{ "id": 3592005, "name": "ST. AUGUSTINE'S CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIANS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "St. Augustine's Center for American Indians, Inc. v. Department of Labor", "decision_date": "1983-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 82\u20141356", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "627", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5620536 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Idaho 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4449012 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "1372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/100/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8914", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "Unemployment Ins. Rep.", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38, 676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.E. 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5780732 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E. 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5645925 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/249/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833631 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2474756 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3010957 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777-78" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "778-80" }, { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0773-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 740, "char_count": 14256, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1182606886311352e-07, "percentile": 0.572765246159139 }, "sha256": "f4c42482173e5aef3de167fe1ca3041f5ade87530831b5a906036ada1c05d874", "simhash": "1:5f8cf59c7cdf31d0", "word_count": 2187 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:13.547892+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ST. AUGUSTINE\u2019S CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIANS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the circuit court\u2019s affirmance of a determination made by defendant, the Illinois Department of Labor, that plaintiff, St. Augustine\u2019s Center for American Indians, Inc., is not exempt from paying employer\u2019s contributions under the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 300, et seq.).\nPlaintiff was founded in 1962 in Chicago by an Episcopal priest, Father Peter J. Powell. According to the bylaws, it was \u201cestablished to provide counseling, casework and supportive services, and scholarship aid for American Indians, primarily those resident in Chicago.\u201d Plaintiff is a separate legal entity with the backing of the Episcopal Church of Chicago. The Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Chicago is an ex officio member of the board of trustees, an ex officio member of the corporation and its ex officio president. All members of the corporation and at least two-thirds of the board of trustees must be members of the Episcopal Church.\nThe building plaintiff owns and uses for its activities has three stories with a chapel on the first floor. Approximately 2,500 American Indian families are helped annually by plaintiff, by means of monetary assistance, food, clothing, job training, counseling and other services. Mass is offered in the chapel twice daily and on Sundays; confessions are heard at least once weekly and priests offer the full range of sacraments.\nIn late 1974, upon learning of a change in the Unemployment Compensation Act (Act), plaintiff contacted defendant in order to obtain a determination of whether it was exempt from coverage. After initially being told that it was exempt, plaintiff was notified on September 28, 1978, that it was covered under the Act and an assessment and demand for payment of unpaid contributions was made for the period covering November 1, 1974, through August 1, 1978. Since that date, plaintiff has been paying the contribution voluntarily, but filed a timely protest to the determination and the assessment.\nOn February 22, 1979, a hearing was held before the Director\u2019s representative, during which plaintiff presented documentary and testimonial evidence. Plaintiff argued that it was exempt from paying contributions under section 211.3(A)(2) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 321.3(A)(2)) as an organization operated primarily for religious purposes. On January 29, 1980, the Director\u2019s representative issued his report which contained the finding that plaintiff was not operated primarily for religious purposes and the recommendation that a minor modification be made to the Department\u2019s assessment. On February 15, 1980, before the period allowed for filing objections to the report had expired, the Director rendered a final decision affirming the representative\u2019s report. On February 22, 1980, plaintiff filed its timely objections to the report.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. The trial court remanded the matter to the Department because it failed to consider plaintiff\u2019s objections before affirming the report of the Director\u2019s representative. After the Director overruled plaintiff\u2019s objections, oral argument was held in the circuit court on plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint. On May 3, 1982, a final order was entered by the trial court affirming defendant\u2019s decision and assessing the amount of $11,030.72 plus costs for unpaid unemployment insurance contributions and interest.\nSTATUTORY HISTORY\nPrior to January 1, 1972, section 221 of the Unemployment Compensation Act exempted services performed for a \u201cfoundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable *** or educational purposes ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 331.) As a result of changes in the Federal Employment Security Amendments of 1970, all States were required to extend, by 1972, State unemployment insurance coverage to nonprofit organizations. In response, Illinois amended section 221 of the Act to no longer apply to services performed in the employ of a nonprofit organization. Section 211.2 of the Act provides that the term \u201cemployment\u201d does include services performed by individuals working for a nonprofit organization that is \u201corganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable *** purposes ***.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 321.2.\nThe next section, 211.3(A)(2), however, allows for a religious organization exemption and states that \u201cemployment\u201d shall not include services performed in the employ of an organization \u201cwhich is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 321.3(A)(2).) The second of the dual requirements, concerning control or supervision by a church, is not being questioned in this appeal, as the Department conceded that plaintiff meets this prerequisite. The sole issue with regard to the statute, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly agreed with the Director that plaintiff is not \u201coperated primarily for religious purposes.\u201d Plaintiff also argues on appeal that this decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For further history of the Act and the historical context of unemployment insurance programs, see Community Renewal Society v. Department of Labor (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777-78, 439 N.E.2d 975.\nI\nThe portion of the Act involved in this appeal (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 321.3(A)(2)) had not been judicially construed in Illinois at the time both the Director and the trial court made their respective decisions in regards to plaintiff\u2019s exemption under it. This section has been subsequently examined by this court in Community Renewal Society v. Department of Labor (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 773, 439 N.E.2d 975 (Community Renewal). Relying upon this case, plaintiff argues that the Director utilized an erroneous standard which would, as in Community Renewal, warrant a reversal of the Director\u2019s decision.\nThe following well-established rules of statutory construction are applicable in this situation: the Unemployment Compensation Act is a benevolent attempt to shield unfortunate persons from economic burdens caused by involuntary unemployment; the statute must be liberally construed with this objective in mind; the burden of proving a tax exemption is upon the one claiming it; exemption statutes are strictly construed; and debatable questions are resolved in favor of taxation. Ducks Unlimited, Inc. v. Grabiec (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 134, 140, 272 N.E.2d 657.\nIt is also well established that the role of the courts, in reviewing administrative decisions, is not to weigh the evidence, but is limited to ascertaining whether the agency\u2019s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Degrazio v. Civil Service Com. (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482, 489, 202 N.E.2d 522.) The conclusions of the agency on questions of fact are held to be prima facie true and correct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 274.\nThis court in the Community Renewal case determined that based upon the Illinois statutory amendment to section 211.3(A)(2) of the Act, which adopted verbatim the language in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) exemption, the previous Illinois cases which construed the phrase \u201creligious purposes\u201d were no longer controlling. (Community Renewal Society v. Department of Labor (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 773, 779.) The Director of the Department of Labor in that case erroneously based his interpretation of the statute upon language in People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde Ungeaenderter Augsburgischer Confession (1911), 249 Ill. 132, 137, 94 N.E. 162, which held that \u201creligious purpose\u201d meant use of the property for \u201cpublic worship, Sunday schools and religious instruction.\u201d The Community Renewal court recognized that this error of law affected the Director\u2019s deliberations and thus his decision had to be overturned. Community Renewal Society v. Department of Labor (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778-80.\nPlaintiff strenuously contends that in the instant case, the Director likewise applied an erroneous standard. Plaintiff points to several comments the Director made during the hearing as well as to several references in the report to support this contention: for example, the Director\u2019s representative framed the issue as whether plaintiff is a \u201cnonprofit corporation under the Act organized and operated primarily for charitable purposes\u201d; the representative focused upon plaintiff\u2019s bylaws and articles of incorporation; the representative utilized the narrow definition of \u201creligious purpose\u201d as use of property \u201cfor public worship, Sunday schools and religious instruction,\u201d quoting People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon (1922), 306 Ill. 234, 238, 137 N.E. 863; and that the representative\u2019s conclusion stated that \u201cwe conclude, based on petitioner\u2019s corporate charter and by-laws, that it is a charitable not-for-profit corporation whose primary purpose is to assist American Indians in the Chicago area.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDuring the review of the Department\u2019s decision, the trial court agreed with plaintiff that \u201cthe nature of St. Augustine\u2019s organization should not have been dispositive.\u201d After noting the legislative changes in the statute which deleted the organization and exclusivity requirements in section 211.3 of the Act, the trial court nevertheless affirmed the agency\u2019s decision because it could not conclude that the representative\u2019s decision was premised solely on plaintiff\u2019s organizational structure. The court commented that in light of all the evidence that was presented regarding plaintiff\u2019s actual functions and activities, \u201c[e]ven without considering the charter and by-laws this Court concludes that the evidence supports the Director\u2019s decision that St. Augustine\u2019s is operated primarily for charitable purposes.\u201d The trial court agreed with the Director\u2019s finding that the religious services which plaintiff offered \u201cwere only incidental to the Center\u2019s primary charitable function of providing secular assistance and benefits to American Indians.\u201d The trial court therefore affirmed the Department\u2019s decision as not being against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAfter a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was correct in its analysis of the law and the record. We have considered the numerous cases plaintiff cites from other jurisdictions which, like Community Renewal, reject the narrow definition of \u201creligious purposes\u201d as being limited to public worship and religious instruction activities. We agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals that the terms \u201ccharitable\u201d and \u201creligious\u201d are not mutually exclusive and that \u201c[i]t is true that the mere fact that an organization is charitable does not necessarily mean that it is religious, but, conversely, the fact that an organization is charitable does not preclude it from being religious.\u201d (St. Vincent DePaul Shop v. Admr., Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) par. 8914, at 38, 676 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1974).) While the record in the instant case indicates that plaintiff offers religious services, we agree with the conclusion that the \u201cprimary\u201d purpose of the Center is to offer social services and the religious purpose is only secondary. As one court noted, the use of the word \u201cprimarily\u201d necessarily contemplates an additional attribute and means \u201cof first importance\u201d as opposed to \u201csecondarily.\u201d Department of Employment v. Champion Bake-N-Serve, Inc. (1979), 100 Idaho 53, 55, 592 P.2d 1370, 1372.\nPlaintiff\u2019s assistant director testified at the hearing before the Director\u2019s representative that \u201cthe emphasis, thrust of the program and the main goal of the program is the same. To help out American Indian families who are coming to Chicago to achieve a better life, both morally, spiritually and physically.\u201d The fact that religious services and guidance are provided by the plaintiff does not preclude a determination that the Center\u2019s primary goal is to provide secular assistance to American Indians in the Chicago area.\nWe also note that the report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the Employment Security Amendments of 1970, relied upon in Community Renewal because of the close causal relationship between FUTA and our Act, offers this guideline as to what services would be exempt which were performed for organizations \u201coperated primarily for religious purposes\u201d:\n\u201c \u2018***[A] church related (separately incorporated) charitable organization (such as, for example, an orphanage or a home for the aged) would not be considered under [section 3309(b)(1) of FUTA] to be operated primarily for religious purposes.\u2019 \u201d Com munity Renewal Society v. Departmemt of Labor (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 773, 781.\nKeeping in mind that each tax-exemption case must be determined on its individual facts (Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship of the United States v. Hoffman (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 798, 801, 379 N.E.2d 813), we conclude that the record supports the Department of Labor\u2019s decision and the trial court\u2019s well-reasoned judgment that plaintiff is not exempt under section 211.3(AX2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nPERLIN and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.\nFather Powell has devoted his entire lifetime to the study and service of American Indians and is a noted author and historian specializing in the history of the Cheyenne.\nOne definition given for the term \u201csecular\u201d is \u201cof or relating to the worldly or temporal as distinguished from the spiritual or eternal.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2053 (1971).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "A. Bruce White, of Karaganis, Gail & White, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Scott J. Linn, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ST. AUGUSTINE\u2019S CENTER FOR AMERICAN INDIANS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 82\u20141356\nOpinion filed May 10, 1983.\nRehearing denied June 9, 1983.\nA. Bruce White, of Karaganis, Gail & White, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Scott J. Linn, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 643, "last_page_order": 649 }