{ "id": 5431201, "name": "PAMELA REAL, Special Adm'r of the Estate of William P. Real, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K. S. KIM, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Real v. Kim", "decision_date": "1983-01-13", "docket_number": "No. 81-2883", "first_page": "427", "last_page": "437", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 427" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2900656 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5281241 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/22/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5089557 ], "year": 1859, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "1975 Ill. Laws 2894", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1963 Ill. Laws 3513", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 Ill. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2593602 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454, 456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/362/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4873005 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/278/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 A.L.R.3d 760", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3355107 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014" }, { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5269653 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/47/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469943 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 F.2d 946", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 765041 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/441/0946-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 F.2d 1067", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 874359 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" }, { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/579/1067-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5329149 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426675 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313793 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307678 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3332580 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3009575 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5441020 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404013 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2781665 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/106/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 849053 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/239/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533082 ], "year": 1909, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 Ill. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2491356 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/384/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 Ill. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2617357 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/402/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2541386 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/376/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070910 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-21" }, { "page": "314-15" }, { "page": "316-21" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742628 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 Ill. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313970 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/413/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2897157 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 U.S. 304", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156228 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "1635" }, { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/325/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 U.S. 342", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 302085 ], "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/321/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454839 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0126-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1039, "char_count": 24805, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4337135806206336e-07, "percentile": 0.920906392612079 }, "sha256": "56b2aea88e07e55aee621d1d21b378d7666cde179d518d15ff1e7ba040a3ebf5", "simhash": "1:7c23d2b0655c7c11", "word_count": 4100 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:40.944956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAMELA REAL, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of William P. Real, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K. S. KIM, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LORENZ\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Pamela Real, as special administrator of the estate of William Real, filed an action under the Wrongful Death Act and the Probate Act of 1975 (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.; ch. IIOV2, par. 27 \u2014 6) alleging that medical malpractice by the defendants (K. S. Kim, M.D., Northwestern Memorial Hospital, and Northwestern Radiology Group, a medical corporation) caused the death of William Real.\nDefendants\u2019 motions to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint were granted by the trial court on the grounds that her claims were barred by section 21.1 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22.1, now codified at section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 212) and that, as a matter of law, the defendants were not estopped from asserting the Limitations Act as a defense. A claim apparently remains pending before the trial court against another physician, but the court found that there was no just reason for delaying appeal of its order (see 87 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). In her appeal plaintiff presents the following issues:\n(1) whether section 21.1 of the Limitations Act bars a special administrator from maintaining a medical malpractice action on behalf of a decedent\u2019s estate in a case where the alleged acts of negligence occurred more than four years before the complaint was filed;\n(2) whether a wrongful death action can be brought in a case where, on the date of the death complained of, the Limitations Act would have precluded the decedent from bringing an action on his own behalf for the acts which allegedly caused his death;\n(3) whether the complaint states facts which, if proven, would es-top the defendants from raising the Limitations Act as a defense;\n(4) whether an entity formed under the Medical Corporation Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 631 et seq.) to diagnose and treat human ailments constitutes a \u201cphysician\u201d under section 21.1 of the Limitations Act.\nThe following allegations (which are assumed to be true for the purpose of resolving the legal issues presented by this appeal) are material to our decision:\nWilliam Real suffered from an unidentified neurological ailment and, as part of a medical evaluation, he was referred to Northwestern Memorial Hospital in April of 1976 for what the complaint calls \u201can EMI scan with and without infusion.\u201d This test was performed by various unknown physicians who worked for Northwestern Radiology Group, a medical corporation, and on April 13, 1976, the test results were evaluated and reported as normal by Dr. K. S. Kim, another employee of the medical corporation.\nAccording to the complaint, this diagnosis was incorrect because proper interpretation of the results of the EMI test would have \u201cdisclosed the presence of an abnormality.\u201d In the alternative, the complaint alleges that the defendants failed to properly conduct the test, or failed to report that the test results were so equivocal that they were \u201cof no diagnostic value.\u201d Each of these acts or omissions allegedly constitutes negligence.\nIn June of 1979, more than three years after he was allegedly misdiagnosed, William Real was diagnosed as having brain cancer. But because the misdiagnosis allegedly given by the defendants in April of 1976 induced William to delay seeking further medical assistance, the cancer was terminal by the time it was discovered, and William died on August 9, 1980.\nThen, on June 19, 1981 (more than four years after the alleged acts and omissions concerning the EMI test), plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the defendants.\nThe pertinent portion of section 21.1 of the Limitations Act provides that,\n\u201cNo action for damages for injury or death against any physician or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22.1, now codified at section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13-212.\nThe first issue is whether this limitations provision barred plaintiff from bringing a medical malpractice action against the defendants. Plaintiff asserts that a cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue, and the two-year \u201cdiscovery\u201d limitations period did not begin to run, until the point in time when William Real\u2019s brain cancer became incurable. Thus plaintiff concludes that the defendants had the burden of proving that plaintiff\u2019s complaint was not filed within two years of when William knew or should have known that his cancer had become incurable.\nWe need not decide whether plaintiff has correctly identified when William Real\u2019s cause of action accrued because section 21.1 bars the survival action filed on behalf of William\u2019s estate even if a cause of action did not accrue until William died.\nSection 21.1 plainly states that \u201cin no event shall [a medical malpractice] action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of [the complained of] injury or death.\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22.1, now codified at section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 212.) Under this portion of section 21.1, the four-year limitations period begins to run from the date of the alleged acts of negligence, even if the resulting injury or death did not occur (and a cause of action for negligence did not accrue) until after the limitations period expired.\nWe recognize that it offends common sense notions of justice for the law to say that the right to invoke a legal remedy expired before the alleged wrongdoing was or could reasonably have been discovered (see West American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 126, 131), but\n\u201cStatutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349. They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.\u201d Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945), 325 U.S. 304, 314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142.\nWhere, as with section 21.1 of the Limitations Act, the General Assembly has clearly manifested its intent through unambiguous statutory language, the only legitimate role for the courts is to give effect to the statute in question \u2014 unless it is unconstitutional. (Certain Taxpayers v. Sheahen (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 75, 84; Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66.) \u201cThere is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.\u201d Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350.\nIn the present case, the alleged acts and omissions of medical malpractice occurred in April of 1976, but a cause of action was not filed until June of 1981 \u2014 more than five years after the alleged wrongdoing. Plaintiff does not argue that section 21.1 is unconstitutional (see Anderson v. Wagner (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 295, 311-21), and our only legitimate role is to apply the unambiguous statutory language which bars a medical malpractice action from being brought more than four years after the acts or omissions which eventually caused the complained of injury or death.\nIt is not clear whether plaintiff asserts that section 21.1 is not applicable to cases brought under the Probate Act of 1975, but a statute of limitations runs against a cause of action, not against the holder of the cause of action. (O\u2019Connell v. Chicago Park District (1941), 376 Ill. 550, 557.) Under the Probate Act of 1975, the right to bring a cause of action is transferred, by operation of law, from the decedent to the representative of his estate. (See Prosser, Torts sec. 127, at 901 (4th ed. 1971).) Consequently, \u201ca cause of action which a deceased in his lifetime was estopped from asserting is not available to his personal representative ***.\u201d 2 Horner, Probate Practice and Estates sec. 817, at 64 (4th rev. ed. 1975).\nThe second issue is whether plaintiff can maintain an action under the Wrongful Death Act even though, on the date of the death complained of, the decedent would have been barred from bringing an action for the acts which purportedly caused his death.\nSection 1 of the Wrongful Death Act states that,\n\u201cWhenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 1.\nThe pertinent portion of section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act states that \u201c[ejvery [wrongful death] action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death\u201d which is the basis for the lawsuit. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 2.) Focusing on the limitation period provided in section 2, plaintiff asserts that her wrongful death action is timely because it was filed within two years of when William Real died.\nAccording to plaintiff, we should \u201crefuse to extend\u201d section 21.1 of the Limitations Act to wrongful death cases. But plaintiff misapprehends the distinction between the two-year limitations period established by section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act and the fact that there is no liability under the Act unless the condition precedent specified by section 1 has been fulfilled.\nThe plain language of section 1 provides that there will be no liability under the Wrongful Death Act unless the decedent could have maintained an action for damages \u201cif death had not ensued\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 1), and the supreme court has consistently acknowledged and given effect to this unambiguous provision. (See Howlett v. Doglio (1949), 402 Ill. 311, 319; Clarke v. Storchak (1943), 384 Ill. 564, 571-72; Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service (1940), 374 Ill. 506, 514-15.) As the supreme court stated in Mooney v. City of Chicago (1909), 239 Ill. 414, 423:\n\u201cThe statute gives a right unknown to the common law in cases where the wrongful act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages. One condition upon which the statutory liability depends is that the deceased had a right of recovery for the injuries at the time of his death, and there is no right in the administrator to maintain an action unless the deceased had the right to sue at the time of his death.\u201d\nUnder the plain language of section 1, the particular reason why the decedent would have been barred from maintaining an action for damages simply isn\u2019t significant, and we are not persuaded by plaintiff\u2019s efforts to distinguish away these supreme court decisions based on the particular reason why each decedent would have been barred from maintaining an action on his own behalf.\nPlaintiff also finds it significant that these supreme court cases were decided before Holton v. Daly (1882), 106 Ill. 131, was overruled by Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 423. According to plaintiff, the results in Mooney, Biddy, Clarke and Howlett would have been different if Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. was the law in Illinois when these other cases were decided. But, in overruling Holton, Murphy merely held that \u201cthe administrator of the decedent\u2019s estate could, independent of the Wrongful Death Act, bring an action [under the Survival Act] for damages which would encompass decedent\u2019s lost wages, lost property, and pain and suffering endured during the [interval] between injury and death.\u201d Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 127, 139.\nWe recognize that Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. represents a very significant development in Illinois law, but it has no bearing in determining whether a decedent could have maintained an action for damages if he had survived. Consequently, Murphy has no bearing on whether the representative of a decedent\u2019s estate can maintain an action under the Wrongful Death Act.\nSimilarly, the remaining cases upon which plaintiff relies\u2014Coleman v. Hinsdale Emergency Medical Corp. (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 525; Fure v. Sherman Hospital (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 259 (both applying the so-called \u201cdiscovery rule\u201d to the two-year limitations period provided in section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act); and Wilson v. Tromly (1949), 404 Ill. 307 (holding that the limitations period established by section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act is applied to cases brought under the Act, rather than the more general provisions of the Limitations Act) \u2014 are irrelevant to determining whether a decedent could have maintained an action \u201cif death had not ensued.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 1.\nFinally, plaintiff argues that invoking section 21.1 of the Limitations Act to bar her cause of action for wrongful death violates section 13 of article IV of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. This constitutional provision (which states that \u201cThe General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, sec. 13)) requires that there be a reasonable basis for legislative classifications. (Anderson v. Wagner (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 295, 314-15.) But in Anderson the court held that section 21.1 does not violate the proscription against \u201cspecial legislation\u201d (79 Ill. 2d 295, 316-21), and the fact that section 21.1 is now being considered in the context of a wrongful death case does not justify disregarding the supreme court\u2019s holding on the constitutionality of this limitations provision.\nAs we noted above, at the time death ensued, section 21.1 of the Limitations Act would have precluded William Real from maintaining an action for the conduct which allegedly caused his death. It necessarily follows that section 1 of the Wrongful Death Act precludes plaintiff from bringing a wrongful death action for the same alleged malpractice.\nThe next issue is whether the complaint states facts which, if proven, would estop the defendants from asserting the defense of limitations.\nEquitable estoppel precludes a litigant from denying his prior assertions in cases where it would be unjust to permit the litigant to disavow express or implied statements upon which another party has relied. (Dill v. Widman (1952), 413 Ill. 448, 455-56; see also Cessna v. Montgomery (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 71, 86; City of Quincy v. Sturhahn (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 604, 614.) Thus, equitable estoppel is merely an application of the fundamental principle that a litigant will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongdoing. Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc. (7th Cir. 1978), 579 F.2d 1067, 1070.\nApplication of the doctrine of equitable estoppel \u201cwill prevent a defendant, whose representations or other conduct have caused a plaintiff to delay filing suit until after the running of the statutory period, to assert the statute of limitations as a bar to the action.\u201d Burke v. Gateway Clipper, Inc. (3d Cir. 1971), 441 F.2d 946, 948; see, e.g., Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146, 158.\nNevertheless, equitable estoppel \u201ccomes into play only after the limitations period has run.\u201d (Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc. (7th Cir. 1978), 579 F.2d 1067, 1070.) Therefore,\n\u201c[A] defendant is not estopped to raise a limitations point because of any alleged \u2018lulling\u2019 of the plaintiff into inaction until after the limitation period where the \u2018lulling\u2019 period, if there was any, expired months before the statute barred the action and where there was ample time and opportunity for the plaintiff to avail of any legal rights he has.\u201d Reat v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1964), 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 274-75; accord, Sabath v. Mansfield (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1014; see also Annot., Plaintiff\u2019s Diligence as Affecting His Right to Have Defendant Estopped From Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 760, 764-65 (1972).\nThe approach taken by the appellate court in Beat and Sabath is consistent with the rule applied by the supreme court in cases where a plaintiff relies on section 22 of the Limitations Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 23, now codified at section 13 \u2014 215 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 215.) Under section 22, if a defendant has \u201cfraudulently concealed\u201d the existence of a cause of action, the injured party has five years in which to file a lawsuit after he learns of his right of action.\nIn Anderson v. Wagner, the supreme court (while noting that it was not deciding whether section 22 could be applied to medical malpractice actions) stated that,\n\u201cIf at the time the plaintiff discovers the \u2018fraudulent concealment\u2019 a reasonable time remains within the applicable statute of limitations, section 22 of the Limitations Act does not toll the running of the limitation period.\u201d 79 Ill. 2d 295, 322.\nApplying the applicable equitable principles to the present case, we find that the complaint fails to state facts which would, if proven, estop the defendants from asserting a limitations defense.\nBriefly stated, plaintiff\u2019s estopped argument is that, in April of 1976, the defendants negligently administered and interpreted a medical test, and that they should be precluded from relying on the Limitations Act because, allegedly, this single act of negligence kept William Real from discovering his true medical condition until his disease was terminal.\nHowever, the complaint also alleges that in June of 1979, William was diagnosed as having brain cancer. At that point, William knew or should have known that he might have been misdiagnosed in 1976. As a result, he then had the burden of investigating whether he had a cause of action for medical malpractice. (See Witherell v. Weimer (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156.) Moreover, the limitations period for any medical malpractice claim which William may have had against the defendants did not expire until April of 1980 \u2014 approximately 10 months after he knew or should have known of his possible cause of action.\nWe need not decide whether mere negligence in diagnosing a patient could give rise to an estoppel, because the circumstances relied upon as justifying a delay in filing suit (i.e., Williams\u2019 ignorance of the alleged misdiagnosis) ceased to be operational when he was diagnosed as having cancer (i.e., when he should have known he may have been originally misdiagnosed). From that point, William had 10 months in which to file a lawsuit. As a matter of law, this was sufficient time in which to bring an action. See Sabath v. Mansfield (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1015 (eight-month period after inducement for delay had passed held sufficient).\nFurthermore, the complaint does not state any facts which would show that the defendants did or said anything after the discovery date to induce William to delay filing an action against them. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint does not state facts which would, if proven, estop the defendants from asserting a limitations defense.\nThe final issue is whether Northwestern Radiology Group, a medical corporation, is covered by section 21.1 of the Limitations Act. Section 21.1 applies to \u201cany physician or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22.1, now codified at section 13 \u2014 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 212), and plaintiff argues that a medical corporation is neither a licensed physician nor a licensed hospital.\nWe disagree. A physician is a person who practices medicine (i.e., diagnoses and treats human ailments) (People ex rel. Gage v. Siman (1917), 278 Ill. 256, 257-58), and section 2 of the Medical Corporation Act authorizes the formation of corporations \u201cfor the study, diagnosis and a treatment of human ailments and injuries ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, par. 632; compare People v. United Medical Service, Inc. (1936), 362 Ill. 442, 454, 456 (decided before the Medical Corporation Act was enacted; holding that Illinois law prohibited corporations from practicing medicine).) Moreover, a corporation formed to practice medicine must be licensed by the State. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, pars. 635 through 642.) Therefore, a corporation formed under the Medical Corporation Act can lawfully practice medicine, just like any individual who is a licensed physician.\nThe Medical Corporation Act was passed in 1963 (1963 Ill. Laws 3513), but the pertinent portion of the Limitations Act wasn\u2019t enacted until 1975 (Pub. Act. 79 \u2014 960, 1975 Ill. Laws 2894). So the key question in this case is whether the legislature intended that the phrase \u201cphysician,\u201d as used in section 21.1 of the Limitations Act, should encompass medical corporations.\nAs commonly used, the word \u201cphysician\u201d suggests a natural person. But the law regards corporations as artificial persons (1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations sec. 7, at 37 (1974 rev. ed.)), and courts have frequently construed the term \u201cperson\u201d in constitutional and statutory provisions as encompassing both natural persons and corporations. See, e.g., Charles Friend & Co. v. Goldsmith & Seidel Co. (1923), 307 Ill. 45, 50-51; Mineral Point R.R. Co. v. Keep (1859), 22 Ill. 9, 18-19.\nIn determining the legislature\u2019s intent in enacting section 21.1 of the Limitations Act, it is important to note that all the officers, directors, and shareholders of medical corporations, as well as the employees who practice medicine on behalf of such corporations, must be licensed physicians. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 32, pars. 632, 643.) It would have been illogical for the legislature to provide that all the officers, directors, shareholders, and physician-employees of medical corporations could take advantage of the special limitations period provided by section 21.1 for medical malpractice actions, but that the corporation itself was subject to the so-called \u201clong tail\u201d of potential liability which used to exist for physicians when most malpractice actions were governed by section 14 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 15, now codified at section 13 \u2014 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 202) as construed by Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hospital (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 32, 40 (holding that a cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until the \u201cdiscovery date\u201d \u2014 no matter how far in the future that date occurred).\nWe are convinced that the legislature did not intend this discrepancy, and we hold that the word \u201cphysician,\u201d as used in section 21.1 of the Limitations Act, includes corporations formed to practice medicine under the Medical Corporations Act.\nBased on all the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSULLIIAN, P.J., and WILSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LORENZ" } ], "attorneys": [ "James H. Canel, Ltd., of Chicago (James H. Canel and Peter J. Posner, of counsel), for appellant.", "Steven H. Jesser and McDermott, Will & Emery, of Chicago (Lee J. Dunn, Jr. and Stewart W. Karge, of counsel), for appellee Northwestern Memorial Hospital.", "French, Rogers, Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C., of Chicago (Richard G. French, Patrick J. Fanning, and Michael J. Hennig, of counsel), for appellees K. S. Kim, M.D., and Northwestern Radiology Group S.C." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAMELA REAL, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of William P. Real, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. K. S. KIM, M.D., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 81\u20142883\nOpinion filed January 13, 1983.\nJames H. Canel, Ltd., of Chicago (James H. Canel and Peter J. Posner, of counsel), for appellant.\nSteven H. Jesser and McDermott, Will & Emery, of Chicago (Lee J. Dunn, Jr. and Stewart W. Karge, of counsel), for appellee Northwestern Memorial Hospital.\nFrench, Rogers, Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C., of Chicago (Richard G. French, Patrick J. Fanning, and Michael J. Hennig, of counsel), for appellees K. S. Kim, M.D., and Northwestern Radiology Group S.C." }, "file_name": "0427-01", "first_page_order": 449, "last_page_order": 459 }