{ "id": 3624779, "name": "THOMAS BEEDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLIN CHEMICAL CORP., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Beeding v. Olin Chemical Corp.", "decision_date": "1983-03-07", "docket_number": "No. 82-543", "first_page": "125", "last_page": "128", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 125" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3117477 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2666796 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889170 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2821480 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/100/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 1134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1143" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436998 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2746880, 2755950 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0185-01", "/ill-app-3d/2/0185-02" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 7593, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.3554680214946895 }, "sha256": "4472a02f8bbfcad5f01df3c9eab640ec0231e0e429d0950ca7010326118bfa9a", "simhash": "1:6db559be7b851695", "word_count": 1240 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:40:35.449940+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS BEEDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLIN CHEMICAL CORP., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Thomas Beeding filed a complaint for damages for personal injuries allegedly occasioned by defendant Olin Chemical Corporation\u2019s violation of the Structural Work Act (HI. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 60 et seq.). Defendant filed a third-party complaint against plaintiff\u2019s employer, Elens and Maichin, Inc., seeking indemnity. After a jury trial, the circuit court of Will County entered judgment in defendant\u2019s favor. Plaintiff filed a post-trial motion seeking relief from the jury verdict. Almost years later, the court vacated the verdict and ordered a new trial. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (87 Ill. 2d R. 306), we granted leave to appeal. At issue is the propriety of two special interrogatories.\nPlaintiff sustained his injuries on October 5, 1977, when he fell through the roof of a building owned by defendant. Elens and Maichin had been retained to remove the roof, and plaintiff was engaged in that work at the time he was injured. The first special interrogatory asked:\n\u201cWas the Defendant, Olin, the party having charge of the removal of the roof of the building in question?\u201d\nThe jury answered, \u201cNo,\u201d and the trial court held that, under Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 275 N.E.2d 905, the interrogatory was improper.\nIn Scully, three defendants were involved in the construction of a hospital addition. Otis Elevator had been awarded one of 11 prime contracts and was responsible for installing eight elevators and dumbwaiters. At trial, the company submitted the following special interrogatory:\n\u201cDo you find from the evidence that Otis Elevator Company was in charge of the erection or construction at the time and place of the accident in question?\u201d (Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 194, 275 N.E.2d 905, 911.)\nThe interrogatory was refused, and the appellate court affirmed the decision:\n\u201cSpecial interrogatories are used to test the general verdict against the jury\u2019s conclusions concerning the ultimate controlling facts. [Citations.] When a special interrogatory is in proper form, the trial court has no discretion but to submit it to the jury. [Citation..] However, the special interrogatory must relate to an ultimate issue of fact. [Citation.] While Otis\u2019 special interrogatory was couched in the language of the Act, it did not relate to an ultimate issue of fact, because a negative answer would not be determinative of whether Otis was in charge within the meaning and intent of the Structural Work Act as defined by case law. Therefore, the special interrogatory could not have tested the general verdict and the trial court properly refused to submit it to the jury.\u201d Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 194-95, 275 N.E.2d 905, 911.\nThe Scully plaintiffs had urged this conclusion as a defendant needn\u2019t be in charge of erection or construction, but only a phase thereof. Thus the jury could have answered the interrogatory in the negative and still found Otis Elevator liable. In the case at bar, the jury was asked if defendant was the party having charge of the removal of the roof. Unlike the comprehensive reference to erection or construction, the removal of the roof was limited to a phase of the work. It was further limited to the phase of the work in which plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury. Thus the jury could not have answered the instant interrogatory in the negative and still have been able to find defendant liable. In so concluding, we in no way suggest that a party in overall charge of work is not in charge of a particular phase thereof. See McGovern v. Standish (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 54, 71, 357 N.E.2d 1134, 1143 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).\nWe also note part of plaintiff\u2019s issue instruction, based upon Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 180.04 (2d ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as IPI) and presented to the jury:\n\u201cThe Plaintiff, Thomas Beeding, claims that the Defendant, Olin Corporation, was the person having charge of the removal of the roof of the building in question.\u201d\nWhere different language was used in an instruction and special interrogatory, it was noted:\n\u201c[Interrogatories should contain a single direct question and should not be repetitious, misleading, confusing or ambiguous. The interrogatory should, of course, use the same language or terms as are contained in the instructions.\u201d (Hocking v. Rehnquist (1968), 100 Ill. App. 2d 417, 424-25, 241 N.E.2d 337, 340, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 196, 254 N.E.2d 515.)\nGiven these circumstances, we find no error in submitting the special interrogatory to the jury.\nThe second of the contested interrogatories asked:\n\u201cDid the conduct of Olin immediately, before and at the time of the occurrence complained of, constitute a major fault which proximately caused the injury and damage complained of[?]\u201d\nThe jury answered, \u201cYes,\u201d and the trial court held the answer was inconsistent with the general verdict.\nIn Isabelli v. Cowles Chemical Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 888, 289 N.E.2d 12, appeal denied (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 603, the defendant made the identical contention. The court responded:\n\u201cThis contention has no bearing upon the propriety of the general verdict. It is well settled that liability under the Structural Work Act can result from a passive violation as well as from affirmative activity. [Citations.] Furthermore, it is clear from this record that the two special interrogatories had no bearing upon the issues between plaintiff and Cowles. The concept of \u2018active misconduct\u2019 used by them is not material in structural work cases. They were submitted to the jury in connection with the issues raised in the third-party litigation by Cowles against Marietta. There was also a general verdict on these issues returned by the jury in favor of Cowles. That verdict had no connection with the general verdict in the original case.\u201d (Isabelli v. Cowles Chemical Co. (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 888, 898, 289 N.E.2d 12, 19.)\nSubsequent to Isabelli, the drafters of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction for indemnity actions expressly rejected use of language about active and passive misconduct (see Przybylski v. Peskins & Will Architects, Inc. (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 620, 623, 420 N.E.2d 524, 527, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 575), and adopted major fault and freedom from major fault in their stead (see IPI Civil No. 500.00 et seq., at 45 (1977 Supp.)). As in Isabelli, the special interrogatory at bar was submitted, here by Elens and Maichin, in connection with the issues raised in the third-party litigation and had no connection with the issues raised in the third-party litigation and had no connection with the general verdict. We therefore find no error in submitting the interrogatory to the jury and no inconsistency raised by its answer.\nHaving found no error in the submission of the special interrogatories to the jury, we need not consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the interval between the filing of plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion and the trial court\u2019s order.\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court of Will County granting a new trial is reversed and the judgment in favor of the defendant is reinstated.\nReversed.\nALLOY and HEIPLE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "William F. Haley and Richard C. Bartelt, both of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas Monahan and H. Arthur Hammel, both of Joliet, for. appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS BEEDING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OLIN CHEMICAL CORP., Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 82-543\nOpinion filed March 7, 1983.\nWilliam F. Haley and Richard C. Bartelt, both of Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas Monahan and H. Arthur Hammel, both of Joliet, for. appellee." }, "file_name": "0125-01", "first_page_order": 147, "last_page_order": 150 }