{ "id": 3556497, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNON GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gibson", "decision_date": "1983-06-16", "docket_number": "No. 82\u2014412", "first_page": "950", "last_page": "954", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 950" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 1373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3403282 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0967-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811651 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.E.2d 1065", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1066" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891604 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2489759 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 1373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3403282 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "968" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0967-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 450, "char_count": 9328, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.521516891525336 }, "sha256": "a2bb479c3308ceafa3e224e5cd5e810bc71965b55554225214d1b3c7f201f6fd", "simhash": "1:ef735ace573f8c42", "word_count": 1628 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:16:24.783716+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNON GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRISON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Shannon Gibson, pleaded guilty to burglary and was sentenced to three years\u2019 imprisonment on April 1, 1982. On April 2, 1982, the written judgment order was filed. On May 4, 1982, a pro se letter from the defendant was filed by the clerk of the circuit court. The State filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the letter did not constitute a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). After a hearing, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The only issue on appeal is whether the letter was timely filed and whether it complies with Supreme Court Rule 604(d). We affirm.\nThe letter from defendant stated:\n\u201cDear Sir,\nI wish to appeal my case, on the grounds of inadequate defence [sic] by my attorney. I was psyeologicly [sic] coherced [sic] into ph ading guilty. I would also like to have the court appoint me\nanother attorney. Thank you.\nSincerly [sic] yours\nShannon Gibson\ncase # 81-CF-94.\u201d\nAt the hearing, the defendant testified that he mailed the letter on April 27, 1982. The court stated that during the week prior to May 4, 1982, he was in another county and that he had no doubt that the letter had been in his basket for a week. As soon as he found the letter, he opened it and had it filed. Assuming, arguendo, that the letter was timely, the appeal must be dismissed because the letter does not constitute a motion to -withdraw a plea of guilty as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Defendant\u2019s letter does not qualify as a motion to vacate the plea where factual allegations not appearing in the record are not supported by an affidavit and the letter does not request withdrawal of the plea. The letter does not request any action other than in matters relative to the appeal. Therefore, the court properly dismissed the motion. People v. Frey (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 77, 83, 364 N.E.2d 46.\nDefendant, relying on People v. Parks (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 967, 369 N.E.2d 1373, contends that the court may treat a letter as a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. However, in Parks, defendant\u2019s letter which was timely filed sought unequivocally to withdraw the negotiated plea of guilty. In the case at bar, defendant\u2019s letter does not unequivocally seek to withdraw the negotiated plea of guilty.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Montgomery County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nEARNS, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRISON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN,\ndissenting:\nI am unable to agree with the decision of the majority; therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nThe record indicates that defendant testified that on April 27, 1982, he mailed the undated letter referred to by the majority. Although this letter was not filed by the circuit clerk until May 4, 1982, the court stated that it had no doubt that the letter had been in its mail basket for a week prior to its being filed. Thus, had defendant\u2019s letter received even routine treatment, it would have been filed in ample time for it to constitute a timely motion under Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (87 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)).\nThe majority has determined that, assuming that defendant\u2019s letter was timely, it would not constitute a motion for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment of guilty, required by Supreme Court Rule 604(d) in order to perfect an appeal. This conclusion, however, fails to take into consideration the fact that Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (87 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) makes provision for the admonitions to be given a defendant upon a plea of guilty. Rule 605(b) requires that when judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, \u201cat the time of imposing sentence\u201d the court shall advise the defendant substantially as follows:\n\u201c(1) That he has a right to appeal;\n(2) That prior to taking an appeal he must file in the trial court, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, a written motion asking to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty, setting forth his grounds for the motion;\n* * *\n(5) That if he is indigent, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the time of his plea of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to him and counsel will be appointed to assist him with the preparation of the motions; and\n(6) That in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to vacate *** shall be deemed waived.\u201d 87 Ill. 2d R. 605(b).\nIn the case at bar, after defendant was given the admonitions under Supreme Court Rule 605(b), he did everything possible to avail himself of the right to the appointment of counsel \u201cto assist him with the preparation of the motions.\u201d First, he applied to the trial judge, not the clerk of the court, requesting the appointment of counsel, a perfectly reasonable response to the court\u2019s admonition under Supreme Court Rule 605(b)(2) that such application must be filed \u201cin the trial court.\u201d Second, he specifically requested the trial court to \u201cappoint [him] another attorney.\u201d\nWhile Supreme Court Rule 604(d) is frequently cited as justification for the dismissal of an appeal, it must be borne in mind that the defendant in a criminal proceeding is not informed of the provisions of Rule 604(d). As a consequence, Illinois courts have consistently held that the failure of a trial court to give a defendant the admonitions required by Supreme Court Rule 605(b) prevents a dismissal of his appeal for failure to comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 604(d). (People v. Ryant (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 273, 274, 354 N.E.2d 395, 396.) It is my conclusion, therefore, that when defendant received the Rule 605(b) admonitions and sought to obtain the appointment of counsel, it necessarily follows that his failure to file the motion to vacate his plea and to vacate the judgment of guilty within 30 days was attributable to the trial court\u2019s failure to provide counsel for defendant \u201cto assist him in the preparation of the motions.\u201d\nWhen the predicament of an accused standing in the position of the defendant in the instant case is considered, it is impossible to expect such accused to do anything more than this defendant did. As a matter of fact, defendant did precisely what the court instructed him that he must do in order to appeal. He wrote to \u201cthe trial court\u201d and requested the appointment of counsel, as the court had advised him would be done, on request, \u201cto assist him with the preparation of the motions.\u201d\nThe dilemma of an accused in -a situation such as that facing the defendant in the instant appeal, as well as defendants similarly situated, is the result of the defendant being left to pursue his appellate remedies on his own. He has been sentenced by the trial court, who gives him the Rule 605(b) admonitions and is gone. Defense counsel, often appointed by the court, wishes defendant good luck and vanishes. The defendant is returned to jail; and, since he is no longer represented by counsel, is left to his own devices in obtaining appointed counsel and perfecting his appeal. It is unconscionable under the circumstances to impute a waiver of the right to file a motion to vacate the judgment of guilty and for leave to withdraw plea of guilty to a defendant who by the only means available to him expressly has requested the appointment of counsel to assist him. See People v. Moore (1976), 45 Ill. App. 3d 570, 571, 359 N.E.2d 1065, 1066.\nParenthetically, the issue presented by the instant appeal appears to occur with sufficient frequency to suggest that consideration be given to requiring, by the amendment of Supreme Court Rule 604(d) or otherwise, that the defendant\u2019s trial attorney, as his final act, prepare and file on behalf of the defendant the documents necessary to preserve the right to appeal under Rule 604(d).\nThe majority in the instant appeal would distinguish People v. Parks (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 967, 369 N.E.2d 1373, on the basis that the defendant there \u201csought unequivocally to withdraw the negotiated plea of guilty.\u201d However, the court in Parks, after referring to a letter written by defendant, observed that the \u201ccourt properly treated this letter as a motion to vacate and appointed counsel as contemplated by Rule 604(d).\u201d (54 Ill. App. 3d 967, 968, 369 N.E.2d 1373, 1374.) It is noteworthy that although Parks unequivocally had sought to withdraw his plea of guilty, he did not file a motion to vacate the judgment of guilty or for the appointment of counsel.\nIt is my conclusion, therefore, that defendant\u2019s letter in the case at bar should be considered as a timely application for the appointment of counsel to assist him in the preparation of his motions for leave to withdraw his plea of guilty and to vacate the judgment of guilty. For that reason, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KASSERMAN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy E. Blue and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Barbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Stephen E. Norris and Debra A. Buchman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHANNON GIBSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 82\u2014412\nOpinion filed June 16, 1983.\nKASSERMAN, J., dissenting.\nRandy E. Blue and Dan W. Evers, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nBarbara Adams, State\u2019s Attorney, of Hillsboro (Stephen E. Norris and Debra A. Buchman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0950-01", "first_page_order": 972, "last_page_order": 976 }