{ "id": 5440880, "name": "JERRY COSTELLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITAL CITIES MEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Costello v. Capital Cities Media, Inc.", "decision_date": "1982-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 81-301", "first_page": "1009", "last_page": "1017", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 1009" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5440493 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493033 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 379234 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/376/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 F.2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1361752 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/639/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 F.2d 882", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1040094 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/539/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473789 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3240112 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173012 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339-40" }, { "page": "805" }, { "page": "3006-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097134 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-51" }, { "page": "351" }, { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3087445 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 N.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5284991 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/56/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2846801 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800594 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3018519 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290808 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0452-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 949, "char_count": 18141, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4977134621229532e-07, "percentile": 0.6650893546303279 }, "sha256": "f59649336cc89bd9d3d0957ba2becb9112778577626830887c2d7a222ebd0146", "simhash": "1:e446d95c9fd5a54e", "word_count": 2986 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:05.990742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JERRY COSTELLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITAL CITIES MEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arose as an action in the circuit court of St. Clair County to recover damages for the publication of an alleged libel. The plaintiff, chairman of the St. Clair County Board, brought suit against Capital Cities Media, Inc., publisher of the Belleville News Democrat and Richard N. Hargraves, an editorial writer for that newspaper. The trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff has appealed.\nOn December 31, 1980, the following editorial appeared in the Belleville News Democrat:\n\u201cCOSTELLO BLEW HIS FIRST CHANCE\nJerry Costello lied to us.\nThere\u2019s no nicer way to put it; he simply lied.\nAnd, when he lied to us, he lied to you.\nHe said he was going to be a tough county board chairman, especially when board members wanted to spend taxpayers\u2019 money.\nHe said he would militantly oppose the implementation of any new tax without first seeking the voters\u2019 approval through a referendum.\nHe said he would lead the County Board down the proper paths, protecting the rights of the taxpayers.\nWell, he lied.\nHe didn\u2019t do any of those things Monday night, thereby breaking his most sacred campaign promise at his very first meeting.\nThe County Board had an opportunity to conduct a binding referendum, asking you if you wanted to pay a new sales tax to support the Bi-State bus system. That\u2019s the very thing Costello had pledged he would do. He had promised, in the strongest possible terms, that he would let the voters decide.\nBut when the time came to make a decision, he was up there sitting on his gavel.\nSome leader!\nYou couldn\u2019t tell him from any other politician in the bunch. He did absolutely nothing to protect your interests.\nTo say we\u2019re disappointed is too mild; we\u2019re irate. We supported Costello\u2019s election because of what he said to us. We told you what he said and how we thought he was different from the run-of-the-mill, Touchette-dominated Democrats of the past.\nNow we wonder if we didn\u2019t lie to you.\nMaybe Costello isn\u2019t different.\nMaybe Costello didn\u2019t mean any of the things he said.\nMaybe his opponent, Republican Larry Reineck, was right when he said Jerry Costello was nothing more than another patronage-oriented political hack.\nHow are we supposed to tell otherwise?\nJerry Costello asked for a chance to prove himself and, in his very first meeting, he blew it.\nJust think, we\u2019ve got two more years of the Costello brand of lying leadership.\nDoesn\u2019t that thrill you?\n-RICHARD N. HARGRAVES.\u201d\nOn January 6, 1981, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the corporation and the editorial writer had libeled him.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the complaint states a cause of action. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleges substantially that the editorial contained one or more false statements concerning the plaintiff, which the defendants knew were false or the truth of which the defendants recklessly disregarded. Seven particular allegedly false statements are set forth in plaintiff\u2019s petition: \u201cJerry Costello lied to us\u201d; \u201cThere\u2019s no nicer way to put it, he simply lied\u201d; \u201cAnd when he lied to us, he lied to you\u201d; \u201cWell he lied\u201d; \u201cBut when the time came to make a decision, he was up there sitting on his gavel\u201d; \u201cHe did absolutely nothing to protect your interests\u201d; and \u201cJust think, we\u2019ve got two more years of the Costello brand of lying leadership.\u201d Plaintiff alleges that these statements held him up to disrepute, public scorn, contempt, hatred and ridicule. He asserts that his personal and professional reputation were injured, as well as his reputation for truth, veracity, honesty and integrity. Plaintiff also asserts that these injuries caused great mental anguish and emotional distress.\nPlaintiff acknowledges in his brief that since special damages have not been pleaded, the editorial must be libelous per se in order to state a claim for libel. Establishing libel per se requires a serious charge of incapacity or misconduct in words so obviously and actually hurtful that proof of their injurious character is dispensed with. (Makis v. Area Publications Corp. (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 452, 456, 395 N.E.2d 1185.) The four categories of words constituting libel per se are: (1) those imputing the commission of a crime, (2) those imputing infection with a loathsome disease, (3) those imputing unfitness or want of integrity in performing the duties of an office or employment, and (4) those imputing lack of ability in a person\u2019s business, trade or profession. Fried, v. Jacobson (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 780, 438 N.E.2d 495, appeal allowed, Sup. Ct. Docket No. 57279; Makis v. Area Publi cations Corp.\nPlaintiff contends that the editorial in question imputes an ability to perform his duties in office or a want of integrity in performing his duties. Defendants respond that the editorial does not impute any want of integrity or ability and that under the rule of innocent construction followed in Illinois, dismissal of the complaint is required. The traditional rule states that a publication must be read as a whole, the words must be given their natural and obvious meaning and words capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law. John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105; Fried v. Jacobson.\nIn the instant case, the defendants assert that their words, although harsh and uncomplimentary, amounted only to criticism of the plaintiff\u2019s conduct in a particular instance. They claim that there was no personal attack on the plaintiff\u2019s honesty or character in general, despite the repeated references to \u201clying.\u201d Delis v. Sepsis (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138; Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co. (1965), 56 Ill. App. 2d 101, 205 N.E.2d 44.\nThe alleged libel in Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co. was discussed at length in the defendants\u2019 trial and appellate briefs. A portion of the editorial alleged to be libelous per se in that case is reproduced below:\n\u201cNO WORD TAKES PLACE OF \u2018LIAR\u2019!\n(An Editorial)\nIn an advertisement appearing in today\u2019s issue of The Daily Gazette, inserted by Cecil P. Wade, candidate for mayor of Rock Falls, appears this statement:\n\u2018After reading these articles, I endeavored to obtain equal space and equal coverage in this newspaper to answer and refute the assertions made by the writer. My request for fair play fell upon dead ears and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that only the present mayor is afforded such privileges and opportunities.\u2019\nThat statement is a \u2018lie\u2019 of the common garden variety, which means that the person accepting the responsibility for that statement, Mr. Cecil P. Wade, in the parlance of the street, is an \u2018unadulterated liar.\u2019\nWe dislike using the word \u2018liar\u2019; it is not dignified, it is unbecoming of either a reputable newspaper or its publisher; unfortunately it lowers the author of this editorial to the degraded level of the advertiser.\n* * *\nWhat Mr. Wade is, perhaps is best known to himself alone, but he \u2018lies\u2019 when he says he was refused space in the Daily Gazette - and from \u2018lies\u2019 come \u2018liars.\u2019\n* * *\nWEBSTER\u2019S DEFINITION OF \u2018LIAR.\u2019\nLIAR \u2014 A person who knowingly utters falsehood.\nIn the instance referred to above Mr. Wade is \u2018tops\u2019 \u2014 his batting average is ONE THOUSAND PERCENT!\u201d Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co. (1965), 56 Ill. App. 2d 101, 105, 205 N.E.2d 44, 46-47.\nThe reviewing court in Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co. observed that the alleged libel was identified as an editorial and did not brand the plaintiff as one unworthy of belief under any circumstances, but merely stated he had been untruthful in one particular instance. The Wade court further took into consideration the circumstances surrounding the editorial, including the fact that the plaintiff was a political candidate at the time. The court stated that the word \u201cliar\u201d is far from complimentary, but held that abusiveness alone does not make a publication libel per se and therefore, the editorial posed no serious threat to the plaintiff\u2019s reputation. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the libel action was affirmed.\nAfter Wade, a reviewing court in Delis v. Sepsis (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 292 N.E.2d 138, reached a similar result. The defendant in that case was sued after he wrote a letter attacking the plaintiff for-his activities as secretary of an organization of persons of Greek descent. The letter also stated that the plaintiff was \u201csly, coy and evasive\u201d and \u201cdeluded, deceptive and possessing a disordered state of mind\u201d and \u201ca deliberate liar and distorter of truths.\u201d (Delis v. Sepsis (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 217, 220, 292 N.E.2d 138, 141.) Despite this abusive language, the appellate court held that the letter was capable of being read innocently. The court stated that the charge did not imply that the plaintiff was generally dishonest or one who could not be believed under oath. Therefore, the words were held to be mere name-calling and not libel per se.\nAlthough not mentioned by the parties, Britton v. Winfield Public Library, (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 546, 428 N.E.2d 650, also involved charges of dishonesty. In Britton a library\u2019s board of directors was sued for libel after writing a letter to local newspapers attacking the actions of the Winfield village administrator. The village administrator was accused of \u201ccheap and dishonest government\u201d and \u201cdirty tricks\u201d; the defendants sought a reprimand and public apology in order to bring \u201chonest and upright\u201d government back to their village. (Britton v. Winfield Public Library (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 546, 547, 428 N.E.2d 650, 651.) On appeal, the Britton court found that the editorial in Wade and the letter in Delis were indistinguishable from the library board\u2019s letter in that case. The court stated that all three cases involved \u201charsh criticism of plaintiff\u2019s actions in a single case rather than an assault on his character in general.\u201d Britton v. Winfield Public Library (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 546, 550, 428 N.E.2d 650, 653.\nLike the instant case, Wade, Delis, and Britton, all involved charges of dishonesty. Nonetheless, we hold that these cases are factually distinguishable from the case at bar. As the plaintiff points out, the editorial in the instant case repeatedly attacked him as a liar and also included an explicit reference to \u201ctwo more years of the Costello brand of lying leadership.\u201d The language of the editorial makes it quite apparent that it was an actionable assault on the plaintiff\u2019s character in general, not mere criticism of his conduct in a particular instance. Accordingly, we find that the editorial constituted libel per se because it imputed to the plaintiff an inability to perform his duties and a want of integrity or lack of honesty in performing the duties of his office.\nMoreover, the Illinois Supreme Court recently clarified the application of the innocent construction rule in Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344. In Chapski, the court modified the longstanding doctrine relied on by defendants in the case at bar, and followed in Wade, Delis and Britton. The traditional rule was criticized by the court because it allowed trial judges to dismiss cases without adequate review if there was any way the alleged libel could be read innocently. The Chapski opinion stated that \u201ccourts generally strain to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of words where such a construction is clearly unreasonable and a defamatory meaning is far more probable.\u201d (Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51.) The supreme court went on to state that the common misapplication of the innocent construction rule is especially improper since, by its own terms, the holding of John v. Tribune Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, requires that words be given their \u201cnatural and obvious meaning.\u201d Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 351.\nThe rule, as modified, states that \u201ca written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se.\u201d (Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352.) Although Chapski allows trial judges to continue to make a preliminary determination whether a statement may reasonably be innocently construed, contorted interpretations of language so that it might be seen as innocent are now precluded. The court stressed that this modified rule would serve to protect both the individual\u2019s interest in vindicating his good name and reputation as well as first amendment interests. Chapski v. Copley Press.\nSince the editorial in the instant case repeatedly attacks the plaintiff\u2019s honesty and makes reference to \u201ctwo more years of the Costello brand of lying leadership,\u201d we feel the Chapski decision does not allow us to consider this language innocent of libelous content as a matter of law. To do so would require us to strain to find a possible, but unnatural, innocent meaning, when a defamatory meaning is far more probable. Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344.\nThe defendants also assert in their brief that the allegations of dishonesty were privileged as a matter of law as a constitutionally protected expression of opinion. (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 805, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3006-07.) Although the boundary between fact and opinion is not a precise one (Catalano v. Pechous (1978), 69 Ill. App. 3d 797, 808, 387 N.E.2d 714, 723, aff\u2019d (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 146, 419 N.E.2d 350), in the case at bar, the newspaper repeatedly stated that the plaintiff lied to its editors and to his constituents. The newspaper stated that the plaintiff had firmly promised that the county board would conduct a binding referendum on a new sales tax to support the local bus system and then refused to do so at his very first meeting. As a result, the newspaper concluded that the plaintiff had deliberately lied and was therefore \u201cnothing more than another patronage-oriented political hack.\u201d\nIn Buckley v. Littell (2d Cir. 1976), 539 F.2d 882, a journalist brought an action for libel against the author of a book. Although the court held the terms \u201cfascist,\u201d \u201cfellow traveler\u201d and \u201cradical right\u201d to be constitutionally protected opinions, the passage of the book that stated that the journalist had lied about several people was held to be a factual assertion relating to the plaintiff\u2019s journalistic integrity. (Buckley v. Littell (2d Cir. 1976), 539 F.2d 882, 895-96.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit further explained Buckley in Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co. (2d Cir. 1980), 639 F.2d 54. The court stated that when an opinion is \u201csomething more than a generally derogatory remark but is laden with factual content,\u201d the first amendment does not confer absolute immunity, but merely the qualified protection accorded by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, in cases where the plaintiffs are public figures. (Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co. (2d Cir. 1980), 639 F.2d 54, 63.) Buckley and Cianci stand for the principle that the allegation that a public figure is a \u201cliar\u201d can be seen as a factual assertion unprotected by absolute privilege when the derogatory remark is laden with factual content, as opposed to mere name-calling.\nIn labelling the plaintiff in the instant case a liar, the newspaper impugned a want of integrity and lack of ability in performing the duties of his office. (Fried v. Jacobson.) The allegations were not made in a loose, figurative sense or as mere rhetorical exaggeration. (Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill, 2d 146, 161, 419 N.E.2d 350, 357.) Rather, while purporting to be expressing an opinion, the newspaper stated that the plaintiff was a dishonest man and a dishonest leader. For the foregoing reasons we find that the defendants made factual statements that the plaintiff deliberately lied for politically motivated reasons. These statements do not warrant protection as constitutional expressions of opinions merely because they happen to be made on a newspaper\u2019s editorial page.\nFinally, we must examine whether the plaintiff\u2019s complaint sufficiently alleges actual malice, as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that since pleadings are to be liberally construed, accomplishing the minimal New York Times requirement of aUeging that a false statement was made knowingly or in reckless disregard of whether it was true or false can be sufficient to avoid dismissal. (Colson v. Stieg (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 205, 433 N.E.2d 246.) In the instant case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants either knowingly or recklessly printed false statements concerning him. The allegedly libelous statements are set forth in the complaint and the publication itself was incorporated into the complaint by reference. Accordingly, the minimal requirements necessary for alleging actual malice are present in the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan; Colson v. Stieg; Fogus v. Capital Cities Media, Inc. (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 1060.) Further proceedings are required to determine whether actual malice can be established with clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for failure to state a cause of action must be reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nHARRISON, P.J., and JONES, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Amiel Cueto, of Belleville, for appellant.", "Robert B. Hoemeke and John M. Hessel, both of Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen and Chubb, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JERRY COSTELLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAPITAL CITIES MEDIA, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 81\u2014301\nOpinion filed December 21, 1982.\nRehearing denied January 18, 1983.\nAmiel Cueto, of Belleville, for appellant.\nRobert B. Hoemeke and John M. Hessel, both of Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen and Chubb, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1009-01", "first_page_order": 1031, "last_page_order": 1039 }