kelsay and expanded the contours of the tort of retaliatory discharge in Illinois.\n\u2022 Ray Palmateer worked in a management position for International Harvester for more than eleven years. Aware of another employee\u2019s possible crimes, Palmateer approached local law enforcement authorities and offered to testify and gather additional evidence against the suspect employee. As a result, Harvester dismissed Palmateer citing as reasons for his discharge that Palmateer refused to comply with the company's requests not to supply law enforcement authorities with information and his agreement to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the employee, if requested. The circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss Palmateer\u2019s action for failure to state a cause of action which was affirmed by the appellate court in a divided opinion. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595.\nIn reversing the appellate court on this issue, the supreme court examined public policy, which the court stated was \u201c[t]he foundation of the tort of retaliatory discharge.\u201d The court characterized Palmateer\u2019s conduct \u2014 voluntary information to a law enforcement agency\u2014 as being \u201cfavored\u201d by public policy and held that Palmateer had stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133.\nMonarch purports to distinguish Palmateer on the ground that in Palmateer the employee notified public authorities of his suspicions while Petrik did not. Monarch argues that because Petrik did not inform public authorities of his suspicions, the instant case merely involves an internal dispute regarding the proper method of managing defendant corporation and that Palmateer is inapplicable because \u201cit is only the political rights and duties of the State\u2019s citizens which Palmateer prohibits an employer from infringing.\u201d We do not agree with Monarch\u2019s characterization of the facts in the instant case as involving a mere internal dispute or with its limitations of Palmateer to \u201cpolitical rights.\u201d\nIn discussing the parameters of the tort of retaliatory discharge in Illinois, the supreme court observed that \u201cthere is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal.\u201d (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130.) The court acknowledged that:\n\u201c[T]he Achilles heel of the principle [of the tort of retaliatory discharge] lies in the definition of public policy. When a discharge contravenes public policy in any way the employer has committed a legal wrong. However, the employer retains the right to fire workers at will in cases \u2018where no clear mandate of public policy is involved\u2019 [citation]. But what constitutes clearly mandated public policy?\u201d 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130.\nThe supreme court, noting the absence of a precise definition for the term \u201cpublic policy,\u201d surveyed cases from other States and found that where \u201ca matter *** strike[s] at the heart of a citizen\u2019s social rights, duties, and responsibilities,\u201d the tort of retaliatory discharge has been allowed. (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130.) In finding that Palmateer had stated a cause of action, our supreme court held that \u201c[t]here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty [citation], than the enforcement of a State\u2019s criminal code,\u201d and that \u201cpublic policy *** favors citizen crime-fighters.\u201d (85 Ill. 2d 124, 132.) The court stated that \u201cthere is a clear public policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.\u201d 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133.\nIn the instant case the crux of Petrik\u2019s complaint is clear. He alleged that in the course of performing his duties at Monarch he discovered a discrepancy in the corporation\u2019s financial records which he believed may have been due to criminal conduct; he investigated the source of the discrepancy and in an effort to force Monarch to comply with the Illinois Criminal Code he reported his suspicions to Monarch\u2019s management. Monarch then discharged Petrik allegedly to aid in the concealment of its wrongdoing and in retaliation for his efforts to ensure management\u2019s compliance with the requirements of the criminal law. Accepting, as we must, the truth of these allegations, it is apparent that Petrik\u2019s complaint involves something more than an ordinary internal dispute between an employee and his employer. It is equally apparent that the public policy considerations that underlie Palmateer also support Petrik\u2019s conduct.\nIn a recent case similar to the one at bar, the Connecticut Supreme Court found a cause of action for retaliatory discharge had been stated where plaintiff, the quality control director of defendant corporation, alleged that he had been discharged because he called to his employer\u2019s attention repeated violations of the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. (Sheets v. Teddy\u2019s Frosted Foods, Inc. (1980), 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385.) The Sheets court found that the employee\u2019s termination violated public policy even though as the dissent in Sheets noted the employee did not inform the public law enforcement authorities of the corporation\u2019s alleged violations. (See also Harless v. First National Bank (W. Va. 1978), 246 S.E.2d 270, where the court held that an employer wrongfully discharged an employee who had notified his superiors at a bank of violations of various State and Federal consumer credit and protection laws.) We find Sheets persuasive and consistent with the national trend which evidences a growing judicial receptivity to the recognition of a tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Accordingly, we conclude that Petrik has alleged facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing counts II and III of plaintiff\u2019s complaint and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nDOWNING and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gregory A. Stayart, of Sullivan & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Martha L. Ashenhurst and William M. McErlean, both of Chicago (Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo & Crowley, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EMIL PETRIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MONARCH PRINTING CORPORA-TION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 81\u20142732\nOpinion filed December 21, 1982.\nGregory A. Stayart, of Sullivan & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nMartha L. Ashenhurst and William M. McErlean, both of Chicago (Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo & Crowley, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0502-01", "first_page_order": 524, "last_page_order": 531 }