{ "id": 5434235, "name": "NATIONAL BOULEVARD BANK OF CHICAGO, Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE COUNTY OF WILL, Defendant-Appellant.-(Barbara Gerard, Intervening Appellant.)", "name_abbreviation": "National Boulevard Bank v. County of Will", "decision_date": "1983-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 82-157", "first_page": "608", "last_page": "612", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "112 Ill. App. 3d 608" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "295 N.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 860", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5397266 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2998485 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 1276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501167 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2478654 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/94/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S. Ct. 1510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 L. Ed. 2d 764", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "425 U.S. 913", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205922, 6204962, 6206372, 6206146, 6205581, 6204749, 6204564, 6206646, 6205374, 6205183 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/425/0913-07", "/us/425/0913-03", "/us/425/0913-09", "/us/425/0913-08", "/us/425/0913-06", "/us/425/0913-02", "/us/425/0913-01", "/us/425/0913-10", "/us/425/0913-05", "/us/425/0913-04" ] }, { "cite": "334 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2709536 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0082-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 580, "char_count": 9426, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31448802613588667 }, "sha256": "b11b543abd1eeb09ad40b46bcad7cafd69f33c582313b2d5ddfe2001e5dd8dc2", "simhash": "1:0646b4bef37b551c", "word_count": 1497 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:40.944956+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NATIONAL BOULEVARD BANK OF CHICAGO, Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE COUNTY OF WILL, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014(Barbara Gerard, Intervening Appellant.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, an Illinois land trustee and beneficiary, brought an action for declaratory judgment invalidating a county of Will zoning ordinance which classified the land trust property as A-l (farming). Injunctive relief was sought as well to restrain the county from enforcing the ordinance. Barbara Gerard, an adjoining land owner, intervened to protest the granting of relief on plaintiffs\u2019 suit on the theory that she had been denied her constitutional right to due process of law by the plaintiffs\u2019 failure to provide her notice of the hearing on their petition for a zoning amendment held by the board of zoning appeals on May 22, 1979; and that, as a consequence, the administrative proceeding initiated by plaintiffs to reclassify their property to 1-1 (light industrial) was invalid and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the instant suit. The matter was tried over a two-week period. After taking the case under advisement, the circuit court of Will County held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated substantial compliance with the statutory notice- requirement and that, in any event, Mrs. Gerard had waived her right to procedural due process by failing to file a motion to dismiss with the court in advance of trial. The court further held that plaintiffs had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the zoning ordinance, as applied to plaintiffs\u2019 property, was arbitrary and -unreasonable. The court declared the ordinance invalid and enjoined the county of Will from enforcing it against plaintiffs\u2019 property.\nBoth the county of Will and Mrs. Gerard appealed from the court\u2019s ruling. It is the position of both appellants that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the court\u2019s findings. We affirm.\nWe have read the voluminous record in this case and will not recite in detail the evidence admitted at trial except as needed to explain our conclusions. The intervenor\u2019s point on appeal is that she was entitled to actual \u2014 as opposing to constructive \u2014 notice of the hearing to be held by the zoning board of appeals respecting plaintiffs\u2019 proposed zoning amendment. In support of her position, she cites section 5 of \u201cAn Act in relation to county zoning\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 34, par. 3158), which provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAt least 15 days notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation published in such county ***. *** In case of written protest against any proposed amendment, signed and acknowledged by the owners of 20% of the frontage proposed to be altered, or by the owners of 20% of the frontage immediately adjoining or across an alley therefrom, *** such amendment shall not be passed except by the favorable vote of 3k of all the members of the county board ***.\u201d\nWe find absolutely no authority requiring a land owner in plaintiffs\u2019 position to serve an adjoining land owner with actual notice of a proposed amendment. Publication per statute is all that is required to satisfy the intervenor\u2019s constitutional right to procedural due process. (Rutland Environmental Protection Association v. Kane County (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 82, 334 N.E.2d 215, cert. denied (1976), 425 U.S. 913, 47 L. Ed. 2d 764, 96 S. Ct. 1510.) Personal notice to adjacent property owners is not required. (Village of Riverwoods v. County of Lake (1968), 94 Ill. App. 2d 320, 237 N.E.2d 547.) There is no dispute that plaintiffs in fact complied with the statutory publication requirement in anticipation of the May 22, 1979, hearing. The trial court did not err in holding that the intervenor was given sufficient notice despite her complaints that she had not had actual notice of the proposed amendment hearing.\nThe second issue for our consideration concerns the county\u2019s contention that plaintiffs\u2019 evidence was insufficient to prove that the existing zoning ordinance is invalid as applied to the land trust property. The property in question is an approximately 10-acre parcel in Green Garden Township bordered on the west by Route 45 and on the north by Manhattan/Monee Road. The zoning ordinance in question was adopted by the county of Will in 1978. According to the county\u2019s master plan for land use, the plaintiffs\u2019 property was classified A-l (farming). The property was purchased with the intention of expanding Johnson\u2019s business of fabricating structural steel into trusses and joists. In February of 1979, plaintiffs applied for reclassification of the property to 1-1 (industrial). The Will County Regional Planning Commission recommended approval of the request. Thereafter, a public hearing on plaintiffs\u2019 application was held by the zoning board of appeals on May 22, 1979. The board also approved the proposed reclassification and made its recommendation to the Will County Board of Supervisors for their consideration. On June 14, 1979, the board of supervisors denied plaintiffs\u2019 application. This suit followed.\nThe evidence established that plaintiffs\u2019 parcel has been farmed by tenants since plaintiffs purchased it in 1978. The land surrounding the parcel is classified and used as follows: 1-2 (industrial) \u2014 a fertilizer plant; C4 (Commercial) \u2014 an implement sales store; A-l special use-storage of landscaping equipment; 1-1 (limited industrial) \u2014 nursery; and A-l (farming) \u2014 production of corn/beans. Plaintiffs\u2019 proposed use as a site for a fabricating plant would result in the employment of 20 workers and would require one semi-truck making one trip in and one trip out of the plant per day. The amount of sewage which would be added to the community public facilities would be comparable to that of two head of cattle. The volume of noise generated by plant operations would be negligible.\nThe parties\u2019 expert witnesses were divided on whether the highest and best use of the parcel was agricultural or industrial. They differed as to whether plaintiffs\u2019 land was in a flood plain which would make it unsuitable for the proposed plant. They disputed as to whether a trend existed in the immediate area of plaintiffs\u2019 property toward industrial development. They disagreed as to the adequacy of existing fire protection to accommodate plaintiffs\u2019 proposed use.\nThe parties did not agree as to whether the products to be fabricated at plaintiffs\u2019 plant were \u201cagricultural\u201d considering evidence that they would be used in the construction of farm buildings. Mr. Johnson\u2019s testimony, however, indicated that most of the joists and trusses to be fabricated at the Green Garden site would be distributed to points outside of the immediate area. Long range plans, according to Johnson, were to add windmills and solar panels to the products made at the proposed plant.\nThe crucial question considered by the trial court was whether the plaintiffs\u2019 evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated that the existing zoning ordinance was unreasonable insofar as it excludes plaintiffs\u2019 proposed use for the parcel in question. (Drogos v. Village of Bensenville (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 48, 426 N.E.2d 1276.) In determining that plaintiffs had met their heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of validity of the ordinance (Gust v. Village of Westchester (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 425, 442 N.E.2d 525), the trial court applied the six factors set forth in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65, and the two additional considerations as set forth in subsequent case law. (See, e.g., Bass v. City of Joliet (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 860, 295 N.E.2d 53; Drogos.) We need not recite each factor here inasmuch as the trial court adequately dealt with them in its judgment declaring the ordinance invalid. Having read the record, we are convinced that the trial court properly applied the factors and correctly determined that, in fact, the ordinance, as applied to plaintiffs\u2019 parcel, is arbitrary, unreasonable and invalid. Those facts which, in our opinion, most strongly dictate our affirmance of the trial court\u2019s ruling are: (1) that the parcel in its present state is economically unsuitable for its present use because of its size; (2) the area immediately surrounding the parcel manifests a trend toward uses for commercial, industrial and other non-farming establishments; (3) the plaintiffs\u2019 proposed use would result in significant economic benefit to the public, and its detrimental impact on public services, and aesthetic and monetary property values of surrounding individual owners would be minimal; and (4) both the immediate and long-range plans proposed by plaintiffs for the fabricating plant are supportive of farm constructions and could directly benefit the Green Garden farming community. In sum, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s determination is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nHaving found no error, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER and SCOTT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas M. Monahan, of Joliet, for appellant Barbara Gerard.", "Edward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Randal J. Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant County of Will.", "Thomas A. Dunn, of Joliet, for appellee Walter E. Johnson." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATIONAL BOULEVARD BANK OF CHICAGO, Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE COUNTY OF WILL, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014(Barbara Gerard, Intervening Appellant.)\nThird District\nNo. 82\u2014157\nOpinion filed February 9, 1983.\nThomas M. Monahan, of Joliet, for appellant Barbara Gerard.\nEdward F. Petka, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Randal J. Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellant County of Will.\nThomas A. Dunn, of Joliet, for appellee Walter E. Johnson." }, "file_name": "0608-01", "first_page_order": 630, "last_page_order": 634 }