{ "id": 3556641, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMONT BAGGETT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Baggett", "decision_date": "1983-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 82\u201414", "first_page": "924", "last_page": "935", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 924" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3159970 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5584177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366478 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5636941 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5495716 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5619453 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2775877 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376950 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427013 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2726133 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.E.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5312273 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 N.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2771043 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "381 Ill. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2557105 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/381/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 N.E. 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2443876 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/324/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 1085", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3151682 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1091" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/1085-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 819", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5414551 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5540457 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404489 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1063, "char_count": 23000, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3254482097769787e-07, "percentile": 0.7904789043685558 }, "sha256": "519b59870137a297ea2d9f0ab0a5b4d336406d7edad7609120c203f5a1dd4594", "simhash": "1:ba2bb2b2de05cac7", "word_count": 3863 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:24.783716+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMONT BAGGETT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE PERLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn a jury trial, defendant, Lament Baggett, was found guilty of murder and armed violence and judgment was entered on the verdicts. The trial court thereafter vacated the judgment on the armed violence verdict and sentenced defendant to serve 30 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections for murder. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court improperly refused the jury\u2019s request to review testimony and coerced the jury into returning a verdict; that the jury was not properly instructed; that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the court unduly limited defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of two State witnesses; and that the court improperly restricted defendant from testifying as to his state of mind immediately prior to the shooting. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence disclosed that on May 26, 1980, at approximately 9 p.m., Venita Richey was visiting her grandmother, Virgie Booker, in Booker\u2019s apartment on North Lockwood Street in Chicago. Shortly after 9 p.m., Kenneth Jackson, whose family lived in the same apartment building, and Verdell Richey, Venita\u2019s brother, went to Booker\u2019s apartment to drive Venita home. Venita, Verdell, Jackson and defendant left the apartment and walked to the patio at the rear of the apartment building. Jackson then asked defendant, \u201cWho do you think you are, you\u2019re pussy, you ain\u2019t nothing.\u201d Keith Perry, Jackson\u2019s cousin, who was waiting for him outside of Booker\u2019s apartment, also heard Jackson tell defendant, \u201cYou need a little pussy.\u201d\nVenita, Verdell, Jackson, Perry and defendant all walked to the front of the building where Jackson\u2019s blue Vega was parked. Jackson sat in the driver\u2019s seat. Perry began to sit down in the back seat of the car but got out when Venita entered the car. Verdell and defendant were standing near a fence talking but as Jackson and Venita were about to leave, defendant approached the car holding a gun in his right hand. Defendant started poking Jackson with the gun and Venita heard defendant say, \u201cI told you to stop f[------] with me, didn\u2019t I, I told you to leave me alone.\u201d Jackson put his arms close to his chest. According to Perry and Verdell, defendant said, \u201cWhat do I care about going to jail, you ain\u2019t s[ \u2014 ], next time I\u2019m going to kill your mother f[......] ass.\u201d Perry testified that Jackson replied, \u201cOkay, man, I\u2019m just playing.\u201d Defendant then shot Jackson once, placed the gun in his pants and ran north on Lockwood. Venita testified that defendant shot Jackson at a distance of between six inches and one foot; Verdell stated that the weapon was about \u201ca foot, more or less\u201d from Jackson when it was fired.\nAfter being shot, Jackson opened the car door, got out, walked a few steps and collapsed. Jackson\u2019s father, Roosevelt Jackson, came out of the family\u2019s apartment and saw his son lying on the grass. He observed that his son had been shot and noticed that his son\u2019s car was parked on the southeast corner of Race and Lockwood with the engine running. He got into the car, backed it up 15 to 20 feet, rolled up the window on the driver\u2019s side and exited the car. There were bloodstains on the car seat. Kenneth Jackson later died at St. Anne\u2019s Hospital.\nDr. Uksel Konacki, who performed the autopsy, discovered three external wounds on Jackson\u2019s body: a bullet entry wound on Jackson\u2019s inner left arm near the fifth finger, an exit wound on the inner left arm near the thumb, and an entry wound near the left nipple. Dr. Konacki was unable to determine whether all three external wounds were caused by the same bullet. Death was caused by bullet lacerations of the heart and lungs.\nDr. Konacki testified that a bullet fired at close range could cause \u201cstippling,\u201d i.e., the speckling of embedded gunpowder particles around an entrance wound. Although he found no evidence of stippling around any of Jackson\u2019s wounds, he did not perform a microscopic examination for powder residue. Dr. Konacki did not state at what exact distance stippling could occur.\nDefendant testified to the following:\nOn the day of the shooting, May 26, 1980, he went to Virgie Booker\u2019s apartment to visit Venita Richey. Venita\u2019s brother Verdell and Kenneth Jackson were also present. When it was time for Venita to go home, Jackson told defendant to leave. Venita, Verdell, Jackson and defendant then left the apartment building together. They walked out to Jackson\u2019s Vega. Jackson called defendant a \u201cpunk, fag sissy\u201d and threatened to \u201ckick [his] ass.\u201d\nVenita sat on the passenger side of the car and Jackson sat in the driver\u2019s seat. Verdell stood next to the open door on the driver\u2019s side talking with Jackson. Defendant started to leave but Jackson called him back. Defendant walked around the front of the car and stopped near the driver\u2019s side door. Jackson told defendant that he did not want \u201cto catch [him] around there any more.\u201d Jackson reached up and shoved defendant who pushed him back. Verdell then handed Jackson a gun through the open car door. Jackson grabbed the weapon with his right hand and pointed it at defendant. Defendant stepped back and said, \u201cNo, don\u2019t do that.\u201d When defendant was four to five feet from the car, defendant pulled his own gun from his pants, closed his eyes and fired. Defendant ran to his mother\u2019s house after the shooting. Defendant fired the gun because he was scared.\nDefendant also testified that he was not upset that Jackson called him names in front of Venita nor was he bothered by the fact that Jackson told him not to return to Booker\u2019s apartment. Defendant admitted that prior to May 26, 1980, he had known both Venita and Verdell Richey but stated that he had not met Kenneth Jackson until the day of the shooting. The first time defendant saw Keith Perry was in court.\nI\nDefendant contends that the trial court improperly refused the jury\u2019s request to review the testimony and coerced the jury into returning a verdict. The facts pertinent to this discussion are as follows:\nThe jury began its deliberations in this case shortly after 3 p.m. At 9 p.m., the foreman sent word to the trial judge that the jury had a question. The foreman stated that the jury had come to an impasse and had not been able to reach a verdict. The foreman at first requested additional evidence, but the court replied that it could not provide such evidence. The foreman then stated that the jury\u2019s question concerned clarification of existing testimony. The judge allowed the foreman to ask the question, and the following exchange took place:\n\u201cFOREMAN: There was an exhibit here number one of the Defense which shows the car which has initials and \u2018x\u2018s indicating a location where a gun was passed from one person to the deceased.\nThis opening. Now at one time during the trial we were lead [sic] to believe that the door was shut. And that the window was down.\nThat was not brought to light today and it seems to be one of the main problems in coming to a conclusion.\nTHE COURT: There\u2019s no way that I can answer that for you. Whatever you collectively or recall individually collectively, I don\u2019t think I could answer it even if I were permitted to.\nFOREMAN: What do we do at this point that we have come to an impasse.\nTHE COURT: Because of that?\nFOREMAN: Apparently, so.\nTHE COURT: Well all I can do is give you more time. It is now nine o\u2019clock. In about half an hour we\u2019ll have to make overnight arrangements for you but the rules of procedure just do not permit it.\nFOREMAN: We cannot go over testimony?\nTHE COURT: No.\u201d\nDefendant submits that the court erred in refusing the jury\u2019s request. It is within the discretion of the trial court to allow or to refuse a request for the review of testimony. (People v. Pierce (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 361, 364, 308 N.E.2d 577.) There is error, however, when a trial court refuses to exercise discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented. (People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 565, 310 N.E.2d 166.) Interpreting the foreman\u2019s question as a request for the review of testimony, defendant argues that the court committed reversible error in denying this request. We believe the premise of defendant\u2019s argument is erroneous.\nWhen the colloquy between the foreman and the court is considered in its entirety, it does not appear that the jury wanted to review any specific portion of the trial testimony. The foreman\u2019s inquiry indicated that the jury was familiar with the evidence. Rather, it appears that the jury sought guidance from the court to help resolve a conflict in the evidence.\nA trial judge does not abuse his discretion when he refuses to answer an improper question and directs the jury to continue its deliberations. (People v. Kelly (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 400, 405, 411 N.E.2d 1012.) The court may decline to answer a question which would require the judge to answer with a conclusion based on his own evaluation of the evidence. (People v. Williams (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13, 322 N.E.2d 819.) In the instant case, the judge refused to answer the foreman\u2019s inquiry apparently because his answer necessarily would have reflected his own opinion of the evidence. We find no error in this. While defendant maintains that the judge\u2019s comment, \u201cBecause of that?\u201d had the effect of telling the jury that the disputed point was not important to its deliberations, we are unable to place such an interpretation on this comment. From our reading of the record, we conclude that the court\u2019s remark was merely another way of asking whether there were other reasons for the impasse in deliberations.\nDefendant also argues that the trial judge coerced a verdict when he informed the jury that, \u201cIn about half an hour we\u2019ll have to make overnight arrangements for you, ***.\u201d We cannot agree.\nThe jurors had been deliberating for approximately six hours and knew that it was late. They may well have been tired and in need of rest. Without being advised that there was a limit as to how long they would have to deliberate before they would be sequestered, the jurors might have felt pressured to reach an immediate decision. The trial judge\u2019s comments had the effect of removing and not of creating any such pressure. Informing a jury that it might be sequestered cannot be considered coercive. (See People v. Green (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1091, 415 N.E.2d 595.) In our judgment, the record fails to show that the trial judge coerced a verdict.\nII\nThe jury in this case was instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter under section 9 \u2014 2(b) (unreasonable belief in self-defense) of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2(b).) In his second argument, defendant contends that the jury also should have been instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter under section 9 \u2014 2(a) (serious provocation) which states, in part:\n\u201cA person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:\n(1) the individual killed, or\n* * *\nSerious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2(a).\nThe supreme court has repeatedly held that \u201c[a] defendant is entitled to the benefit of any defense shown by the entire evidence, even if the facts on which such defense is based are inconsistent with the defendant\u2019s own testimony\u201d (People v. Scalisi (1926), 324 Ill. 131, 145, 154 N.E. 715; People v. Papas (1942), 381 Ill. 90, 96, 44 N.E.2d 896; People v. Izzo (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 203, 211, 151 N.E.2d 329) and that \u201cvery slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction.\u201d (People v. Khamis (1951), 411 Ill. 46, 53, 103 N.E.2d 133; People v. Kalpak (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 411, 425, 140 N.E.2d 726.) Nevertheless, the \u201cvery slight evidence\u201d test does establish a minimum standard to be met before instructions are required. \u201cTo hold otherwise would permit a defendant to demand unlimited instructions, which are wholly unrelated to the case but are based upon the merest factual reference or witness\u2019s comment.\u201d (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540-41, 349 N.E.2d 31.) With these principles in mind, we turn to a review of the evidence which defendant cites in support of his argument that instructions on the elements of voluntary manslaughter under section 9 \u2014 2(a) were required in this instance.\nDefendant claims that there was evidence of serious provocation because of the names Jackson called him and because of their \u201cshoving match\u201d which defendant characterizes as \u201cmutual combat.\u201d\n\u201cPassion on the part of the slayer, no matter how violent will not relieve him from liability for murder unless it is engendered by a provocation which the law recognizes as being reasonable and adequate. If the provocation is not sufficient the crime is murder. It is the general rule that language, however aggravated, abusive, opprobrious, or indecent, is not sufficient provocation to reduce a killing committed with a deadly weapon from murder to manslaughter. [Citations.] The rule does not apply where as a result of insulting or opprobrious words, the parties become suddenly heated, and engage in a mutual combat, fighting on equal terms, and death results from the combat. [Citation.]\nThe term mutual combat has been defined as one into which both parties enter willingly, or in which two persons, upon a sudden quarrel, and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms. 15 C.J.S. p. 358.\nA slight provocation will not be adequate since the provocation must be proportionate to the manner in which the accused retaliated and therefore if accused on a slight provocation attacked deceased with violence out of all proportion to the provocation and killed him the crime is murder. This is especially true if the homicide was committed with a deadly weapon. [Citations.]\u201d People v. Matthews (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 249, 253, 314 N.E.2d 15.\nIn our judgment, shooting someone is a disproportionate response to being called names and being shoved one time. Moreover, defendant testified that he was not disturbed by the names Jackson called him nor was he upset that Jackson told him not to return to Booker\u2019s apartment. Defendant also testified that he shot the deceased because he was \u201cscared.\u201d None of the other witnesses testified to any conduct which would indicate that defendant shot the deceased because he was provoked. We conclude that defendant did not present evidence which would have entitled him to a voluntary manslaughter instruction under section 9 \u2014 2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961.\nIn his second argument, defendant also raises certain objections to the armed violence instructions. In light of the fact that the trial court vacated the judgment of conviction on this offense, we need not address them.\nIll\nDefendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder. At trial, Kenneth Jackson\u2019s cousin, Keith Perry, testified that he observed defendant shoot Jackson. Perry, how- \u25a0 ever, did not discuss the shooting with anyone for eight or nine months thereafter. And Verdell Richey could not recall with certainty whether Perry was present when Jackson was shot. Defendant cites People v. Coulson (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 290, 297, 149 N.E.2d 96, for the proposition that \u201c[w]here testimony is contrary to the laws of nature, or universal human experience, [a court of review] is not bound to believe the witness.\u201d According to defendant, the fact that Perry did not mention the shooting to anyone for eight or nine months and then gave a detailed account of the incident is too improbable to be believed. We cannot agree.\nIn our judgment, Perry\u2019s testimony is not so inherently improbable that it could not be believed. At best, Perry\u2019s dilatory actions in reporting what he had witnessed merely affects his credibility, a matter for the jury to decide. (People v. Spates (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 890, 893, 379 N.E.2d 869.) Furthermore, Perry\u2019s account of the incident was corroborated by Venita and Verdell Richey. Defendant, however, asserts that their testimony was contradicted by the \u201cphysical evidence.\u201d\nVenita Richey testified that when defendant shot Jackson, the gun was between six inches and one foot from the victim. Verdell Richey estimated that the distance was \u201ca foot, more or less.\u201d Dr. Konacki, however, discovered no evidence of stippling which normally is found when a person has been shot at close range. Defendant thus concludes that the physical evidence contradicts the eyewitness accounts of Venita and Verdell Richey. We note, though, that Dr. Konacki did not explain what he meant by \u201cclose range.\u201d Moreover, the eyewitnesses\u2019 estimates were imprecise. The accuracy of those estimates and the weight to be given them were matters for the jury to resolve.\nDefendant also argues that since he testified that Jackson was armed, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson did not have a gun and that defendant therefore did not act in self-defense. Defendant maintains that it was incumbent upon the State to establish that no one removed Jackson\u2019s gun prior to the arrival of the police.\nBoth Venita and Verdell Richey testified that Jackson did not have a gun. Whether Jackson was in fact armed was an issue for the jury to decide. A jury is not obligated to accept as true defendant\u2019s testimony concerning self-defense. Rather, in weighing the evidence, the jury must consider the probability or improbability of the testimony, the circumstances surrounding the killing, and the testimony of other witnesses. (People v. Perez (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905, 427 N.E.2d 229.) In our judgment, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict that defendant was guilty of murder.\nIV\nDefendant contends further that his counsel was unduly unlimited in his cross-examination of Roosevelt Jackson, the victim\u2019s father, and Verdell Richey.\nJackson testified that when he moved his son\u2019s car, he rolled up the car window. At defendant\u2019s first trial, which ended in a mistrial, Roosevelt did not mention this fact. Defense counsel asserted that his testimony at the second trial had been fabricated and wanted to impeach him by proving that at the first trial he had not referred to raising the car window. The trial court ruled that the prior testimony did not form a proper basis for impeachment by omission. Defendant\u2019s attorney, however, was allowed to ask Roosevelt whether, prior to September 30, 1981, the date on which he testified at the first trial, he had told the prosecutors that he had rolled up the window of his son\u2019s car. Roosevelt answered affirmatively.\nMatters of impeachment are within the sound discretion of the trial court. (O\u2019Brien v. Walker (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 940, 951, 364 N.E.2d 533.) In People v. Brown (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 920, 928-29, 365 N.E.2d 514, the appellate court stated:\n\u201cThe omission of a witness to state a particular fact under circumstances rendering it incumbent upon him to, or likely that he would state such fact, if true, may be shown to discredit his testimony as to such fact. The omission must be material ***. *** If the court fails to allow the impeachment by omission, reversal is not required unless manifest prejudice to the defendant results. [Citation.]\u201d\nDefendant has not established that it was incumbent upon Roosevelt to have mentioned at the first trial the fact that he rolled up the car window; that this omission was material and affected his credibility; or that defendant was manifestly prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow defense counsel to pursue this line of questioning.\nDefendant also contends that his counsel was improperly restricted in cross-examining Verdell Richey with regard to whether Verdell saw Keith Perry at the scene of the shooting. We note, however, that after a sidebar discussion, defense counsel was allowed both to impeach Verdell and to ask him questions about his former testimony concerning Perry\u2019s presence at the shooting. Defendant\u2019s argument is not supported by the record.\nV\nFinally, defendant contends that he was prevented from testifying as to his state of mind immediately prior to the shooting.\nSince the intention or belief of the accused is a material fact in self-defense cases, the defendant must be allowed to testify directly to that fact. (People v. Pernell (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 664, 667, 391 N.E.2d 85.) When a defendant raises the issue of self-defense, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to permit a defendant to testify directly as to his state of mind and the circumstances surrounding his acts. (People v. Kline (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1014, 414 N.E.2d 141.) Defendant argues that he was not allowed to relate his state of mind. The record discloses the following testimony by defendant on this point:\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: At this point how did you feel, Lament?\nDEFENDANT: Scared because.\nPROSECUTOR: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Objection sustained.\nPROSECUTOR: Ask that his answer be stricken.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: When you saw the gun in his hand, what did you feel like?\nPROSECUTOR: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Objection\u2019s sustained.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Now you say that you backed up?\nDEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: What did you do at that time?\nDEFENDANT: I backed up, pulled out my gun and closed my eyes and fired one shot.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Why did you take your gun out?\nDEFENDANT: Because I was scared. ***\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDespite defendant\u2019s testimony that he was \u201cscared,\u201d defendant now contends that the effect of the trial court\u2019s rulings prevented him from presenting a \u201cclear picture\u201d that he believed his life was in danger and that it was necessary that he resort to deadly force. We cannot agree. The record reflects that defendant testified that Jackson grabbed a gun and pointed it at him; and that he stepped back a few feet and shot Jackson because he was scared. The inference seems obvious that defendant was afraid that Jackson was going to shoot him. Thus, in our opinion, the trial court in the instant case did in fact permit defendant to testify as to his state of mind immediately prior to the shooting.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDOWNING, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE PERLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven Clark, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, and Richard E. Neville, of Walsh & Neville, Ltd., of Chicago, pro bono, for appellant.", "Richard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Bruce A. Cardello, and Harry John Devereux, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAMONT BAGGETT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 82\u201414\nOpinion filed June 7, 1983.\nSteven Clark, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, and Richard E. Neville, of Walsh & Neville, Ltd., of Chicago, pro bono, for appellant.\nRichard M. Daley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Bruce A. Cardello, and Harry John Devereux, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0924-01", "first_page_order": 946, "last_page_order": 957 }