{ "id": 3556397, "name": "HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF COOK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARITA R. TONSUL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Housing Authority v. Tonsul", "decision_date": "1983-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 82\u20142027", "first_page": "739", "last_page": "746", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 739" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "214 N.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879703 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E. 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5291764 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/354/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635780 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3412234 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" }, { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2594923 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/68/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2582681 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/73/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2519093 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Mo. 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1894207 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800-01" }, { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mo/340/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454753 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 N.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879703 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2594923 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/68/0234-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 14653, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3496184461595762e-07, "percentile": 0.7930728779940452 }, "sha256": "8dc1f53e654c738e3f707d7dc9dcc221aee0c130a8ad79fa6c6b54ffc4542db6", "simhash": "1:7d1616d07b0a344f", "word_count": 2444 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:24.783716+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF COOK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARITA R. TONSUL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Margarita Tonsul appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff Cook County Housing Authority (CCHA) in this forcible entry and detainer action, contending that the judgment is void because CCHA\u2019s complaint was prepared, signed, and filed by a nonattorney agent.\nThe complaint which commenced this action was filed on May 17, 1982. The complaint was signed by James A. Floyd in the space reserved for the attorney\u2019s signature. Floyd was not licensed to practice law in Illinois at that time. Next to the signature the word \u201cattorney\u201d was scratched out and the word \u201cagent\u201d put in its place, so that the signature line read \u201cJames A. Floyd, agent for plaintiff.\u201d A hearing was held on July 28, 1982, at which plaintiff\u2019s attorney requested and was allowed leave to file his appearance. Defendant filed a special appearance and moved to quash the service of summons on the grounds that plaintiff, as a municipal corporation, is not empowered to initiate litigation on its own behalf except through a licensed attorney, and that the signing of the complaint by a nonattorney rendered all subsequent proceedings in the case a nullity. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant elected not to contest the merits of the case. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, with execution stayed under a use and occupancy bond during the pendency of this appeal.\nIt is well settled that section 11 of the attorneys and counselors act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 13, par. 11), which allows parties litigant to prosecute and defend their actions \u201cin their proper persons,\u201d in no way authorizes a corporation to appear in any proceeding in any court through an agent who is not a licensed attorney. (See Aarrow Ambulance v. Davis (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 318, 319, 306 N.E.2d 363; Leonard v. Walsh (1966), 73 Ill. App. 2d 45, 47, 220 N.E.2d 57; see, e.g., Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 238-39, 215 N.E.2d 678.) Where a cause is prosecuted by a layman acting on behalf of a corporation, any proceedings in the case are a nullity and any judgment rendered therein is void. (See Aarrow Ambulance; Remole.) This strict rule operates to void the judgment even where the lay agent merely files the complaint over his own signature, and all subsequent court appearances are made by a duly licensed attorney. See Marken Real Estate & Management Corp. v. Adams (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 426, 428, 371 N.E.2d 1192.\nPlaintiff advances several arguments as to why the judgment in the instant case is not rendered void by the fact the complaint was signed by a layman. The first is that Floyd, by filling out and signing the simple, two-paragraph form complaint for forcible entry and detainer was performing a simple ministerial task which required no legal knowledge or skill and which can not be considered to be practicing law. Our supreme court has defined the practice of law as \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service *** when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch (1950), 406 Ill. 253, 256, 94 N.E.2d 148.) The court has expressly stated that that definition \u201cembraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings.\u201d (People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers (1933), 354 Ill. 102, 110, 187 N.E. 823.) In Marken Real Estate & Management Corp. v. Adams (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 426, 371 N.E.2d 1192, a layman agent of the plaintiff corporation filed a complaint for distress for rent, a distress warrant, and an inventory \"with his name entered in the space for the attorney\u2019s name. The court expressly did not decide whether the filing of the inventory and warrant constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The court held that the signing of the complaint by the nonattorney agent constituted the unauthorized practice of law and rendered the judgment entered in the plaintiff\u2019s favor void. 56 Ill. App. 3d 426, 429.\nPlaintiff relies on Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771, for the proposition that the simplicity of the complaint involved in this case takes the preparation of the complaint out of the realm of the practice of law. In that case, our supreme court held that a real estate broker is not engaged in the practice of law when he fills in the blanks on a standard form earnest money contract or offer to purchase form with information provided by the parties to the transaction, because the preparation of such a preliminary form is incidental to the broker\u2019s function and operates as his entitlement to his commission. (34 Ill. 2d 116, 121.) That holding, however, represents only a narrow exception to the broad rule enunciated in that case that real estate brokers are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when they fill in the blanks on deeds, mortgages, and other legal instruments. (34 Ill. 2d 116, 122.) As to the defendant\u2019s argument that such instruments are so standardized that only ordinary business knowledge is required to complete them, the court stated:\n\u201cMany aspects of law practice are conducted through the use of forms, and not all of the matters handled require extensive investigation of the law. But by his training the lawyer is equipped to recognize when this is and when it is not the case. Neither counsel nor amici have suggested any practicable way in which an exception to the general rule can be made where only the use of forms is involved, or where the transaction is a \u2018simple\u2019 one. Mere simplicity cannot be the basis for drawing boundaries to the practice of a profession.\u201d 34 Ill. 2d 116, 123.\nLikewise, we reject plaintiff\u2019s argument that the simplicity of the forcible entry and detainer complaint exempts Floyd\u2019s actions from the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law.\nThe briefs of the parties contain extensive references and arguments concerning the application of the Practice of Law by Corporations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 411 et seq.) to this case. The cases cited above, however, construed the provisions of the attorneys and counselors act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 13, par. 1 et seq.), and the holdings in those cases are dispositive of the issues in this case. The court in Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N.E.2d 678, noted that section 1 of the Practice of Law by Corporations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 411), which forbids the practice of law by corporations, and section 5 of the act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 415), which authorizes corporations to employ attorneys to conduct litigation and other matters incidental \u2022to the corporation\u2019s business, evidences a strong legislative intent that corporations may not practice law except through a licensed attorney. (68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 238.) Plaintiff argues that the Practice of Law by Corporations Act should not be applied to municipal corporations, because although such corporations are not specifically exempted from the provisions of the Act (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 415), the distinctions between municipal corporations and business corporations are so great that a statutory provision which specifically applies to business corporations should not be construed to apply to municipal corporations absent a clear legislative intent.\nWithout addressing the question of whether the Practice of Law by Corporations Act applies to municipal corporations, we note that municipal corporations, like business corporations, can not be said to have the ability to appear in court \u201cin their proper persons\u201d as provided in section 11 of the attorneys and counselors act, and thus they can not be exempted from the provision of section 1 of that act that no person shall practice law in this State unless he is a duly licensed attorney. The issue in this case is not whether a municipal corporation may hold itself out as being entitled to practice law or whether it may practice law on its own behalf; the issue is whether such an entity may conduct legal proceedings through a layman agent. In this regard, the court in Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N.E.2d 678, remarked that \u201c[i]t is more than a play on words to say that soulless corporations function only through living souls.\u201d (68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 238.) Municipal corporations, like their business counterparts, are soulless and inanimate, and when an agent undertakes to practice law on behalf of such a principal, he must be licensed to do so.\nFor the reasons expressed herein, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nPERLIN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STAMOS" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING,\ndissenting:\nAs stated by the majority, \u201cthe issue is whether such an entity may conduct legal proceedings through a layman agent.\u201d I differ with the majority in the interpretation of \u201cconduct legal proceedings.\u201d To reverse this case- solely because the forcible detainer complaint was prepared, signed and filed by a nonattorney agent is an example where, in the administration of justice, we can be imprisoned in a straight jacket of archaic formalism. Defendant does not challenge the finding of the trial court. In fact, rather than meet the substantive charges head-on, defendant adopted a formalistic objection which the court approves.\nNow the case must go back to square one and an attorney must sign the complaint. How is the administration of justice helped, in a case of this type, by the continued adherence to this antediluvian principle? What prejudice or damage is there to defendant by the fact that James A. Floyd signed the complaint on behalf of his employer as \u201cAgent for plaintiff?\u201d What prejudice or damage is there to defendant by the fact that the \u201cNotice of Termination of Tenancy\u201d attached to the complaint was signed for plaintiff \u201cBy James A. Floyd, Director of Management?\u201d\nThe majority relies upon section 11 of the attorneys and counselors act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 13, par. 11), the Practice of Law by Corporations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 32, par. 411 et seq.), and numerous appellate court cases. The supreme court has not addressed this precise question. The appellate court apparently first addressed itself to this question in 1966 in Remole Soil Service, Inc. v. Benson (1966), 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N.E.2d 678.\nPlaintiff correctly relies on Chicago Bar Association v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d 771. As I read that case, the supreme court held that what was done by a real estate broker (completing blanks on a printed real estate contract) did not amount to the practice of law. Here, all agent Floyd did, on behalf of his employer, was fill in a printed form issued by the circuit court of Cook County (CCMD-21A) with the words hereafter underlined (the balance of the words are preprinted):\nFloyd never identified himself as an attorney. Floyd never appeared in court as an attorney. There is no claim that anyone other than an attorney ever appeared for plaintiff in court. Under these circumstances, I think the supreme court\u2019s position in Quinlan & Tyson should prevail. I do not think that Floyd\u2019s act constituted the practice of law, and if it did, certainly not the type of practice intended to be covered under either of the pertinent statutes. It is difficult to understand how the filling in of the blank spaces and words as underlined in the aforesaid illustration requires the skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law. Floyd, as plaintiff\u2019s agent, initiated legal proceedings, but did not conduct them.\nDefendant does not point out how she was harmed by virtue of agent Floyd signing the complaint rather than an attorney. In fact, the \u201cNotice of Termination of Tenancy\u201d which was attached to the complaint was signed on behalf of plaintiff by Floyd as \u201cDirector of Management.\u201d Upon receipt of that notice, defendant requested a hearing, and the hearing officer ruled that the termination of defendant\u2019s lease was justified.\nII\nAlthough not discussed in either the majority opinion or the parties\u2019 briefs, it might be noted that the issue here involves the operation of the court system and the interpretation of papers filed in the court. This brings into consideration the court\u2019s supervisory and administrative responsibility. The practice of law involves much more than the instant issue. When there is a question which involves the papers to be filed in a court proceeding, should not the determination of that question be left to judicial rules or discretion rather than to statutory mandate? (See People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602.) In the absence of a judicial rule (no supreme court rule covers this question), then I suggest judicial discretion should apply. In effect, the trial court\u2019s determination was the exercise of judicial discretion based on the record in this case and should be affirmed.\nIII\nAs to whether the Practice of Law by Corporations Act applied to municipal corporations, it might be pertinent to note that said act is codified in chapter 32 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Chapter 32 does not deal with municipal corporations, whereas chapter 24 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24) includes definitions of \u201cmunicipal\u201d (par. 1\u2014 1 \u2014 2(1)) and \u201ccorporate authorities\u201d (par. 1 \u2014 1\u20142(2)), and provides for the incorporation of areas into municipalities. Plaintiff is a municipal corporation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 67V2, par. 8). No one has pointed out any legislative intent to apply the Practice of Law by Corporations Act to municipal corporations. In City of Webster Groves v. Smith (1937), 340 Mo. 798, 800-01, 102 S.W.2d 618, 619, the Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished between a \u201ccorporation\u201d and a \u201cmunicipal corporation,\u201d holding that each term has a distinct and commonly accepted meaning. I suggest the same is true in Illinois.\nThe record in this case does not demonstrate any harm to defendant, or how she was prejudiced by the complaint tiled in this case. I would affirm.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING," } ], "attorneys": [ "Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., of Chicago (Marilyn S. Rzasa, of counsel), for appellant.", "Keck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (James T. Otis, James J. Casey, and A. Benjamin Goldgar, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF COOK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARITA R. TONSUL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 82\u20142027\nOpinion filed June 14, 1983.\nDOWNING, P.J., dissenting.\nCook County Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., of Chicago (Marilyn S. Rzasa, of counsel), for appellant.\nKeck, Mahin & Cate, of Chicago (James T. Otis, James J. Casey, and A. Benjamin Goldgar, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0739-01", "first_page_order": 761, "last_page_order": 768 }