{ "id": 5439423, "name": "ROY M. GETSCHOW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co.", "decision_date": "1982-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 81-2578", "first_page": "522", "last_page": "535", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 522" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "131 N.E. 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5031667 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/298/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 915", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3123286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 U.S. 359", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142042 ], "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/273/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1927, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11662851, 11662884, 11663140, 11663079, 11663181, 11663056, 11662930, 11663099, 11662973, 11663007 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/420/0975-01", "/us/420/0975-02", "/us/420/0975-09", "/us/420/0975-07", "/us/420/0975-10", "/us/420/0975-06", "/us/420/0975-03", "/us/420/0975-08", "/us/420/0975-04", "/us/420/0975-05" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953527 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3021507 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 S. Ct. 1591", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 L. Ed. 2d 777", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 1000", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6323721, 6323514, 6324208, 6323957, 6323290 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/1000-03", "/us/394/1000-02", "/us/394/1000-05", "/us/394/1000-04", "/us/394/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 F.2d 57", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2117357 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/406/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 L. Ed. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6421856, 6422113, 6421734, 6422023, 6421545, 6422253, 6421652, 6421300, 6421943, 6421435, 6422397 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0983-06", "/us/409/0983-09", "/us/409/0983-05", "/us/409/0983-08", "/us/409/0983-03", "/us/409/0983-10", "/us/409/0983-04", "/us/409/0983-01", "/us/409/0983-07", "/us/409/0983-02", "/us/409/0983-11" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392511 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2741946 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/129/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5150234 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/8/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3125500 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828622 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852328 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490363 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1093", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3206108 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S. Ct. 214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 L. Ed. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 902", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385857, 11385645, 11385806, 11385582, 11385755, 11385693 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0902-06", "/us/396/0902-02", "/us/396/0902-05", "/us/396/0902-01", "/us/396/0902-04", "/us/396/0902-03" ] }, { "cite": "410 F.2d 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2195421 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/410/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5470910 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2671030 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 1162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3202394 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2537669 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/95/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill. App. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5186861 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/18/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 N.E. 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5599048 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/206/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3157944 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0547-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1335, "char_count": 30320, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.1450049539523035e-07, "percentile": 0.8622838628815811 }, "sha256": "c734d308866be8e2413272d266bb5f65043f945ee33b94d03d4e1e16a10cd028", "simhash": "1:b696fd497e4f463d", "word_count": 4836 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.990742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROY M. GETSCHOW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff brought this action against Commonwealth Edison Company (Edison) for tortious interference with contractual relations. After hearing several days of testimony, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $295,000, representing both compensatory and exemplary damages. On appeal, defendant contests the court\u2019s findings with respect to liability, as well as the amount and nature of damages awarded.\nThe record discloses the following facts:\nDuring the early 1970\u2019s, plaintiff entered into the business of representing building trades contractors to potential buyers of their services. Plaintiff sought sales positions with companies in different fields of the building trades which would enable him to sell the products and services of each contractor separately, to present a single bid to an owner on behalf of several or all of his contractor-clients, and to arrange for two or more of his contractors to \u201cco-venture\u201d portions of a construction project. By January of 1976, plaintiff had entered into separate employment contracts with seven contractors, each in a different field. While the terms of these contractual arrangements varied, at the time of Edison\u2019s alleged interference plaintiff was receiving salary plus a percentage commission from five of the seven contractors and a straight commission from the remaining two. Plaintiff had become successful in selling the products and services of his employers to many owners and his sales and commissions had grown from a few thousand dollars in 1972 to more than $20,000 during the 12 months prior to Edison\u2019s claimed interference.\nEdison was and is one of the largest customers of building contractors in Chicago due to its extensive construction and maintenance work. In his previous position as the president of an industrial pipefitting concern, plaintiff had worked closely with Edison over a seven-year period, during which time he developed business, personal and social ties with many of the Edison personnel, including its buyers and construction engineers, and Edison was among the many companies that plaintiff later called upon as a salesman for his principals. By the spring of 1976, plaintiff had been calling on Edison\u2019s buyers in this capacity for more than five years, had been successful in placing his contractors on Edison\u2019s approved bidders list and had earned commissions on many successful bids submitted to Edison.\nThe events leading up to plaintiff\u2019s cause of action against Edison began in March of 1976 with a meeting between plaintiff and Edward Jennett, Jr., sales manager for Johnson Controls, a potential contractor-client. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a possible employment relationship, and at that time plaintiff apparently mentioned certain \u201ccontacts\u201d he had with Edison. At the time of said meeting, Johnson Controls had a bid pending at Edison for work on a new project. It is undisputed that although there was mention of the pending bid, plaintiff did not then or at any other time suggest that he could or would do anything with regard to it.\nJennett reviewed plaintiff\u2019s request for employment with his superior at Johnson, Joseph Lewis. Despite Jennett\u2019s efforts to advise Lewis only of plaintiff\u2019s good faith intentions in seeking a sales position with Johnson, Lewis prepared a memorandum entitled \u201cMr. Gets-chow\u2019s Offer\u201d relating to plaintiff\u2019s solicitation of Johnson\u2019s business. The memorandum stated:\n\u201c*** Mr. Getschow reports that he is an independent Contractor Representative who represents a number of contractors doing work with Commonwealth Edison. *** He reports that he knows the right people at Commonwealth and would be in a position to help us. *** Ned Jennett called me with this information and said that Mr. Getschow needed an answer. My response to Ned\u2019s call was that Mr. Getschow\u2019s request sounded like a payoff.\nIf, in fact it was a payoff, the answer was a plain and simple \u2018no.\u2019 My instructions to Ned were to soft peddle the answer to Getschow; merely put it on the back burner. Ned did just as instructed, however, Mr. Getschow persisted calling 3 or 4 times between March 30, 1976 and April 9, 1976. On Friday, April 9, Mr. Getschow said he needed an answer. *** On Monday, we were called by Commonwealth Edison and informed that the job was awarded to Powers [another contractor].\u201d\nAlthough Jennett was the only individual at Johnson Controls who ever actually talked with plaintiff, Jennett never saw or knew of the existence of the Lewis memorandum prior to the ensuing trial. The trial court ultimately found that the memorandum had \u201cno validity in substance or fact.\u201d\nSome time later, in May of 1976, the Lewis memorandum came into the possession of Thomas Ayers, Edison\u2019s chairman. Ayers referred the memo to Glenn Beeman, a vice president in purchasing, who, in turn, referred the matter to H. L. Holmberg \u201cfor investigation.\u201d Holmberg reported back the following day, after having spoken with the buyers in Edison\u2019s purchasing department and having found no indication that any payoffs had been made or that plaintiff had been instrumental in securing any Edison contracts for his clients. Holmberg also showed Beeman the \u201ccalling card\u201d which plaintiff had distributed to Edison\u2019s purchasing department listing the seven contractors plaintiff represented, and a \u201cBusiness Placed\u201d memorandum showing when Edison had requested bids from plaintiff\u2019s clients and the dollar amount of business that Edison had done with each during 1974 and 1975. It is clear that no one at Edison ever checked with Jennett or anyone else at Johnson Controls to determine if the suggestion of a \u201cpayoff\u201d in the Lewis memo had any factual basis, nor did Edison investigate the existence of any conflicts with respect to plaintiff\u2019s other contractors, although one of them was at that time a principal bidder on the same project as Johnson. There was no evidence adduced at trial that plaintiff had bribed or attempted to bribe any Edison employee; to the contrary, the evidence showed that Edison had an elaborate system of controls for analyzing incoming bids which made \u201cpayoffs\u201d almost impossible.\nIn spite of the fact that Holmberg\u2019s investigation revealed nothing to substantiate the allegations in the Lewis memorandum, Beeman proceeded to draft a letter intended for plaintiff\u2019s contractor-clients. Beeman\u2019s sending of an identical letter to each of plaintiff\u2019s seven contractors constituted the act of \u201cinterference\u201d on which plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is based. The letter stated:\n\u201cAs you know, your company and mine have a long standing business association.\nIt has recently come to my attention that Mr. Roy M. Gets-chow has indicated, as shown on the attached copy of his calling card, that he represents your company for purposes of our continuing business relationship. I am not aware of the nature of Mr. Getschow\u2019s status with respect to your company, but I wanted to assure you that business is available from Commonwealth Edison Company only on the basis of most favorable price and the best quality.\nFurther, I want to call to your attention a condition of Commonwealth Edison Company\u2019s EXHIBIT C, GENERAL CONDITIONS, which is included in all of our purchase contracts: Covenant Against Brokerage. The Contractor warrants that no person or commercial agency has been engaged to solicit or secure the Contract, and agrees that the Contractor shall pay no compensation to any person or commercial agency for soliciting or securing the Contract, except in the case of bona fide employees or bona fide established commercial agencies maintained or utilized on a continuous basis by the Contractor for the purpose of securing business generally. For breach of violation of this warranty, the Owner shall have the right to annul the Contract without liability or in its discretion to deduct from the contract price or consideration, or otherwise recover, the full amount of any such compensation paid.\nSincerely,\nGlen W. Beeman Vice President.\u201d\nPrior to sending the letter to plaintiff\u2019s contractors on May 25, 1976, Beeman called plaintiff in and showed him the draft. At that time plaintiff stated that he did not understand the letter, but that if it was sent he would be terminated by his contractors and his reputation would be damaged. Beeman\u2019s response was that he was not interested in plaintiff\u2019s business generally, but that he would no longer allow plaintiff to call on Edison. Beeman did not tell plaintiff about the \u201cpayoff\u201d allegations in the Lewis memo, nor was plaintiff given any opportunity to explain his employment relationship with the seven other contractors. Beeman then mailed eight copies of the letter, one to each of plaintiff\u2019s present employers and one to Johnson Controls. At plaintiff\u2019s request, the parties met again some two weeks later, at which time plaintiff told Beeman that he had already been terminated by some of his contractors and asked if anything could be done to save his business, to which Beeman responded negatively. Within a few months all seven of plaintiff\u2019s employers had terminated their contracts with him.\nThe trial court found that the Edison letter was the cause of each of the terminations and that the Lewis memorandum was the actual and sole cause of Edison\u2019s action in mailing the letter. The court further found the language in the quoted \u201cCovenant Against Brokerage\u201d to be ambiguous and, as used by Edison for the first and only time against plaintiff, improper because it required that only a full-time employee working 12 months a year and representing a single principal could call on Edison on behalf of a contractor. The brokerage provisions had never been applied against any representative of a seller from the time of its insertion into Edison\u2019s contracts in 1971 until the time of trial, despite the fact that manufacturers\u2019 representatives representing more than one company had called on Edison continuously during that period. The court therefore found that the use of said covenant against plaintiff was a mere \u201cpretense\u201d on Edison\u2019s part to mask its true motivation for the letters \u2014 the Lewis memorandum.\nHaving found that Edison had intentionally and without justification interfered with each of plaintiff\u2019s seven employment contracts, the trial court awarded plaintiff $270,000 in compensatory damages, based on plaintiff\u2019s earnings prior to the interference and upon plaintiff\u2019s testimony concerning his expected future earnings under the contracts. The court also awarded $25,000 in punitive damages, based upon the means used by Edison to interfere with plaintiff\u2019s employers, Edison\u2019s concealment of the Lewis memorandum as the real basis for its action, its failure to investigate into the allegations contained in the memo, and its false pretense in using the Covenant Against Brokerage to justify the interference.\nEdison asserts that the trial court erroneously reversed the burden of proving justification for the interference and applied an incorrect legal standard as to the existence of such justification, and also argues that a finding of liability would be improper in any event since its conduct was justified as a matter of law. Neither the record before us nor the applicable law supports defendant\u2019s contentions.\nIn reaching its determination, the court relied on Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 413 N.E.2d 98, setting forth the essential elements of the tort of interference with contractual relations. These include: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between plaintiff and another; (2) the defendant\u2019s awareness of this contractual relation; (3) the defendant\u2019s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the other, caused by defendant\u2019s wrongful conduct; and (5) damages. 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551.\nEdison does not dispute that plaintiff had seven valid and enforceable employment contracts at the time it sent the letters, nor does defendant deny its awareness of these contractual relations at that time. Edison contends, however, that the trial court erred in applying the standard applicable to interference with contractual relations as opposed to interference with prospective business advantage since Edison did not induce the \u201cbreach\u201d of any contract, but rather, the contracts involved either lapsed or expired by their terms. Edison also submits that since the contracts involved were terminable at will or upon certain notice, plaintiff had no more than a \u201cmere expectancy\u201d of economic gain. Defendant cites that portion of Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc. where the court viewed the distinction as \u201ca matter of expectancies\u201d and stated that \u201cas the degree of enforceability of a business relationship decreases, the extent of permissible interference by an outsider increases.\u201d 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 552.\nWe believe that the trial court correctly applied the standard applicable to interference with contractual relations. We also note, however, that defendant\u2019s conduct does not fall within the type of \u201cpermissible interference\u201d by a bona fide competitor referred to by the court in Belden, and defendant has therefore failed to show how the court\u2019s ruling would have been different under any standard. See Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 552.\nIllinois courts have long held that maliciously causing a breach of contract terminable at will is\" actionable (London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn (1903), 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526) and governed by the standards for interference with contractual relations. (W. P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Manufacturing Co. (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 404, 152 N.E.2d 615; B. R. Paulsen & Co. v. Lee (1968), 95 Ill. App. 2d 146, 237 N.E.2d 793; accord, Ancraft Products Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co. (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 836, 405 N.E.2d 1162.) These cases make clear that the termination of a contract, as opposed to a \u201cbreach,\u201d is enough to provide a cause of action. As stated in Iverson, the gist of the action is the malicious interference in the contractual relation between plaintiff and another \u2014 that the defendant\u2019s interference caused the third party to do an act which it otherwise would not have done. This is so even though the third party may have had the right so to act had the malicious interference not been exercised. (18 Ill. App. 2d 404, 417; accord, Bergfeld v. Stork (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 486, 288 N.E.2d 15.) It is also well settled that \u201cmalice,\u201d when used in this context, does not require a showing of ill will, hostility or an intent to injure; plaintiff need only show that the defendant acted intentionally and without just cause. Amalgamated Financial Corp. v. Atlantis, Inc. (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 379, 381, 434 N.E.2d 417, citing W. P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Manufacturing Co. (1958), 18 Ill. App. 2d 404.\nIn dealing with substantially similar conduct by a defendant which caused the modification of an existing contract between plaintiff and another, the Seventh Circuit in Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 410 F.2d 285, cert. denied (1969), 396 U.S. 902, 24 L. Ed. 2d 178, 90 S. Ct. 214, held that the defendant could reasonably have been found to have induced a \u201cbreach of contract within the true meaning of the tort\u201d by coercively interfering in the relationship between plaintiff and the third party. There, the court stated:\n\u201cTo us, there is no legally significant distinction between unabashed third party conduct which induces one party to out-rightly repudiate and breach its contract with another and subtle third party conduct which achieves essentially the same result ***.\nTo distinguish between conduct which directly causes a breach of contract and unjustifiable coercive conduct which effects the same result without a breach would overly limit the significance of the tort of inducing breach of contract and invite today\u2019s superior economic forces to freely interfere with contractual relationships without fear of legal reprisal.\u201d (410 F.2d 285, 291.)\nAccord, Venturini v. Affatato (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 547, 405 N.E.2d 1093.\nPlaintiff here was a party to seven valid employment contracts at the time of Edison\u2019s interference. Many of these had been in existence for several years and all had been continuously renewed since their inception. Plaintiff also produced testimony at trial of his overall satisfactory relationship with each of the contractors. Based on these facts, plaintiff had a certain and enforceable expectation of receiving the benefits of these contracts for an indefinite period. The only issue with respect to liability, therefore, is whether Edison\u2019s conduct was intentional and without just cause.\nThe trial court in its written opinion cited Swager v. Couri (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 173, 395 N.E.2d 921, in which the supreme court held that lack of justification is an element of plaintiff\u2019s case which must be pleaded and proved. (77 Ill. 2d 173, 179.) We agree with the trial court that plaintiff sustained his burden.\nWhether there is just cause for interference depends upon a number of factors, including the interest sought to be protected and the methods used. (See Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co. (1969), 41 Ill. 2d 468, 244 N.E.2d 809; Supreme Savings & Loan Association v. Lewis (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 16, 264 N.E.2d 857; Connaughton v. Gertz (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 265, 418 N.E.2d 858.) As stated in Connaughton, the third party claiming the privilege must be acting to protect a conflicting interest that is considered to be of equal value to or greater than plaintiff\u2019s contractual rights, and the third party\u2019s acts to bring about the breach must be legal acts and not unreasonable in the circumstances. 94 Ill. App. 3d 265, 270.\nEdison contends that its interest in sending the letters was to protect its policy of not dealing through brokers. The trial court rejected this purported justification, however, based in part on the testimony of defendant\u2019s own employees that they did not consider plaintiff to be a broker, as well as Edison\u2019s course of conduct with respect to plaintiff for several years prior to the interference. The trial court also found that Edison\u2019s actions were unreasonable under the circumstances. These determinations are amply supported by the record.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, this case involves more than Edison\u2019s refusal to deal with plaintiff. Such a right, if it existed, could have been protected by Beeman\u2019s instructions to Edison\u2019s employees not to deal with plaintiff. Nor did Edison\u2019s letters merely transmit \u201ctruthful information.\u201d Rather, the trial court found that Edison, by its letters, effected \u201ceconomic duress\u201d on plaintiff\u2019s employers causing each of them to terminate their contract with plaintiff. This fact was attested to by several of the contractors at trial. In addition, the record contains letters written to Edison expressing the contractors\u2019 intentions to comply with its \u201cCovenant Against Brokerage\u201d and apologizing for even the appearance of impropriety in that regard. This was even true of one contractor which plaintiff had never represented at Edison pursuant to his employment arrangement. Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly found defendant liable for interference with plaintiff\u2019s contractual relations. See Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 410 F.2d 285, and Pure Milk Association v. Kraft Foods Co. (1955), 8 Ill. App. 2d 102, 130 N.E.2d 765.\nTurning to the issue of damages, Edison argues that the trial court\u2019s award was based on speculation and was not supported by the evidence. Edison also argues that exemplary damages are improper in this case.\nEdison first contends that the trial court erred in accepting plaintiff\u2019s projections which were based on a six-month period immediately preceding the interference when plaintiff\u2019s earnings from both salary and commissions were at an all-time high, that the court considered gross, rather than net, profits as the basis for its calculations and improperly projected these figures for a Mlz year period to determine lost profits. Edison also challenges the inclusion of retainers and projected commissions from Edison projects in plaintiff\u2019s calculations of lost profits as being inconsistent with its purported right not to deal with plaintiff. Lastly, Edison points to alleged inconsistencies in plaintiff\u2019s testimony and proffered exhibits which, it contends, induced the trial court to premise an award based on wholly erroneous figures.\nAfter hearing the evidence, the court awarded $270,000 in compensatory damages. While its precise method for arriving at this figure is not clear from the record, the court had before it plaintiff\u2019s income and expense records for the 41/2 years prior to Edison\u2019s interference, Federal records indicating growth in the construction industry during that period and the period subsequent to the interference, and plaintiff\u2019s testimony as to expected future profits which was based on both his lengthy experience in the industry and his sales efforts shortly before the interference. The court\u2019s language also indicates that it took account of inflationary factors from the time of the interference to the time of judgment. (See Raines v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1970), 129 Ill. App. 2d 294, 302, 263 N.E.2d 895, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 428, cert. denied (1972), 409 U.S. 983, 34 L. Ed. 2d 247, 93 S. Ct. 322, and Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp. (7th Cir. 1969), 406 F.2d 57, 62, cert. denied (1969), 394 U.S. 1000, 22 L. Ed. 2d 777, 89 S. Ct. 1591.) In determinations such as the one before us, our courts have consistently recognized certain limiting factors: first, since the loss of profits is not a matter ordinarily susceptible to highly detailed direct proof, inferential proof must be admitted to establish the amount of damages; and second, the assessment of damages by a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside unless manifestly erroneous. (Monotronics Corp. v. Baylor (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 14, 17, 436 N.E.2d 1062; Vendo Co. v. Stoner (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied (1975), 420 U.S. 975, 43 L. Ed. 2d 655, 95 S. Ct. 1398; Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 143, 281 N.E.2d 323.) These factors take on particular relevance where, as here, the trial court\u2019s task was to compute a damage award based on evidence of a constantly growing and developing enterprise. Our review of that determination is further limited in the instant case by the summary nature of plaintiff\u2019s exhibits and the fact that neither these exhibits nor plaintiff\u2019s testimony with regard to lost earnings was challenged at trial. We have carefully reviewed the record and will examine each of Edison\u2019s contentions in light of the above observations.\nThe trial court had before it records reflecting the gradual growth of plaintiff\u2019s business from its formation in 1971 to the time of Edison\u2019s interference in 1976, when plaintiff was involved in ongoing employment relationships with seven different contractors. It is undisputed that plaintiff\u2019s income from both salary and commissions nearly doubled during the period from mid-1975 to May of 1976 as a result of his securing the last three of his seven contracts during that time. At trial, plaintiff also testified as to his conversations shortly before Edison\u2019s interference with several owners in the area who later carried out substantial construction work. Based on these contacts, upon which he could reasonably have anticipated new work, proven past performance and Federal records evidencing the dramatic increase in nonresidential construction in the years 1977 through 1980, plaintiff testified that his anticipated earnings for the second half of 1976 would equal his actual earnings of approximately $25,000 in the first half of that year, and then projected a 10% increase in earnings for the succeeding three years.\nEdison now contends that plaintiff\u2019s projections constituted pure speculation when based on a single six-month period. Edison also points to plaintiff\u2019s omission of business expenses for the first half of 1976 in his summary exhibit which, it contends, when combined with plaintiff\u2019s testimony resulted in fatal miscalculations by the trial court. Edison\u2019s present challenge merely assumes, however, that the court accepted plaintiff\u2019s testimony and projections in a vacuum, a conclusion for which we find no support in the record.\nAs previously noted, the court had an opportunity to view the complete history of plaintiff\u2019s business activity beginning in 1972 and steadily progressing to an all-time high in 1976, when it was virtually halted as a result of defendant\u2019s conduct. Under the circumstances, we believe that the trial court could properly take account of the substantial increase in activity over the 12 months preceding Edison\u2019s interference in formulating a reasonable basis upon which to project lost profits and that such would not indicate a disregard of plaintiff\u2019s actual experience, as defendant contends.\nWe similarly find no support for defendant\u2019s contention that plaintiff\u2019s failure to account for business expenses for a six-month period resulted in a damage award based on gross earnings which failed to recognize any future expenses. While it is true that the assessed damages for lost profits are to be based on net profits or a reasonable approximation thereof and not on gross profits (Henry\u2019s Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 113, 125-27, 185 N.E.2d 103; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 359, 71 L. Ed. 684, 47 S. Ct. 400), the trial court clearly had before it sufficient information upon which to base such an approximation. Net profits constitute the difference between gross profits and the expense of operating the business. (Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 359, 71 L. Ed. 684, 47 S. Ct. 400.) Plaintiff\u2019s records, which were available to the trial court, show that his expenses remained low and relatively constant from 1972 through 1975, despite the fact that his earnings more than doubled during that period. The court could take notice of the fact that the nature of plaintiff\u2019s work as a salesman for building trades contractors enabled him to maintain low overhead costs which were not significantly affected by large fluctuations in his gross earnings. Where such expenses are nominal or fixed, a plaintiff\u2019s failure to introduce evidence of these expenses will not automatically render the resulting damage award invalid. (Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 143, 148; Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (7th Cir. 1969), 410 F.2d 285, 293.) All that is required is that the court use a reasonable basis for computation and such a reasonable basis shall be sufficient to establish damages even though the result is only approximate. Further, a defendant whose wrongful conduct caused the difficulty in ascertaining the precise extent of plaintiff\u2019s actual damages will not be heard to complain of the resulting uncertainty. Henry\u2019s Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 113, 126; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 359, 71 L. Ed. 684, 47 S. Ct. 400.\nWe have reviewed the record with regard to defendant\u2019s remaining contentions and cannot say that the trial court failed to use a reasonable basis for its compuations or that its award was manifestly erroneous. The nature of plaintiff\u2019s employment as a salesman and the fact that his business was obtained through the competitive bidding of his employers required the court to accept largely inferential proof on the question of lost profits. There is no question but that Edison\u2019s conduct caused the almost immediate termination of each of plaintiff\u2019s contracts and defendant has failed to put forward any evidence, other than that proffered by plaintiff, which would prove with precision the amount that plaintiff would have earned but for defendant\u2019s wrongful conduct. Since we have found that the trial court\u2019s basis for projecting lost profits did not lack the requisite certainty, we also hold that the court\u2019s projection of plaintiff\u2019s lost profits for 4V2 years into the future was not improper. See Henry\u2019s Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson (1962), 37 Ill. App. 2d 113, 127.\nDefendant lastly challenges the court\u2019s assessment of exemplary damages. We believe that under the facts and circumstances of this case such damages were properly assessed and awarded. It is clear that punitive damages are within the discretion of the trial court when, as here, the wrongful act complained of is characterized by wantonness, malice, oppression or circumstances of aggravation. (Jensen v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 915, 937, 419 N.E.2d 578.) The purpose of such damages is to deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the wrongful conduct. (Eshelman v. Rawalt (1921), 298 Ill. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675.) The trial court specifically found aggravating circumstances surrounding Edison\u2019s conduct, which findings are supported in the record. We find that defendant\u2019s intentionally coercive and oppressive conduct warranted the court\u2019s assessment of punitive damages in the instant case.\nAlthough not pertinent to the merits of this appeal, we feel compelled to call the attention of the appellate bar to the provision of the supreme court rule covering the contents of briefs (87 Ill. 2d R. 341(a)), which states:\n\u201cFootnotes, if any, shall be used sparingly.\u201d\nIn this case appellant\u2019s brief contains 39 footnotes, appellee\u2019s, 41, and appellant\u2019s reply brief, 20. Under no circumstances can this use of 100 footnotes be described as \u201csparingly.\u201d\nJudgment affirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and GOLDBERG, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Laurence D. Lasky, E Willis Caruso, and John W. Treece, all of Isham, Lincoln & Beale, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Paul E. Plunkett, Stanley J. Parzen, and Mayer, Brown & Platt, all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROY M. GETSCHOW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 81\u20142578\nOpinion filed December 20, 1982.\nLaurence D. Lasky, E Willis Caruso, and John W. Treece, all of Isham, Lincoln & Beale, of Chicago, for appellant.\nPaul E. Plunkett, Stanley J. Parzen, and Mayer, Brown & Platt, all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0522-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 557 }