{ "id": 3625150, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFF SMITH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "1983-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 81-1026", "first_page": "917", "last_page": "926", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 917" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413530 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 1044", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3181391 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 966", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2962864 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2624513 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505052 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/1084-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2699862 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 3d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3280293 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/76/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2504038 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952306 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2503425 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3359319 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/1004-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 676, "char_count": 15835, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.102853585001513e-07, "percentile": 0.7620428835812435 }, "sha256": "9dc0a49c6f82464eec6294a47a30ac1ab9bdfbc9be3c34b2c70deaffe0398358", "simhash": "1:2362f47b6748cb3d", "word_count": 2728 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:40:35.449940+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFF SMITH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn December 8, 1981, the defendant, Jeff Smith, was arrested, convicted and sentenced in Winnebago County to six months\u2019 imprisonment and a $25 fine for driving while license revoked and speeding. (111. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95x/2, pars. 6 \u2014 303, 11 \u2014 601(b).) The former offense is a Class A misdemeanor, the latter is punishable by a fine.\nThe defendant was arrested at 1:45 a.m. on December 8 and taken to the Winnebago County Public Safety Building. He appeared before the circuit court later that morning at 10:30 or 11 a.m. At that time he entered a plea of guilty to charges and was sentenced as we have indicated. Later, On December 16, 1981, a motion to withdraw the defendant\u2019s guilty plea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) was filed on his behalf by counsel. That motion was heard and denied. Counsel for the defendant then filed a motion for reduction of sentence. After a hearing, the defendant\u2019s sentence was modified by the trial court to six months\u2019 periodic imprisonment. The defendant appealed and raises three issues: (1) whether the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was improperly denied; (2) whether defendant\u2019s sentence was improperly imposed, and (3) whether a corrected mittimus should be issued.\nDefendant asserts the trial court\u2019s acceptance of his guilty plea nine hours after his arrest constituted an egregious violation of his due process rights. Specifically, he asserts the court failed to comply with either the spirit or the letter of Supreme Court Rules 401 and 402 (87 Ill. 2d Rules 401, 402).\nHe contends there was an ineffective waiver of counsel, and that he was not properly admonished as to the nature of the charges, the minimum possible sentences, or his right to plead not guilty. Further, he asserts his plea was improperly accepted because there was no sufficient factual basis for the plea, and the court made no effort to determine that the plea was voluntarily and understandingly tendered as required by Supreme Court Rule 402(b) (87 Ill. 2d R. 402(b)).\nFinally, defendant points to the facts surrounding the proceedings at which his plea was entered merely nine hours after he was arrested. He notes it was his first appearance before the judge. Considering certain comments he made about leaving after the hearing, he asserts it was clear that he did not understand the import of the proceedings which had just occurred.\nThe State asserts the defendant did validly waive counsel, and that the trial court strictly. admonished him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 401 (87 Ill. 2d R. 401). Alternatively, the State argues that in light of the defendant\u2019s \u201clegal sophistication\u201d a failure by the court to properly admonish him may be considered harmless. (People v. Jackson (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 1004.) Inter alia, the record indicates the defendant served seven days in jail after pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated in June 1980, and was fined after his guilty plea to reckless driving in May 1980.\nThe State argues the court is not required to explain each element of the offense when informing the defendant of the nature of the charge (People v. Nunn (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 399), nor to explain what acts the defendant did to commit the offense (People v. Harden (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 559). In fact, the State argues, it has been held that the mere naming of the offense was sufficient to admonish the defendant as to the nature of the charges. People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187.\nThe State points out that the defendant\u2019s theory that more than the name of the offense is required when the defendant is not represented by counsel is unsupported by authority. Likewise, the State argues Krantz and People v. Baxter (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 471, also defeat the defendant\u2019s argument as to the court\u2019s failure to admonish as to the possible \u201cminimum\u201d sentences of probation, conditional discharge, or periodic imprisonment. Also, the failure to inform the defendant of the right to plead not guilty or to persist in a plea is not fatal to the guilty plea. People v. Lumley (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 221.\nFinally, the State asserts that substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402 is still shown even where the court fails to inquire whether any force or threats had been used against the defendant. People v. Gratton (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 503.\nWe are of the opinion that the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied by the trial court.\nAt the time the defendant entered his guilty plea the following proceedings took place before the trial court:\n\u201cTHE CLERK: 81-TR-53870 and 71, Jeff Smith.\nTHE COURT: Let the record show the Defendant in Court. You are Mr. Smith?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: How old are you?\nTHE DEFENDANT: 19.\nTHE COURT: You are charged with drivers license revoked and speeding 68 in a 55. The first offense is punishable by a fine up to One Thousand Dollars or imprisonment for up to one year in jail or both. The second offense is punishable by a fine of Twenty-Five Dollars and costs. As to both charges, however, you are presumed innocent. You have a right to a trial before a judge or jury. You have a right to be represented by an attorney. If you are indigent and cannot afford an attorney, you maybe entitled to have one free of charge; do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: What do you wish to do today?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Huh?\nTHE COURT: What do you wish to do today about these cases?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I will just plead guilty.\nTHE COURT: You understand when you plead guilty you give up your right to trial before a judge or jury?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And your right to meet the witnesses in court and make the State prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt; do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Do you understand you are giving up your right to an attorney whether you can afford one or not?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: The Complaints here alleged that at 1:45 in the morning on December 8th you were driving a Ford on Route 2 in Winnebago County; is that true?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And what was the speed limit along that stretch of highway?\nTHE DEFENDANT: It is supposed to be 55.\nTHE COURT: This is a copy of a Waiver of jury and plea of guilty form. Sign that if you will. What is the best estimate of the top speed you were travelling?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I was doing about 55.\nTHE COURT: Why are you pleading guilty to speeding?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Because my speedometer was off.\nTHE COURT: There is a basis to believe you were over the speed limit for that reason?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Did you have a valid license?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I didn\u2019t.\nTHE COURT: What happened to them?\nTHE DEFENDANT: They were revoked about a year ago.\nTHE COURT: What was it revoked for?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Drunk driving.\nTHE COURT: I will accept your waivers of counsel, waiver of jury trial and pleas of guilty. You are how old?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Nineteen.\nTHE COURT: Are you employed?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir,\nTHE COURT: When was the last time you were employed?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I got laid off up in Reedburg, Wisconsin just recently.\nTHE COURT: How long were you working?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I worked there for a year.\nTHE COURT: What were you doing?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I worked in a foundry as a utility man.\nTHE COURT: Do you have any checking or savings?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: Own any property?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I own a truck and that\u2019s about all.\nTHE COURT: What offenses have you been previously convicted of in your whole life?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Just mostly drunk driving; two of them.\nTHE COURT: How many times?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Two.\nTHE COURT: How many times have you been convicted of driving while license revoked?\nTHE DEFENDANT: None.\nTHE COURT: What about any other license charges?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No.\nTHE COURT: The State\u2019s Attorney, Mr. Gemignani, is present. Mr. Gemignani, do you have anything on this?\nMR. GEMIGNANI [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Yes, sir. I show in October of \u201969 a drinking as a minor.\nTHE COURT: \u201979?\nMR. GEMIGNANI: I\u2019m sorry, \u201979. January of \u201980 a criminal damage to property, fine and costs. May of \u201980 a minor drinking, DWI, drag racing plea of guilty to reckless driving, fine and costs One Hundred Dollars and the rest of the charges dismissed. June 2nd, 1980 DWI minor drinking and improper lane usage, no drivers license on person, plea of guilty to DWI, costs and seven days and the rest of the charges were dismissed.\nTHE COURT: Any recommendations?\nMR. GEMIGNANI: Six months.\n-THE COURT: Enter a Judgment of Conviction on the charge of drivers license revoked and sentence you to a term of six months imprisonment in the Winnebago County Jail and the court costs in that case for speeding I will enter a Judgment of Conviction and sentence you to Twenty-Five Dollars plus costs. The Defendant is remanded to the County Jail under the mittimus that will issue.\u201d\nWe believe that this record shows the defendant was correctly admonished regarding the nature of the charges and the possible sentences which could be imposed, and the trial court did, in fact, comply with Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (87 Ill. 2d R. 401(a)). We also believe that the defendant\u2019s decision to waive counsel was an informed one and that he had an understanding of the consequences of pro se representation.\nThe defendant argues that he was not properly admonished as to the nature of the charges because the trial judge merely named the two charges. When informing the defendant of the nature of the charge, the court is not required to explain each element of the offense. (People v. Nunn (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 399.) Furthermore, the trial judge has no obligation to state to the defendant all of the acts which constitute the offense or to explain what acts the defendant did to commit said offense. (People v. Harden (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 559.) In People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187, the supreme court held that the mere naming of the offense was sufficient to admonish one of the nature of the charge.\nThe defendant next argues that he was inadequately admonished regarding possible sentences because the trial judge did not inform him that probation, conditional discharge or periodic imprisonment were available. The supreme court has specifically rejected this identical argument. See People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187.\nThe defendant argues that he was not admonished of his right to plead not guilty and persist in that plea. We have addressed that issue on two prior occasions and have clearly held that the failure of the trial court to inform the defendant of his right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea was not fatal to the guilty pleas. People v. Lumley (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 221; People v. Pritchett (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 1084.\nThe defendant argues that there was an insufficient factual basis for the plea. A review of the colloquy between the defendant and the court reveals a factual basis for the guilty plea is more than adequate. Such a factual basis consists either of a defendant\u2019s express admission that he committed the offense alleged or a recital to the court of evidence which supports the allegations of the charge. People v. Lundeen (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 21.\nThe defendant next argues that there might have been a viable defense to the charges. In People v. Burgess (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 966, we held that the supreme court rule which imposes a duty upon the trial court to determine whether a valid factual basis for the guilty plea exists does not require the trial court to ferret out possible defenses for the defendant. The trial court may accept a guilty plea even when the defendant maintains complete innocence, so long as the plea is voluntary. The defendant argues that the fact that he was not asked whether the plea was the result of threats or force in combination with the fact that the plea was entered nine hours after his arrest demonstrates that his plea was involuntary. However, we have previously stated that a trial judge may be in substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402, despite his failure to inquire about whether any force or threats had been used against the defendant. (People v. Gratton (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 503.) We therefore determine that there was no error in the trial court denying the defendant\u2019s motion to vacate his plea.\nThe defendant next contends that the imposition of a six-month term of periodic imprisonment for the traffic violation of driving while license revoked, given the existence of several mitigating factors, especially the presence of substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant\u2019s conduct, constituted an abuse of discretion. We believe the record fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the modified sentence of six months\u2019 periodic imprisonment. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149.) There is no requirement that the court state the reasons for a misdemeanor sentence on the record (cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 4\u2014 1(c) (the court shall specify the factors which led it to impose a particular felony sentence (but see People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 155))), and the court is presumed to have considered the mitigating evidence before it unless the record indicates otherwise. (People v. Fugitt (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 1044.) In fact, the record shows the court was influenced by the defendant\u2019s mitigation evidence as shown by the court\u2019s modification of the term initially imposed to one which would allow the defendant\u2019s release for employment purposes. We, therefore, reject the defendant\u2019s second ground for reversal.\nThe third issue raised by the defendant is that the cause should be remanded with directions that a corrected mittimus to the Winnebago County Jail should be issued. The record reflects that on December 8, 1981, the court below sentenced the defendant to a six-month period of imprisonment in the Winnebago County Jail. The mittimus to the county jail reflecting that sentence was thereupon filed with the clerk of the circuit court.\nOn December 22, the court below allowed the defendant\u2019s motion for a reduction of sentence, in part, and reduced the sentence to a six-month term of periodic imprisonment in the county jail, with the sheriff authorized under local rules and regulations to release the defendant pursuant to the jail\u2019s work release program. However, as the defendant points out no mittimus to the county jail was ever filed in the records of this cause to reflect the modified sentence. Consequently, since we are affirming the judgment and sentence below, this cause must be remanded with directions that a corrected mittimus be issued to reflect the actual sentence in this case. (91 Ill. 2d R. 329; 87 Ill. 2d R. 612(g); People v. Griffin (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 255.) Since the defendant has prevailed on one of the issues of this appeal, the State\u2019s request for costs is denied.\nTherefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence to a six-month term of periodic imprisonment in the county jail and a fine of $25 is affirmed, but the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Winnebago County with directions that a corrected mittimus be issued to reflect the actual sentence in this cause.\nJudgment affirmed; cause remanded with directions.\nLINDBERG and VAN DEUSEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFF SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 81\u20141026\nOpinion filed March 8, 1983.\nG. Joseph Weller and Paul J. Glaser, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel D. Doyle, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Phyllis J. Perko and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0917-01", "first_page_order": 941, "last_page_order": 950 }