{ "id": 3590403, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER G. BLAIR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Blair", "decision_date": "1983-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 82\u20141404", "first_page": "655", "last_page": "657", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 655" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5541447 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391990 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3101896 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2485353 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0584-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 386, "char_count": 5091, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.644174733055332e-07, "percentile": 0.6916038348181689 }, "sha256": "aa3df4e8302e72c97593a95e2bdb2631008f1c76ac6dfe00984a8e05696a2275", "simhash": "1:2a2a1e1f8c55bec1", "word_count": 852 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:13.547892+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER G. BLAIR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial the defendant, Walter G. Blair, was convicted of soliciting for a prostitute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1)), and sentenced to pay a fine of $80 and $10 in costs. He appeals contending that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe defendant was arrested in the 600 block of South Cicero in Chicago, on November 14, 1981, at approximately 12:45 a.m. Police Officer Diane Trible testified she was assigned to Operation Angel in the above area. The defendant pulled over to the curb and called her to his car and \u201cI believe offered me $15 for a French,\u201d which she said is a term of oral copulation. She admitted that she did not remember the exact conversation, but said the defendant asked something like, \u201cDo you want a date.\u201d He asked her if she knew what a \u201cFrench\u201d was, and she responded, \u201cOh, yeah.\u201d She then signaled her partners, who placed the defendant under arrest.\nThe defendant testified that he was in his car with his auto mechanic and they were going in . an easterly direction. He noticed Officer Trible standing at the intersection of Fifth and Cicero avenues. After passing her, they came to an alley, and he told the mechanic to turn into it so they could back out and drive in a westerly direction. As they backed out of the alley, he saw a police squad car. When he returned to Officer Trible at the intersection, he told the mechanic to stop. He told the officer that if she was looking for a \u201cdate,\u201d she should find another place because of the police. He was then arrested. He denied knowing what the term \u201cFrench\u201d means, and denied offering to pay the officer for a sex act.\nThe defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense of soliciting for a prostitute. He maintains that the statute does not proscribe soliciting a prostitute,' but soliciting for a prostitute which he says constitutes conduct by third parties that aids and abets the transaction between the prostitute and patron.\nSection 11 \u2014 15(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:\n\u201cAny person who performs any of the following acts commits soliciting for a prostitute:\n(1) Solicits another for the purpose of prostitution; ***.\u201d\n(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15(a)(1).)\nIn People v. Rice (1943), 383 Ill. 584, 50 N.E.2d 711, our supreme court said:\n\u201cThe definitions of \u2018solicit\u2019 and \u2018prostitution\u2019 are so well and universally understood as to require no further definition in the statute or charge to set forth the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.\u201d 383 Ill. 584, 588.\nIn the instant case the defendant cannot assert that the statue does not proscribe soliciting a prostitute. The language of the statute creating the offense may be easily understood, and it does not preclude soliciting prostitution. The defendant relies upon the Committee Comments set forth in the Smith-Hurd Illinois Annotated Statutes, which state:\n\u201cSubsection (a)(1) proscribes simply \u2018soliciting\u2019. This subsection envisions one who actively seeks out customers for the prostitute, those who initiate the suggestion to the prospective patron.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 15, Committee Comments, at 341 (Smith-Hurd 1979).)\nHowever, the language of the statute is not to be so narrowly drawn. Courts should look to the object of the statute and the evils sought to be remedied. (People v. Gibson (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 616, 425 N.E.2d 1197.) The defendant\u2019s analysis overlooks the important element of the offense of soliciting for a prostitute; namely, the public nuisance aspect of open solicitation which the legislature sought to limit.\nWhen a statute uses words which have a well-known legal meaning, courts will assume that is the meaning intended by the legislature. (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Wishnevsky (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 550, 283 N.E.2d 872.) If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, there should be no resort to extrinsic aids such as legislative history. (Rushton v. O\u2019Malley (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 103, 411 N.E.2d 528.) The phrase \u201csolicits another for the purpose of prostitution\u201d has a broader meaning than to solicit another on behalf of a prostitute as the defendant contends. It also means to appeal to or entice another for an act of prostitution. Here, we believe that the trial court correctly held that the statute applies to the facts of this case.\nFor the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDBERG and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and Thomas Wood Flynn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER G. BLAIR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 82\u20141404\nOpinion filed May 2, 1983.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan, and Thomas Wood Flynn, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0655-01", "first_page_order": 677, "last_page_order": 679 }