{
  "id": 3626762,
  "name": "LINDA FESS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.-(Katherine Fess, a Minor, by Linda Fess et al., her Parents and Next Friends, Plaintiff; Bernard M. Greenwald et al. Defendants.)",
  "name_abbreviation": "Fess v. Parke, Davis & Co.",
  "decision_date": "1983-03-10",
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    "parties": [
      "LINDA FESS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. \u2014 (Katherine Fess, a Minor, by Linda Fess et al., her Parents and Next Friends, Plaintiff; Bernard M. Greenwald et al. Defendants.)"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE JIGANTI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn November 19, 1979, the plaintiffs, Linda and Arthur Fess, parents of minor child, Katherine Fess, brought suit against the defendant, Parke, Davis & Company, on behalf of their daughter for the severe and permanent injuries which she sustained during her birth on November 24, 1974, The plaintiffs also brought an individual action against Parke Davis alleging that their daughter\u2019s injuries rendered them liable for medical, hospital, nursing, caretaking and other related expenses, as well as loss of income and loss of consortium.\nParke Davis moved to dismiss those portions of the complaint brought by the parents individually as not being commenced within two years following the injuries pursuant to section 14.1 of the Limitations Act. That section is applicable to loss of consortium and other derivative type actions. (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 15.1, now codified as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 204.) The parents responded that section 21, commonly referred to as the savings section which extends the time for bringing a minor\u2019s cause of action until two years after the minor has reached the age of 18, similarly tolled their derivative action. (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22, now codified as 111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 211.) The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe relevant statutes are summarized as follows:\n\u201cSec. 14. Actions for damages for an injury to the person *** shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 15, now codified as 111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 203.\n\u201cSec. 14.1. Actions for damages for loss of consortium or other actions deriving from injury to the person of another shall be commenced within the same period of time as actions for damages for injury to such other person.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 15.1, now codified as 111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 204.\n\u201cSec. 21. If the person entitled to bring an action *** is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of 18 years *** he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the disability is removed.\u201d 111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22; now codified as 111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13 \u2014 211.\nOn appeal the parents argue that when the legislature amended section 14.1 on derivative actions in 1977, it reduced the filing time from five years to two years to conform the derivative action to the underlying injury action. According to the parents, this evinced an intent on the part of the legislature to conform derivative actions generally to the underlying injury. Consequently, the parents urge that since their child\u2019s action is tolled under section 21 until two years after she reaches her majority, their derivative action is also tolled. We do not agree.\nThe language of section 21 specifically refers to the person who can avail himself of the savings clause as \u201c*** the person entitled to bring an action *** [who] is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of 18 years ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 22.) The defendant argues here, and rightfully so, that this language cannot refer to the parents because at the time their derivative action accrued, they were over the age of 18. Section 21 goes on to say that \u201che or she may bring the action within 2 years after the disability is removed.\u201d Again, this language cannot refer to the parents because they are under no removable age disability. Therefore under the plain meaning of the savings clause, the clause applies only to a person who is under 18 years at the time that the cause of action accrued and only that person may bring an action within two years after the disability is removed. In construing a statute, a court must adhere to the plain meaning of the words employed by the legislature. Rushton v. O\u2019Malley (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 103, 411 N.E.2d 528.\nFurthermore in ascertaining legislative intent, it is an established rule regarding statutes of limitations that no exceptions which toll the statute or enlarge its scope will be implied. As the court stated in Fisher v. Rhodes (1974), 22 Ill. App. 3d 978, 317 N.E.2d 604, \u201cfor if the legislature had intended to except any class of persons from the effect of the statute, it would have done so and courts will not assume such authority or dominion. '*** [T]he court may construe only the clear words of the statute, and if its scope is to be enlarged, the remedy should be legislative rather than judicial. ***\u2019 \u201d 22 Ill. App. 3d 978, 981-82, 317 N.E.2d 604, 607.\nAlso, the rationale for allowing a savings clause for minors has no application to a derivative action. The reason for tolling the statute of limitations for minors is that enforcement of a child\u2019s right should not be left to the whim or mercy of some self-constituted next friend. (Girman v. County of Cook (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 897, 431 N.E.2d 1291.) An exception for minors is necessary \u201c \u2018to protect the minor\u2019s interest and preserve his day in court\u2019 \u201d until he is able to bring suit in his own behalf. (103 Ill. App. 3d 897, 899, 431 N.E.2d 1291, 1293.) The parents, as adults, are quite capable of bringing suit on their own behalf within the two years of the child\u2019s injury.\nFinally, the conformity which the parents presume from their theory of legislative intent is not in fact present. If a derivative action is conformed to the time period allocated to minors under the savings section, it would still be possible for the minor to bring her action within a short time after injury while her parents would have almost 20 years to bring their action. This could not be the result intended by the legislature.\nFor the reasons stated above we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nROMITI, RJ., and LINN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE JIGANTI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John D. Hayes & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (John D. Hayes and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellants.",
      "Lord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William J. White and Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "LINDA FESS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. \u2014 (Katherine Fess, a Minor, by Linda Fess et al., her Parents and Next Friends, Plaintiff; Bernard M. Greenwald et al. Defendants.)\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 82\u201452\nOpinion filed March 10, 1983.\nJohn D. Hayes & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (John D. Hayes and David A. Novoselsky, of counsel), for appellants.\nLord, Bissell & Brook, of Chicago (William J. White and Hugh C. Griffin, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0133-01",
  "first_page_order": 155,
  "last_page_order": 158
}