{ "id": 5437861, "name": "JUDY K. MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIRK BROS., INC., et al., Defendants; (Kirk Bros., Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Beggs Enterprises, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.)", "name_abbreviation": "Morgan v. Kirk Bros.", "decision_date": "1982-12-09", "docket_number": "No. 82-184", "first_page": "914", "last_page": "922", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 914" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "56 Wis. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8669732 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" }, { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/56/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.W.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10681284 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/309/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 109", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 St. Mary's L. J. 587", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "St. Mary's L.J.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Pa. L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5273883 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/49/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2839667 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937840 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2631647 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2789528 ], "year": 1880, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12137935 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2730616 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/94/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ill. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682615 ], "year": 1880, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/80/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2893261 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.Y.S.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Misc. 2d 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1951179 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/107/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.W.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10779784 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/172/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Minn. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 351265 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/274/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5448072 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5805433 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "14" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/70/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2931537 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 902", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2473395 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5169899 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/13/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5619400 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/215/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5333391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2541824 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/114/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5172446 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/14/0418-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 880, "char_count": 18179, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.3655356049578197e-07, "percentile": 0.8755193835625166 }, "sha256": "2ccdbd2dc80d9c0c12c553919037e72eb04e53538a733b377135fb57d60c0027", "simhash": "1:dfb2b110a505d69c", "word_count": 2938 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.990742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JUDY K. MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIRK BROS., INC., et al., Defendants.\u2014(Kirk Bros., Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Beggs Enterprises, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWhether \u201cAn Act in relation to contribution among joint tortfeasors\u201d (hereinafter the Contribution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70, par. 302) allows a cause of action for contribution against one whose liability arises from an alleged violation of the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 43, par. 135) is the question posed by this appeal.\nJudy Morgan was injured as the result of a collision between the automobile in which she was a passenger, being driven by Bernard N. Bailey, Jr., and a truck owned by Kirk Bros., Inc. (Kirk), being driven by Paul Joyce, its employee. Kirk filed a third-party suit against Beggs Enterprises, Inc., Recreation Services, Inc., and Varsity Inn, Inc. (the Dramshops). The third-party complaint contained allegations that the dramshops sold and served alcoholic liquor to Bailey, he became intoxicated, while intoxicated collided with the Kirk vehicle, and as a direct and proximate result of the acts of Bailey while intoxicated the original plaintiffs, Judy K. Morgan and Jerry Lee Morgan, her husband, sustained injury. The third-party plaintiff states that if judgment is entered against it in the Morgans\u2019 suit that judgment be entered against the dramshops \u201cby virtue of the provisions of \u00a7135 of Chapter 43 of the Illinois Revised Statutes\u201d (the Dramshop Act) and in favor of the third-party plaintiff \u201cin such amount, by way of contribution, as would be commensurate with the Dram Shop Act.\u201d\nThe Dramshops moved to dismiss the third-party complaint, contending that it did not state a cause of action either under the Dram-shop Act or under the Contribution Act. The trial court granted the motion of Recreation Services, Inc., and made final its ruling that Kirk, as a matter of law, could not obtain contribution from a party subject to potential dramshop liability.\nRecreation Services (hereinafter referred to as the Dramshop) is the only dramshop defending the appeal.\nThe contribution statute, as material, states:\n\u201cwhere 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury *** there is a right of contribution among them ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70, par. 302(a).\nThe \u201csame injury,\u201d that to the plaintiffs in the original suit, is undeniably involved. Whether the Dramshops are \u201csubject to liability in tort\u201d is the initial question raised. The Dramshop argues, and it is undisputed, that its liability is solely based on the Dramshop Act. The further refinement of that argument is that the Dramshop Act requires the Dramshop to respond in damages only to one who is injured in his person or property by an intoxicated person; and that Kirk is not claiming for its own personal injury. The Dramshop notes that a claim for pecuniary loss has been held not to constitute \u201cproperty damages\u201d under the Dramshop Act. (Eager v. Nathan (1957), 14 Ill. App. 2d 418, 423.) We agree that Kirk could not have recovered against the Dramshops under the Dramshop Act. That, however, is not contested.\nKirk concedes that it cannot sue the Dramshops directly under that statute and that prior to the enactment of the Contribution Act it could not have obtained indemnity or contribution from a Dram-shop. It contends, however, that the Dramshops are joint tortfeasors under the Contribution Act. The Dramshop contends that its liability is not based on tort but upon a purely statutory regulation of its status, which imposes liability without regard to fault, upon the sale of alcoholic liquor shown to cause the intoxication of the customer. Thus, that there is no common basis to compare the strict liability of a dramshop with the fault liability of the negligent motorist. Further, that the lawful sale of alcoholic liquor is not the proximate cause of the injuries to a passenger of an intoxicated motorist involved, as here, in a collision with a negligent motorist.\nWe cannot agree that the Dramshops are not statutory tortfeasors. The action under the dramshop statute and its predecessors has long been considered an action in tort. (Pisa v. Holy (1904), 114 Ill. App. 6, 7. See also Dworak v. Tempel (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 181, 191; Wanack v. Michels (1905), 215 Ill. 87, 94-95; Coffey v. ABC Liquor Stores, Inc. (1957), 13 Ill. App. 2d 510, 514.) Liability by statute is imposed on dramshops not merely because of their \u201cstatus,\u201d which is a lawful but regulated business, but because, when they are shown to have caused the intoxication of persons who as a result of the intoxication cause injury to others, they are denominated as wrongdoers. Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc. (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 902, 905, aff\u2019d (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 127.\nThe Dramshop seeks to distinguish its liability from liability \u201cwhich results from a breach of a duty imposed by statute\u201d and argues that various statutes commonly said to impose \u201cstatutory liability\u201d differ significantly from the Dramshop Act in that each creates a tort law duty upon certain classes of defendants and the ensuing tort liability flows from a breach of that duty. It gives as examples the Scaffold Act imposing on persons engaged in construction activity certain duties towards workmen, the Road and Bridges Act imposing upon persons engaged in road and bridge construction certain duties towards workmen and members of the public and the Public Utilities Act imposing upon persons operating certain utility services duties towards workmen and members of the public. In contrast the Dramshop argues that the Dramshop Act does not impose any duty on the tavern operator with respect to his conduct. With this we cannot agree. The Dramshop Act is but one example of legislation creating new rights founded on tortious conduct. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 874A, Comment b, at 301 (1979).) To the extent taverns\u2019 sale or gift of intoxicating liquors causes in fact the intoxication of persons and as the result of the intoxication causes injury to others requiring them to answer in damages, a standard of conduct is prescribed, a duty to which they are required to conform.\nThe Dramshop\u2019s further argument that it cannot be considered a \u201cjoint tortfeasor\u201d with the negligent motorist does not address the full scope of the contribution statute. Although the act is styled \u201cAn Act in relation to contribution among joint tortfeasors,\u201d neither section 302(a) nor the published Legislative History requires that the tortfeasors be joint in the strict sense, that their tortious acts be simultaneous, or that they act in concert before contribution will lie. The only apparent requirement for contribution between co-tortfeasors is that recovery over be based on the same injury to person or property. Thus, the act permits contribution where co-tortfeasors are concurrent (Legislative History compiled by Chicago Bar Association, at 1 (12-1-81); see Comment, Comparative Contribution: The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. Mar. L. Rev. 173, 182 (1980)) or successive (see Horan, Contribution In Illinois: Skinner v. Reed-Prentice and Senate Bill 308, 61 Chi. Bar Rec. 331 (1980)) as long as the same injury is involved.\nWe consider the further contention that no-fault liability cannot be compared with the fault liability of Kirk, a negligent tortfeasor. The Dramshop reads the supreme court\u2019s seminal decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13, as involving a contribution claim under which the manufacturer and plaintiff\u2019s employer downstream were subject to the same common law standard in products liability. The absence of a similar denominator in this case, it is argued, precludes the contribution claim.\nIn Skinner, the Illinois Supreme Court held that damages are to be equitably apportioned according to the \u201crelative degree to which the defective product and the employer\u2019s conduct proximately caused them.\u201d (70 Ill. 2d 1, 14.) This language avoids applying the principles of fault based upon negligence to defendants who are strictly liable, or, we believe, to defendants whose liability is based upon a form of wrongdoing defined by a statute such as the Dramshop Act, which is not a common law tort. Appel & Michael, Contributions Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. Chi. L. J. 169, 182 (1979); see Note, A Judicial Rule of Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Illinois, 1978 U. Ill. L. F. 633, 647.\nContrary to the Dramshop\u2019s contention, the majority in Skinner did not apply the principle of comparative causation to tortfeasors subject to a \u201ccommon standard of comparison.\u201d (See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (Ward, C. J., dissenting); 12 J. Mar. Prac. J. & Proc. 165, 173-74 (1978) .) Rather, the Skinner majority fashioned an equitable rule by which a strictly liable manufacturer may obtain contribution from a co-tortfeasor whose misuse of the defective product or assumption of an actually known risk diminishes, but does not extinguish, the strict liability of the manufacturer. Compared with the strict liability of the manufacturer, the downstream party\u2019s misuse of the product or assumption of the known risk involves conduct more culpable than passive negligence. See Appel & Michael, 10 Loy. Chi. L. J. 169, 183 (1979) .\nThus, contribution is not prevented by the fact that, in this case, the motorist and the Dramshops are subject to a common liability to an injured party resting on different theories rather than on a common standard of wrongdoing. Only recently we held that the principles of causation of Skinner are to be read into the new Contribution Act. (Doyle v. Rhodes (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 594.) One who is culpable in contributing to an injury in the sense that her wrongful conduct in some part caused the injury may be liable for contribution under the broad language of the statute. Doyle v. Rhodes (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 593.\nWe note that decisions from other jurisdictions are in accord that the liability necessary for contribution is not limited to a common tort and need not be based upon the same ground for each defendant. (See generally 1 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law sec. 26.22 (1982).) In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Village of Hewitt (1966), 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the driver of an automobile and the vendor making an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor were jointly liable to the injured parties although the liability of one rested on common law negligence and the other on the Minnesota version of the Dramshop Act. The court noted that \u201cthe parties having a common liability to the injured persons, it is no bar to contribution that their liability rests on different grounds.\u201d (274 Minn. 246, 253, 143 N.W.2d 230, 235.) While conceding that the Wrongful Death Act under which one of the parties was liable in negligence and the Civil Damage Act under which the dramshops were regulated were wholly unrelated as to scope and purpose, the court concluded that the liability created under both statutes was a common liability. (274 Minn. 246, 251, 143 N.W.2d 230, 234. See also Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Dunkelberger (Iowa 1969), 172 N.W.2d 137, 142; Anderson v. Comardo (1981), 107 Misc. 2d 821, 829, 436 N.Y.S.2d 669, 674.) Applying the Skinner doctrine which compares \u201ccausation\u201d instead of \u201cliability\u201d the same result in favor of allowing contribution would appear to be required.\nThe Dramshop finally contends that the lawful sale of alcoholic liquor, as a matter of law, is not the proximate cause of injuries sustained by the intoxicated driver\u2019s passengers. This contention, too, seems without merit.\nThe Dramshop Act gives persons injured in their person, property or means of support by an intoxicated person or in consequence of intoxication a right of action \u201cseverally or jointly\u201d against any person who causes the intoxication. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 43, par. 135; see Thompson v. Tranberg (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 809, 812.) For this reason, the supreme court has condemned tendered instructions requiring that the jury find the sale of liquor was the proximate cause. (See Roth v. Eppy (1875), 80 Ill. 283, 288; Schroder v. Crawford (1880), 94 Ill. 357, 362.) The argument of the Dramshop, however, that the acts of the intoxicated person are the proximate cause of the original plaintiffs\u2019 injuries while the sale of the liquor is only a remote condition (citing Miller v. Moran (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, and Cunningham v. Brown (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 23) does not support the conclusion that the third-party plaintiff, as a matter of law, may not recover contribution from the Dramshops. The intoxication resulting from the sale need not be the sole cause of the injuries. See Schroder v. Crawford (1880), 94 Ill. 357, 361; Linson v. Crow (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 574, 575.\nIn its third-party complaint, Kirk Bros., Inc., alleges in substance that the Dramshops caused the intoxication of the motorist, Bailey, whose passenger sustained injuries when his vehicle struck the rear of defendant\u2019s semi-tractor while he was intoxicated. At this, the pleading stage, all facts well pleaded are taken as true. (Gertz v. Campbell (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 84, 87; Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 613.) Taking the above pleaded facts as true, whether Bailey\u2019s intoxication resulting from the Dramshops\u2019 sales of liquor was a proximate cause of injuries to Bailey\u2019s passenger would be for the jury. Accord, Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Insurance Co. v. Dunkelberger (Iowa 1969), 172 N.W.2d 137, 144.\nWe conclude that the third-party\u2019s complaint states a cause of action for contribution based on violation of the Dramshop Act. It has been recommended that where, as here, liability is based upon a statute, rather than on common law, the public policies behind the statute must be examined in determining whether contribution will lie. (Appel & Michael, 10 Loy. Chi. L. J. 169, 185-86 (1979).) In decisions before the new Contribution Act, it was held that it is the public policy of this State that those sued under the Dramshop Act cannot diminish their responsibility by being allowed recovery over against a co-tortfeasor. (Wessel v. Cormi Elks Home, Inc. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 127, 132 (dramshop not entitled to implied indemnity from intoxicated motorist involved in vehicular collision .causing injuries to third persons); McDonald v. Trampf (1964), 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 120 (intoxicated motorist not entitled to contribution from Dramshops or their insurers since right to collect under Dramshop Act is limited to person injured or personal representative of deceased).) We do not believe public policy is undercut or dramshop liability diminished where a motorist sued for ordinary negligence seeks contribution from dramshops which cause the intoxication of another motorist by selling alcoholic liquor. (Cf. Dworak v. Tempel (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 181, 191-92 (allowing automobile insurer of innocently injured motorist to be subrogated in insured\u2019s dramshop suit against dramshop and insurer effectuates purposes of Liquor Control Act by indirectly disciplining dramshops which indiscriminately sell alcoholic liquor).) If contribution were denied between the Dramshops and the motorist, the entire burden of a loss, for which each party may have been partially responsible, could be placed on the motorist alone, if the injured party did not sue the Dramshops. See McDonald v. Trampf (1964), 49 Ill. App. 2d 106, 120.\nKirk in its third-party complaint prays that if judgment is entered against it by Judy K. Morgan and Jerry Lee Morgan her husband, judgment then be entered in Kirk\u2019s favor in such amount by way of contribution \u201cas would be commensurate with\u201d the Dram-shop Act. We conclude that the third-party complaint states a cause of action for contribution as prayed and that the trial court erred in dismissing the pleadings as a matter of law.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to vacate the order dismissing the third-party complaint and to thereafter proceed consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nLINDBERG and UNVERZAGT, JJ., concur.\nThe Dramshop Act provides as material \u201c[e]very person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, has a right of action in his own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 43, par. 135.\nThe currently accepted definition of the term \u201cjoint tortfeasors\u201d includes all cases where there is joint liability for a tort, whether the acts of those liable were concerted, merely concurrent, or even successive in time; and that definition has been followed under the statutes allowing contribution. (Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 130, 131 n.9 (1932): Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in Product-Liability Cases, 10 St. Mary\u2019s L. J. 587, 588 n.5 (1979).) It has been recommended that the term be rejected in favor of the term \u201cco-tortfeasors\u201d (Note, Contribution and Indemnity-An Examination of the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Law Allocation Concepts, 5 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 109, 110 n.1 (1979)) and courts elsewhere agree that the term \u201cco-tortfeasors\u201d is more precise. See Jones v. Fisher (Minn. 1981), 309 N.W.2d 726, 728; Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp. (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 383, 386, 202 N.W.2d 268, 270.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SEIDENFELD" } ], "attorneys": [ "John L. Schroeder, of Gooding & Schroeder, Ltd., of Geneva, for appellant.", "Barry L. Kroll, Nunzio C. Radogno, and C. Barry Montgomery, all of Jacobs, Williams & Montgomery, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUDY K. MORGAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. KIRK BROS., INC., et al., Defendants.\u2014(Kirk Bros., Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Beggs Enterprises, Inc., et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.)\nSecond District\nNo. 82\u2014184\nOpinion filed December 9, 1982.\nRehearing denied February 10, 1983.\nJohn L. Schroeder, of Gooding & Schroeder, Ltd., of Geneva, for appellant.\nBarry L. Kroll, Nunzio C. Radogno, and C. Barry Montgomery, all of Jacobs, Williams & Montgomery, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0914-01", "first_page_order": 936, "last_page_order": 944 }